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ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyses Turkey’s relations with states and non-state actors on transboundary 
water issues by examining hydropolitics at the inter-state and transnational layers from 1923 
to 2011. The cases investigated are Turkish – Syrian relations primarily over the Euphrates 
and Tigris basin, and relations between opponents and proponents over the construction of 
the Ilısu Dam, which is currently underway. Turkey is fully engaged in its ‘hydraulic 
mission’, very extensively and rapidly ‘developing’ water resources throughout its territory. 
Some of these flows cross international borders, specifically the very heavily contested 
Euphrates and Tigris basin. This large basin has attracted considerable academic attention, 
notably in regards to Turkey’s relations with downstream neighbours Syria, Iraq. Yet, the 
great bulk of the existing analysis falls prey to two broader weaknesses: a) it has narrowly 
applied the recently developed literature regarding the role of power in transboundary water 
politics, and b) it has also neglected or under-emphasised how non-state actors enrol in 
hydropolitical processes.  
  
 
Informed by deep investigation of the cases, the study develops and applies the distinct 
theoretical framework referred to as “An Enhanced Analytical Framework of Power in 
Hydropolitics”. The theoretical framework includes the conceptual frameworks that critically 
look at the role of power in transboundary water basins in terms of material and discursive 
power capabilities of actors. It also enhances the existing conceptual frameworks by 
demonstrating the following key elements of power: a) scalar dynamics (where actors are 
located and they interact with one another) and its linkage with power and b) the role of 
values and norms in terms of conflictual/cooperative hydropolitical relations and their linkage 
with power. Thus, the broader notion of power employed and elaborated upon here enables 
the analyst to understand how power influences the outcome of interactions, conflictual and 
cooperative relations between the actors in question. Constructivist approaches in the theories 
of international relations and its application to hydropolitics and other critical conceptual 
approaches to transboundary water politics have been used in making the analysis.  
 
 
The theoretical framework makes an original contribution to existing conceptual frameworks, 
as it widens understanding and role of power in hydropolitics. The application of the 
theoretical framework to Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations and relations between the 
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opponents and proponents over the construction of the Ilısu dam provides an empirical 
contribution to knowledge. The analysis shows how power dynamics as well as conflictual 
and cooperative relations dramatically change in different hydropolitical eras. By 
highlighting the influence the transnational anti-dam activist networks, the study shows the 
relevance of including non-state actors into the analysis. One of the several conclusions 
drawn is that such actors lack material power but are able to use discursive (ideational and 
bargaining) power very effectively to meet their interests.  
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1. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION   
1.1. Turkey’s Transboundary Water Resources  
 
Organisational process of water affairs and surveys are just at their beginning stages. It was obligatory to 
establish scientific capability and power of water affairs organisation firmly, as water affairs is essential 
element of our economy. 
(Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Founder of Turkey) 
 
 
Water issues have always occupied a major place in the state agenda since the creation of 
Turkey as a nation state. Numerous hydraulic development projects including dams, 
irrigation schemes, and flood management facilities have been introduced by the state to meet 
the socio-economic needs of the country. The recent figures published by the State Hydraulic 
Works (DSI-Turkish Acronym) show the historical growth and magnitude of Turkey’s 
massive scale hydraulic development. According to these figures, in 2012 there are 284 large-
scale dams and 486 small-scale dams and ponds operating across the country on 25 defined 
sub-basins. Moreover, since 2000 there has been a dramatic increase in large-scale and small-
scale hydraulic works. Accordingly, approximately 51.8% large-scale projects have been 
completed since 2000, while 38.8% small-scale projects reached completion during the same 
period (DSI 2012).  
 
Today, hydraulic projects still occupy a major policy area of the state agenda and numerous 
hydraulic projects are either underway or in the planning phase as the entire water potential 
of the country is yet to be realised according to Turkish policy makers. For instance, with 
respect to the hydropower potential of Turkey, Veysel Eroğlu, the Turkish minister of 
Forestry and Water Affairs, recently stated that Turkey could only realise 40% of its entire 
hydropower potential in spite of the recent rapid increase (Eroğlu 2013).  
 
Hydraulic works have been conducted on 25 sub-basins in Turkey, five of which are 
transboundary in nature. The sub-basins that are transboundary water resources within 
various parts of Turkey are:  
 
i. The Maritza basin in western part  
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ii. The Aras-Kura Basin in the northeast 
iii. Coruh basins in the northeast  
iv. The Euphrates and Tigris basin in the southeast  
v. The Orontes basin in the southern part  
 
It is estimated that 40% of Turkey’s entire water potential comes from those transboundary 
sub-basins that are transboundary water resources in nature (Ünal, Sargın et al. 2009). The 
following map shows 25 sub-basins of Turkey defined by the Turkish official authorities and 
highlight sub-basins that are transboundary in nature. 
 
 
Map 1 Turkey's transboundary and other in-boundary sub-basins 
 
 
 
Map 1 shows the sub-basins in Turkey, specifically ones that are transboundary in nature (01: Maritza Basin; 
19: Orontes Basin; 21: ET basin; 23: Coruh Basin; 24: Aras-Kura Basin). Among these transboundary sub-
basins, the map also highlights the ET basin and the Orontes basin, as they are two transboundary basins that 
will be examined in this study. In terms of other riparian states within these two transboundary basins, the map 
also highlights Syria, as the study will look at Turkish-Syrian relations regarding Turkey’s transboundary water 
relations with other riparian states.  
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Turkey Water Report (2009:14)  
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Among the five transboundary sub-basins, the Euphrates and Tigris (ET- hereafter) basin is 
particularly important in terms of Turkey’s transboundary relations, since the ET basin is the 
largest water resource constituting 28.4% of Turkey’s entire water potential. Furthermore, the 
ET basin is at the centre of political upheavals in inter-state relations among the riparian 
states since it is also one of the largest transboundary water basins in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region. Considering the arid climatic conditions of the region where 
the ET basin is located and rapidly growing population in the riparian states, the ET basin is 
one of the most exploited and politically contested basins in the MENA region. Thus, water 
(hydro) politics of the ET basin has attracted a great deal of scholarly works developed 
around hydropolitics (Biswas and Zaidan 1994, Schultz 1995, Bağış 1997, Kibaroğlu 2002, 
MacQuarrie 2004, Sağsen 2006 among others). Turkey’s role is particularly important in the 
hydropolitics associated with the basin due to following reasons. First, Turkey is located 
within the pivotal waters of the ET basin and considerable parts of the streams; tributaries of 
the ET watershed originate from Turkish territory, which give Turkey a supreme riparian 
position. Second, the Turkish government has significant economic, technical and 
institutional capacities, which have enabled the country to conduct massive scale hydraulic 
development projects. Moreover, the ET basin is not the only transboundary watershed in the 
MENA region in which Turkey is located as a riparian state. Apart from the ET basin, Turkey 
is also located as a downstream riparian state in the Orontes basin, another important 
transboundary watershed within the MENA region.  
 
 
However, as it will be discussed in this study it would be misleading to understand Turkey’s 
hydropolitical relations merely within the context of its neighbouring states. There are, in 
fact, other stakeholders within and outside Turkey, including NGOs, local authorities, 
informal grass root networks, private sector actors and so on. These non-state actors interact 
with the Turkish government at sub-national, local or transnational layers to influence in 
decision-making processes regarding water related issues. These hydropolitical contexts, 
particularly in relation to the ET basin, have also attracted scholarly works, although there are 
relatively fewer studies examining diverse layers (Harris 2002, Mukhtarov 2009). The recent 
dispute over the construction of the Ilısu dam project, which is one of the large-scale dams on 
the mainstream Tigris River introduced by the Turkish government, shows the importance of 
layers in terms of Turkey’s hydropolitical relations with other actors apart from riparian 
states (Atzl 2009, Fliesser 2010).  
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This study seeks to understand how patterns of conflict and cooperation can be understood 
and how actors exert material and discursive power capabilities to influence in outcome in 
the context of Turkey’s hydropolitical relations with states and non-state actors at different 
layers by establishing a theoretical framework, which will inform the analytical chapters, The 
main research question, which guides the study, is how can Turkey’s inter-state and 
transnational hydropolitical relations be interpreted drawing upon an enhanced 
constructivist analytical framework of power? 
  
 
This study will elucidate Turkey’s hydropolitical relations with states and non-state actors by 
analysing the following empirical cases. In terms of understanding Turkey’s inter-state 
relations with respect to water, the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations will be examined. 
Given the complex character of the bilateral relations between these two countries, 
understanding longstanding Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations will also provide 
important theoretical insights. In understanding Turkey’s relations with non-state actors, the 
study will look at the recent Ilısu dam dispute between the opponents and proponents of the 
Ilısu dam project as an empirical case study. As it will be elaborated in the following 
sections, the empirical case study will help to understand transnational and sub-national 
dynamics of hydropolitics in the context of Turkey in the ET basin. The study will establish a 
theoretical framework referred as “An Enhanced Analytical Framework of Power in 
Hydropolitics” to inform both case studies. As mentioned above the concept of hydropolitics 
is of central importance in this study, in the subsequent section I will discuss its significance 
and relevance.  
 
1.2. Hydropolitics as a Key Concept  
 
Several authors noted that the term hydropolitics may not be widely appreciated among water 
practitioners, and often equated with water conflict. The political consideration of water is 
problematic since such understanding, it is argued, is clouding the technical dimensions of 
water related problems (Wagerich and Warner 2010: 3) Thus, the concept of water politics is 
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delimited and downgraded to water conflict and contrasts with water cooperation (Amare 
2000).  
 
 
However, scholars or water practitioners outside political science have acknowledged the role 
of politics concerning water issues. While the bulk of empirical and theoretical literature is 
written by these scholars and water practitioners, political science and international relations 
(IR) scholars have made relatively fewer contributions (Warner and Zeitoun 2008:803, 
Wagerich and Warner 2010:4). This does not necessarily mean that theories of IR have not 
been part of the hydropolitical analysis. In fact, the concepts developed within IR have been 
implicitly used in developing literature on hydropolitics (Du Plessis 2000:20, Furlong 
2006:439, Julien 2012:46).  
 
 
As different aspects of hydropolitics have become more salient in the literature, scholars have 
defined the term diversely. Considering the general development of the hydropolitics 
literature, it can be argued that pioneering studies conducted during 1980s and 1990s have 
mainly analysed political relations between the riparian states of a particular watershed with a 
transboundary character (Gleick 1993, Wolf 1995, Lowi 1999, Waterbury 2002). It appears 
that this dimension still dominates much of the practical and theoretical debate. Thus, 
hydropolitics was initially defined as “systematic analysis of interstate conflict and 
cooperation regarding international water resources” (Elhance 1997:218). The definition 
implies that understanding water conflict and, cooperation between riparian states in 
transboundary water contexts and more importantly, identifying factors leading to conflictual 
and cooperation outcomes are the main areas of research.  
 
 
States are the most influential actors in hydropolitics since they have explicit sovereignty 
rights over the territories they control with a wide range of hard power (material capabilities) 
and soft power (discursive capabilities). However, we can identify other actors involved in 
decision-making at different degrees. Interaction among these actors and with the state 
authorities is also subject to research inquiry. Thus, recent academic works examine 
conflictual and cooperative patterns in other aspects of hydropolitics apart from inter-state 
relations at transboundary water basins (El-Khodari 2004:150, Lang 2004:85, Westermann 
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2004:117). It is argued that while the acute conflictual relations between co-riparian states are 
rare, relations among different stakeholders within sub-national context may create acute 
conflictual dynamics within the transboundary context (Boesen and Ravnborg 2004:154, 
Selby 2005:329, Mustafa 2007:484).  
 
Therefore, as some literature has begun to address those aspects of hydropolitics, scholars are 
putting forward more comprehensive definitions of hydropolitics. In this regard, two well-
known definitions of politics-politics as ‘authoritative allocation of values in society’ and 
‘who gets what, when and how’ made by Easton and Laswell respectively are adapted to 
define hydropolitics.  
 
Drawing upon Laswell’s definition of politics, the term hydropolitics is defined as ‘who gets 
how much (what) water how and why?” (Zeitoun and Warner 2006:435, Zeitoun and Allan 
2008:4). Cascao (2011) unpacks the components of this definition as depicted in the Table 1 
below.  
 
Table 1 Delineating the definition of hydropolitics 
  
Source: Cascao 2011  
 
  
Table 1 implies that users as actors in hydropolitics range from central governments, NGOs, 
private sector actors, individuals and so on. The definition includes a variety of actors 
although it does not indicate levels of interaction.  The definition also identifies different 
issues such as blue, green, virtual, surface, ground water in answering the question of what.  
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Furthermore, Turton adapts Easton’s definitions to define hydropolitics as “the authoritative 
allocation of values in society with respect to water.” (Turton 2002:16). The distinguishing 
feature of these two definitions is that while the former focuses on water resources, the latter 
highlights values constructed around water resources in a certain social context. Drawing 
upon Turton’s definition of hydropolitics, Meissner proposes a more comprehensive 
definition and defines hydropolitics as, “Water (hydro) politics is the transnational 
interaction, through norm creation and utilization, between a plethora of non-state and state 
actors, varying from individuals to collectivities, regarding the authoritative allocation and 
use of, and perception towards domestic and international water resources” (Meissner 
2005:103). Although the definition of hydropolitics proposed by Meissner was criticized for 
being ‘fuzzy’ (e.g.: Turton 2002:16), it points out two important aspects of hydropolitics.  
 
Firstly, the definition explicitly states that there are varieties of actors ranging from states to 
individuals in hydropolitics. This also implies that those actors interact with one another at 
different levels. Chapter 3 (Theoretical Framework) will show the importance of identifying 
these levels in hydropolitical analysis, given the variety of actors.  
 
 
Secondly, Meissner argues that this interaction occurs through norms creation and utilisation. 
In doing so Meissner states interactions between actors do not occur due to water itself, but 
also through construction of norms, directly or indirectly related with water.1 Therefore, if 
hydropolitics is understood through norms formation and utilisation of water resources, this 
understanding grasps the variety of issues directly or indirectly associated with water. In 
similar vein, this study argues that it is imperative to analyse norms, values and ideas 
constructed around certain hydro-social context. The role of norms, ideas and values in 
hydropolitics will be discussed in Chapter 3 and applied to analytical Chapter 6, 7 and 8.  
 
 
To sum up, we may draw at least two relevant conclusions from the discussion. First, while 
some scholars in hydropolitics consider contestation on water in terms of norms, ideas, and 
values developed around a particular water resource within historical context, others consider 
                                                        
1
 Norms are generally defined as “shared (thus social) understandings of standards for behavior (Klotz 1995:14)  
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the area of contestation in terms of water and its different forms such as green water, virtual 
water. In other words, whether hydropolitics is about contestations over water resources 
between actors or it is contestations over values is debated issue. I will return to this by 
establishing the theoretical framework in Chapter 3.  
 
Second, it would be misleading to view hydropolitics merely in terms of inter-state relations 
between the riparian states of a particular transboundary water basin, at least for countries 
with more than one transboundary resource. Hydropolitics does include different layers in 
which various actors from different parts of the society (public sector, private sector, and 
civil society) interact with each other, although emphasis is on inter-state relations between 
riparian states. Here, the question that needs to be posed is whether those different layers of 
hydropolitics can be outlined in a systemic way or not. The following section will attempt to 
answer this question by looking at the relevant literature.  
 
1.3. Different Layers of Hydropolitics  
 
Although hydropolitics is a relatively recent study area, it does include various layers, since 
various actors ranging from individuals to nation-states are involved in political processes 
with respect to water issues. Mollinga (2001) provides a systematic account where he 
considers water and politics in terms of three different levels, which are inter-state 
hydropolitics, sub-national hydropolitics and everyday hydropolitics.  
 
 
i. Inter-state politics of Water (inter-state hydropolitics) refers to official interactions 
between states, which is called hydropolitics by Mollinga (2001:735). Here, inter-
state relations between the riparian states in transboundary water contexts forms the 
main sets of relations. Most of the scholarly work has been conducted by taking 
transboundary water contexts as case studies across the world.  
 
ii. Politics of Water Resources Policy, Development and Management (sub-
national/domestic hydropolitics) refers to formulation and implementation of a 
particular water policy by a relevant actor (states or federative government, quasi 
states and so on) and contestation between this authority and the various interest 
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groups directly or indirectly affected by those water policies. (Mollinga 2001:736) 
The sub-national hydropolitics is composed of several themes including resistance 
against dams, water policies waged by civil society groups, internal dynamics within 
state apparatus regarding water policies and their implementation (ibid. 737). The 
commonality of different themes in hydropolitics is that it occurs within a domestic 
context; therefore, this dimension can also be labelled as sub-national hydropolitics.   
 
iii. The everyday politics of water use (everyday hydropolitics) refers to contested nature 
of water relations between individuals and/or entities. As Mollinga states it forms a 
‘vast terrain’ in which various scalar dynamics can be identified (ibid. 737).  
 
In addition to these three levels (layers) of hydropolitics, global hydropolitics and 
transnational hydropolitics can also be added as layers of hydropolitics.  
 
iv. Global Politics of Water (Global hydropolitics) Mollinga (2001: 737) considers 
global hydropolitics as an emerging level, which remains unexplored. Activities of 
international organisations regarding water include those by the World Water Council 
to promote certain sets of norms including global governance, basin-wide cooperation 
among stakeholders; then there are standpoints of International Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) in international meetings. Finally, there are debates between 
actors from public sector, private sector and civil society regarding water sources 
management that can be considered within the branch of global politics of water 
(Conca 2006). In a similar vein, the evolution of international water law within 
historical context and attempts to codify overarching international norms such as 
establishment of the 1997 Helsinki Convention can also be considered part of global 
hydropolitics.  Since certain sets of norms and ideas are being promoted within the 
context of global politics of water, it may directly or indirectly influence other layers 
of hydropolitics.  
 
v. Transnational politics of water (transnational hydropolitics): Since transnational 
anti-dam activism along with growing involvement of private sector has become more 
salient in the study of hydropolitics and one of aims of this study to analyse this 
dimension in the context of Turkey, I assert that a fifth category can be established 
called transnational hydropolitics. Transnational hydropolitics can be analysed 
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within two interconnected trends in hydropolitics; on the one hand, there is growing 
salience of privatization and marketing of water and growing impact of private sector 
in water resources development. Thus, involvement of Transnational Corporations 
(TNCs), international creditors, credit guarantee agencies and their relations with 
nation-states, nation-wide business form important aspects of transnational 
hydropolitics. On the other hand, there are transnational advocacy networks against 
certain hydraulic development projects as a response to the previous dynamic. As 
various empirical cases shows across the world including the case of the Ilısu dam, 
international and nation-wide campaigns are organised against the construction of 
particular hydraulic development projects, which are often conducted through public-
private partnerships.  
 
 
The layer of transnational hydropolitics is particularly linked with layer of sub-national 
hydropolitics, since there needs to be interactions among actors located within and outside of 
domestic context of a particular country. In fact, what distinguishes the layer of transnational 
hydropolitics from other layers is we do not only observe vertical interactions which is often 
the case in sub-national hydropolitics or horizontal interactions which can be seen in layers of 
global and inter-state hydropolitics, but we also do observe diagonal interactions between 
actors by passing the state (e.g.: informal alliances established between INGOs and societal 
forces within domestic context). Therefore, layer of sub-national hydropolitics is necessary 
component of layer of transnational hydropolitics.  
 
Considering the points regarding the layer of transnational hydropolitics and various similar 
cases across the world, this study adds the layer of transnational hydropolitics to existing 
categorization done by Mollinga. Figure 1 illustrates the above-discussed points regarding 
layers of hydropolitics in a pentagon as follows.  
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Figure 1 Five Layers of Hydropolitics 
 
Notes: The highlighted layers show this study’s main concern: trans-national and inter-state 
Source: Author’s own compilation, 2014  
 
As Figure 1 shows, in terms of conceptual focus, we may observe different layers in 
hydropolitics and depending on the conceptual focus that any study adopts, these layers 
become subject to research inquiry in hydropolitics. Considering hydropolitics of any given 
transboundary water resource, those layers can be observed and studied. As the figure shows 
political dynamics occurring in each layer shapes one another at different degrees. For 
instance, codification of an international a particular water law principle might have an 
impact on inter-state hydropolitics. Considering the empirical case studies that this study will 
analyse, this study deals primarily with two particular layers among those layers of 
hydropolitics; layers of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics, whish are highlighted in 
Figure 1.   
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These two layers of hydropolitics will be discussed in the following chapters in the context of 
Turkey’s hydropolitical relations with state and non-state actors. The main case study of 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations will be discussed in Chapter 6 and 7 in terms of inter-
state hydropolitics. The recent conflict between the opponents and proponents of the Ilısu 
dam project, which is under construction in the Tigris River in Turkey, will be discussed in 
Chapter 8 in terms of transnational hydropolitics.  
 
1.4 Scope of the Study  
 
The scope of this study is four-fold, as shown in Table 2. The table shows how the four foci 
of the study are structured in three empirical chapters (Chapter 6, 7 and 8).  
 
Table 2 The four foci of the scope of the study: Conceptual, actors, time and spatial foci 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 2014 
 
 
As Table 2 illustrates, the conceptual focus forms the main dimension in the scope of the 
study. Layers of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics form the conceptual focus of this 
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study, which are analysed in two empirical case studies. Empirical cases of this study are also 
bound by three foci: Actor focus, that refers to consideration of particular actors in the 
analysis; spatial focus that refers to consideration the ET basin as primary spatial context and 
the Orontes basin as a secondary spatial context; and temporal focus that looks at the period 
from 1923 to 2011 for the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations and the period from 1997 
to 2013 for the Ilısu dam conflict.  In the following sections these four foci will be further 
elaborated.  
 
1.4.1. Conceptual Focus  
 
The study is bound by a conceptual focus given the previous discussion regarding different 
layers of hydropolitics. One of the strengths of understanding hydropolitics as composed of 
certain layers, outlined above, is that it enables us to see where a particular research regarding 
hydropolitics can be located, given the complex structure of hydropolitics in terms of actors 
and interactions among each other. It provides a clear picture in terms of conceptual focus of 
any particular study. As illustrated in Table 2 above, two empirical cases studies, 
hydropolitical relations between the Turkish and Syrian governments and hydropolitical 
relations between the opponents and proponents over the construction of the Ilısu dam project 
corresponds to layers of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics respectively.   
 
1.4.2 Actor Focus  
 
The study looks at relations between certain actors to understand Turkey’s hydropolitical 
relations in terms of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics.  
 
The hydropolitical relations between Turkey and Syria, as the riparian states of several 
transboundary watersheds, will be analysed in detail to uncover inter-state hydropolitics. The 
reason why the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations were chosen as an empirical case are 
as follows.  
 
First, considering Turkey’s sub-basins that are transboundary in nature, Turkey and Syria are 
located as riparian states in most of the watersheds that are located in those transboundary 
sub-basins. Therefore, Turkey and Syria are riparian states of various transboundary 
watersheds. The following table shows transboundary basins among Turkey’s sub-basins and 
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other riparian states of these basins along with Turkey. As it is shown in highlighted parts in 
Table 3 below, Turkey and Syria are located as riparian states in most of those transboundary 
watersheds.   
 
Table 3 Transboundary watersheds that Turkey is located as a riparian state 
 
Source: Yıldız 2009  
 
 
 
Second, the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations have a long-term time span, since 
hydraulic development projects conducted by both governments can be traced back to 1950s. 
This long term hydropolitical relations can be categorised, as it will be in the following 
chapters, in different eras and each era can be further sub-divided into phases in terms of 
changing patterns of conflict and cooperation intensities. This rich empirical literature 
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enables us to understand how and why those patterns of conflict and cooperation evolve over 
time between riparian states in inter-state hydropolitics. Therefore, it provides insights in 
understanding inter-state water conflict and cooperation patterns in theory. Furthermore, 
Turkey and Syria are located in reverse riparian positions on the ET and Orontes Basin. This 
geographical fact and different status quos that are currently established in those 
transboundary water basins also provide important theoretical insights to assess the utility of 
conceptual frameworks that critically assess transboundary water relations between riparian 
states.  
 
Third, as it will be explained in the following chapters, the introduction of the Southeastern 
Anatolian Project (GAP-Turkish acronym) by the Turkish government in the early 1980s has 
fundamentally changed the inter-state hydropolitics of the ET basin. With the introduction of 
the GAP, which prospected series of hydraulic development projects, irrigations schemes in 
pivotal waters of the ET basin, the hydropolitical relations have evolved into Turkey 
(upstream) vs. Syria and Iraq (downstream) dichotomy. Moreover, since Iraq faced series of 
armed conflicts and crisis (Iran-Iraq War, Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and UN intervention, 
UN sanctions and US invasion), Syria has become the vocal opponent of Turkey’s upstream 
hydraulic development in the ET basin during 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, understanding the 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations is particularly important in understanding the recent 
history of inter-state hydropolitics of the ET basin.  
 
 
As stated above, the study will also focus on case of the Ilısu dam conflict. The Ilısu dam, 
one of the largest hydropower projects conducted by the Turkish government and private 
sector actors on the mainstream Tigris River, has become the most controversial cases in 
terms of anti-dam activism against large dams across the world. The study will analyse the 
conflict between the pro-dam and anti-dam actors in detail. Here, while pro-dam actors 
(proponents of the Ilısu dam project) include the Turkish government, private companies 
from inside and outside of Turkey, Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), private/public banks as 
creditors, the anti-dam actors (opponents of the Ilısu dam project) include NGOs from inside 
and outside of Turkey, activists, local municipalities, and political parties.  
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1.4.3. Spatial Focus   
 
In Section 1.1 it was shown that Turkey is located as a riparian state in 5 transboundary water 
contexts. As stated above, inter-state hydropolitics and transnational hydropolitics will form 
the main foci of this study. To explain these two layers of hydropolitics in the context of 
Turkey’s transboundary water relations, the ET basin will be the main spatial focus in the 
analysis. However, since the hydropolitical relations between Turkey and Syria is one the 
empirical case study, this choice requires including the Orontes basin, another major 
transboundary watershed in which Turkey and Syria are located as riparian states, in analysis. 
Therefore, while the ET basin is the main transboundary water basin that this study analyses, 
the Orontes basin will also be included in the analysis to better understand the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. The ET basin along with the Orontes basin has been chosen as 
transboundary contexts due to the following reasons.   
 
First, given the variety of transboundary water contexts that Turkey is part of, it would be 
beyond the scope of this study to analyse all those 5 transboundary water contexts that 
Turkey is located in as a riparian state. Second, as shown in previous sections, the ET basin 
constitutes 28.5% of Turkey’s entire water resources potential, which has been driving the 
Turkish government to conduct large-scale hydraulic projects in the basin for decades. 
Finally, political factors as well as socio-economic factors have driven Turkey to conduct 
extensive hydraulic projects and the ET basin is the main watershed that carries all the 
elements of hydraulic mission of Turkey. Third, The ET basin is not only an important 
watershed for Turkey, but also a vital water resource for the downstream riparian states. The 
basin is one of the largest transboundary water resources in the MENA region and most 
politically contested transboundary water context between the riparian states. By looking at 
the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations and the Ilısu dam dispute, the study will analyse 
two important aspects of hydropolitics of the ET basin. 
  
 
In Chapter 5, a detailed account will be provided on hydrological facts and figures, hydraulic 
infrastructures that have been already completed, underway or in planning phase, and those 
introduced by the Turkish and Syrian governments in these two transboundary water basins.   
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1.4.4. Temporal Focus  
 
 
The scope of this study is bound by a temporal focus. In terms of inter-state hydropolitics, the 
study will look at hydropolitical relations during the period between 1923 and 2011 in two 
analytical chapters (Chapters 6 and 7). The foundation of the republic of Turkey (1923) is 
taken as a starting point in the analysis of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. 
However, as it will be explained in Chapter 5 in detail, the initial interactions were made 
between the Turkish government and the French mandatory authorities on behalf of Syria 
until the independence of Syria in 1946. Longstanding hydropolitical relations between 
Turkey and Syria will be analysed by dividing them into two main eras. The first era covers 
the period between 1923 and 1998, while the second era covers the period between 1998 and 
2011. The reason why the hydropolitical relations between Turkey and Syria is analysed 
within two eras stems from the fact that a notable change can be identified in hydropolitical 
relations from 1998 to 2011 in terms of patterns of conflict and cooperation intensities. The 
analysis ends with the uprising erupted in Syria in 2011, which led to a major political crisis 
between Turkey and Syria. However, the reflections of the political crisis with respect to 
bilateral hydropolitical relations are briefly discussed in Chapter 7. Finally, each era will be 
further sub-divided into three phases by considering the key moments in hydropolitical 
relations between Turkey and Syria. These phases of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations will be explained in Chapter 5 in detail.    
 
 
In terms of transnational hydropolitics, the study will analyse the recent conflict on 
construction of the Ilısu dam. Although construction of the project can be traced back to 
1950s, the study will particularly look at establishment of the first international consortium in 
1997 and subsequent events. As in the case of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, 
this time period will be analysed by dividing into three phases. The first phase will analyse 
the period between 1997 and 2001, where the first international consortium was established 
and the anti-dam actors initiated the first international campaign. The second phase will 
analyse the period between 2005 and 2009, where pro-dam actors for the Ilısu dam project 
established the second international consortium and the anti-dam actors initiated the second 
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campaign. The final phase covers the period between 2010 up to present day, where the 
second consortium was re-organised by the withdrawal of some of the TNCs, ECAs and 
creditors and on-going campaign against the Ilısu dam project.  
1.5. Research Gaps and Contributions  
 
 
As will be seen in Chapter 2 (Literature Review), considerable hydropolitical research has 
been devoted to understand inter-state hydropolitics in transboundary water contexts. 
Understanding patterns of conflict and cooperation, factors leading to conflictual or 
cooperative relations between riparian states constitute the main research enquiry in 
hydropolitics. The attempts to conceptualise inter-state relations between riparian states and 
water issues have enriched the theoretical frameworks in inter-state hydropolitics. Concepts 
such as power, interests, conflict and cooperation that are frequently used in international 
relations (IR) and by those seeking to understand inter-state relations between riparian states 
at transboundary water contexts. As I will discuss in Chapter 3, theories of IR were explicitly 
or implicitly used to understand inter-state hydropolitics. In this respect, two mainstream 
approaches of the IR theory, realism and liberalism, have dominated the theoretical literature 
dealing with inter-state hydropolitics.  
 
There has been a recent development of conceptual framework that critically analyses 
concepts like power, water conflict and cooperation, and their role in hydropolitics by 
examining different transboundary water contexts. In this respect, the Framework of Hydro-
hegemony (Zeitoun and Warner 2006); the Framework of Counter Hydro-hegemon (Cascao 
2009); the Framework of Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus (TWINS) (Mirumachi 
2010) the related literature developed by scholars from London Water Research Group 
(LWRG) are key examples of critical conceptual frameworks. I will review these concepts in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.4), since they form the bases of the theoretical framework developed in 
this study in Chapter 3. I will call this literature as critical conceptual frameworks or critical 
body of literature throughout this chapter and in the subsequent chapters.  
 
However, there have been fewer empirical and theoretical studies focussing on other layers of 
hydropolitics as compared to interstate politics of water in hydropolitics. There are relatively 
lesser attempts to conceptualise conflictual and cooperative patterns in the host of actors that 
are active in different layers of hydropolitics.  Therefore, concepts such as power, water-
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conflict, and water-cooperation are not well established in other layers of hydropolitics. The 
critical conceptual frameworks, which will be discussed in Section 2.6, also have the same 
weakness, although they are not necessarily drawn upon state-centric approaches unlike the 
mainstream theories of IR.  
 
The same shortcomings also exist in the context of Turkey’s hydropolitical relations at 
transboundary water contexts. Considering Turkey’s hydropolitical relations with states and 
non-state actors in the transboundary water contexts, while a great deal of academic work 
have been devoted to understand inter-state hydropolitics, relatively less research exists in 
understanding other layers of hydropolitics in the context transboundary water resources that 
Turkey is located as a riparian state. This is also the case in the hydropolitics of the ET basin. 
Moreover, as far as the hydropolitics of the ET basin is concerned, the application of the 
recently developing conceptual frameworks that critically look at inter-state hydropolitics in 
transboundary water contexts is limited.  
 
Bearing those shortcomings in mind, this study mainly seeks to cover shortcomings regarding 
empirical context in the literature. The empirical contribution of the study to the existing 
literature lies in its application as a distinctive theoretical framework, which is drawn upon 
critical conceptual frameworks associated with transboundary water politics to the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations. Moreover, conceptual frameworks that have been established 
in hydropolitics are applied to the case of the Ilısu dam dispute between the proponents and 
opponents of the Ilısu dam project.  
 
More specifically, individual contributions to the empirical cases can be outlined as follows.  
 
 The study provides a detailed account of the trajectory of hydropolitics of the ET 
basin in different layers. The study argues that inter-state relations between the 
riparian states had remained the main layer dominating hydropolitics of the ET basin 
until 2000s. However, as involvement and influence of actors from private sector and 
civil society have gradually increased, other layers of hydropolitics such as the 
transnational and sub-national layers have become more salient since 2000 
particularly in the Turkish domestic context.  
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 The study applies the critical conceptual frameworks regarding power in hydropolitics 
to inter-state hydropolitics in the context of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations. The application of this literature has remained limited in the context of 
inter-state hydropolitics in the ET basin in spite of the importance of basin water 
related issues in the context of the MENA region. Given the fact that the ET basin 
constitutes the main spatial realm in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, the 
literature on power has been extensively applied to the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations. 
  
 
 Although the case of the Ilısu dam dispute has been subject to limited academic works 
where case was analysed in terms of water governance and transnational advocacy 
networks (e.g.: Atzl 2009; Fliesser 2010), conceptual frameworks developed around 
hydropolitics have not been applied to the case of the Ilısu dam. This study addresses 
this gap by applying critical conceptual frameworks on transboundary water politics.  
 
Apart from the empirical contributions of this study, outlined above, the theoretical 
contribution of the study to the existing literature is that it extends the applicability of the 
critical conceptual frameworks, which has been largely applied to inter-state hydropolitics 
and transnational hydropolitics. By applying the critical conceptual frameworks developed 
around inter-state hydropolitics, the study particularly expands current understanding of 
power, which is one the main concepts elaborated in the critical conceptual framework.  
 
More specifically, individual contributions to the hydropolitical theory can be outlined as 
follows.  
 
 The study highlights the importance of the concept of scale, which will be discussed 
in detail in theoretical framework in Chapter 3 in hydropolitics. It argues that scales 
must be understood as social constructions that are subject to change over time as a 
result of power relations between actors. In other words, actors in hydropolitics exert 
power to establish new scales or to existing scalar dynamics. In other words, power 
relations between actors determine scalar dynamics. By integrating the power cube 
approach developed by John Gaventa (2005), the study establishes a distinctive 
account regarding the link between power and scales in hydropolitics.  
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 The study seeks to understand what leads to patterns of conflict and cooperation in 
any given hydro-social context. It questions the argument made by the critical body of 
literature that actors’ material and discursive power capabilities and power 
symmetrical and asymmetrical power relations determine patterns of conflict and 
cooperation in hydropolitics. This study argues that although power must be taken 
into consideration in understanding patterns of conflict and cooperation in 
hydropolitics, we should also look at norms, ideas and values in any given hydro-
social context to understand patterns of conflict and cooperation. This study provides 
a systematic account regarding the roles of norms, ideas and values in patterns of 
conflict and cooperation in hydropolitics. It also analyses the relationship between 
power and those norms, ideas and values.  
 
 The study does not only identify factors that help us to understand conflictual and 
cooperative patterns in hydropolitics, but it also conceptualises the change from 
patterns of high conflict-low cooperation to low conflict-high cooperation in inter-
state hydropolitics as a discursive process by applying the concept of de-securitization 
to the empirical case. 2 
 
 The study also assesses the role of power in terms of understanding the outcome (who 
gets what) in hydropolitics. It will apply the critical conceptual framework on power 
to the Ilısu dam conflict and it will analyse power relations between opponents and 
proponents of the project. In doing so, this study will extend the utility of these 
conceptual frameworks other than inter-state relations between riparian states.  
 
 
1.6. Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 
The overarching research question explored in this study is how can Turkey’s inter-state and 
transnational hydropolitical relations be interpreted drawing upon an enhanced 
constructivist analytical framework of power? 
                                                        
2 In Chapter 3, I will discuss whether patterns of conflict can be co-existed with patterns of cooperation or not in 
inter-state hydropolitical relations (See Section 3.5.4)  
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The following complementary sub-questions and corresponding hypotheses help to answer 
the overarching research question in this research. Figure 2 shows these complementary sub-
questions.  
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Figure 2 Research question and complementary sub-questions of the study  
  
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014 
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The main research question contains both theoretical and empirical elements, which will be 
delineated by sub-questions. As explained in the previous section, this study will establish a 
theoretical framework based upon the critical body of literature.3 Thereafter, the theoretical 
framework, developed in Chapter 3, will be applied to empirical cases studies in analytical 
chapters 6, 7 and 8. The main research question and the complementary sub-questions were 
developed based on this research design. Sub-questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 will guide the 
theoretical framework of the study. Here as Figure 2 shows, sub-question 1 will constitute the 
departure point and it will be further delineated by sub-questions 2, 3 and 4, which constitutes 
three main elements of the theoretical framework. Each of these three theoretical sub-
questions will guide in responding to five empirical sub-questions to address the analytical 
chapters of the thesis. In other words, sub-questions 2A, 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B will guide the 
applications of the theoretical framework in analytical chapters 6, 7 and 8. These 
complementary sub-questions and working hypotheses for each sub-question can be outlined 
as follows. At the end of this study in Chapter 10, these working hypotheses will be tested 
based on the analyses made throughout the thesis.   
 
Sub-question 1: How should power be re-interpreted to better explain relations between 
actors in the context of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics? 
 
Hypothesis 1: Power has a central importance in understanding hydropolitical relations 
between actors. It strongly influences the outcome in hydropolitical relations between actors. 
It also shapes conflictual and cooperative relations between actors. However, the following 
key elements must be taken into account to provide a comprehensive account of the role of 
power in inter-state and transnational hydropolitics: a) the relationship between scalar 
dynamics and power; b) non-material factors leading to conflictual and cooperative relations 
between actors and their linkage with power; and c) material and discursive aspects of power 
and their role in inter-state and transnational hydropolitics.   
 
Sub-question 2: To what extent the interplay between power and scales serve to explain 
hydropolitical relations?   
 
                                                        
3 The critical body of literature will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 (See Section 2.4).  
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Hypothesis 2: Scales refer to both spatial realms where actors are located and levels where 
they interact with one another in hydropolitics. Scales are not just given but they are socially 
constructed. Constructions of scales are subject to material and discursive power capabilities 
of actors and power configurations between each other.  
  
Sub-question 2A: How can scales be analysed in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
and in the Ilısu dam dispute between the opponents and proponents of the project?  
 
Hypothesis 2A: Actors exert both material and discursive power tactics to construct new 
scales or to keep the existing scalar dynamics in the cases of Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations and the Ilısu dam dispute. Changes in power configurations directly influence 
constructions or de-constructions of scales in the both empirical cases.  
 
Sub-question 3: How can patterns of conflict and cooperation be understood in relationships 
between actors in the context of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics?  
 
Hypothesis 3: Two factors are relevant to understand conflictual and cooperative patterns 
between actors in inter-state hydropolitics and transnational politics. One factor is that 
prevailing water paradigms that serve to legitimize certain sets of norms, idea, rules and 
practices shape conflictual and cooperative relations between actors in inter-state and 
transnational hydropolitics. Secondly the broad socio-political context constructed in any 
given hydro-social context, shapes conflictual and cooperative relations between actors with 
respect to water issues. The broader socio-political context is composed of cultural-religious 
values, mutually constructed perceived identities between actors, and domestic, regional, 
global political and security concerns.  
 
Sub-question 3A: How can patterns of conflict and cooperation be understood between the 
Turkish and Syrian governments with respect to transboundary water issues in different eras?  
 
Hypothesis 3A: Conflictual and cooperative patterns in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations in different eras can be understood by looking at prevailing water paradigms that 
sanction certain norms, ideas, narratives and practices (sanctioned discourses), and changes 
in broader socio-political contexts at different time periods in bilateral relations.  
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Sub-question 3B: How can predominantly conflictual relations be understood between the 
opponents and proponents of the Ilısu dam project?  
 
Hypothesis 3B: As in the case of Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, conflictual 
relations between proponents and opponents of the Ilısu dam project can be understood by 
looking at sanctioned discourses that compete with each other and the broader political 
context.  
 
Sub-question 4: How does power influence relations between actors in the context of inter-
state and transnational hydropolitics?  
 
Hypothesis 4: Power plays a major role in determining the outcome in hydropolitical 
relations between actors. Power also shapes conflictual and cooperative relations between 
actors in the context of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics. In order to understand the 
role of power in terms of determining the outcome and shaping conflictual and cooperative 
patterns between actors, a more comprehensive approach is necessary which would look at 
different understandings and roles of power in inter-state and transnational hydropolitics.  
 
Sub-question 4A: To what extent different aspects of power serve to explain the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations?  
 
Hypothesis 4A: Both Turkish and Syrian governments have bargaining and ideational 
material capabilities and exert these at different scales to achieve their goals. The study 
argues material and bargaining power capabilities of actors have not remained fixed but 
changed over time. These changes in power capabilities of actors have played a vital role in 
determining the outcome in hydropolitical relations as well as conflictual and cooperative 
relations between actors.  
 
Sub-question 4B: To what extent different aspects of power serve to explain hydropolitical 
relations between the opponents and proponents of the llısu dam project?   
 
Hypothesis 4B: Multi-dimensional power analysis (understanding material, bargaining and 
ideational power capabilities of actors in hydropolitics) made for understanding the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations in transboundary water issues is also applicable to relations 
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between opponents and proponents of the Ilısu dam project. Both proponents and opponents 
of the Ilısu dam project adopt different power capabilities including material, bargaining and 
ideational power tactics. Although opponents of the Ilısu dam project lack material power 
capabilities in comparison with the proponents of the project they are able to use discursive 
(bargaining and ideational) power capabilities to achieve their goals.  
 
1.7. Structure of the Study  
 
The study is composed of ten chapters. All the chapters are summarised below.  
 
Chapter 2 is a theoretical literature review of the concept of hydropolitics. It highlights the 
emergence and evolution of hydropolitics, and how different tenets of international relations 
theory have been used in development of hydropolitics as a study area.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical framework regarding hydropolitics based on standpoints of 
constructivism in international relations (IR) theory. It first seeks to conceptualise complex 
character of issue of actors and scales (where actors in hydropolitics are located and where 
they are interacted) in hydropolitics. Thereafter, it discusses determinants leading to 
conflictual and cooperative relations in hydropolitics. It then questions the role of power and 
its diverse dimensions in hydropolitical relations between actors. The theoretical framework, 
provided in chapter 4, will be applied to the empirical case studies discussed in analytical 
chapters.  
 
Chapter 4 provides the methodological framework explaining the approach used by the 
study, methods of data collection and analysis of gathered data. The chapter will also 
highlight the rationale for these choices. Finally, the chapter will show limitations and 
problematic fields in the methodological approach adopted by the study and indicate how 
these limitations can be addressed.  
 
Chapter 5 provides background information regarding the empirical cases of the study. First 
it outlines geographical facts and hydrological data on watersheds. Geographical and 
hydrological data on the ET basin is primarily outlined. Since hydropolitical relations 
between Turkey and Syria are the central focus in the initial two analytical chapters, the 
Orontes basin and transboundary aquifers between Turkey and Syria are briefly reviewed. 
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Finally, the chapter will explain the key events regarding the empirical case studies of the 
study. The longstanding Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the ET and Orontes Basins 
and the recent anti-dam campaign waged against the construction of the Ilısu dam will be 
explained in detail. In doing so, Chapter 5 will inform the subsequent analytical Chapters 6, 7 
and 8 by explaining key political developments in the case studies and by outlining 
geographical and hydrological facts and figures regarding the case studies.  
 
Chapter 6 is the first analytical chapter that seeks to analyse the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations given the theoretical framework provided in chapter 4. Considering 
the temporal focus of the study outlined in the previous section, the first analytical chapter 
will focus on the initial three stages of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations.  
 
Chapter 7 is the second analytical chapter will analyse recent Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations being informed by the theoretical framework. It will focus on the last two stages of 
the Turkish-Syrian relations. The chapter mainly seeks to give an understanding of how both 
states were able to realise cooperative actions on water considering the long-term conflictual 
relations and how this change can be assessed.  
 
Chapter 8 is the last analytical chapter that will focus on the growing role of non-state actors 
from private sector and civil society and proliferation of the scalar dynamics in hydropolitics 
of the ET basin. The conflict over the Ilısu dam will be taken as an empirical case study to 
understand these new dynamics in the basin. The theoretical framework will also guide the 
analysis.  
 
Chapter 9 is the discussion chapter. The theoretical and analytical contribution made by the 
study will be refined in this chapter, by considering the theoretical framework and the 
empirical chapters together.  
 
Chapter 10 provides the concluding remarks of the study. The research questions and 
hypotheses are reviewed. Gaps and potential future research areas will be highlighted.  
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2. CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
UNDERSTANDING HYDROPOLITICS from an INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
PERSPECTIVE   
2.1. Introduction  
 
 
This chapter reviews theories developed on hydropolitics and sets the basis of theoretical 
framework, established in Chapter 3. The empirical case studies analysed in this study are 
transboundary in nature. Therefore, this chapter examines how theories of international 
relations (IR) are implicitly or explicitly reflected in the field of hydropolitics in 
transboundary water basins.  
 
In the first section, I will discuss how rationalist/mainstream and reflectivist/critical 
approaches to IR theory reflected in hydropolitics. In the second and the third sections, I will 
discuss the extensive use of two rationalist approaches of IR theory, realism and liberalism, 
in transboundary water analysis. In the fourth section conceptual frameworks, which can be 
considered in the context of constructivist approaches to IR theory will be discussed. A 
special focus will be on the securitization theory and the Transboundary Water Interaction 
Nexus (TWINS), developed by the Copenhagen School (CS) and Naho Mirumachi 
respectively. Finally, there will be a discussion on the recently growing literature (the 
Framework of Hydro-hegemony (FHH) developed by Zeitoun and Warner, the Framework of 
Counter Hydro-hegemony (FCHH) developed by Cascao and the related academic works), 
that critically assesses transboundary water issues between riparian states by problematizing 
power asymmetries and symmetries in transboundary water politics.  
 
2.2. The Theories of International Relations and Hydropolitics 
 
Hydropolitics as a research area has been part of the IR theories and security studies since the 
1980s as a result of conceptual change in understanding ‘security’ at the end of the Cold War 
(Dinar 2002:230). As the non-traditionalist approaches broadened the study of security 
outside military security and survival of the state, issues such as economic issues, 
environmental problems have become part of a significant part of research on security studies 
(Ullman 1983:129, Haftendorn 1991:11, Krause and Williams 1996:230, Buzan and al 1998). 
In fact, fresh water resources are increasingly associated with different domains of security 
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such as environmental security and energy security. In particular, water related issues 
between riparian states at transboundary contexts linked with different aspects of state 
security and a great deal of literature seeks to understand relations between states.  
 
Considering literature analysing inter-sate hydropolitical relations between riparian states, it 
appears that two rationalist approaches of the IR theory, the realism and the liberalism, have 
dominated the academic debate in the 1980s and 1990s. The evolution of the hydropolitics 
literature can be understood as successive domination of two narratives on hydropolitics: a) 
(armed) water conflict and b) water cooperation (Stucki 2005, Schemeier 2010:5-7, Warner 
2012 ). It appears that the dominance of rationalist approaches in hydropolitics stems from 
convergence of following three factors. First, implicit theorisation in hydropolitics has 
resulted in limited application of IR theories (Julien 2012:46). Second, given the fact that 
initial studies in hydropolitics mainly focus on inter-state relations in transboundary water 
contexts, priority is to the rationalist approaches of the IR, which are inherently state-centric. 
The third factor explaining the predominance of the rationalist approach is that ‘neo’ versions 
of the rationalist approaches, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, is a product of the 
third great debate in IR between the rationalist approaches and Marxist and neo-Marxist 
theories, which took place during 1970s and 1980s. With the decline of the Marxist and neo-
Marxist approaches in 1980s, these two rationalist approaches, neo-realism and neo-
liberalism, dominated the IR debate (Smith 1997:166, Du Plessis 2000:16, Waever 2009:161-
162). The initial studies of hydropolitics were conducted within this context in early 1980s 
and onwards.  
 
 
While the neo-realism vs. neo-liberalism debate in IR theory continued during 1980s and 
1990s, they were posed by the approaches that challenge the core epistemological and 
ontological assumptions of rationalist approaches becoming more salient in 1980s and 1990s. 
Although these approaches differ from one another they are labelled as reflectivist 
approaches as opposed to rationalist approaches (Smith 1997:172) This challenge from the 
reflectivist approaches constituted the fourth great debate in IR, also labelled as post-
positivist debate in IR theory (Kurki and Wight 2007:19-20). The main difference between 
rationalist/mainstream and reflectivist/critical approaches is ontological. Accordingly, 
rationalist approaches argue that social world is out there and can be examined through 
repeated observations as natural world.  Reflectivist approaches argue that social reality is not 
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separated from human interpretation. In other words, as Smith (1997:167) concisely puts it 
“… theory is not external to the things it is trying to explain, and instead may construct how 
we think about the world”.  
 
While the dominance of rationalist approaches in hydropolitics literature is clear, applications 
of reflectivist approaches have largely remain limited. As du Plesis clearly states, while the 
rationalist approaches constitutes the mainstream discourse in hydropolitics, the reflectivist 
approaches forms the tributary discourse, which is “… marginalized and times even silent” 
(2000:24). Table 4 shows the rationalist/mainstream and reflectivist/critical approaches 
which I will discuss throughout this chapter.  
 
Table 4 International Relations Theories and their implications in the study of hydropolitics 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014   
 
Table 4 shows that hydro-realism and hydro-liberalism, linking water issues between riparian 
states in transboundary water contexts with conflict and cooperation respectively, emerged as 
two mainstream discourses in existing literature during 1980s and 1990s. These two 
mainstream approaches still dominate the literature. In spite of the dominance of these two 
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rationalist approaches, there has been growing implicit and explicit application of standpoints 
of constructivism in the theory of hydropolitics (Mirumachi 2010, Julien 2012). The 
conceptual frameworks, considered within constructivist approaches, emphasise socially 
constructed character of conflictual and cooperative relations between different actors. 
Therefore, they can be included within critical approaches. As shown in table above, the 
conceptual frameworks considered within constructivism in IR theory are as follows; the 
three narratives – water and wars, water and peace and water and hegemony in hydropolitics 
(Warner 2010, 2012), the framework of hydro-social contract (Turton and Meissner 2002), 
the securitisation theory developed by the CS and its implication on hydropolitics (Warner 
2004; Zeitoun 2007) and the framework of TWINS (Mirumachi 2010). The table also shows 
another recently developing literature which analyses power relations between riparian states 
in transboundary water contexts. The FHH (Zeitoun and Warner 2006), the FCHH (Cascao 
2009) and the related conceptual frameworks developed by scholars from a research circle 
namely the London Water Research Group (LWRG) are example of recently growing 
literature. Moreover, as to be shown in the following sections, there are overlaps and 
continuity between conceptual frameworks within constructivist approaches and hydro-
hegemony/counter hydro-hegemony. This study focuses on the concept of power drawing 
upon hydro-hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony framework and also discusses 
constructivism in hydropolitics. Therefore, the critical body of literature discussed in the 
context of reflectivist/critical approaches in this chapter will form the basis of theoretical 
framework in Chapter 3.  
 
2.3. Rationalist/Mainstream Approaches  
 
2.3.1. Water and Realism (Hydro-Realism)   
 
Water is, in fact, a complex resource utilised for variety of purposes. This utilisation renders 
association of water with different domains of security within societies. Perhaps most 
relevant and existential, water has a vital importance for sustaining livelihoods. It is used for 
drinking, personal hygiene and sanitation. Although domestic water consumption forms the 
smallest share of water utilisation, growing population and urbanisation trends at the global 
scale challenge water needs (Falkenmark 1990). Second, water utilisation for agricultural 
activities poses another big challenge to sustainable water resources management, given the 
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rapidly growing population (Falkenmark 1986). Third, hydropower generation is another 
important field where water resources (in this case surface water resources) are utilised. In 
particular, states relying on meeting their energy needs from the international markets 
consider hydropower energy, as a strategic resource to satisfy and diversify their domestic 
energy needs. Therefore, hydropower is frequently linked with energy security and economic 
security by the states. Fourth, water is of vital importance for industrial development; it is 
also valuable in non-consumptive uses including navigation, recreation and fishing (Mostert 
2003:3). Given the importance of fresh water resources, the features to be discussed in the 
subsequent section may lead to conflict in hydropolitics according to realist approaches.  
 
2.3.1.1. The Role of Scarcity in Realist Hydropolitics  
 
The first feature of fresh water resources leading to conflict is its scarcity. In fact, fresh water 
resources are scarce across the globe, in spite of its vital importance for life. Over 70% of our 
planet is covered with water. However, fresh water resources merely constitute 2.5% of the 
earth’s water resources. Nearly 70% of fresh water resource is frozen in polar icecaps or 
locked deep underground, which leaves less then 1% fresh water accessible for human use. 
Lakes, rivers and groundwater resources constitute this 1% accessible water. Moreover, fresh 
water resources are unevenly distributed spatially and temporally. Almost 60% of the 
accessible freshwater is located within fewer than 10 countries. In other words, some regions 
enjoy water abundance, whilst others are water deficit (Ohlsson 1995:5, Samson and Charrier 
1997). Given the vital importance of fresh water to all uses in society, it is argued that 
competition over physical scarcity of water leads to conflicts among states. Since the pattern 
of scarcity is particularly more salient in arid and semi-arid regions such as the Middle East, a 
great number of studies considered fresh water resources as a source of conflict in the MENA 
region (Frey 1985, Gleick 1993, Lowi 1995, Schultz 1995). Some even portrayed fresh water 
resources as future source of inter-state wars (Starr 1991, Bulloch and Darvish 1993). The 
political statements, media discourses and reports also suggest possibility of ‘water wars’ in 
the Middle East (Alam 2002, Ravnborg 2004, Selby 2005).  
 
Water scarcity, however, is one of many reasons for conflictual relations than cooperation in 
inter-state relations. Haftendorn (2000: 53) identifies water use (navigational use of water), 
water quality (pollution, environmental issues), relative distribution of water, and absolute 
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distribution of water as the causes of inter-state water conflicts. In addition, in some cases 
water abundance (flooding) can also cause conflictual relations at inter-state level 
(Kundzewicz 2001: 883).   
 
2.3.1.2. Riparian Position an Important Factor in Realist Hydropolitics  
 
Riparian positions are another important factor that may either increase or decrease patterns 
of conflict in inter-state relations. Most of the fresh water resources (either surface water or 
groundwater) simply do not recognise political boundaries. Approximately 260 rivers or 
lakes either cross or create political boundaries. In terms of groundwater resources, the 
situation is more or less the same. Approximately 2 billion people rely on groundwater, 300 
of which are transboundary aquifer systems (UN Water Thematic Paper 2008:1). Thus, 
upstream/downstream dichotomies are considered a determinant factor in transboundary 
water relations (Naff and Matson 1984).  For instance, Frey argues that it is more likely to 
expect conflictual relations in basins where downstream co-riparian state is most powerful 
and show greater interests, but upstream co-riparian state(s) have interest to a certain degree. 
Conversely, more stabilised relations can be expected in basins where upstream co-riparian 
state is powerful but has limited interest over the watershed (Frey 1985). To further elaborate 
the importance of geography, Allouche (2005:Ch.2) emphasises the link between territory 
and nationalism illustrating how water becomes inherent part of nation-making and state-
making processes. He then argues that national territoriality and sovereignty enable the states 
to act towards unilateral development resulting in conflictual relations in their transboundary 
relations.   
 
2.3.1.3. The Role of Power in Realist Hydropolitics  
 
The concept of power is another determinant factor in transboundary water relations 
according to realist hydropolitics.. In terms of the role of power, some studies emphasise 
power capacity of each riparian state in particular water basin, while other studies emphasise 
relative power capabilities. In other words, power configurations between the co-riparian 
states determine either conflictual or cooperative relations. For instance, Lowi (1999) argues 
that relative power capabilities (power configurations) establish either conflictual or 
cooperative outcomes in transboundary water relations at inter-state level. Accordingly, if the 
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upstream co-riparian states enjoy power supremacy over the downstream co-riparian states, 
any cooperation is less likely. This explains, as Lowi argues, why agreements can be 
identified in the Jordan and Nile basins, while there is a lack of agreement in the Euphrates 
and Tigris. Similarly, Waterbury (1994) in the context of the Nile basin shows that powerful 
co-riparian party can impose cooperation on the basin rather than conflict in transboundary 
water basins. (Julien 2012: 49 in Waterbury). Here power is a tool to consolidate control over 
particular watershed. However, power is also defined as the ultimate goal in politics (also in 
hydropolitics) as understood by Hobbesian (Jablanski 1997, Mollinga 2001).  Whether it is a 
tool or goal, both dynamics can be identified in states’ behaviour in transboundary water 
relations. Moreover, empirical examples can also be identified where water is used as an 
instrument to achieve certain goals (Gleick 1993, Dinar 2002); or a co-riparian state may 
perceive other state’s action regarding water development as a weapon or a political card 
against itself. The mutual findings of this analysis are considering power as material 
capability such as military power, economic strength and technical capacity. However, as will 
be discussed in detail in subsequent sections, such understanding of power as material power 
capabilities of actors is too narrow in hydropolitics and discursive dimensions of power 
capabilities must be taken into consideration. 
 
2.3.1.4. The Broader Political Context in Realist Hydropolitics  
 
The broader political context is considered a determining factor in conflictual or cooperative 
relations among co-riparian states (Gleick 1993, MacQuarrie 2004). In fact, in some 
empirical case studies co-riparian states can cooperate to a certain degree in spite of tense 
relations (Alam 2002, Lejano 2006). However, in most cases it would be misleading to 
consider hydropolitical relations without thinking about the broader political context in the 
basin. Therefore, studies in hydropolitics consider broader political contexts as an important 
variable in transboundary water issues (Yoffe and al 2003). The role of broader political 
context is also seen as a determinant factor in realist hydropolitics. Accordingly, it is argued 
that even though transboundary water issues are more likely to be source of conflict, they are 
less likely to identify violent conflicts (Lowi 1999). Lowi also considers water issues as ‘low 
politics’ and emphasises the importance of high profile issues as they also play a vital role in 
hydro-political inter-actions in transboundary water issues among the co-riparian states (Lowi 
1995). 
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2.3.2 Water and Liberalism (Hydro-liberalism)   
 
The views and narratives linking water issues with conflict or even violent conflict are still 
intact within media discourses (Katz 2011:2). However, as literature on hydropolitics has 
developed, they have lost dominance in academic studies since mid 1990s. Accordingly, as 
opposed to the water-conflict mainstream more cooperative relations rather than conflict can 
be identified between the co-riparian states considering diverse empirical case studies. Wolf 
(1998) argues empirical examples to legitimise water- (armed) conflict argument are 
inaccurate. Apart from war in Sumerian times, water has never been the sole cause of armed 
conflict at inter-state level. In this context, like the first mainstream approach, the hydro-
liberalist approach also seeks to understand factors explaining cooperative relations between 
the co-riparian states.  This section reviews and categorises the reasons for cooperative 
actions between states to be more likely in hydropolitics.  
 
2.3.2.1. Considering Water as an Economic Commodity and its Role in Cooperation  
 
 
Some studies have focussed on the economic value of water. Here, water is considered an 
economic commodity where principles of demand and supply management are applied. 
According to this view, since the agricultural sector covers the lion share of the fresh water 
use, riparian states should apply strategies to harness water demand. Thus, valuing water and 
its effective pricing, applying advanced effective irrigation methods, training the stakeholders 
for effective water use in agricultural sector is a crucial method to deal with water demand. 
Likewise, in his work, Global Political Economy in the Middle East, Waterbury (1996) 
questions whether food self-sufficiency is an effective method for reaching food security and 
argues that relying on domestic production is not profitable in the Middle Eastern context 
(Waterbury and Richards 1996). Furthermore, Allan (2002) argues that virtual water trade is 
an effective mechanism to tackle increasing water scarcity in the Middle East.4 He further 
contends that virtual water trade is already being used by the state in the Middle East region, 
although it has not been explicitly expressed by the states. Finally, as technology develops, 
innovations in technology have allowed states to adopt new methods to increase water 
                                                        
4
 Allan (2003: 5) defines virtual water “the water needed to produce agricultural commodities.” For instance, to 
produce a ton of grain, the amount of needed water is 1000 cubic meters. Given fact that 50 million tons of grain 
was imported by the MENA region states, they virtually imported 50 billion cubic meters water, which is 
equivalent to 30 per cent of the entire water supply of the MENA region.  
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supplies to tackle with water scarcities. In fact, de-salinization plants, deep fossil aquifers, 
wastewater reclamation schemes (cleaning and reusing the used water), rain harvesting, water 
imports through inter-basin transfers or water purchases are the key methods to increase 
water supply (Wolf 1995).  
 
2.3.2.2. The Role of Institutionalization on Water Cooperation  
 
A related strand of liberalism in IR namely liberal institutionalist approaches emphasise the 
importance of institutionalisation. Like realist approaches they acknowledge the likelihood of 
the water issues as sources of international conflicts. However, with liberalism in the IR 
theory, scholars of this school state that joint institutions can regulate inter-state relations in 
water issues; they constrain states’ behaviour and facilitate cooperation in inter-state relations 
(Jackson and Sorensen 2007). Accordingly, the basin wide institutions can address different 
aspects of water issues, they can produce solution mechanisms by producing technical data 
for effective water management, acting as medium for data and information exchanges, 
monitoring water use and providing up-to-date data on water quantity and water quality. 
Therefore, increasing number of joint institutions at different degrees of mandate can be 
identified in different transboundary water contexts across the globe. The rationale behind 
this tendency stems from two reasons. First, although international boundaries form 
externalities, the river basins as single hydrological units also create interdependencies 
between the upstream, midstream and downstream units (Elhance 1999). Therefore, these 
interdependencies render the co-riparian states more likely to move towards joint actions 
rather than unilateral development (Jagerskog 2003). Second, since international 
transboundary water issues by nature have political, economic, agricultural, hydrological and 
technical dimensions, these issues could be addressed by establishing joint mechanisms in 
different fields. Therefore, it is argued that establishing transboundary water institutions is 
impetrative in resolving water issues. 
 
The role of regional integration is also applied to transboundary water issues, drawing upon 
functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches in the liberal school within IR theory. In 
theory, neo-functionalist approaches argue that cooperation in areas which are politically less 
contentious will have a ‘spill over effect’’ and lead the states towards a regional integration in 
economic, political and social fields (Mitrany 1975, Haas 2004).  Therefore, technical 
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cooperation on water issues carries great potential for further cooperation in relatively more 
contentious fields (Dolatyar and Gray 2000:71). Since water issues are inseparable parts of 
other issues and often linked with particular issues, they potentially have a spill over effect. 
However, in cases where other political disputes are dominant, attempts are made to create 
‘spill over’ from cooperation facing resistance in high politics (Philips and al 2006:32,33).  
 
2.3.2.3. The Role of Issue Linkages on Water Cooperation  
 
Another variable that explains cooperation in transboundary basins is establishing issue 
linkages and incentive mechanisms between water related and non-water related issues. As 
indicated above, water related issues have multi-disciplinary characters easily linked with 
other policy domains. Here the benefit sharing approach is a good example of how water 
related issues are associated with different policy realms. Accordingly, it is argued that the 
riparian states should focus on the benefits from the water rather than water itself for 
constructive cooperation; and by establishing positive issue linkages with other policy realms 
benefits can be increased. In other words, joint mechanism should be established in the basins 
so that even actor(s) who are reluctant to cooperate find cooperative actions beneficial for 
national interests. Thus, establishment of trade-off mechanism between water and non-water 
issues are vital (Saddoff and Grey 2002, Turton 2008).  
 
Moreover, states can also use issue linkages as an advantage to increase their power 
capabilities and convince the other party to cooperate. It is argued that direct incentive 
mechanisms conducted by the states can also result in cooperative relations. For instance, 
Dinar (2006, 2009) shows that side payments are used by downstream riparian states to 
secure their water shares in the basin.  
 
2.4. Reflectivist/Critical Approaches  
 
 
While rationalist approaches to IR theory, realism and liberalism, are still prevalent in 
hydropolitics literature, particularly in inter-state hydropolitics, we can also identify growing 
application of the critical approaches to IR theory. Among these, conceptual frameworks 
drawing upon constructivist approaches in IR theory and studies critically looks at power 
relations in hydropolitics are particularly important for this research, as they constitute the 
backbone of theoretical framework of this study outlined in Chapter 3 and considered most 
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appropriate to explain Turkey’s hydropolitical relations.  As I have indicated in Chapter 1, 
this literature is labelled as critical approaches to hydropolitics throughout the thesis. The 
remaining sections of the chapter will discuss this literature and its limitations.  
 
2.4.1. Water and Constructivism (Hydro-constructivism)  
 
Constructivism in IR theory emerged at the end of the Cold War and has made significant 
contributions to various issues and concepts concerning IR (Checkel 1998: 338,Adler 2005: 
97, Jackson and Sorensen 2007:162). It has emerged as a ‘via media’ approach in the context 
of the inter-paradigm debate between the rationalist and reflectivist approaches (Lapid 1989, 
Hopf 1998, Burchill and Linklater 2005). Constructivism largely benefited from sociology 
and philosophy. From this perspective, constructivism is not merely theoretical and empirical 
approach to IR, but a metaphysical stance about the social reality and social theory (Adler 
2005).  
 
Constructivism attempts to understand inter-subjectivity, social context, agency and structure. 
Although constructivist views vary in IR, they converge on the perspective that “material 
resources can only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared 
knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendt 1995: 73). Constructivists oppose the view 
where social reality is given and exists independent from thoughts and ideas of the people 
(Jackson and Sorensen 2007:164). Constructivist approaches consider meaningful actions as 
social and inter-subjective phenomenon. According to this view, material world in fact does 
matter, but to what extent depends on ideas (Fearon and Wendt 2005: 60). Studies adopting 
constructivist approach are able to enrich the theoretical frameworks of IR by examining 
various empirical contexts in spite of the existing shortcomings. These works have provided 
new perspectives on the concepts of IR theory (Checkel 1998: 325). The following 
contributions made by the constructivist approaches in IR theory are useful in hydropolitics.  
 
2.4.1.1. Social Construction of Identities and Interests  
 
Constructivist studies have made a significant contribution to IR by problematizing the 
concept of identities and interests. Unlike the rationalist approaches of IR theory, 
constructivist approaches, reject the idea that state interests are given but they consider them 
as social constructions. They particularly look at the link between identities and interests 
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(Fierke 2007:171). In his prominent work, Anarchy is What States Make of it; Alexander 
Wendt (1992) convincingly demonstrates the anarchical structure of the international system 
is socially constructed. Accordingly, state action consists of desire and belief. While interests 
constitute the desire part of the action, identities form the belief.  Wendt contends that 
although “interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants, until it 
knows who it is”; they cannot solely explain the state action (Wendt 1999: 231). Regarding 
construction of identity, Wendt (1994) introduces an interactionist model that considers 
construction of identity and interest as a result of repeated interaction at the inter-state level. 
He states, “identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in 
response to how actors are treated by significant Others... if the Other treats the Self as 
though she were an enemy, then by the principle of reflected appraisals she is likely to 
internalise the belief in her own role identity vis-à-vis the Other” (Wendt 1999: 327).  
 
Furthermore Wendt states that social life is how actors represent the Self and the Other. 
These representations are the starting point for interaction, and the medium by which they 
determine who they are, what they want and how they should behave (Wendt 1999:332). In 
other words, according to Wendt’s model, interests and identities of states are constructed 
because of repeated interactions between each other within certain political and historical 
context. Based on how identities are defined within the anarchical inter-state structure, 
different culture of anarchies may be constructed. Wendt suggests that Hobbesian, Lockean 
and Kantian culture of anarchies can be constructed depending on identification between self 
and other within the historical context. While patterns of enmity and conflictual relations are 
dominant and patterns of amity and cooperative relations are dominant in Hobbesian and 
Kantian culture of anarchies respectively, in the Lockean culture of anarchy the dominant 
pattern is rivalry. In my view, considering identities and interests are social constructs which 
is particularly important in understanding the role of broader political context in inter-state 
hydropolitical relations in transboundary water basins. As will be shown in the context of the 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, riparian states interact with one another over water 
and non-water issues within certain historical and political context. These repeated 
interactions between riparian states result in construction of different culture of anarchies at 
inter-state level thereby directly affecting on conflictual and cooperative relations.  
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2.4.1.2. The Role of Norms  
 
Another contribution of constructivism is different understanding of the role of norms in 
international relations. Since ideas and thoughts do matter according to constructivist 
approaches, the concept of norms has a central importance. Unlike rationalist approaches, 
considering norms as either widening or constraining states’ actions, constructivist 
approaches argue that norms inform actors’ identities and interests (Klotz 1995, Finnemore 
1996, Ruggie 1998:864). Katzenstein identifies two different types of norms: Constitutive 
Norms and Regulatory Norms. Regulatory norms are by and large covered by the liberal 
approaches and reveal what is acceptable behaviour and what is not. However, to Katzenstein 
(1996: 27), liberal approaches fail to grasp constitutive norms that shape actors identities and 
interests. Moreover, norms do not simply float around political space, they are internalised 
and institutionalised by the decision makers. Once they are institutionalised they are 
considered objective realities that constrain and shape decision makers’ behaviour 
(Katzenstein 1996:21).  
 
In my view, the role of norms from a constructivist point of view is self-explanatory in 
understanding actors’ preferences and goals, which are defined as interests in hydropolitics. I 
will discuss in Chapter 3, we can identify certain sets of norms, ideas, rules and practices 
regarding water resources development that can be generalised to any given hydro-social 
context. Drawing upon competing prevailing paradigms in hydropolitics developed by Tony 
Allan, this study will show that actors in hydropolitics adopt sets of norms that shape 
conflictual and cooperative relations between actors by informing their interests.  
 
2.4.1.3. Understanding Power in Constructivism  
 
Power is a key concept for constructivist approaches as it is for the rationalist theories. 
However, unlike rationalist approaches, constructivism does not merely understand power in 
terms of material capabilities. It also takes into consideration the role of ‘discursive power’. It 
argues to understand any kind of relations between actors in world politics, we need to 
analyse the role of discursive and material power capabilities (Barnett 2008: 165). Discursive 
power can be defined as power to convince through discursive processes. Its roots are in 
Foucault’s knowledge/power nexus view or Gramsci’s concept ideological hegemony (Hopf 
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1998:177). Regarding power, most of the conceptual frameworks drawing upon 
constructivism often include Lukes’s tri-dimensional power approach along with the works of 
Foucault (Bourdieu) in their analysis (Guzzini 2005:508). Section 2.4.2 will focus on 
understanding power, which is compatible with conceptual frameworks that critically assess 
power relations in hydropolitics. These conceptual frameworks also draw upon Lukes’s tri-
dimensional power analysis to analyse power relations in transboundary water contexts (e.g.: 
Zeitoun and Warner 2006, Cascao and Zeitoun 2010, Cascao 2010, Nicol and Cascão 2011).  
 
2.4.2. Constructivist Approach in Hydropolitics  
 
There are growing uses of elements of constructivist approaches in relatively recent 
conceptual frameworks in hydropolitics. However, neither do I claim that these studies share 
all the assumptions of social constructivism in IR theories, nor do the scholars explicitly 
locate their works within constructivism. Yet, some of the elements within those studies can 
be considered within constructivist approaches. For instance, Trotter (2008:197) describes the 
concept of ‘water crisis’ as a discursive construction that has become a hegemonic concept. 
She contends water crisis cannot be equated with simply shortage of water arguing, “water is 
short only when actors have decided it is so for variety of reasons’’ (Trottier 2008:198). 
Likewise, Allan (2002: 257) argues that claim that water is a scarce resource in the Middle 
East region stems from a narrow understanding of water availability. Therefore, water 
scarcity as a discourse should be understood as a ‘constructed knowledge’ rather than an 
objective truth.  
 
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that discourses such as water-conflict and water-
cooperation are constructed regardless of material factors. There are material grounds that 
legitimise these discourses. With this perspective, the material world can only become 
meaningful through inter-subjective knowledge construction between the agent and structure. 
Moreover, actors’ rationality is considered as social constructions rather than an objective 
truth. As such, actors can give different meaning to water or particular watersheds. They can 
construct discourses based on these meanings and ideas that are not necessarily supported by 
objective evidence. For instance, while a state can consider a development project in a 
watershed as vital for its energy or food security, an environmental group can deem the same 
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project as an environmental catastrophe as in the case of the Ilısu dam dispute, to be analysed 
in Chapter 8. Therefore, hydropolitical analysis should investigate how concepts, discourses, 
ideas about water are constructed within a historical context.  
 
 
Here, it is essential to review and address what does a conceptual framework on 
hydropolitics, drawing upon constructivist approach, look like? After all, constructivism is a 
metaphysical stance regarding social reality rather than a particular theoretical framework; it 
can only become a practical tool through application of a conceptual framework based on 
constructivism (Adler 2005: 96).  
 
In relation to constructivism and hydropolitics, Dinar (2002: 244) points out the role of 
“epistemic communities” as fostering and perpetuating cooperation on water issues. 
Accordingly, since epistemic communities are able to construct alternative knowledge, set 
out norms, shared beliefs they may perpetuate cooperation in transboundary water issues. 
Constructivist approaches are able to explain the evolution of discourse from ‘water-conflict’ 
to ‘water-cooperation’ and the decline of the concept of ‘water wars’ since the mid 1990s. 
Accordingly, concepts like water wars/peace and water conflict/cooperation are discourses 
and narratives rather than objective realities (Du Plessis 2000, Warner 2010:86, Julien 2012). 
Warner shows how ‘water wars’ as a narrative has declined over time and how it has been 
replaced by the discourse of ‘water peace’. He describes such discourses as lenses that 
provide two different and competing outcomes. In other words, the interpretation by the 
actors makes sense of ‘water wars’ or ‘water peace’ (Warner 2010).  
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that there is linear change occurring from ‘water 
wars/conflict’ to ‘water peace/cooperation’ in every empirical context. In spite of the relative 
decline of water conflict discourse, it still has merits and there are now two competing 
discourses rather than one dominant narrative (Warner 2012:173,174).  Therefore, different 
status quos can be identified in different transboundary contexts. Warner identifies 
Hobbesian nature of order and Lockean nature of order as two different status quos at 
transboundary water contexts, which support the water wars/conflict discourse and water 
peace/cooperation discourses respectively. While in Hobbesian status quo, riparian states 
pursue their development goals independently from one another with few cooperative actions 
among each other. In Lockean status quo, there are interdependent relations between the co-
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riparian states with involvement of other actors such as the civil society, epistemic 
communities, donors and so forth (Warner 2012: 180).  
 
 
Similarly, Turton and Meissner (2002) introduced the concept of hydro-social contract that 
conceptualises state-society relations in the layer of sub-national/domestic hydropolitics. Like 
Warner, they also identify two types of status quos, the Hobbesian form of hydro-social 
contract and the Lockean form of hydro-social contract. The Hobbesian form of hydro-social 
contract refers to the period in which central governments get more involved in water issues 
and initiate hydraulic missions. In this period, bureaucratic structures in state apparatus deal 
with water related issues from different aspects, which is labelled as hydraucracies (hydraulic 
bureaucracies) by Mole (2009) who became the ‘discursive elites’ to generate and sanction 
discourses relevant to their view of the water resources development. The Lockean form of 
hydro-social contract refers to the period when dominant positions of hydraucracies as 
discursive elites were challenged by the economists, social scientists, environmentalists and 
the involvement of state decreased and the NGOs filled the vacuum left by the state (Turton 
and Meissner 2002:54,55). 
 
Meissner and Turton also define key concepts essential in understanding the framework of 
Hydro-social Contract (Turton and Meissner 2002:38,39). In particular, two concepts, 
discursive elites and sanctioned discourse, are referred to regularly throughout this study. 
The concept of sanctioned discourse is defined as: “the prevailing or dominant discourse that 
has been legitimised by the discursive élite within the water sector at any one moment in 
time. It represents what may be said, who may say it and how it may be interpreted, thereby 
leading to the creation of a dominant belief system or paradigm.” (Turton and Meissner 
2002:39). In other words, sanctioned discourse refers to particular norms that inform actors’ 
interests and create areas of contestation among different actors.  
 
The concept of discursive elites is defined as: “those persons who are in a dominant position 
within bureaucratic entities and who can determine the nature, form and content of the 
prevailing discourse,” i.e. the group that sanctions the discourse.’ (Turton 2000:1,2). These 
two concepts are particularly important in understanding hydropolitics from a constructivist 
point of view and will be used in this research.  
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2.4.2.1. Blending Securitization Theory and Hydropolitics Literature 
 
Securitisation theory, as developed by the Copenhagen School (CS), offers one of the most 
appealing theoretical frameworks linking constructivism and hydropolitics. The link between 
water and security studies can be analysed in the context of traditionalists (those arguing state 
security and survival of the state should be core of security studies) vs. non-traditionalists 
(those arguing other domains environmental issues, economic issues should be considered 
with security studies) debate in security studies.5 The securitization theory, developed by the 
CS, is one of the critical approaches that also consider different domains of security other 
than survival of the state.  
 
 
From an ontological and epistemological perspective, securitization theory is informed by 
constructivism (Buzan and Waewer 1997:243). According to Weaver (1995: 47), ‘something 
is a security problem, when the actors declare to be so’. In other words, security is not an 
objective condition but a social construction formed through particular social processes 
(Williams 2003:513).  However, the CS does not claim that a subjective perceived threat is 
entirely independent from objective conditions. Objective realities are important facilitators 
of successful securitization processes (Buzan, Waever et al. 1998:31).  
 
Securitization theory provides an explanatory conceptual tool to understand hydropolitics 
drawing upon constructivism. It is considered as an important conceptual tool to establish a 
grand theory based on constructivism (Julien 2012: 57). Thus as it will be shown in the 
following section the securitization theory is integral part of the TWINS framework, which 
seeks to establish a general framework regarding water conflict and cooperation in inter-state 
hydropolitics. Furthermore, securitization theory also informs the frameworks of hydro-
hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony in terms of actors’ discursive power capabilities.  
 
Moreover, securitization theory has not only been applied to empirical case studies in 
hydropolitics, but also those using the theory of securitization in their hydropolitical analysis 
have improved the theory by taking insights from empirical case studies. The figure, provided 
                                                        
5 For further information on traditionalists and non-traditionalists debate in security studies see (Buzan, Waever 
et al. 1998).  
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by Julien (2012:59) shows extended version of the spectrum of securitization theory used in 
academic literature on hydropolitics. The following parts will discuss each of these concepts 
as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 Extended Copenhagen Continuums 
 
Source: Julien (2012:59) 
 
 
2.4.2.1.1. Securitization  
 
Securitization is a way of social practice of a particular public issue, which has special 
rhetorical structure. The identification of existential threats has made securitization different 
from other social practices (Buzan, Waever et al. 1998:24). An existential threat to a referent 
object is identified in developing securitization. Once an issue is securitised, it is lifted 
beyond the normal political agenda. In fact, the issue is dramatized and presented as one of 
supreme priority, which cannot be solved through politics where classical haggling takes 
place among different groups and individuals. In doing so, extraordinary measures to 
overcome the existential threat are justified and legitimised. Therefore, the ‘existential threat’ 
does not objectively exist or is absent rather it is socially constructed. Instead of analysing 
whether the threat actually exists or not, one must analyse the ways in which the issue is 
presented as an existential threat (Buzan, Waever et al. 1998:26).  
 
 
Elements of securitization process can be outlined as follows. First, what is being secured 
needs to be clarified, which is labelled in theory as the ‘referent object’ .The referent objects 
also frame the domains in which securitisation speech acts are seen. Four domains of security 
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are identified as the referent object: the military sector, economic sector, environmental 
sector and societal sector (Buzan, Waever et al. 1998). Second, certain actors are able to 
conduct securitisation speech act who are labelled as ‘’securitizing actors’’ (Buzan, Waever 
et al. 1998:24). Securitising actors include politicians, bureaucrats, NGO representatives and 
academics. Securitizing actors form the discursive elites, who conduct securitization speech 
act.  Third, there needs to be a recipient of the securitisation act labelled as audience in the 
above theory. A successful securitisation is subject to acceptance by an audience (Buzan, 
Waever et al. 1998:25). Otherwise, it is considered as a securitising move rather than a 
successful securitisation. With respect to audience, Waever indicates composition of the 
audience may change according to different state-society structures. For example, while the 
audience would be the public and civil society in pluralistic societies, it may be a small circle 
of policy makers in authoritarian societies (Waever, 2003 in Leonard and Kaunert 2011:59).  
 
Considering the different security domains (referent objects) identified by the securitisation 
theory, securitizing actors, as discursive elites, can easily associate water related issues with 
different security domains. Thus, water related issues can be both directly or indirectly linked 
with national security by the discursive elites. For instance, since water is strongly related 
with energy and food security, water development projects are considered important tools to 
meet those security needs. 6 As will be discussed in the following chapters, in relation to the 
enormous GAP project, discursive elites consider water development projects are major tools 
to sustain regional socio-economic development and extend authority and political legitimacy 
of the central governments to remote places. Therefore, such water development projects are 
seen as vital in preserving states’ economic and political security (Floyd 2008).  
 
Here, hydraucraices and politicians form the main discursive elites as securitizing actors of 
particular water policy or hydraulic project. However, it would be misleading to consider 
discursive elites as the only securitizing actors. Given the inherent link between environment 
and hydraulic development, certain hydraulic projects or water policies, which are already 
securitised by the above-stated discursive elites, are confronted by ‘counter securitization’ 
moves. In this case, civil society groups often seek to counter-securitize large-scale dams as 
threats to the environment. The environmentally complex feature of water issues also enables 
those actors to conduct counter-securitizing moves by referring to another domain being 
                                                        
6
 Although food and energy security is not specifically stated as separated security domains by the securitization 
theory, they can be considered within the domains of economic and political security.  
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‘threatened’. As Warner (2004:9) shows, civil society movements often emphasise the issue 
of community displacement and its inherent link with human rights issues. Discursive elites 
may conduct ‘counter securitization’ moves by recasting the issue. This enables the actors to 
reach wider audience and increase their discursive power capabilities. Finally, it is not solely 
within the domestic context that securitization of hydropolitics occurs. For instance, 
downstream co-riparian states often perceive upstream development as threatening to their 
own national security.                 
2.4.2.1.2. Opportunitisation  
 
With respect to the securitization theory and hydropolitics, Warner introduces the concept of 
“opportunitisation” as a social practice. Accordingly, Warner (2004:12) questions whether 
securitization is the only mechanism for using extra ordinary measures. If all the states were 
motivated by the defence mechanisms, none of them would seek to establish empires. In his 
theorisation, Warner identifies three sets of goals. At the base line, actors try to identify their 
primary goals within securitization. The governing behaviour at this stage is protection. 
However, if an actor sees an opportunity to achieve higher goals, the opportunity logic might 
be presented by the actors, which might require an emergency action similar to a security 
issue. Therefore, instead of a defence-threat mechanism, the offense-opportunity mechanism 
would be at work.  In other words, there can be a significant gap in power between the strong 
(seeking further goals instead of primary goals) and weak actors (trying to keep their basic 
goals). Dynamics of securitization are also at work for the strong party in such cases. Actors 
legitimise extraordinary measures to realise those goals. Therefore, the ‘opportunitisation’ 
constitutes the ‘flip-side’ of the logic of securitization (Zeitoun 2007:7).  It appears that the 
concept of opportunitisation is mainly based on the contention that, ‘upstreamers use water to 
get more power, downstreamers use power to get more water’ (Zeitoun and Warner 
2006:436). 
 
In other words, the approach asserts that state located upstream has relatively more power 
capabilities driven by opportunitisation in the case of transboundary water politics between 
co-riparian states.  However, even in such cases, it is rather difficult to identify to what extent 
an actor is driven by either defence-security or offense-opportunity mechanisms. Particularly, 
in cases where domestic securitized dynamics are very strong, such evaluation becomes even 
more difficult.  
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2.4.2.1.3 Violisation  
 
Neumann further diversifies the securitization theory by introducing the rhetoric of war that 
has not been conceptualised by the CS. He introduces the concept of ‘violisation’ and defines 
it as ‘… the process whereby an already securitised issues such as identity becomes casus 
belli over which blood must run” (Neumann 1998:8). In other words, he argues where large-
scale violence is visible, politics is ‘violised’. One may argue that securitization theory 
already covers concepts such as actual violence, since successful securitization already 
legitimizes extra-ordinary measures. However, Neumann (1998: 7) states, “deceleration of 
war can be considered as securitization. However, waging the war and conducting actual 
violence will have further consequences with regard to perceived identities’’.   
 
Therefore, violisation of the issue can be associated with extreme speech act in the spectrum 
developed by securitization theory. Zeitoun (2007: 8) finds the concept of violisation is 
useful in the analysis of the Jordan River Basin hydropolitics. He argues that confrontational 
actions may result in violisation of politics – putting water issues not just out of reach of 
‘normal’ politics, but also even out of the realm of securitization. He illustrates large-scale 
wars, occupation, and destruction of the infrastructure as the violsation of politics in the 
Jordan River basin. 
 
2.4.2.1.4. Politicization and Non-Politicization  
 
There are many empirical cases where transboundary water issue were securitised or in some 
cases extreme cases they may me violised. Yet, it is essential to examine whether water 
issues are necessarily regarded within the context of securitization/opportunitisation or, in 
extreme cases, violisation dynamics. The short answer to this question is, “no”. In fact, 
empirical contexts can be identified where water issues are politicized, meaning “the issue is 
part of public policy requiring government decision and resource allocation or, more rarely, 
some other form of communal governance’’ (Buzan, Waever et al. 1998). For example, the 
European Water Framework is a suitable example in terms of the ‘politicised’ character of 
water among different actors. (Mirumachi 2010:57).  
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While empirical examples are where water is regarded as a ‘politicised’ issue, it is rather 
difficult to identify a context such issues are ‘non-politicised’, “meaning the state does not 
deal with it and it is not in any other way made issue of public debate and decision’’ (Buzan, 
Waever et al. 1998:23). Generally, such cases are identified in historical context. For 
instance, Mirumachi (2010:95) shows that water had been a ‘non-politicised’ issue between 
Lesotho and South Africa until 1968 in the Orange-Senqu basin. It appears there are similar 
‘non-politicized’ dynamics between co-riparian states at the time of lack of hydraulic 
development on subjected transboundary water basin. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that states do not consider water issues they need not deal with. On the contrary, as 
Allouche (2005) shows in detail, often water is regarded as a ‘state matter’. In other words, it 
is politicised by the central governments. Here, it is worth noting that academic studies on 
Securitization Theory and hydropolitics mainly deal with inter-state relations, which is the 
main weakness of the conceptual framework.  
 
2.4.2.1.5. Changes in Securitization Theory Spectrum  
 
Referring to Figure 3 provided by Julien, the Securitization Theory also suggests that changes 
can be identified from ‘non-politicized’ to ‘violised’ or vice versa. In this regard, it is 
relatively easier to identify securitization than de-securitization, since securitization is a 
particular speech act that requires showing an existential threat and that legitimizes extra 
ordinary action to overcome this threat. However, the concept of de-securitization is 
particularly important, since in most of the water cases a change can move from patterns of 
high conflict-low cooperation to low conflict-high cooperation. 
 
 
The concept of de-securitization in theory is defined as, “the shifting of issues out of 
emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of political sphere (Buzan, 
Waever et al. 1998).” In spite of the recently growing literature, the concept of de-
securitization in still under-theorized and there are different views on how formerly 
securitized issues have become de-securitized (Roe 2004, Morina 2013:17). Nevertheless, 
recent studies analysing de-securitization provides a strong explanatory power in 
understanding the change from conflictual relations to cooperative ones. One of the aims of 
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this study is to understand how Turkey and Syria could realise cooperative actions on water 
issues in the second era (1998-2011) in spite of highly conflictual hydropolitical relations 
before 1998. The existing literature on de-securitization enables us to understand this change 
in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations as a discursive process. I will analyse how 
water issues were de-securitized by the Turkish and Syrian discursive elites in Chapter 9, 
after I analyse patterns of conflict and cooperation intensities in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Moreover, as it will be discussed in the following empirical chapters, it would be misleading 
to assume de-securitization process is the only way to shift from securitization to 
politicization. As could be inferred from the above stated definitions, while securitization 
stipulates, ‘There is No Alternative (TINA)’ approach, politicization refers to arts of possible. 
In other words, ‘politicization’ means existence of different alternatives. For Guzzini (2005: 
511), this is exactly what ‘power’ does; it provides ‘counterfactuals’ and redefines ‘the 
borders of what can be done’. In other words, power is exerted to ‘politicize’.  Guzzini (2005: 
518) further argues, “the increasing diffusion of power through society implies the increasing 
‘politicization’ of different social spheres’. In addition, ‘politicization’ and power have 
important implications in understanding both inter-state relations among co-riparian states 
and relations between states and civil society actors. For example, as Chapter 8 will 
elaborate, civil society groups seek to ‘politicize’ the ‘securitized’ issues by providing 
counter-factuals, alternative narratives and counter-securitizing moves. 
 
However, ‘politicization’ moves may not necessarily be received positively by the discursive 
elites who securitize certain water issues. In such cases, de-politicization, which means taking 
the ‘politics’ out of an issue, becomes an effective tool for those ‘securitizing elites’ in terms 
of increasing their discursive power capabilities (Wagerich and Warner 2010:6). For instance, 
as Chapter 8 will discuss, discursive elites seek to grab the ‘scientific ground’ in their 
discourses. In other words, they claim that their discourse is in accordance with scientific 
facts. Therefore, the ability to produce scientific data becomes very crucial. 
 
 
To sum up, the conceptual framework developed around the securitization theory has been 
used extensively in hydropolitical analysis drawing upon constructivism. The concepts 
developed in the context of the securitization theory are also integral part of other conceptual 
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frameworks such as the TWINS framework and it will be also be part of theoretical 
framework in this study.  
 
2.4.2.2. Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus (TWINS)  
 
One of the ways in which constructivist understanding of hydropolitics is operationalized is 
the TWINS framework, developed by Naho Mirumachi (2010).   
 
Drawing upon constructivist approach, the framework provides a comprehensive analytical 
tool analysing the conflictual and cooperative relations between riparian states in the analysis 
of transboundary water relations. The TWINS framework was developed in the context of 
research activities conducted by the London Water Research Group (LWRG). The LWRG, 
comprising academics, water practitioners, and activists across the world, has conducted 
several studies contributing to literature on transboundary water politics (Mirumachi 
2010:73).  Therefore, the TWINS framework must be considered as an integral part of a 
broader literature that critically examines issues concerning transboundary water politics. I 
will consider this in the subsequent analysis and evaluate literature by exemplifying the 
TWINS framework. The framework has already been applied to different transboundary 
water contexts across the world (Sojamo 2008, Warner and van Buuren 2009). The main 
elements of the TWINS can be outlined as follows.  
 
 
2.4.2.2.1. Speech Acts as Signifiers of Conflict and Cooperation  
 
The TWINS framework questions how we can identify conflictual and cooperative relations 
between riparian states in transboundary water contexts. It argues that we need to look at 
‘speech acts’ to see the trajectory of the relations between co-riparian states over time. In 
other words, the TWINS framework suggests that instead of labelling the hydro-political 
relations as either conflictual or cooperative in general, the main focus should be on speech 
acts showing conflictual and cooperative hydropolitical relations between actors. 
Accordingly, “speech acts constitute social action by creating social facts, relations and 
commitments” (Austin 1962 in Duffy and Frederking 2009:327). Speech acts can be both 
verbal and non-verbal. Duffy and Frederking (2009:328) identify three types of speech acts 
based on their effect. Accordingly, public statements and declarations can be considered 
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assertive speech acts; deploying troops, closing the dam, deciding to open a new irrigation 
scheme can be directive speech acts. Finally, treaties and joint decelerations are examples of 
commisive speech acts. Identifying speech acts in the analysis of conflictual and cooperative 
relations in the case of the ET basin will also be used in this study.   
2.4.2.2.2. Coexistence of Conflict and Cooperation in Hydropolitics.  
 
Considering the speech acts conducted by the discursive elites, which shows conflictual and 
cooperative patterns, it is rightly argued by the TWINS framework that both conflictual and 
cooperative patterns are found in transboundary water relations between the riparian states. In 
fact, the TWINS framework opposes the view that relations in transboundary hydropolitics 
necessarily moves from conflict to cooperation in a linear sense. Rather conflictual and 
cooperative relations evolve together over time. Moreover, it is argued that identifying 
conflictual relations do not necessarily mean lack of cooperation or vice versa; rather both 
concepts co-exist (Mirumachi 2010:43).  
 
Thus, empirical examples can be illustrated from different transboundary water contexts 
depicting co-existence of conflict and cooperation. For example, Daoudy analyses the 
enduring negotiation process among the co-riparian states of the ET basin and describes the 
negotiation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq as, “relations…. with peaks of conflict and 
periods of mutual cooperation.” (2009:362). 
 
Drawing upon Craig’s matrix regarding conflict and cooperation intensities from low to high, 
Mirumachi (2010) identifies conflict and cooperation intensities in hydropolitical interactions 
between co-riparian states in transboundary water contexts.  With respect to conflict, she 
mainly uses the extended version of securitization continuum, outlined above. Regarding 
cooperation continuum Mirumachi identifies confrontation of the issue, ad hoc joint actions, 
common goal formation, common norm formation and collective identity formation as 
cooperation intensities from low to high cooperation (Mirumachi 2010:57,61)7. It is admitted 
further theorization is still needed to better conceptualise the cooperation continuum. Figure 4 
shows the basic TWINS matrix template developed by Mirumachi.  
 
                                                        
7
 It should be noted that it seen that cooperation intensities are labelled differently in Mirumachi’s other 
academic works apart from her theses and other authors’ academic works who apply Mirumachi TIWINS 
matrix to different transboundary water contexts. See  
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Figure 4 Basic Template of TWINS Matrix 
 
Source: Mirumachi 2010 
 
 
Considering the TWINS framework, the patterns of high conflict-low cooperation and low 
conflict-high cooperation are often expected outcomes in transboundary water relations 
between the riparian states. Thus considering the empirical chapters of this study, both 
patterns are found in the context of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations at different 
periods. However, patterns of low conflict-low cooperation can also be frequently identified 
in transboundary relations. In such cases, there are no or little interactions between the 
riparian states. As will be shown in Chapter 6, this pattern can be identified in the context of 
the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. Finally, The TWINS matrix allows the 
researchers to analyse what has happened between two co-riparian states in a certain time 
period thereby enabling dynamic character of inter-state relations.  
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2.4.2.2.3. Critical Look at Treaties and Accords as Signifiers of Cooperation in Hydropolitics  
 
The TWINS framework supports the view that treaties and accords on water, seen as 
indicators of cooperation, should be critically examined. Considering the literature, studies 
examine the extent of treaties to distribute equitable rights between the actors particularly in 
the transboundary contexts (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008). For instance, Selby (2003) 
assesses the water agreement signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
as, “dressing up domination as cooperation”. Since the treaty has codified existing 
asymmetrical status quo, it has neither established a common ground for further cooperation 
between the parties, nor remedied the existing water problems in the region (Bateh 2012). 
Therefore, it is argued that one has to critically look at the power asymmetries/symmetries 
between the actors in the assessment of treaties. In many cases, treaties only codify the 
exiting power asymmetries and establish “imposed cooperation” between the actors. From 
this perspective, even the codification of international water law itself is a product of a highly 
political process where power relations apply (Woodhouse and Zeitoun 2008).  
 
When analysing the cooperative actions between Turkey and Syria during 2000s on water 
issues, which will be discussed in Chapter 7, cooperative actions such as protocols and joint 
actions could be considered by the Turkish and Syrian policy makers and will be analysed in 
terms of actors’ changing power capabilities.  
                       
 
2.4.2.2.4. Determinants of Conflict and Cooperation in Hydropolitics  
 
The TWINS framework examines what determines either conflictual or cooperative relations 
between the co-riparian states in transboundary water politics. In relation to the previous 
point, Mirumachi (2010:62) argues that basin asymmetries/symmetries have a determinant 
role in understanding the cooperative and conflictual relations in transboundary water 
contexts. In other words, power plays a determinant role in understanding transboundary 
water politics between the co-riparian states. According to constructivist understanding of 
power, Mirumachi considers power as material power (material capabilities) and discursive 
power (power to convince). However, the TWINS model does not further elaborate the role 
of power in transboundary water politics. Rather, it refers to the existing literature developed 
around the framework of hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun and Warner 2006, Daoudy 2008, Saleh 
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2008, Warner 2010; among others) and the framework of counter hydro-hegemony (Cascao 
2009, Cascao and Zeitoun 2010).  The following section discusses these frameworks in 
detail.  
 
2.4.3. Power and Hegemony: Critical Inter-state Hydropolitics  
 
The concept and role of power is crucially significant in the study of hydropolitics since it is 
considered as the most decisive factor in the analysis of transboundary water relations. As 
Reisner (1990) states in every case water can flow against gravity and through power and 
money. In other words, those who have the ability to mobilise more power resources will 
have better access to water resources than others (Swyngedouw 2005). The critical body of 
literature developed by the LWRG draws a similar conclusion for transboundary water issues 
too (e.g. Warner, Zeitoun, Cascao). In fact, those having powerful capabilities to mobilise 
will consolidate their control of water in transboundary watercourses. As outlined in the 
context of realist understanding of inter-state hydropolitics, the LWRG literature was not, in 
fact, the first school, which concluded power is the ultimate factor in determining the control 
of water in transboundary water issues.  
 
However, what differs in the critical conceptual frameworks, as developed by the LWRG, 
from realist understanding of inter-state hydropolitics is its focus on discursive power 
capabilities of riparian states as well as their material power capabilities. For example, 
Daoudy (2008) identifies diplomacy, lobbying and international law as sources of bargaining 
power capabilities successfully used by the Syrian government to balance Turkey’s 
development water development projects in the ET Rivers. These bargaining power strategies 
constitute the second dimension of power, which is also labelled as ‘soft power’ in other 
literatures. Cascao (2008) further spots the applicability of Luke’s power approach to the 
transboundary water analysis in relation to power relations. In his seminal work, Power a 
Radical View, Lukes (1974) identifies three dimensions of power: power of coercion, power 
of influence and power of ideas. In transboundary water interactions, the actors exercise those 
dimensions of power as their availabilities.  
 
Drawing upon these concepts, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) developed a general theoretical 
framework (the framework of hydro-hegemony- FHH). The FHH questions why some states 
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consolidate control in watercourses, whereas other do not. For example, Ethiopia and Turkey 
are located in similar geographic positions in the Nile and ET basins respectively.  Yet, while 
Turkey is able to conduct extensive hydraulic development projects in the pivotal waters of 
the ET basin, Ethiopia cannot do the same in the Nile Basin. The FHH questions what 
prevents Ethiopia from conducting large-scale hydraulic works in the Nile Basin as Turkey 
does in the ET basin (Zeitoun and Warner 2006: 436).  The FHH suggests this can only be 
explained by examining the difference between availability of power resources in each state. 
Here, drawing upon Lukes’s power approach, the FHH understands power in terms of 
material, bargaining and ideational (structural) capabilities of riparian states. Moreover, the 
framework also considers riparian position and exploitation potential are other elements of 
hydro-hegemony. These elements are illustrated as pillars of hydro-hegemony by the FHH in 
Figure 5 as follows.  
 
Figure 5 Pillars of Hydro-Hegemony 
 
Source: Zeitoun and Warner (2006:451)  
 
 
The FHH argues that the most powerful actors of the basin can attempt (and succeed) to 
establish a hegemonic status quo enabling it to access a particular watercourse. Therefore, 
basin hegemons can be identified in the MENA region or other regions across the world. 
Here, basin hegemons do not only use force to establish a status quo, but they also establish 
hegemonic structures in transboundary basins by getting consent of other riparian states 
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(Cascao 2010:70). Therefore, riparian states frequently use bargaining and ideational power 
capabilities to establish such status quos in transboundary water basins. 
 
Cascao (2009) argues so-called weaker parties are not purely powerless in hegemonic 
structures. Cascao points out dynamic character of power configurations in transboundary 
water contexts. Both material and discursive (bargaining and ideational) capabilities of actors 
are not static but subject to change over time, which ultimately influences relations between 
riparian states. Cascao also revised the pillars of hydro-hegemony based on the original 
compilation shown in Figure 5. Accordingly, hegemonic structures in inter-state 
hydropolitics is based on combination of four dimensions of power; geography (riparian 
position), material power, bargaining power and ideational power. Figure 6 shows revised 
pillars of hydro-hegemony in hydropolitics developed by Cascao.  
 
Figure 6 Revised Pillars of Hydro-hegemony 
 
Source: Cascao and Zeitoun (2010:32) 
 
The critical conceptual frameworks developed around the FHH are particularly important for 
the study, since they take into account different types of power at work in hydropolitics. In 
fact, the critical literature on power widens the understanding of the concept in transboundary 
water contexts by exploring the role of discursive power (bargaining and ideational power) in 
the analysis. Yet, understanding power through existing critical literature is still thin and 
some aspects require revision. Since, the concept of power is of central importance in my 
theoretical framework, I will address and cover these weaknesses in Chapter 3.  
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2.4.4. Evaluation of the Critical Approaches (The Critical Body of Literature) in 
Hydropolitics and Its Limits  
 
Throughout Section 2.4 above, this study has discussed conceptual frameworks that can be 
considered within critical/reflectivist approaches in hydropolitics. In this regard, the 
conceptual frameworks are analysed within two broad categories. On the one hand, some of 
the conceptual frameworks, which draw upon constructivist approaches, seek to analyse the 
way in which conflictual and cooperative patterns can be understood in hydropolitics. On the 
other hand, other conceptual frameworks focus on the concept of power and its role in 
hydropolitics. Frameworks of hydro-hegemony, counter-hegemony and the related 
conceptual frameworks can be considered within this category. In this respect, while the 
former mainly focuses on how conflictual and cooperative processes in hydropolitical 
relations between actors can be understood, the latter mainly focus on the outcome as a result 
of those processes. However, there are overlaps between these two bodies of literature. As 
stated above, both approaches consider power in term of its material and discursive 
dimensions. This understanding is compatible with constructivist understanding of power that 
considers both discursive and material capabilities of actors. Both approaches employ the 
same conceptual tools in making analysis. For example, concepts such as securitization, de-
securitization, and politicization and so on are integral part the hydro-hegemony and TWINS 
analysis. Moreover, concepts like the discursive elites, sanctioned discourses, speech acts are 
employed in both approaches. Therefore, both approaches can be considered as a single body 
of literature that analyses different aspects of hydropolitics. This study will refer this body of 
literature as ‘critical body of literature’ throughout the thesis. The critical body of literature 
discussed in Section 2.4 is particularly important for this study, since it constitutes the base of 
the theoretical framework of this study. Therefore, some of thee conceptual frameworks such 
as hydro-hegemony, securitization theory will be integral part of the theoretical framework 
(Chapter 3) and analytical chapters (Chapters 6,7 and 8).  
 
 
If we evaluate the critical body of literature in general, we may identify the following 
contributions made by the conceptual frameworks within the critical body of literature to the 
study of hydropolitics.  
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The first contribution to critical body of literature on hydropolitics is that conflictual and 
cooperative relations are not necessarily at opposing ends of the same linear scale. As 
indicated in the context of the TWINS framework, conflictual and cooperative relations, as 
social constructs of certain hydro-social contexts, between actors evolve over time. 
Furthermore, the TWINS framework shows conflictual and cooperative relations co-exist. To 
explain this fact, Allan states “those of you who have a close relationship in a marriage or 
similar relationship know that conflict and cooperation go on at the same time.” (Allan 2007 
in Mirumachi 2010:44). As I will discuss in chapter 6 and chapter 7 in detail, the changes in 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations over time affirm the circular character of inter-state 
relations in relation to water issues. Moreover, we can identify patterns of high conflict-low 
cooperation and low cooperation and high conflict at different phases in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations.  
 
 
The second contribution of critical body of literature on hydropolitics is its extensive focus 
on the concept and the role of power in hydropolitics. Accordingly, as shown in the context 
of the framework of hydro-hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony, the literature considers 
both material and discursive power capabilities as in understanding power in constructivism. 
As shown in the previous section different dimensions of material and discursive power 
capabilities are taken into consideration in the hydropolitical analysis (Zeitoun and Warner 
2006, Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008, Cascao and Zeitoun 2010, Zeitoun, Mirumachi et al. 
2010).  Although it is not delimited clearly, different aspects of power account for making 
hydropolitical analysis in the critical body of literature. In Chapter 3, I will discuss these 
aspects in detail. It appears that there are two main roles of power according to this literature. 
First, actors in hydropolitics use the above-stated material (geography, material power 
capabilities) and discursive (bargaining and ideational) power capabilities to achieve their 
goals in hydropolitics. In other words, power mainly shapes the outcome (who gets what) in 
hydropolitics. Second, power shapes conflictual and cooperative relations in transboundary 
water politics. Accordingly, while conflictual relations are more likely to occur where there is 
a power asymmetry between actors, cooperative relations are more likely to occur where 
there is power symmetry between actors (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008, Mirumachi 2010). 
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This study also acknowledges the relevance of power and will take up and further develop 
existing literature on power in the analysis.  
 
In spite of the above stated contributions of the critical body of literature in hydropolitics, it 
can be further improved through following ways.  
 
Firstly, considering the critical body of literature, it is seen that relations between co-riparian 
states in transboundary water contexts constitute the focus. The frameworks of the TWINS, 
Hydro-Hegemony, Counter Hydro-Hegemony, developed by scholars from LWRG, merely 
look at inter-state relations in transboundary water contexts. Inter-state hydropolitics is the 
only layer that most of the critical conceptual framework on power focuses on. In my view, 
this state centric approach is both theoretically and empirically problematic due to following 
reasons. It is theoretically problematic because studies based on constructivist approaches in 
IR theory emphasise the pluralistic approach including multiple actors but not limited to state 
actors. However, both TWINS framework and the related conceptual frameworks mainly 
focus on relations between riparian states in transboundary water contexts. Thus, the 
framework of hydro-hegemony is being criticised for being state-centric in literature 
(Davidson-Harden and al. 2007, Selby 2007). It is empirically problematic since co-riparian 
states are not the only actors in transboundary contexts. As shown in Chapter 1, hydropolitics 
as a study area is composed of different layers and there are actors other than co-riparian 
states that are involved in the political processes in transboundary water contexts. Although 
state-centric approach will be adopted in the analysis of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations in Chapters 6 and 7, the study will also analyse the layer of transnational 
hydropolitics in Chapter 8 by looking at controversial Ilısu dam project. In doing so, the 
study will extend the applicability of the critical body of literature other than the layer of 
inter-state hydropolitics.  
 
 
Secondly, the critical body of literature analyses how outcomes (who gets what) in 
hydropolitical relations between actors. According to this view, actors in hydropolitics often 
do not possess equal material and discursive power capabilities and there are often 
asymmetrical power configurations shaping the outcome in transboundary water basins. The 
strength of the critical body of literature is its ability to weight elements of material and 
discursive power capabilities of actors thereby its ability to expose asymmetrical or 
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symmetrical power configurations in transboundary water basins. However, as pointed out in 
the previous point, its weakness is that it has not been extensively applied to layers of 
hydropolitics other than inter-state hydropolitics. Furthermore, it is also argued that these 
power asymmetries and symmetries shape conflictual and cooperative relations between 
actors in hydropolitics. However, as I will discuss in detail in theoretical framework in 
Chapter 4, this facet of the critical body of literature does not provide a sufficient account 
regarding factors leading to conflictual and cooperative relations between actors.  
 
 
Thirdly, as stated above, one of the main arguments of the critical body of literature drawing 
upon constructivism is that conflict and cooperation in hydropolitics between actors are not 
only objective facts but are socially constructed, resulting from particular social and historical 
contexts. Therefore, they are not fixed but may change over time. As seen in the context of 
the TWINS framework nuances of conflict and cooperation are identified in detail. 
Mirumachi integrates the securitization theory and its application to transboundary water 
context and identifies nuances of conflict as discursive processes. Although Mirumachi 
admits that further theorisation is needed, she also identifies nuances of cooperation in 
transboundary water politics. This conceptualisation enables us to see the trajectory of 
changes in inter-state relation in transboundary water contexts. For example, as I will discuss 
in chapters 6 and chapter 7, we can identify a notable change in Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations from ‘high conflict-low cooperation’ to ‘low conflict-high cooperation’, to put it 
other way from securitization to politicization, in different time periods, which can be shown 
in the TWINS framework. Yet, we cannot analyse the change as discursive processes from a 
constructivist point of view, even though we can show factors leading to cooperative 
relations on transboundary water politics. The concept of de-securitization provides a strong 
explanatory tool to understand how changes from conflict to cooperation occur in inter-state 
hydropolitics. How formerly securitised transboundary water issues become de-securitised 
will be discussed in detail in Chapters 7 and 9 in detail in the context of relevant literature on 
de-securitisation.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to review conceptual frameworks developed around the 
concept of hydropolitics in the case of transboundary water issues. The following findings 
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can be summarised. First, the chapter finds that both mainstream/rationalist and 
critical/reflectivist approaches in IR theory have been applied to understand hydropolitical 
relations among various actors in transboundary water basins. Second, the chapter finds that 
rationalist approaches in IR theory, realism and liberalism, have become dominant 
approaches in understanding patterns of conflict and cooperation between riparian states in 
transboundary water basins. In Section, 2.3, the chapter discussed core assumptions of two 
mainstream approaches in hydropolitics, hydro-realism and hydro-liberalism, considering 
inter-state hydropolitical relations are inherently conflictual or cooperative respectively. 
Second, the chapter finds that while hydro-realism and hydro-liberalism have remained 
prevalent in the literature, we may observe growing application of conceptual framework that 
can be considered within critical/reflectivist approaches in IR theory. In Section 2.4, the 
chapter discussed those conceptual frameworks by dividing them into two broad categories. 
First, the conceptual frameworks, developed around hydro-constructivism (analysing patterns 
of conflict and cooperation drawing upon constructivism in IR theory) and hydro-hegemony 
(conceptual frameworks assessing the role of power how different dimensions of power are at 
work in transboundary water issues), were discussed in detail. Considering these two 
approaches in general, we may observe overlaps in terms of core assumptions and use of 
similar concepts. Therefore, this study refers these critical approaches as the critical body of 
literature that will be the basis of theoretical framework as to be discussed subsequently in in 
Chapter 3.  
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3. CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
ENHANCED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK of POWER in 
HYDROPOLITICS  
 
3.1. Introduction to Theoretical Framework: The Concept and Role of Power in 
Hydropolitics   
 
This chapter develops a distinctive theoretical framework, called “Enhanced Analytical 
Framework of Power in Hydropolitics”. The theoretical framework seeks to inform empirical 
cases in this study and discuss theorization of hydropolitics, discussed in Chapter 2. 
Particularly, the theoretical framework of this study is based on critical approaches to 
hydropolitics as discussed in Section 2.4; these approaches constitute the departure point of 
development of the theoretical framework.  
 
The concept of power has been widely researched in the study of hydropolitics. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, power is a key factor in understanding transboundary water relations 
between riparian states in hydro-realism (See Section 2.3.1). Power in hydro-realism is 
understood as material capabilities of actors (Gleick 1993, Lowi 1995). However, this 
understanding is deemed too narrow by the critical body of literature, as developed by the 
London Water Research Group (LWRG). As discussed in the previous chapter the conceptual 
frameworks such as those of hydro-hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony have focused not 
only on the material dimension of power but also its discursive dimensions (Zeitoun and 
Warner 2006, Cascao 2009). These frameworks and the related concepts constitute the bases 
of analysing power in this chapter.  
 
 
Looking at this literature in general, the concept of power is understood as follows. First, 
power is a ‘tool’ to achieve certain goals and also a ‘go al’ actors seek to achieve. This 
understanding of power is incisively stated at the beginning of hydro-hegemony framework 
in the phrase, “upstream states use water to get more power and downstream states use power 
to get more water” (Warner 2004, Zeitoun and Warner 2006:436).  It is argued that while 
water is a tool to be more powerful for upstreamers, it is a goal for downstreamers and power 
is exerted to reach this ultimate aim in transboundary water relations between the riparian 
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states. However, this chapter will show hydraulic development is an effective tool to increase 
states’ material and discursive capabilities. This linkage between power and hydraulic 
development is applicable to both upstream and downstream co-riparian states. In fact, 
upstream and downstream states are driven by similar aspirations, which can be associated 
with power. Moreover, empirical cases show that both upstream and downstream riparian 
states use different power capabilities (material and discursive) to reach certain goals. 
Therefore, it appears that the argument rather oversimplifies the aims of co-riparian states 
enabling them to conduct hydraulic development project in transboundary water basins. 
Nevertheless, as the following sections will illustrate power can be understood both as a tool 
to achieve certain goals and a goal to achieve hydraulic development in inter-state 
hydropolitics.  
 
 
Second, power is understood both in absolute and relative aspects. While the former is 
implicitly labelled as power capabilities of actors, the latter is referred as power symmetries 
or asymmetries (Zeitoun and Jagerskog 2011:9). As shown different dimensions of power, 
riparian position, material power, bargaining power, ideational power, are elaborated in the 
literature. This detailed assessment analyses actors’ absolute power capabilities and power 
configuration between riparian states in transboundary basins. Finally, the critical literature 
takes into account both potential and actual power. While, potential power (puissance) refers 
to capabilities and abilities, actual power (pouvoir) creates an impact on particular actors(s). 
While material power capabilities can be considered as potential power, discursive power 
capabilities (bargaining and ideational) can be actual power. However, frameworks of hydro-
hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony do not explicitly show how different material power 
capabilities of actors are actualised.  
 
Apart from how power can be understood in hydropolitics, the critical body of literature also 
problematizes the role of power in hydropolitics. Accordingly, the role of power functions in 
hydropolitical relations between riparian states in two ways.  
 
 
First, the outcome (who gets what) in transboundary water basins is subject to material and 
discursive power capabilities. In other words, material and discursive power capabilities of 
actors establish symmetrical and asymmetrical power configurations, and the outcome is 
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shaped by these configurations. In this respect, the literature mainly analyses how actors exert 
different power tactics in their interactions with others (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Although 
this facet of literature has been extensively developed as layers of inter-state hydropolitics 
(inter-state hydropolitical relations between riparian states in transboundary water basins), its 
applicability is still limited in relation to other layers of hydropolitics. As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, this study will not only look at inter-state hydropolitics, but also examine 
transnational hydropolitics by using Ilısu dam conflict between the opponents and proponents 
of the project as an empirical case study. Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter 2, state centric 
view, focussing merely on the layer of inter-state hydropolitics is one of the major 
weaknesses of the critical body of literature. Considering the layer of transnational 
hydropolitics, there are varieties of actors including central governments, 
regional/provincial/local governmental authorities, private sector actors and civil society 
actors. These actors interact with one another at different scales and influence decision-
making processes. This study argues that, adopting multi-scalar approach is necessary to 
understand complex relations at different scales. Moreover, since power also applies 
construction of these scales, understanding scalar dynamics enhances our current 
understanding of the role of power in hydropolitics.  
 
Second, it is argued that power symmetries and asymmetries between/among riparian states 
in transboundary water basins do not only impact on the outcome, but also influence 
conflictual or cooperative relations (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008:309). However, as will be 
discussed in the subsequent sections although factors leading to conflictual and cooperative 
relations in hydropolitics and their relations with power are problematized, the literature does 
not provide an exhaustive account.  
 
Bearing the above points in mind, the structure of this chapter will be as follows. In the first 
section, functions of power at different layers of hydropolitics will be examined; the concept 
of scale and its relations with power will be problematized. In the second section the role of 
power in terms of understanding the conflictual and cooperative relations will be analysed. In 
the final section, the role of power explaining the outcome and the frameworks of hydro-
hegemony and counter hegemony will be discussed so that material and discursive power 
capabilities used by state and non-state actors can be understood.  
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3.2. Understanding Power at Different Layers of Hydropolitics  
 
In Chapter 1, this study had shown inter-state hydropolitical relations between riparian states 
in transboundary water basins, labelled as the layer of inter-state hydropolitics, constituting 
the bulk of academic scholarly works in hydropolitics. However, it was also shown that other 
sets of relations in which inter-governmental organisations, different segments of nation-state 
apparatus, regional/provincial governmental authorities (regional governments, 
municipalities), NGOs, private sector actors and individuals interact with each other and are 
involved in decision-making processes with respect to water resource management in the 
context of layers of transnational, sub-national, every day and global hydropolitics. The 
concept of scale is used by the scholars to address these sets of relations among actors 
(Warner 2010:119, Mustafa 2007: 487, Turton 2002:17, Harris 2002). Particularly, as 
different layers other than inter-state hydropolitics have become more salient, scholars 
emphasise the importance of scalar approach in hydropolitics (Alatout 2008, Feitelson and 
Fischhendler 2009, Harris and Alatout 2010). Some scholars use the term ‘level’ in the 
literature to emphasise diverse sets of relations in hydropolitics (e.g.: Allouche 2010:45, 
Meissner 2005: 103). However, as will be explained in the subsequent sections, the concept 
of scale is extensively researched by disciplines such as geography, ecology, environmental 
governance, which provides insights to the study of hydropolitics. Therefore, I will use the 
concept of scale throughout the study. In the subsequent section, I will first problematize the 
concept of scale and then integrate the concept of scale to the existing power theory 
developed by the critical body of literature. 
 
3.2.1. The Concept of Scale: Scales as Socio-Political Constructions in 
Hydropolitics  
 
The concept of scale is widely used by different disciplines such as physical geography, 
human geography, ecology, and environmental governance to understand human-
environment relationships. In spite of its widespread use, it is a complex concept interpreted 
differently by diverse disciplines. In this respect, two general considerations of scale can be 
identified in the literature (Reed and Bruyneel 2010:647).  
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Firstly, for some the concept of scale is considered as “temporal and/or spatial range and 
magnitude of process of observation” (Silver 2008:922); physical geographers and other 
natural scientists tend to use this understanding of scale Here, scales are understood as a 
spatial category and influence different constructed models and results across diverse 
observation levels (Reed and Bruyneel 2010: 647). Secondly, the concept of scale refers to 
“social organisations and interactions between those levels of organizations (provincial to 
federal, household to community” (Silver 2008: 922). Human geographers and other social 
scientists tend to use this consideration of scale (Reed and Bruyneel 2010: 647); it is 
understood as ‘levels of representation’ (Johnston 2000:724).  
 
In this context, scales are understood as relational elements that are socially constructed and 
politically contested (Silver 2008, Reed and Bruyneel 2010, Norman, Bakker et al. 2012, 
Delaney and Leitner 1997, Marston, 2000, among others). Actors such as individuals, 
informal or formal groups, governmental or non-governmental organizations interact at these 
scales to pursue certain goals. Therefore, these scales can be labelled as ‘scales of 
governance’ (Norman and Bakker 2008:103). Moreover, it is also argued that power 
capabilities of those actors strongly shape construction of those scales. Swyngedouw 
(2001:5) describes scalar configurations as “… the outcome of social-spatial processes that 
regulate and organize social power relations”. According to Swyngedouw since power 
configurations are not fixed they are subject to change over time and change in power 
relations between actors result in transformation of scalar dynamics (Swyngedouw 2005:8). 
Thus, scales of governance depend on where social, economic and political power resides.  
 
Furthermore, it would be also misleading to understand the spatial and/or temporal scales as 
socially fixed elements. Spatial scales such as basin, region, and province are not just given 
realties, but they are also social constructions of constant human interactions within particular 
historical and geographical context. These constant relations between different actors form 
shared understandings of what region or locality represent (Sneddon, Harris et al. 2002: 667). 
Moreover, as is the case of water issues, human interventions make spatial scales even more 
complicated as a result new spatial scales are constructed. For instance, dams, reservoir lakes 
and irrigation zones are established as a result of human intervention in water resources  
(Sneddon, Harris et al. 2002:666).  
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In hydropolitics, the emergence of nation states can be considered as a turning point in 
construction of both spatial scales and scale of governance. It can be argued that construction 
of national/domestic scales is directly related with power consolidation of nation states 
(Alatout and Harris 2010). Here, the question is how nation states scale their water resources. 
In his seminal work, Water Nationalism, Allouche (2005) shows hydraulic development is a 
part of state making processes. Accordingly, this process occurs as follows. First, water is 
labelled as a strategic resource which the central government must deal with it. Drawing upon 
securitization theory, this process can be labelled as politicization of water resources. In most 
cases, water resources are securitized by the discursive elites of the state due to their socio-
economic and political importance. Second, nation states realise institutionalization of water 
resource management, which can be called centralization. Thus, central, regional, regional 
state apparatuses are established. Finally, nation states claim exclusive sovereignty rights 
over their spatial scales (territory) they control in so doing water resources in which they are 
located. Here, it should be noted that central governments not only exert their state power in 
their spatial scales and establish their central, regional, provincial and local state apparatuses 
(Brenner 1997), but they also delineate and frame those scales in a particular way. In other 
words, nation-states intervention plays a major role in constructing and framing spatial 
scales. Thus, spatial scales can be sub-basins, regions, provinces, cities and so on. As will be 
shown in the analytical chapters, these spatial scales are social constructs and do not 
necessarily correspond with the physical reality (Barnes 2009).  
 
Finally, once national/domestic scale is constructed through the control of central 
governments it results in construction of transboundary/inter-state scales in water resources 
that do not recognise political boundaries of nation states. Therefore, others scales of 
governance may be established between riparian states in transboundary watersheds. 
Moreover, framing transboundary watersheds is also construction of certain historical and 
political contexts. As will be discussed in the following analytical chapters, riparian states 
may adopt different interpretation of what spatial scale represents and how it can be framed. 
This difference may also be the core issue of water conflict in inter-state relations.  
 
While nation states continue to be the most powerful actor in hydropolitics, there has been a 
major shift in discourse from government to governance in water resources management. 
According to this view, nation-state is no longer the only decision-making authority in water 
resource management and development. Instead, water governance provides a condition 
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where different actors interact with one another and influence decision-making processes at 
different degrees (Pahl-Wostl, Gupta et al. 2008:423). As will be analysed in detail in the 
following sections, this transformation from government to governance has occurred as a 
result of promoting the holistic approach (promotion of Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) as a hegemonic concept) and the discourse of privatisation and 
marketization as a prevailing paradigms in water resource management (Budds and Hinojosa 
2012:121,122).   
 
This structural transformation has resulted in the following changes: 
 
a. Participation of different stakeholders: While the nation state and its regional and local 
apparatuses have been the ultimate decision-making authority in issues related to 
governance of water, various stakeholders such as private sector actors, NGOs, 
individuals, regional and local governmental authorities have also been involved in 
hydropolitical processes.  
 
b. Constructions of new scales of governance: As the actors from public, private sectors 
and civil society are involved in hydropolitical process, this results in establishment of 
new decision-making bodies such as multi-stake holder platforms in water resources 
management. Moreover, growing involvement of private sector also results in 
establishment of new decision-making bodies. The newly constructed scales enable 
actors from different sectors to engage in decision-making processes to influence 
water resources management and development (Budds and Hinojosa 2012:123).  
 
c. Re-definition of spatial scales: A typical example of redefining spatial scale is the 
promoting the idea the best way for effective water resources management and 
development is to consider watersheds as single hydrological unit and designate 
institutionalization accordingly (Moss and Newig 2010). The outcome of this change 
could be establishment of intergovernmental or supranational decision making bodies, 
which could re-territorialize spatial scales. However, it should be noted that even in 
the most extreme cases, the outcome is a hybrid type of re-territorialisation of spatial 
scales where states retain their primary position (Johnson 2012).  
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After having identified how scales are constructed in the course of time, the study will look at 
how power is applied in construction of scales. The study will integrate the Power Cube 
approach developed by John Gaventa (2005) within the analysis.  
 
3.2.2. Scales and Power: Integrating the Power Cube to the Critical Conceptual 
Frameworks on Power  
 
In the previous part, I argued that scales, including geographical size and levels are not only 
spatial facts, but also products of inter-subjective understandings in which power relations 
apply. Here, the question is how to conceptualize relations between scales and power. 
 
Regarding the link between scales and power, Gaventa’s power cube is a useful tool to 
understand the link between scale and power (Gaventa 2005). Drawing upon Lukes’s tri-
dimensional power view, Gaventa identifies different dimensions of power as invisible, 
hidden and visible power. From this aspect, Gaventa’s conceptualisation of power 
dimensions is in accordance with Luke’s three faces of power approach. As such, visible 
power, hidden power and invisible power can be equated to coercion, influence and authority 
respectively (Gaventa 2005: 14). However, Gaventa finds this conceptualisation inadequate 
in understanding power. He argues “power must be understood in relation to how spaces for 
engagement are created, the levels of power (from local to global), as well as different forms 
of power across them.” (Gaventa 2005:6).  In the power cube, Gaventa (2005: 10) mainly 
analyses the following three elements;  
a. Spaces of engagement  
b. Places and levels where engagements take place  
c. Forms of power, which is at work within and across those spaces and places.  
Gaventa labels the first element as spaces of power that refer to opportunities, moments and 
channels through which citizens can participate and potentially influence policies, discourses 
and decisions. Such spaces are not simply out there but are socially constructed (Gaventa 
2005:11). Construction of these spaces is a power-laden process. Power relations shape 
constructions of these spaces for participation (Cornwall in Gaventa 2005: 11). Gaventa also 
problematizes how these spaces for participation are created and suggests three types of 
spaces for participation (Gaventa 2005:12), which are:  
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Closed spaces; these are official or unofficial arenas controlled by an elite group 
(bureaucrats, experts, elected representatives), exclude citizen participation. Therefore, those 
decision-making spaces only enable particular actors and exclude others.  
 
Invited spaces; these are still controlled by an elite group, but may widen participation by 
inviting other groups to discuss issues and learn their views on specific issues. 
 
Claimed spaces; these refer to platforms for decision-making claimed by relatively less 
powerful actors against the power holders.  
 
Finally, Gaventa illustrates the dynamic character of these spaces that are constantly closing 
and opening throughout the interactions between actors. For example, actors’ changing 
material and discursive power capabilities may result in opening new spaces or closing 
spaces that are already open (Gaventa 2005: 13).  
 
Gaventa labels the second element as places where participation and decision-making takes 
place. Depending on where social, political and economic power resides, Gaventa identifies 
local, national and global places. As in the case of spaces, places are dynamic social construct 
that may change over time (Gaventa 2005: 13). The concept of place corresponds to the 
broad understanding of scale, as explained above in the scales of governance.  Gaventa also 
emphasises that local actors use global platforms to pursue their goals as seen in the case of 
transnational anti-dam activism in Narmada Dam in India (Gaventa 2005: 13). This view is 
related to the concept of ‘jumping scales’, which refers to actors’ ability to be involved in 
different scales (Budds and Hinojosa 2012:123).   
 
The final element of power cube approach is the forms of power that surrounds spaces and 
places. Drawing upon Lukes’s tri-dimensional power approach, Gaventa identifies visible, 
hidden and invisible forms of power. Examples of visible power can be formal rules, 
structures, institutions and procedures of decision-making that enable engagement of actors 
in the decision-making processes or exclude them from such processes. Hidden power refers 
to actors’ ability to influence in setting the agenda. Invisible power refers to, perhaps, the 
most powerful form of power that shapes physiological and ideological boundaries of 
participation (Gaventa 2005: 15). The following figure shows the template of the power cube 
provided by Gaventa. 
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Figure 7 Power Cube Template 
 
Source: Gaventa (2005: 11)  
 
Gaventa notes each of these three spectrums – space, place and forms of power - are 
interrelated. For example, changes in global, national or local places may result in opening or 
closure of spaces. Likewise, a particular actor may increase its power capabilities by making 
vertical or horizontal alliances. The power gained may create new spaces (Gaventa 
2005:15,16).  
 
Although the power cube approach analyses how different forms of power are at work in 
participation of citizens in decision-making processes at different scales and spaces; it also 
expands our understanding and the role of power in hydropolitics. Regarding the applicability 
of the power cube in hydropolitical analysis, two main points can be made.  
 
First, the concept of space expands our understanding of multiple scalar dynamics in 
hydropolitics. In this respect, closed, invited and claimed spaces can be identified at different 
scales in the context of different layers of hydropolitics. For example, considering the layer 
of inter-state hydropolitics, different levels of interactions from high-ranking decision makers 
to lower ranking bureaucratic bodies establish transboundary scales. Riparian states may also 
establish particular decision-making bodies such as river basin organisation, regional inter-
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governmental organisation (e.g.: River basin organisations, initiatives), ad hoc meetings and 
so on as spaces. In other words, multiple spaces can be established as decision-making bodies 
and arenas of engagement at different scales.  
 
 
In terms of how those spaces are constructed, we may observe examples of closed, invited 
and claimed spaces. A typical example of closed spaces is intergovernmental negotiations 
between riparian states, which are not, often, allowed involvement of other actors such as 
NGOs, intergovernmental organisations, third party states and so on. In some hydro-social 
context, actors from public sector (central governments, municipalities, and regional 
governments), private sector and civil society may be involved in the decision-making 
processes. Such spaces can be considered as invited spaces. Multi-stake holder platforms can 
be typical examples of invited spaces (Warner 2010). However, involvement of actors from 
different sectors does not necessarily result in symmetrical relationships among those actors. 
For example, Bakker and Morgan (2009) analyse water governance in the US-Canada 
borderland arguing that in spite of greater involvement of local actors in transboundary water 
governance, nation-state retain their power in water governance. Therefore, power dynamics 
must be critically assessed among those actors in decision-making processes.  
 
 
Second, in fact, actors do exert variety of material and discursive power tactics in constructed 
spaces in which they interact with other actors to pursue their goals. However, in some cases, 
keeping spaces closed for particular actors or claiming to open new spaces to influence are 
tools of discursive power tactics for actors to pursue their goals. For instance, actors from 
civil society often cannot be involved at governmental decision-making processes. Yet, they 
may claim to open new spaces for influencing the decision making processes in particular 
water policies or projects., Appeals to national courts made by the NGOs regarding a 
particular water policies or projects adopted by central governments  can be considered as 
attempts to open new claimed spaces.  
 
As pointed by Gaventa (2005), while relatively weaker actors seek to open new claimed 
spaces to increase their capacity to influence, relatively more powerful actors tend to keep 
existing spaces. However, in some cases changes in power configurations and/or socio-
political transformations in the given hydro-social context result in construction of new 
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spaces. As will be discussed in the empirical chapters, these patterns can be found both in the 
contexts of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics.  
 
3.2.3. Mapping Actors in Hydropolitics  
 
 
The concept of scale is directly related to the issue of mapping actors. Given the complex 
character of scalar dynamics in hydropolitics, various actors engage or attempt to be involved 
in the decision-making processes. As in the case of scales, the question that needs to be posed 
is how we can outline a systematic account of actors. In my view, involvement of different 
actors in any given hydropolitical context varies, which, in turn, is subject to the state-society 
relations and the power configurations among different interest groups in any given domestic 
context. For example, while civil society groups and private sector have considerable 
influence in one domestic context, these dynamics can simply be lacking in another. Here, the 
type of regime a state has plays an important role. Involvement of civil society groups and 
private sector actors in decision-making processes is more likely in democratic pluralistic 
regimes, while participation of these actors in decision-making processes is less likely to 
occur in authoritarian, statist or corporatist regimes (Khagram 2004:21).  
 
Regarding mapping actors at different scales, Wagerich and Warner (2010:11) provide a 
systemic account that clearly illustrates the importance of considering different actors located 
in different scales (see Table 5). Accordingly, actors involved in hydropolitics are mainly 
located within three scales: international, national and local. Moreover, they also identify 
three different sectors, public, civil society and private sectors to differentiate the types of 
actors. Here, public sector actors refer to governmental or intergovernmental actors. Private 
sector actors refer to profit-based organisations acting different scales. Actors from civil 
society are non-profit organisations acting as societal forces to influence in decision-making 
process in different policy domains. Warner also points out that horizontal, vertical and 
diagonal interactions can be identified between those actors. Table 5, introduced by Warner 
and Wagerich (2010:11), shows how mapping actors looks like in hydropolitics.  
  
76 
 
Table 5 Playing field from government (state only) to governance (mix of actors) 
 
Source: Wagerich and Warner (2010: 11)  
 
 
In my view, Table 5, provided by Warner and Wagerich, adequately shows scalar dynamics 
based on actors’ different origins in state-society relations in the context of layer of inter-state 
hydropolitics. However, as I will discuss the context of Ilısu dam conflict in Chapter 8, scalar 
dynamics in transnational hydropolitics are much more complex than inter-state hydropolitics 
given the variety of actors involved in decision-making process. Therefore, mapping actors 
according to different scales provided by Warner and Wagerich does not entirely capture 
mapping the actors in the context of layer of transnational hydropolitics.  
 
I argue that the state does play a critical role in mapping actors in transnational hydropolitics. 
This does not only stem from the fact the state is still arguably the most influential actor in 
hydropolitics but it also forms political, institutional and societal boundaries among different 
actors. Therefore, I categorise scales in hydropolitics as national/domestic and international. 
Here, international scales refer to those constructed outside the domestic context and states 
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Local SME  
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are central actors. In this regard, the international scale can be further sub-divided into global 
and regional scales. Such subdivision is made to differentiate the dynamics directly related 
with a certain transboundary context and other dynamics that directly or indirectly affect 
transboundary water politics. Likewise, domestic scales can be divided into national and 
local. Moreover, as Warner and Wagerich point out actors in hydropolitics can also be 
categorised as private, public and civil society sectors in terms of their position in state-
society relations. Bearing in mind these points, Table 6 shows actors in hydropolitics 
according to their scales and sectors. 
 
Table 6 Actors in the layers of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics 
Source: 
Author’s own compilation based on Wagerich and Warner 
 
 
The following observations can be made from the Table 6.   
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First, scales identified in the table are not fixed but subject to change according to different 
empirical contexts. For example, while the Turkish domestic context does allow creation of 
opposition movements organised primarily by civil society against dams, such movements 
cannot be established in the context of neighbouring Syria simply because such societal 
forces do not operate.   
 
Second, since this study asserts that scales are social constructions, new scales are expected 
to emerge over time in the same water context. Thus, as would be elaborated, recent changes 
in the hydropolitics of the ET basin is a suitable example of how new scales may be 
constructed by involving new actors in the decision-making process.  
 
Third, the role of state is still important in this conceptualisation. The states and its different 
bodies interact with both international and domestic actors on water issues. While states 
establish vertical relations with other domestic actors, they also form horizontal relations with 
international actors. Although states act as a reference point in actors-scales mapping in 
hydropolitics, this does not necessarily mean that only vertical interactions between states 
and other actors or horizontal interactions within each domestic and international scales 
occur. As would be elaborated in the third analytical chapter, in the case of transboundary 
waters, certain actors located in international scales simply do not recognise political 
boundaries and establish diagonal relations between the actors located in domestic realm and 
vice versa.  
 
Finally, it would be misleading to consider the state as a single unit in hydropolitics. Various 
divisions within states such as hydro-bureaucracies (hydraucracies) and judicial bodies may 
be directly or indirectly involved in decision-making processes. Moreover, there may be 
different perceptions or even contestation within hydraucracies or between with other 
bureaucratic structures. For example, Molle et al (2009:339) illustrate how different 
bureaucratic divisions within the state compete with each other on particular water policy or 
project. Therefore, the public sector-national scale (part of the table) elaborates possible 
decision-making bodies. Conceptualization of actors and scales in hydropolitics in 
transboundary water contexts is at the heart of this study’s contribution to existing literature.  
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After having analysed the concept of scale, its relationship with power and mapping actors in 
hydropolitics according to scales, the following section will look at how power influences in 
patterns of conflict and cooperation in hydropolitics.  
3.3. Influence of Power in Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in Hydropolitics: 
Critical Approaches and their Limitations  
 
As pointed out in introduction of this chapter, understanding how power influences 
conflictual and cooperative relations are one of the researched enquiries problematized in the 
context of critical body of literature. In hydro-hegemony framework, Zeitoun and Warner 
(2006) argue that asymmetrical power configurations in terms of material and discursive 
power capabilities of riparian states may often lead to conflictual relations between riparian 
states in transboundary water basins. In these transboundary basins, where a clear power 
asymmetry can be identified between one riparian state and others, the type of water resource 
control strategy adopted by the riparian state enjoying material and discursive power 
supremacy over others shapes the conflictual and cooperative outcomes. Accordingly, the 
strongest riparian states may adopt resource capture, containment and integration as a water 
resource control strategies and choices made by the strongest party strongly shapes the 
patterns of high conflict-low cooperation and vice versa (Zeitoun and Warner 2006: 
443,444). However, the hydro-hegemony framework does not further elaborate why the 
different strongest riparian states, or called as the basin hegemons by the framework, adopt 
different water resources control strategies at different transboundary water contexts. In other 
words, if the riparian states seek to maximise their benefits from a particular water resource, 
as the framework considers it as taken for granted, then why some adopt resource capture as a 
water resource control strategy, while others adopt the strategy of integration.  
 
In a similar vein, drawing upon the hydro-hegemony framework, Mirumachi (2009: 62) 
argues that asymmetrical power configurations between riparian states have a determining 
role in construction of conflictual and cooperative patterns. Furthermore, Mirumachi (2009: 
213) also identifies drivers increasing conflict and reducing cooperation intensities and vice 
versa. Accordingly, demand for water resources by riparian states may increase conflictual 
relations and decrease cooperative relation in transboundary water basins In other words, 
growing water demands for each riparian state may negatively affect transboundary water 
relations (Mirumachi 2009:214). Mirumachi and Allan argue that levels of scarcity in 
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particular transboundary water basin directly influence conflict and cooperation intensities 
between riparian states. While hydropolitical relations are more conflictual than cooperative 
in transboundary water basins where water scarcity is high, they are more cooperative than 
conflictual in transboundary water basins where scarcity is moderate (Allan and Mirumachi 
2010: 23). However, as illustrated in the previous chapter, the concept of water scarcity in the 
MENA region must be understood as a constructed knowledge rather an objective truth. In 
other words, water scarcity is a discourse subject to interpretation of particular discursive 
elites for a certain physical reality. If water scarcity is socially constructed, then it cannot be a 
factor for conflictual and cooperative relations between actors itself. The social, political, 
physical conditions in which water scarcity are constructed needs to be analysed to 
understand the role of water scarcity in water conflict and cooperation.  
 
It is worth noting that Mirumcahi also considers water demand as a driver to increase 
cooperation and reduce conflicts in transboundary water relations between riparian states, 
since riparian states may find it beneficial to tackle with their growing water demands by 
conducting joint actions and forming common goals with the other riparian states, which 
would foster cooperative actions in inter-state hydropolitical relations (Mirumachi 2009: 
214). Considering water demand as a driver for increasing conflict and reducing cooperation 
intensities and vice versa implies that discursive elites may construct different social realties 
by interpreting same physical realities such as perceiving water scarcity, water demand and 
construction of a dam or irrigation scheme in a different way. The question worth 
investigating is under what socio-political contexts these social realities are constructed by 
the actors in hydropolitics.  
 
Finally, it is argued that broader political context and political economy landscapes shape 
conflictual and cooperative patterns in transboundary water relations between riparian states. 
In the context of political economy landscapes, it is argued that states having strong and 
diverse economic structures may achieve water security by using alternative methods (e.g: 
importing actual and/or virtual water) and they may avoid conflict with their neighbours, 
whereas poor economies lack such alternatives. (Mirumachi and Allen 2007:12, Allan and 
Mirumachi 2010: 15). Within the broader political context, Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008: 
309, 310) argue that the process of interactions is shaped by the political context in which 
interactions with respect to water issues occur between riparian states (Zeitoun and 
Mirumachi 2008: 309). Depending on the political context, there may be positive, neutral and 
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negative interactions between riparian states in transboundary water basins. Although the 
broader political context is considered to be a main factor shaping conflict and cooperation 
intensities, it has not been discussed in detail by the critical body of literature so far.   
 
In my view, although the above stated points can, to some extent, explain conflictual and 
cooperative relations between riparian states, they partially elucidate why conflictual 
relations are more salient in certain transboundary water contexts, and cooperative relations 
can be identified in others. As stated in Chapter 1, it would be rather narrow to understand 
contestation in hydropolitics as merely a contestation over resources (See Section 1.2). Ideas, 
norms and values constructed in any given hydro-social context need to be fully examined. 
This is also in accordance with constructivism arguing norms, ideas and values inform actors’ 
interests. Moreover, constructivist approach also informs us that identities that are mutually 
constructed between actors within historical context informing actors; interests thereby 
influence patterns of enmity and amity. Therefore, this study argues that those norms, ideas 
and values need to be examined to understand conflictual and cooperative relations in 
hydropolitics. However, this study does not suggest that power has no role in conflictual and 
cooperative relations in hydropolitics. On the contrary, as it will be shown in following 
section, construction of those norms, values and ideas are power-laden process and direct 
linkages can be found between them and actors’ material and discursive power capabilities.  
 
3.3.2. Norms, Values, Ideas in Hydropolitics and their Role in Understanding 
Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation  
 
In the previous section, utility of norms, ideas and values were discussed in understanding 
conflictual and cooperative relations between actors in hydropolitics. This section will 
analyse how these norms, values and ideas constructed in any given hydro-social context can 
be examined in a systematic way. This inquiry, in my view, can be addressed by looking at 
the combination of two overarching factors.  
 
Firstly, we can identify certain sets of norms with respect to water resources development 
that inform actors’ interests in hydropolitics. These norms can be generalised and applied to 
any hydro-social context. The prevailing water paradigms (competing discourses) in 
hydropolitics, developed by Tony Allan (2010), help to grasp norms in hydropolitics.   
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Secondly, we can identify other values including cultural-religious considerations, actors’ 
perceived identities with one another constructed due to repeated interactions over water and 
non-water issues and domestic security concerns, political considerations, which are directly 
or indirectly associated with water by actors. Contrary to the previous category the values 
associated with water cannot be generalised and they differ in different empirical cases. Their 
impacts on conflictual and cooperative relations on water also differ. They condition 
hydropolitical relations between actors and influence conflictual and cooperative relations. 
The study terms this factor as “broader political context”. The following part will discuss in 
detail these two overarching factors leading to conflict and cooperation in hydropolitics.  
 
Furthermore, this study also argues that these two overarching factors can be directly linked 
with power and they widen our understanding of power and its role in hydropolitics as will be 
discussed in the subsequent sections. The following Figure 8 illustrates factors leading 
patterns of conflict and cooperation in hydropolitics.  
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Figure 8 Factors Leading to Conflictual and Cooperative Relations in hydropolitics 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
  
 
As Figure 8 shows prevailing paradigms in hydropolitics and broader political context 
influence in patterns of conflict and cooperation in hydropolitics by informing actors’ 
mutually constructed identities and interests. These two overarching factors leading to 
conflictual and cooperative relations will be unpacked in the subsequent sections. 
Furthermore, as the figure shows, power must be taken into account to make a proper 
analysis in terms of understanding patterns of conflict and cooperation. As will be discussed 
in the subsequent sections in detail we may identify direct linkage between actors’ material 
and bargaining power capabilities and prevailing water paradigms. For example, as will be 
shown in the subsequent sections hydraulic mission, adopted by the central governments, can 
be associated with material and discursive power capabilities of riparian states. Likewise, 
similar linkage can be found between broader political context and power. For example, in 
the context of stabilised and constructive relations where cooperation can be identified in 
various fields between riparian states, riparian states less likely to use coercive mechanisms 
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such as deployment of troops, use of actual force, covert actions, destroying hydraulic 
infrastructure as power tactics in inter-state hydropolitics.  
3.3.1. Prevailing Paradigms in Hydropolitics: Norms, Ideas and Narratives 
Matter  
 
This study argues that there are certain sets of norms, ideas, rules and practices on water 
resources management and development, which sanction certain discourses and inform 
actors’ interests in hydropolitics. This study draws upon the concept of prevailing water 
paradigms in water resources development developed by Tony Allan (2010) to understand 
certain sets of norms, ideas, rules and practices. These norms and ideas can be generalised 
and they are applicable to any given hydro-social context. The following table shows the 
prevailing water paradigms in hydropolitics.  
 
Table 7 Prevailing paradigms in water resources development and management 
 
Source: Allan, 2006:46-49 
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As can be seen from Table 7, Allan identifies five prevailing paradigms on water resource 
development. These paradigms sanction competing discourses. Therefore, the competing 
character constitutes contestation between actors. It also shows evolution of prevailing 
paradigms in water resources development over time in global North and South in course of 
time. Allan (2001) in Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of these prevailing paradigms in the 
course of time in global North and South as follows.  
 
Figure 9 Five Water Resources Management Paradigms 
 
Source: Allan 2001:326  
 
As the figure above shows, Allan (2001:325) considers the last three paradigms within the 
umbrella of ‘reflexive modernity’ as a response to industrial modernity in which the 
hydraulic mission is the prevailing paradigm. In the next part, I will elaborate prevailing 
water paradigms starting from the industrial modernity, as they can be identified in the 
empirical chapters of the study. I will also show the link between conflict-cooperation 
patterns and those prevailing paradigms.  
 
3.3.1.1. Hydraulic Mission  
 
Hydraulic mission is one of the key concepts in the study of hydropolitics. It refers to 
extensive hydraulic development infrastructure conducted by the states to expand irrigation 
and hydropower capacity and prevent flooding henceforth-natural disasters (Molle, Mollinga 
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et al. 2009:333). However, understanding hydraulic mission as series of hydraulic 
development projects could be misleading. It is rather a determination that drives states to 
follow a particular path on water development (Wester, Mollard et al. 2009: 75).  
 
Turton and Meissner provide a comprehensive definition of hydraulic mission: “…. the 
overarching rationale that underpins the state’s desire to establish conditions that are 
conducive to socio-economic and political stability. As such, it can be regarded as a form of 
ideology in the study of hydropolitics, infusing itself in the dominant or sanctioned discourse, 
serving to legitimize (thereby sanction) this discourse.” (2002: 38).  
  
In unpacking this definition we can identify the following points. First, the main rationale 
behind the ‘desire’ of the state is the perception that hydraulic development enhances socio-
economic and political stability of the state. Second, the concept of hydraulic mission sets an 
ideological ground in which certain discourses are constructed by the discursive elites to 
reach particular social, economic and political goals. The components of hydraulic mission as 
a prevailing paradigm can be outlined as follows.  
 
Harnessing the Nature: Harnessing nature is the conviction that nature can be and should be 
harnessed by human intervention for the benefit of humankind. We can identify numerous 
discourses, which reflect the idea that nature must be controlled for the benefit of humankind 
across the world particularly during the first half of the 20th century. For example, in the 
inaugural ceremony of the Boulder Dam in the US, President Roosevelt proclaimed victory 
of humankind over nature (Molle, Mollinga et al. 2009, Molle 2011:330). Likewise, George 
Perkins Marsh, an American diplomat who was considered to be America’s first 
conservationist, stated “America offers the first example of struggle between the civilised 
man and barbarous uncultivated nature” (Marsh in Fleischman 2007:32). The same idea has 
been represented with similar discourses such as “win over nature (vence a la naturleza-
Mexico)”, “rivers to be tamed and domesticated (South Africa)”, “turn the mad rivers to sane 
(Russia), “declaration of war against nature (China)” and so on (Molle 2011).  
 
Basin-wide Hydraulic Development: In relation to the previous point, hydraulic mission is 
the conviction promoting the idea where entire potential of the watersheds should be 
developed for human welfare. (Wester 2009: 10). Moreover, this view is particularly 
imperative for areas where flow of water fluctuates erratically (Swyngedouw 2007: 12). As 
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the technological innovations in hydraulic engineering have progressed during the 20th 
century, it has become possible to develop all the streams of river basins. This made basin-
wide development projects possible, which combines the construction of multipurpose dams 
(irrigation, hydro-power, flood control) and sophisticated irrigation schemes. Thus, the idea 
of realising regional socio-economic development via combined water infrastructure was 
introduced. These ideas were materialised when the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was 
established in 1933 in the US. The main purpose of the TVA was to develop a particular 
region with a basin-wide approach via multipurpose dams and irrigation schemes. In the US, 
other regional development projects were influenced by the TVA model to some degree 
(White 1957: 170-171). The TVA model of water development also got attention from the 
other regions across the world. As William Douglas states, “The word “Tennessee” is well 
known all the way across from the Mediterranean to the Pacific . . . They know about 
Tennessee because they have heard of the Tennessee Valley Authority. It is the Tennessee 
Valley Authority that fits their needs and will solve many of their basic problems.” (Ekbladh 
2000: 335).   
 
Therefore, during the second half of the 20th century, the TVA model of development has 
been cloned primarily by developing countries all around the world. The TVA is also 
considered to an effective recipe to overcome social problems (Newson 1992: 286, Warner 
2008: 122). As will be seen in the coming chapters, the TVA model was exported to the ET 
basin in the context of the Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP) conducted by Turkey.  
 
 
Furthermore, both large-scale infrastructures and TVA type of basin-wide development 
projects are not only seen as important in terms of their socio-economic benefits, but they 
also represent the link between development and ideology. From this respect, the TVA was 
considered “to achieve development democratically” (Reisner 1990). Thus in the context, of 
the Cold War dichotomy, the TVA model was a strategy to combat backwardness in the third 
world countries and an appropriate way to struggle over the expansion of communism 
(Ekbladh 2000: 335,336).  
 
In the context of Cold War, similar patterns can be identified in the case of the Soviet Union 
under the rule of Lenin to Gorbachev. According to Soviet leadership, large-scale 
technologies in general are cultural artefacts that enhance political legitimacy of the state. 
88 
 
Corollary to this view of large-scale technologies in general, the gigantic hydraulic 
infrastructures have become important tools for socio-economic development (Joesphson 
1995).  For example, the annual report of Elektrosila describes the massive hydraulic works 
built in the Stalin era as “clear evidence of the unprecedented growth of our socialist 
economy, an expression of the outstanding success of the peaceful, constructive labour of the 
Soviet people” (Joesphson 1995:525).  
 
Dams as Symbols of State Progress: Large-scale hydraulic development projects are also 
considered as symbols of state achievements. Therefore, this symbolism is also frequently 
used by discursive elites. The view considering large-scale-projects as symbols of states’ 
progress and power is also evident in various contexts across the world. For example, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, regarded water development projects as 
“the new temples of India” (Shiva 2002: 81, Khagram 2004: 33). It appears that large-scale 
hydraulic infrastructures such as dams and irrigation canals have replaced the big cathedrals, 
palaces and mosques. This symbolism is also represented through other ways of verbal and 
non-verbal speech apart from official statements. Thus, quite often large-scale projects are 
named after important historical figures. For example, it is not just coincidence that reservoir 
lakes of the Aswan Dam (Egypt) and the Euphrates Dam (Syria) are named after Lake Nasser 
(referring to Gamal Abdel Nasser) and the Lake Asad (referring to Hafez al-Asad) 
respectively. Similarly the largest dam on the Euphrates River was named as the Ataturk 
Dam, after the founder of Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In similar vein, even 
symbolism is also carried through visual and audio discourses. For example, a few countries 
have used dam sites as pictures for their currency banknotes including Turkey and Syria. 
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Picture 1 One million Turkish Liras banknote (no longer tender) and 500 Syrian Pounds showing the 
Atatürk Dam and Euphrates Dam 
 
 
Source: Author 2014 
 
After identifying the elements of hydraulic mission as a prevailing paradigm, in the next 
section I will examine how it is closely linked with power and how it shapes conflictual 
relations between riparian states.  
3.3.1.2. Hydraulic Mission as a Tool to Increase State Power and Competing Hydraulic 
Missions as a Source of Conflict  
 
Hydraulic mission is closely linked with state making processes. Although the idea of 
harnessing nature emerged in the context of industrial modernity in the 19th century, water, 
particularly irrigation, flood control and navigation has always played an important role in 
state formation. In ancient times, great civilisations were established on the banks of large 
rivers such the Nile, the Euphrates, the Tigris and so on. And the grand empires created 
within these ancient civilisations are well known for their success in developing irrigation 
schemes and increasing agricultural production to strengthen their power. It is also argued 
that the rise and fall of these civilisations is closely connected with their ability to enforce 
water management (Hillel 1994, Ohlsson 1995). 
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Regarding state formation and hydraulic development, Wittfogel (1957) analyses the link 
between control over water through large-scale development systems and the ancient great 
civilisation in Asia in his prominent book the Oriental Despotism (1957). He contends that 
since extensive labour was needed to establish large-scale irrigation systems and deal with 
huge flows it has created a suitable environment for emergence of strong authoritarian 
bureaucracies. Wittfogel calls it ‘oriental despotism’ and defines ancient civilisations as 
hydraulic civilisations. Wittfogel’s thesis –the Oriental Despotism and its relation to 
hydraulic building - has attracted intense academic debate among scholars; the thesis has 
been tested in different Asian contexts. Although it has been found that great hydraulic works 
have not necessarily resulted in despotic structures, it is clear that hydraulic development 
played a vital role in state formation and centralisation of state power in the past and when 
hydraulic mission emerged as a prevailing discourse (Molle, Mollinga et al. 2009:329).  
 
 
State making is defined as ‘state’s ability to accumulate power’. This process occurs through 
increase in states’ political and institutional power and its economic capabilities and control 
in terms of security (Jaggers 1992: 29). Therefore, it requires an effective control over a 
state’s defined territory and people and resources within (Allouche 2005: 107) Therefore, the 
power of nation state is measured by its ability to control its territory and the natural 
resources.  As the number of nation states has dramatically increased by the 20th century, new 
political entities have sought ways to increase their internal control over their territories. 
Studies from different empirical contexts illustrate that the hydraulic mission plays a vital 
role in the state making process and extends the authority of central government in to remote 
places (Allouche 2005, Wester, Rap et al. 2009: 398). In particular, it plays a vital role in 
curbing the autonomous aspirations in certain contexts (MacQuarrie 2004:32, Swyngedouw 
2007: 9)  
 
While hydraulic mission enables the extension of government’s power internally, it also 
increases their material and bargaining capabilities externally in different ways. First, 
increasing irrigation via hydraulic development will dramatically increase agricultural 
production of the country henceforth it helps sustain food security and develops national and 
local economic activities. Second, hydraulic development enables central governments to 
increase and alternate their energy production. Diversification of energy resources is 
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particularly important for states that rely largely on external energy. Third, since hydraulic 
infrastructure also helps prevent natural disasters like flooding, it will avert severe human and 
economic losses. The following figure shows the link between state power and hydraulic 
development in the context of hydraulic mission.  
 
Figure 10 Relationship between hydraulic development and power 
 
Source: Author 2014  
 
In fact, the link between hydraulic development and states’ increasing material capabilities, 
legitimacy and authority are clear. However, referring to the definition of hydraulic mission, 
the term must be understood as a form of ideology that sets out certain norms, ideas and that 
legitimises the desires of states’ extensive hydraulic development projects. These narratives 
and ideas constructed in the context of hydraulic mission constitute the ideational power 
tactics such as securitization, sanctioned discourses, framings that are used by the riparian 
states. These ideational power tactics will be discussed in detail in the final section of this 
chapter.  
 
Furthermore, water issues become national matters that the state must deal with, as the 
hydraulic mission is promoted as a prevailing paradigm, In other words, water issues are 
politicised or in most cases they are securitised by the state elites due to those strong 
incentives discussed above for the states. Growing control of central governments can also be 
92 
 
considered as construction of national scales (Allouche 2005: 114, Harris and Alatout 
2010:152). 
 
Finally, the question that needs to be addressed is how hydraulic mission influences inter-
state hydropolitics in transboundary water contexts. Given the incentives of extensive 
hydraulic development projects that are legitimised within the context of hydraulic mission, 
the reflection of hydraulic mission promoted by central governments is of greater tendency to 
unilateral development. Therefore, conflictual relations or lack of cooperative actions are 
more likely to occur in transboundary water contexts where co-riparian states are driven by 
hydraulic mission as a prevailing paradigm. 
 
3.3.1.3. Marketization of Water and Emergence of Private Sector as new Actors in 
Hydropolitics 
 
The rise of economic liberalisation and growing impact on neo-liberal policies in global scale 
by the early 1980s has led to the ‘marketization of water’ (Selby 2007: 7). This shift has 
brought new norms and practices, new actors involved in hydropolitical interactions, 
constructions of new scales and levels and new areas of contestations. The marketization of 
water is based on the idea that water can be much more efficiently utilised, if price and 
market-based mechanisms are applied (Conca 2006: 217). According to this view, the main 
problem is the inefficient use of water, since states cannot provide sufficient infrastructure to 
the people and water is not effectively valued (Finger and Allouche 2002: 3, Robbins 2003). 
As the idea of marketization has been supported by developed countries and leading to 
intergovernmental organisation in the water sector such the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), two outcomes have become more salient in hydropolitics during 
1990s and onwards; (Conca 2006: 219)  
 
i. Water as an economic value and commodification of water.  
ii. Privatisation and growing involvement of private sector.  
 
The first outcome of water marketization is the promotion of the idea that water can be 
treated as an economic good, in other words, the commodification of water. According to this 
view, it is argued that water should be regarded as a ‘private good’, responsive to market 
forces. The economists even more bluntly describe water as a ‘first commodity’ and it is 
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tradable like any other resources such oil or coal. The economists further contend that unless 
water is considered a private good, it cannot be efficiently utilised (McDonald and Ruiters 
2005:23). Thus, the idea that water must be treated as an economic good for efficiency and 
equitable use has gradually become an ‘international norm’ regarding water management and 
is part of internationally accepted principles (Solanes and Fernando 1999, Savenije and van 
der Zaag 2002). As marketization of water has become the prevailing water paradigm at 
global scale, it was also diffused through national domestic context at different degrees 
across the globe during by 1980s and onwards (Budds and McGranhan 2033, Labour 
Resource and Research Institute (LAIRI) 2005, Hale 2006, Topaloğlu 2008;among others).  
 
The second outcome of marketization is privatization of water and growing involvement of 
the private sector. Privatization is when states sell their assets (infrastructures such as dams, 
hydro-power plants, irrigation channels) and other operational, maintenance services part of 
the assets (McDonald and Ruiters 2005: 4). The natural outcomes of the privatization are 
removal of state from its traditional position as the public owner and the sole provider of 
water as a public service. In this model states only play a regulatory monitoring role in water 
services. Different types of privatization models can be identified in the water sector 
including service contracts, management contracts, BOOT (build, own, operate and transfer) 
model, lease of afterimage and so forth (McDonald and Ruiters 2005: 16,17). 
 
 
With privatization in the water sector globally, the following actors have become part of 
decision-making process. First, transnational corporations (TNCs) have emerged as owners 
and service providers.8 TNCs in water sector are labelled as infrastructure TNCs (Robbins 
2003: 1077) . In the context of globalization TNCs in general have progressively expanded 
their activities and they have become more involved in water sectors and identified as 
significant actors in hydropolitics at different scales (Finger and Allouche 2002: 105). 
Second, infrastructure TNCs often establishes alliances with the private sector in the 
domestic context including large nation-wide infrastructure firms and small and medium size 
                                                        
8
 The term “Transnational Corporation are defined as "… an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment 
and owns or controls value-adding activities in more than one country.” Altenburg, T. (2000:2 ). Linkages and 
Spill-overs between Transnational Corporations and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Developing 
Countries – Opportunities and Policies. Reports and Working Papers 5/2000. Berlin, German Development 
Institute. 
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enterprises (SMEs) (Altenburg 2000). In Chapter I will elaborate how they establish 
consortia. Third, infrastructure companies seek to acquire credits and credit guarantees to 
finance hydraulic projects. This brings banks and credit agencies as actors. For example, in 
the case of first and second consortium regarding the construction of the Ilısu dam, TNCs 
acquired export credit guarantees from the Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) of the states in 
which they were based (Fliesser 2010:72). Finally, privatization of water management in 
general and involvement of TNCs in particular is often confronted by opposition movements 
at different scales, constructed mostly by civil society actors (Bakker 2007).  
3.3.1.4. Privatization and Marketization and Power  
 
As in the case of hydraulic mission, marketization of water as a prevailing paradigm can be 
associated with power in hydropolitics in the following ways. First, while state officials from 
hydraucracies, politicians form the discursive elites in hydraulic mission, discourses 
constructed in the context of marketization of water promoted by wide range of actors 
including discursive elites of hydraulic mission, private sector actors, intergovernmental 
organisations (e.g.: the World bank), NGOs, performing at different scales (e.g.: Global 
Water Partnership). Second, state officials, politicians consider involvement of private sector 
as an ample opportunity in terms of finding new financial sources or technical expertise. 
Therefore, privatization in water sector increases bargaining and material power capabilities 
of states.   
 
However, involvement of private sector often stimulates creation of anti-privatization 
movements against hydraulic projects thereby it constitutes another conflictual dynamic in 
hydropolitics. Moreover, since private-public partnerships result in establishment of new 
spaces for decision-making processes, the newly constructed spaces also enables those 
opposition movements to claim new spaces to influence decision-making process. Therefore, 
privatisation in water sector increases states’ material and bargaining power capabilities, they 
also result in involvement of actors opposing any given hydraulic project. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 8 in detail, Ilısu dam project is a kind of public-private partnership 
model which has increased both bargaining and ideational power capabilities of actors.  
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3.3.1.5. Ecological and Political Resistance  
 
Even though the norms, practices and rules constructed in the context of hydraulic mission 
and water marketization supports the view that more infrastructure needs to be installed for 
sustainable water management; construction of large dams decreased by the 1990s and 
onwards (Khagram 2004: 6). This is primarily due to opposition movements towards such 
large-scale projects. Globally speaking, two main discourses of opposition movements 
against large-scale projects can be identified.  
 
i. Movements based on ecological, social and cultural concerns  
ii. Movements based on political concerns in relation to ownership rights.  
 
Although norms, rules and practices constructed in the context of hydraulic mission and 
water marketization are criticised as a whole by ecological and political resistance 
movements, opposition against constructions of dams is the main cause for creating these 
movements. As shown in Allan’s prevailing paradigms of water resources management the 
environmental opposition towards large-scale dams dates back to the 1970s. Preservation of 
cultural heritage was promoted by opponents of the large-scale project. In addition to 
environmental resistance against the large-scale dams advocacy networks, opposing 
privatization also become salient in later periods.   
 
The initial opposition against the construction of large dams was waged by conservationists 
fighting to protect the ecological system of the areas (Mc.Cully 2001). According to them, 
large dams have devastating effects on the ecosystems and especially when they become 
operational. Since large areas of land must be excavated during construction phase, this 
causes significant loss of fertile lands, forests and other environments. However, it is argued 
that the main destructive environmental impact occurs after the construction phase, when 
impounding of water to the reservoir commences. Afterwards, dams cause wide range 
environmental problems such as flooding of agricultural lands, forests and wildlife habitats. 
In addition, impoundment also has catastrophic effects on downstream areas including 
destruction of wildlife, biodiversity loss, and decreased fertility of agricultural land due to the 
impoundment of sediment (Goldsmith and Hildyard 1984: ch.4-5).  
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Large-scale dams also have social impacts since local population residing in submerged areas 
have to be resettled. Therefore, resettlement issues create another area of contestation 
between the ‘developers’ and ‘opponents’. This contestation does not merely stem from the 
fact that local residents tend to resist resettlement. In some cases, problems also occur during 
the settlement and post-settlement periods (The Fact Finding Committe on the Srisaliam 
Project 1984, Morvaridi 2004).  
 
 
Another problem that occurs as a result of impounding is the submergence of sites that have 
historical and cultural importance. Therefore, anti-dam campaigns are also waged to protect 
historical places in different water contexts. The ‘opponents’ of large-dams frequently use the 
argument that large dams submerge historically or culturally important sites, as this receives 
a wide-range of national and international support. For example, as it will be discussed in 
Chapter 8, protection of cultural site of Hasankeyf is the main theme of campaigns waged by 
opposition groups against the Ilısu dam project.  
 
 
Political opposition movements of anti-dam activism have gained momentum since the 1990s 
as a reaction to water marketization, especially privatization of water sector. While nature is 
the central point of ecological resistance movements, people and society constitute the central 
point of political resistance against hydraulic projects or certain water policies. In this regard, 
the issue of ownership (who has right to utilise water resources) constitutes the core of the 
debate. Therefore while opposition groups tend to consider de-centralisation and 
empowerment of local authorities in water management, central governments are often 
reluctant to give up their exclusive rights over water resources. Finally, they target 
marketization process of water. In growing water privatization across the globe in different 
contexts, economic liberalisation of trade are the main issues which activist movements wage 
campaigns at global and local scales.9  
 
Actors from civil society form the ‘discursive elites’ of ecological and political resistance 
movements. The arguments of political and ecological opposition movements on water have 
                                                        
9
 For example, at global scale, activist groups wage campaigns in the World Water Forums to oppose the neo-
liberal policies with respect to water issues. They are also active at national and local scales; they wage 
numerous campaigns in South Africa, Indonesia, Ghana, and so forth.  
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gained a momentum with action by civil society actors. Allan (2006: 44) incisively states: 
“The lesson from the North, however, is that two or three decades-long environmental 
discourse and especially water discourse, did not start in corridors of power in Washington. 
Neither did the initiative come from the multi-national corporations or from the Corps of 
Engineers or the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)…. The argument had been 
made by individuals and activists, mainly ecologists and scientists (and the hippies of the 
1960s who have now come into power)”. Civil society actors include NGOs and INGOs, 
transnational informal networks, political parties, paramilitary groups, scientists, expert 
groups, and epistemic communities (Khagram 2004:ch.4, O'Neill 2009: ch.3).  
 
3.3.1.6. Holistic Approach to Water Resources Management: The Rise of the Fifth 
Paradigm as a Hegemonic Concept  
 
While environmental and economic aspects of water management have been promoted by 
various actors, an inclusive approach gained currency in 1990s and onwards; the approach 
considered water management and allocation issues as a political process involving various 
stakeholders (Allan 2006:48). It appears that Integrated Water Resource Management 
(IWRM) has been promoted as a ‘hegemonic concept’ by various actors globally (Trottier 
2008:198, Warner 2008, Mukhtarov 2009). 
 
IWRM is inherently a political process bringing together a wide-range of actors from the 
public sector, civil society and the private sector. Since different actors prioritise different 
aspects of water, such prioritisation of actors necessarily results in contestation over different 
norms. Although the concept of IWRM has widely been recognised as a hegemonic concept, 
what the concept actually constitutes is largely a debated issue (Mukhtarov 2009:17). Here, 
my focus is not to discuss the different aspects of the concept. Rather, I will discuss how the 
fundamental elements of the fifth paradigm, specifically in relation to the concept of IWRM, 
have altered hydropolitics in terms of scalar dynamics, actors and issues.  
 
The holistic approach includes the previous sub-categories of the reflective paradigm, 
environmental discourse and marketization of water. Environmental aspects of water 
management are acknowledged as one of the key issues in water resources management in 
the IWRM. Thus, environmental pressure on water resources as a result of human activities is 
a key issue that needs to be addressed within the fifth paradigm. In addition, considering 
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water as an economic good is specified as one of the core principles of the IWRM. 
Accordingly, valuing water in terms of economic, social and environmental aspects and water 
demand management are important tools for effective utilization of water according to 
different sectors (Agarwal, Angeles et al. 2000). Therefore, having such holistic approach in 
water resource management necessarily requires greater involvement of civil society and 
private sector actors as stakeholders.  
 
The promotion of holistic approach as a hegemonic discourse has following implications in 
terms of layers of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics. Regarding inter-state 
hydropolitics, issues other than water entitlement for each riparian state including 
environmental aspects of transboundary water management (TWM), effective utilization of 
water has become part of inter-state relations. Moreover, IWRM particularly emphasises the 
significance of constant interactions among the co-riparian states. According to this 
perspective, fragmented and non-integrated approaches form the core of water related 
problems. Lack of dialogue between co-riparian states, overexploitation of water and water 
pollution may result in severe water related problems. Therefore, conflict resolution 
mechanisms between co-riparian states are vital for effective water resources management 
(Agarwal, Angeles et al. 2000:15, Molle 2008:133).  Within this context, main standpoints of 
hydro-liberalism, in which I have discussed in chapter 2, have become dominant in 
understanding transboundary water politics between co-riparian states in different empirical 
contexts across the world. In my view, as the holistic approach has become a prevailing 
paradigm in water resources management globally, it has led to the emergence of ‘water 
cooperation’ as a hegemonic concept in transboundary water management. How this point 
will be further reflected in the context of inter-state hydropolitical relations in the ET basin 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  
 
 
Regarding transnational hydropolitics, as pointed above, public participation is a key 
principle in the holistic approach. Actors from civil society or the private sectors are, in 
principle, involved in decision-making process in the context of IWRM. Therefore, adopting 
the holistic approach results in establishment of new invited spaces in the decision-making 
process. However, in spite of the wide-ranging support of the fifth paradigm from the public, 
private sectors and civil society, there are ecological and political resistance groups globally 
who challenge the core principles of the fifth paradigm that water is an economic good and 
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that privatisation is an important tool for effective water resources management. As will be 
analysed in Chapter 8, these groups seek to open new claimed spaces by using different 
bargaining power tactics such as using judicial processes and pressuring targeted groups.  
 
Finally, the IWRM, as a hegemonic concept, is a political process necessarily requiring 
participation of various stakeholders from public and private sectors and civil society. 
Therefore, it appears that adoption of the holistic approach in water resource development 
necessarily leads to politicization of water issues and construction of spaces in which 
decision-making are made by participation of different actors. As illustrated in Chapter 2, 
politicization of water issues results in more symmetrical relations between actors. Therefore, 
since the IWRM necessarily results in politicization of water issues with the involvement of 
wide-ranging participation of actor, we can identify more symmetrical relations between 
actors in hydro-social contexts where the holistic approach is a prevailing paradigm.  
 
3.3.2. Prevailing Paradigms in Water Resources Development and Power  
 
As discussed in previous sections, we can associate prevailing paradigms with actors’ 
material and bargaining power capabilities in hydropolitics. However, in my view, the main 
role of prevailing paradigms is its link with ideational power capabilities of actors. I argue 
that prevailing water paradigms are composed of certain norms, ideas and rules and serve as 
bases for ideational power capabilities of actors including securitization moves, sanctioned 
discourses, counter-securitization moves, and framings and so on. Furthermore, these norms 
inform actors’ interests who then implicitly or explicitly refer to the paradigms when 
promoting their discursive positions. Therefore, competing character of paradigms constitutes 
the discursive battle in different layers of hydropolitics.  
 
3.3.3. Broader Political Socio-Political Context an Important but Uncovered 
Factor  
 
Considering the literature on hydropolitics, there is a consensus that neither water conflict nor 
water cooperation can be understood without considering the broader context in which 
hydropolitical relations occur in transboundary water relations between riparian states 
100 
 
(Gleick 1993, Lowi 1995, Mason 2003 among others). Linkages can also be identified 
between water-conflict and other political conflicts at different scales (Harris 2002:743). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the critical body of literature developed by scholars of the 
London Water Research Group also acknowledge the importance of broader political context 
as a determinant factor in water conflict and cooperation in transboundary water context 
(Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008). Yet, these studies have not attempted to uncover what 
broader political context entails and how it could be conceptualised. The analytical Chapters 
6, 7 and 8 in this study provide rich accounts on the relationship between broader socio-
political context and hydropolitics. They show that broader political context strongly 
influences conflictual and cooperative relations in the context of the ET basin at different 
scales.  
 
The study argues that while there are certain sets of norms, ideas and narratives in 
hydropolitics that shape conflictual and cooperative relations, we can also identify values, 
ideas, constructed by actors in any given hydro-social context. These values cannot be 
generalised and they change according to different hydro-social context. These values include 
cultural/religious considerations associated with water resource by actors, actors’ perceived 
identities with one another constructed within historical context in any hydro-social contexts, 
particularly non-water issues, domestic security concerns, global or regional dynamics, 
geopolitical elements and so on. The elements of broader political context can be outlined as 
follows.  
 
Issue Linkages: We can identify direct linkages between certain water issue and non-water 
issues, as constructed by the relevant actors. In such cases, there are direct relations between 
water issues and particular ‘non-water’ issues. For example, in the case of Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations with respect to the Orontes transboundary basin, the territorial Hatay 
dispute forms the issue linkage (See Chapter 6).  
 
Geopolitical elements: It is often claimed that hydraulic infrastructure is built to meet 
particular political and security aspirations and provide supplies for different utilisation of 
water. For example, it is claimed that Kumganstan Dam, proposed by North Korea in the 
tributary of the Han River is designed to flood Seoul in the case of military emergency 
(Gleick 1993:88). Likewise, Saddam Hussein’s plan to drain the Marshlands, it is claimed, 
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was designed not only to enable land reclamation and hydrological control, but it was also 
designed to avert rebel activities in the region (North 1993:10). Considering different 
examples, it appears that while the ‘affected group(s)’ tend to level such accusations, the 
‘developers’ often deny such ‘hydraulic weapons’ claims.  
 
Domestic Concerns: Domestic political concerns may play a vital role in the rationale behind 
allocating financial resources to the state for particularly large-scale projects. As stated 
above, curbing autonomous aspirations was one the main aims of the hydraulic mission in 
Spain during the 20th century. As I will discuss in Chapter 6, decision-makers in Syria and 
Turkey have made similar linkages between the security concerns and hydraulic 
development.  
 
Global and Regional Political Dynamics; Changes in global and regional political dynamics 
also impact hydropolitical relations between actors. The Cold War has played an important 
role in hydropolitical relations between riparian states during the second half of the 20th 
century. For example, Mirumachi (2010:97,138) states the role of the Cold War in bilateral 
relations with respect to water in the context of the Orange-Senqu and Mekong basins. 
Moreover, the Cold War also conditioned choices of the so-called ‘developing states’ that 
had acquired technical and financial support for their hydraulic development projects from 
western or eastern blocs (Sneddon and Fox 2011, Warner 2012: 175,176).  
 
Historical Background: The ‘broader political context’ is also shaped by relations between 
states within historical context. It thus becomes vital to identify the historical background of 
relations between actors interacting with each other on water issues, since it plays a vital role 
in construction of mutual identities henceforth patterns of enmity and amity in relations 
(Wendt 1999:325,326). For example, although bilateral relations in the ET basin have existed 
between Turkey and Syria since 1960s, mutual identity constructions can even be traced back 
to the creation of Turkey and Syria as nation states. Moreover, understanding the historical 
context reveals how domestic political concerns have emerged and how certain issue linkages 
are associated with water issues. Furthermore interpreting the historical context shows initial 
interactions between actors occur within socio-political conditions.  
 
Cultural elements and water resources: Cultural, ethnic or religious elements may be an 
integral part of in certain hydro-contexts. In this regard, the on-going anti-dam activism in the 
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Munzur Valley of Turkey, which is one of the tributaries of the Euphrates basin and located 
in the upper part of the Euphrates basin, is a good example of how cultural and religious 
elements accompanied by ecological and political resistance discourse against dam can 
exacerbate the anti-dam activism at the national scales (Ignatow 2007). The cultural and 
religious importance of the Munzur Valley for the Alawi faith and Alawi community has 
enabled in establishing strong opposition movements against the on-going hydraulic projects 
in the Munzur Valley (Interviewee 11 pers. 2013). In similar vein, Norman (2012) shows 
roles of cultural elements in transboundary water governance in the context of the Coast 
Salish Region located in Canada- US border. As would be shown in the chapter 8, cultural 
elements are particularly brought to the attention by opposition groups in the case of the Ilısu 
dam project to attract further support.  
 
Economic Interdependencies and regional organizations: The degree of cooperation in the 
field of economic relations also influences hydropolitical relations between riparian states 
(Mason 2003:225). The degree of economic interdependencies and cooperation on non-water 
issues may drive actors to enhance cooperation on water. Moreover, regional organisations 
may positively impact hydropolitical relations at different scales. As in the case of the EU 
integration process, water has become one of the policy areas of the EU resulting in 
construction of common norms and diminishing power asymmetries between co-riparian 
states.   
 
Finally, although I have listed these factors in a sequence, in my view it is impossible to take 
them into consideration separately. For example, without considering the historical 
background of relations between two actors, we cannot understand under what conditions the 
direct issue linkages are made. Their separation here is for analytical purposes, at the very 
least to draw attention to the elements that should be, but are not regularly, considered in 
transboundary water politics. Moreover, some other factors can also be identified within the 
realm of broader socio-political context in different empirical context. In addition, some 
components may have more profound impact than others.  
 
After having discussed factors leading to patterns of conflict and cooperation in 
hydropolitics, the following section will look at how power capabilities of actors and power 
configurations shape the outcome in hydropolitics.  
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3.4. The Role of Power in Explaining the Outcome: The Utility of Critical 
Approaches  
 
 
The main contribution to critical approaches is its explanatory value in analysing the 
outcomes in hydropolitical relations. Accordingly the status quo in any given transboundary 
water basin is shaped by power configurations between riparian states. Here, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, power capabilities of actors are not only analysed in terms of their material power 
capabilities, but also analysed on the basis of their discursive power capabilities (See Section 
2.4.3). Thus, the frameworks of hydro-hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony developed by 
the critical approaches provide an extensive account on different dimensions of power 
capabilities and their components in hydropolitics. Therefore, it enables observing how actors 
exert those power capabilities in their hydropolitical relations with others. Moreover, the 
power analysis helps to understand how status quos are established at different hydro-social 
contexts. This study affirms the utility of frameworks of hydro-hegemony, counter hydro-
hegemony and related literature in explaining the outcome in hydropolitical relations. It not 
only applies these conceptual frameworks to the layer of inter-state hydropolitics, but also 
extends their utility to the layer of transnational hydropolitics. In the following sections, I 
will revisit the frameworks of hydro-hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony, as discussed in 
Section 2.4.3, and integrate the insights derived from the empirical cases.  
 
 3.4.2. Geography (Riparian Position)  
 
In theory geography is regarded as an element of material power capabilities of states. 
However, geography has a particular importance in hydropolitical analysis. Looking at some 
pioneering studies, riparian position is considered a separate variable in understanding 
transboundary water politics. According to this view, in transboundary water issues, upstream 
co-riparian states are in more favourable and advantageous position than downstream co-
riparian states (Naff and Matson 1984). Riparian position also directly affects conflictual or 
cooperative relations in transboundary water politics. For instance Frey (1993:62) claims, 
“The most stable situation exists when the upstream nation is also most powerful and has 
little interest in water”. Although Warner and Zeitoun acknowledge the importance of 
geography as a power dimension in transboundary water politics, they argue it is not 
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necessarily a primary power dimension determining hydropolitical outcome between co-
riparian states. Rather, they emphasise the material and discursive (bargaining and ideational) 
power capabilities as the determining factors (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Furthermore, 
Warner and Zeitoun (2006:436) draw a comparison between the Nile and the ET basins. They 
problematize “if Turkey, – upstream on the Tigris and the Euphrates – can build the GAP… 
what is preventing Ethiopia from doing the same on the Nile?” Therefore, they argue that 
other dimensions of power have even more profound impact in transboundary water relations. 
Given the fact that Turkey and Syria are located in reverse upstream/downstream riparian 
positions on the Orontes and ET basins, this feature allows to assess this hypothesis.  
3.4.3. Material Power  
 
Material power is the most visible type of power in power analysis. It entails military might, 
economic capabilities, and technical capacity along with access to knowledge (Cascao and 
Zeitoun 2010:31). Material power capabilities establish the material basis for ideational and 
bargaining power capabilities. Moreover, actors also exert material power tactics are to 
increase their influence in hydropolitics. The basic elements of material power capabilities 
can be considered as follows.  
 
Military force is one of the main elements of material capabilities of states. The military 
might as a potential power resource is either used directly as a military force or as coercion-
pressure mechanism in hydropolitics. Although military force is rarely used by states as a 
power tactic regarding water issues, we can identify empirical examples where hydraulic 
infrastructure or water resource is targeted militarily by a state (Cascao 2009:81). This entails 
occupation of particular water resource or infrastructure or even deliberate destruction of 
water infrastructure (Zeitoun 2007). Moreover, paramilitary groups also target water 
resources or particularly hydraulic infrastructures (Gleick 2006). For instance, the Maavilaru 
Dam located in north eastern part of Sri Lanka was occupied by Tamil Tigers in 2006 and 
flow of water was stopped (Aral 2006:51). However, military force as a material power tactic 
has not been used in the context of the ET basin.  
 
Economic capabilities perhaps constitute the most important part of material power in 
hydropolitics. Changes in economic capabilities such as the rise or fall in country’s total GDP 
directly effect on hydropolitical relations between riparian states, since it often results in the 
allocation of more or less financial resources to hydraulic development. In Chapter 7, the 
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study will show the correlation between Turkey’s growing economic capabilities and 
government investment in water resources development. Economic capabilities are also 
important for civil society actors seeking to involve and influence decision-making processes. 
Although actors from civil society do not need to mobilise huge amounts of money to finance 
their activities, they heavily rely on finding financial sources. They apply other actors such as 
as international organisations to acquire their financial needs. Therefore, availability of 
funding directly influences civil society actors’ power capabilities.  
 
Technical and Institutional capacity is also important components of material power 
capabilities. Having technical expertise and knowledge in hydraulic development, water 
resources management, social and environmental aspects of water, water law, water politics 
and so increase actors’ capacity to influence in hydropolitics. Furthermore, availability of 
institutional settings such as well-established hydraucracies, universities, research institutes, 
think tanks also affect on power capabilities of actors in hydropolitics.      
 
Ability to create data and Access to knowledge is an element of material capabilities of 
actors, which is also directly related with the previous point. Regarding ability of actors to 
create data and access to knowledge, although actors from public sector such as states, 
intergovernmental organisations have had monopoly over producing data and access to 
knowledge until recently, however as computing technologies have become improved and 
knowledge is a global public good, actors from civil society or private sector have also been 
able to create data or construct alternative knowledge (Grey 2011).  
 
 
As stated at the beginning of this section, the material power capabilities maintain a ground 
for bargaining and ideational power capabilities. In other words, they are used in conducting 
material (coercive), bargaining and ideational power tactics. The figure shows how 
components of material power capabilities establish different power tactics used by actors. 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
Figure 11 Relationship between components of material power capabilities and application of those 
material power capabilities 
 
 
Source: Author‘s own compilation 2014  
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 11 actors exert material (coercive), barraging and ideational 
power tactics out of material power capabilities. In other words, material power capabilities 
are transformed to actual power by adopting different power tactics. It must be noted that the 
figure above exemplifies possible ways to ‘actualize’ material power capabilities. Therefore, 
these ways can be further diversified.  
 
Moreover, according to the above figure material (coercive) power tactics include use of 
military force, conducting coercion pressure mechanisms by using military power, covert 
actions and non-violent actions. As mentioned above, states may use direct military force by 
occupying particular watersheds or destroying infrastructures, although actors rarely use such 
tactics.  
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Coercion-pressure mechanism is when an actor secures compliance from another by 
conducting limited military actions (military manoeuvres, military drills, and deploying 
arms), closing border, conducting blockade or threating to conduct such actions (Zeitoun and 
Warner 2006:446,447). In my view, while military force is used in such ways in 
hydropolitics, we also should take into consideration the deterrent capacity of military within 
coercion-pressure mechanisms. Possessing enough military power can deter other actors from 
using military force or even from conducting speech acts of military threat as a coercive 
power tactic. It is for this reason that, while we can identify direct military threats from Egypt 
towards possible upstream development in the Nile (Beschorner 1992:60) we cannot identify 
similar discourses conducted by Syrian decision-makers in the Euphrates. This also shows 
that we cannot assess power resource by only looking at the power holder. In other words, 
“…any power instrument becomes a potential power resource only if its control is seen to be 
valued by other actors in the interaction. Power comes out this relation, not from the power 
holder alone” (Baldwin 1985 in Guzzini 1993:452,453).  
 
Covert actions are used as material power in hydropolitics. Covert actions include providing 
military, logistical or political support to opposition groups, which would de-stabilise the 
domestic context of other co-riparian states. A co-riparian state may choose to conduct covert 
actions to hinder water development attempts of the other co-riparian state (Zeitoun and 
Warner 2006:446).  
 
Non-violent actions can be considered as material power tactics frequently used by non-state 
actors as a source of material power. In theory, we can identify a wide range of non-violent 
action mechanisms including protests, demonstrations, marching, and non-violent 
interventions conducted by civil society actors (Sharp 1990). Thus, demonstrations and press 
statements in front of buildings of targeted actors, organising march and temporary 
occupation of dam sites are some tactics used. We may also observe limited use of force 
conducted by in some cases. Obstructing workers in dam site, preventing heavy construction 
equipment from entering project area are examples of limited use of force as non-violent 
actions. Actors conduct these actions to raise public awareness and support as well as 
psychically create obstruction. However, violence often becomes part of non-violent 
struggles (Dudouet 2008: 9). In water related issues, non-violent actions may spontaneously 
turn into violent actions as a result of confrontation between opponents and proponents of a 
particular project or water policy. We can also identify actions with violent character. A well-
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known Cochabamba rioting in Bolivia is a typical example of how non-violent protests 
became violent between authorities and people (Hall and Lobina 2002, Shultz 2003). In some 
other cases, the opponents of certain water projects or policies can conduct violent actions 
such as damaging dam sites and destroying earthmovers as coercive tactics.   
 
Economic capabilities can be the basis for increasing the bargaining power capabilities of 
actors. As I will discuss in the next section, completed infrastructure increases actors’ 
bargaining power capabilities. This is particularly related with economic capabilities, since 
allocating more financial resources is subject to economic capabilities of actors.  
 
Finally technical expertise and the ability to produce data form the bases of ideational power 
capabilities, since actors’ ability to control and sanction data is subject to technical expertise 
and ability to produce knowledge (Cascao 2009:85). Having technical expertise and 
knowledge provides a ‘discursive upper hand’ to a powerful party throughout its formal and 
informal interactions with other actors.  
 
3.4.4. Bargaining Power  
 
Bargaining power refers to actors’ capabilities to construct or promote social, political or 
institutional values, practices and rules that would limit other actors’ capabilities (Bachrach 
and Baratz 1970:7).  In the case of bargaining power, actors are able to establish agenda 
settings and rules of the game (Gill and Law 1993:73, Cascao and Zeitoun 2010:31). It 
appears that bargaining power tactics are most frequently used as power tactics by actors for 
the following reasons. First, as can be understood from the definition, bargaining power 
tactics often serve as an important resource for actors lacking structural and material power 
capabilities (Daoudy 2009).  Second, empirical cases show that bargaining power tactics are 
also frequently used by stronger parties to acquire compliance of so-called weaker parties in 
hydropolitics (Cascao 2009). Finally, as shown in the previous chapter, politicization 
inherently means bargaining process among actors and often requires exclusion of coercive 
tactics. Therefore, in the empirical case studies, where water issues are regarded as 
‘politicized’ among stakeholders, bargaining power capabilities are the main power tactics 
for actors. The main bargaining power tactics can be outlined as follows.  
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Treaties that maintain status quo can be used as a bargaining power tactic. It is argued that 
treaties regarding transboundary water basin reflect the status quo of the time period they are 
codified; established status quos might codify asymmetrical power relations between actors. 
Therefore, in such cases, previously signed treaties may be used as a bargaining power tactic 
and included in certain actors’ discursive positions (Cascao 2009:83).  
 
Incentives are another bargaining power tactic identified in hydropolitics. It may be 
considered as the flip side of coercion-pressure mechanisms. It entails economic incentives, 
political support, military protection and so on (Zeitoun and Warner 2006:447). Joint projects 
and side payments are often used by actors as bargaining tactics in different transboundary 
water basins (Dinar 2009:336).  
 
Using Diplomacy and Negotiations: The use of diplomacy and long-run negotiation 
processes to deal with transboundary water issues is common in hydropolitics. Daoudy 
(2009:367) shows the importance of negotiation and how it is used as a bargaining power 
tactic by riparian states. . During negotiations actors seek to limit alternatives of their 
counterparts and impose mutual perceptions to reach acceptable agreements (Lax and 
Sebenius in Daoudy 2009:367). Moreover, given the fact that the participation of various 
stakeholders has gradually become an international norm in water management, we may 
identify empirical case studies where actors from civil society, private sector, and different 
tenets of public sector actors actively engage in decision-making processes through 
negotiations. As is the case of negotiations between co-riparian states, one riparian may 
conduct different strategies through the negotiation processes to increase their influence over 
another co-riparian (Warner 2010).  
 
Using Legal Instruments: Co-riparian states tend to take principles of international law into 
account when constructing their respective positions in transboundary water politics. 
Therefore, international water law forms an important resource for states to increase their 
bargaining power capabilities. (Daoudy 2008). However, it should be noted that international 
water law has two shortcomings, both of which undermine its effect on transboundary water 
interactions. First, even though we can identify certain internationally accepted principles 
such as equitable and reasonable utilisation and no-harm practices, co-riparian states tend to 
interpret them differently, which may become a source of discursive conflict between co-
riparian states. Second, due to the very nature of international law, legal principles in 
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international water law can only become binding when all states involved are in an 
agreement.  
 
As this study will show in the subsequent chapters, actors from civil society who oppose or 
criticise particular projects or water policies frequently use legal instruments by suing 
government authorities or private sector actors over their actions. It appears that using legal 
instruments is a more effective tool in sub-national hydropolitics (politics of water between 
different actors at domestic scales domestic scales) and transnational hydropolitics than inter-
state hydropolitics, since individuals or NGOs may appeal to court without getting any 
consent from public authorities and we often see decisions of courts that favour civil society 
actors. Needless to say the proponents of a particular project or water policy also react to 
such actions by using legal instruments. In Chapter 8, I will explain how opponents of the 
Ilısu dam use judicial processes as a bargaining power tactic within and outside Turkey to 
influence decision-making.   
 
Establishing alliances: Actors establish alliances to increase their bargaining power 
capabilities. For instance, downstream co-riparian states may establish ‘common position’ 
against hydraulic projects developed by upstream co-riparian states. In similar vein, upstream 
co-riparian states may establish alliances to balance downstream states, labelled as 
‘cooperation without the hegemon’ in transboundary water basins (Cascao and Zeitoun 
2010). Political alliances also help co-riparian states increase their influence in decision-
making since they provide financial resources, technical expertise and maintain strong 
position in negotiations. Establishing alliances is also vital for anti-dam activism. For 
example, NGOs having different interests and focus may establish an informal platform or an 
initiative to deal with water issues. Here the very institutionalisation pattern of NGOs is 
based on alliance. Moreover, transnational and nation-wide alliances are established by the 
civil society actors to increase their influence in decision-making.  
 
Lobbying or Pressurizing the Targeted Actors: Since large-scale hydraulic projects need 
large sums of financial sources and technical expertise, states often appeal for credits to 
finance projects. This fact is apparent to those opposing the projects. Here, actors seek to 
constrain options of the other actor by hindering possible financial options. Therefore, 
pressurising creditors of projects becomes an effective bargaining power tactic for actors 
including states and civil society actors.  
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Completed Infrastructure: Hydraulic infrastructures, which have been already completed, 
increased actors’ bargaining power capabilities. In many empirical case studies riparian states 
or those actors opposing a particular project exert power tactics to hinder construction that 
project. Therefore, when the other actor finalises the project, those power tactics become no 
longer attainable. Completion of hydraulic infrastructure also increases actors’ bargaining 
power capabilities in the negotiation process.  
 
Apart from the above mentioned bargaining power tactics, this study also identifies other 
types of bargaining power tactics, which are specifically conducted in the case of anti-dam 
activism by civil society actors. These bargaining power tactics are drawing public attention 
and support, mobilising more powerful actors and empowering weaker actors.  
 
Drawing public attention and seeking public support is one of the main aims of activist 
groups opposing a particular project or water policy. It helps to politicise the issue and 
increases actors’ influence. As I will elaborate in Chapter 8, actors use non-violent actions 
such as demonstrations, public statements and media (mainstream and alternative) to increase 
their influence.  
 
Mobilising more powerful actors is used by actors opposing a certain water related project 
such as dams. For example, as I will analyse in Chapter 8, anti-dam activist groups target 
downstream states and stakeholders of the ET basin to mobilise their support to their 
campaigns in the case of the Ilısu dam.  
 
Finally, empowering the weaker parties within coalition established by opponents can be 
considered as a bargaining power tactic.  Given the fact that opponents of certain water 
development projects establish an informal network composed of various groups having 
institutional capacities at different degrees, they share knowledge and strategies within the 
informal opposition network.  
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3.4.5 Political Opportunity Structures as a Source of Power  
 
In Section 3.2.3, it has been argued that structural changes in social context directly influence 
opening or closure of spaces thereby affecting actors’ bargaining power capabilities. This 
pattern is applicable to both inter-state and transnational hydropolitics. This study argues that 
the concept political opportunity structures enable us to understand under what conditions 
spaces are constructed in hydropolitics.  
 
The concept of political opportunity structures was originally developed in understanding 
why influence and success of social movements vary according to different contexts (Van 
Der Heijden 1997, Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Kitschelt describes the concept of political 
opportunity structure as: “Specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and 
historical precedents for social mobilisation, which facilitate the developments of protests 
movements in some instances and constrain them in others (Kitschelt 1986:58)”. Studies have 
examined the role of political opportunity structures of different types of social movements. 
For example, Van der Heijden examines the influence of environmental movements in 
different domestic contexts and argues that the impact of environmental groups and their 
degree of institutionalisation is determined by political opportunity structures according to 
domestic contexts (Van Der Heijden 1997:26). As shown in Section 3.3.1.5, environmental 
concerns constitute one of the main reasons of anti-dam movements and NGOs; informal 
networks oppose dams owing to their environmental impacts.  
 
In my view, given the fact that transnational anti-dam movements, as in the case of anti-dam 
movement against the Ilısu dam project, are social movements organised by civil society 
actors operating at different scales, the concept of political opportunity structures are 
particularly relevant for understanding how influence of civil society actors changes in 
different social contexts. In transnational hydropolitics, actors opposing a particular hydraulic 
project or a water policy are often excluded from the decision-making process. Therefore, 
they seek to open new claimed spaces by using different power tactics to influence decision-
making. In this regard, changes in broader political opportunity structures strongly affect 
their capacity to influence. Given these actors do not possess rights to territorial control over 
a particular watershed this study suggests that political opportunities can be one of the key 
elements of actor’s discursive power capabilities. Therefore, changes in political opportunity 
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structures directly affect actors’ capacity to influence thereby influencing the outcome in the 
context of transnational hydropolitics. 
 
The following elements of political opportunity structures either increase or decrease actors’ 
capacity to influence in transnational hydropolitics.  
 
First, democratic pluralistic state structures are essential for civil society actors to engage in 
decision-making. Khagram (2004:20,21) argues that transnational advocacy groups are more 
likely to be influential where there is a high degree of democratisation and social 
mobilisation. Civil society actors have limited or no influence in decision-making in 
authoritarian state structures. In democracies, civil society actors have certain opportunities in 
engaging in decision-making. This includes pressuring different divisions of state 
bureaucracies, political parties and private sector actors, conducting non-violent actions, 
engaging in judicial processes and using media effectively. Figure 12 below shows the 
relationship between influences of civil society actor and high degree of social mobilisation 
and democracy (Khagram 2004:24,25).   
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Figure 12 Link between degree of democracy and social mobilisation 
 
Source: Khagram 2004:21  
 
Second, existing political divisions within the society such as class struggles and ethnic 
problems, may both positively and negatively influence civil society actors. Van Der Heijden 
(1997: 27) argues that environmental issues are likely to become salient in the domestic 
policy agenda in societies where domestic political conflicts have already been 
accommodated and integrated. However, as will be discussed in the following chapters, 
domestic conflicts may also form a broader political context of water issues, which provides 
certain practicalities and obstacles in engaging in decision-making.  
 
Third, formal institutional structures of the states provide opportunities to civil society actors 
to open new scales in hydropolitics. It affects on influential capacity of the civil society 
actors in following ways. Civil society actors have more access points; therefore they have 
more influence in de-centralised state structures than centralised states. Moreover, 
proportional division of power between executive, legislative and judicial bodies provides 
more accession points than state structures in which power is accumulated in executive 
bodies. Finally, electoral systems influence civil society actors. While environmental groups 
may not be influential as political parties in majority/plurality electoral system, they may be 
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more influential in proportional representation electoral system with low thresholds. In 
addition, it appears that coalition governments provide more opportunities to access decision-
making than single ruling party governments.  
 
Fourth, while the growing role of TNCs in hydraulic development provides opportunities to 
states to finance hydraulic projects, it also enables civil society actors to create new accession 
points to influence these projects. In Chapter 8 I will discuss how the structure of the 
international consortium on construction of the Ilısu dam in terms of actors’ origin shapes the 
informal anti-dam networks in transnational water politics. It appears that public-private 
partnership, which consists of states, international creditors, ECAs, TNCs and nationwide 
businesses, results in construction of transnational advocacy networks.  
 
Finally, significant changes in communication and transportation technologies have resulted 
in constructions numerous transnational informal networks in the civil society sector.  
 
Although the concept of political opportunity structure is important in understanding anti-
dam actors’ capacity to influence in transnational hydropolitics, it is also applicable to to 
inter-state hydropolitics between riparian states. For example, in the case of transboundary 
water politics between two co-riparian states (A and B), state A may decide to finance its 
hydraulic project by appealing for credits from a certain credit agency. This decision gives 
state B an opportunity to pressurise the credit agency to hinder the project. Therefore, this 
dimension can be considered within the context of bargaining power capabilities concerning 
inter-state hydropolitics.  
 
3.4.6. Ideational (Structural) Power  
 
Ideational power refers to an actor’s capacity to impose and legitimise particular sets of ideas, 
norms, rules and practices (Cascao 2009: 76). In other words, it is actors’ ability to sanction 
certain discourses, narratives and storylines (Cascao and Zeitoun 2010:32). As shown in 
Chapter 2, those actors are coined as ‘discursive elites’ in this study. Discursive elites seek to 
impose their discursive position in a certain hydropolitical context. As pointed earlier, 
ideational power is directly related to the prevailing water paradigms. This power is 
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considered a determining factor in the outcome of hydropolitical relations between actors, 
since it enables actors to control the ‘power of ideas’ (Zeitoun and Warner 2006).  
 
Securitization, knowledge construction and sanctioned discourses are considered to be 
ideational power tactics in literature (Zeitoun and Warner 2006: 448). However, in the light 
of the discussion of securitization theory and hydropolitics in Chapter 2 and considering the 
empirical case studies, we can also consider counter-securitization, politicization-de-
politicization, de-securitization and framings as ideational power tactics. The following 
section will briefly outline these tactics.  
 
3.4.6.1. Sanctioned Discourse 
 
Sanctioned discourse is defined as “prevailing opinions and views that have been legitimised 
by the discursive and political elites” (Jagerskog 2002: 1). It constitutes discursive positions 
of actors. It frames what the ideas, rules and practices ought to be, who the actors are 
legitimising the ideas to, and what are the rules and practices and how they should be 
understood. (Turton and Meissner 2002:39). Sanctioned discourses can be identified in the 
following ways. Actors may de-emphasise or over-emphasise certain ideas, norms, rules or 
practices on water management. For example, states that have pioneered hydraulic 
development often emphasise historical rights to water or acquired rights (in case there is an 
agreement favouring it), while others may emphasise the needs of the each co-riparian states, 
or the sovereignty of states (Cascao 2009:84). As stated in the context of the prevailing water 
paradigms, certain sets of norms, ideas and rules within a particular prevailing paradigm are 
sanctioned by actors in hydropolitics. Therefore, prevailing water paradigms play a vital role 
in constructions of sanctioned discourses as promoted by actors.  
 
3.4.6.2. Data and Knowledge Monopoly  
 
Knowledge construction can be defined as actors’ capacity in controlling data, information 
and knowledge. Therefore, it is a component part of sanctioned discourses (Allan 2003: 141, 
Cascao 2009: 85). In terms of knowledge construction as an ideational power source, 
hydraucracies have had supremacy, since they are able to produce grounded hydrological 
data. However, this supremacy is being increasingly challenged, as new technologies such as 
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growing use of remote sensing technologies and data produced by international organisations 
has become readily available for other actors. Co-riparian states in any given transboundary 
context often have unequal capabilities to produce constructed knowledge. These disparities 
are reflected in water negotiations, agreements and so forth (Cascao 2009:85).   
3.4.6.3. Securitization and Counter-Securitization 
 
Securitization can be considered as an important source of ideational power in hydropolitics. 
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, we can frequently identify securitization speech 
acts conducted by different securitizing actors. Securitizing moves, however, may be 
challenged by counter-securitizing moves. For instance, anti-dam activist groups often 
portray hydraulic projects as existential threat to natural habitat or cultural heritage to the 
sites in which they are planned to be built. As discussed in Chapter 3, recasting the issue such 
as emphasising displacement and human rights can be considered as counter-securitizing 
moves against securitizing speech acts.  
3.4.6.4. Politicization and De-Politicization  
 
Given the fact that politicization can be understood as showing counter-factuals (borders of 
what can be done) of issues, actors in hydropolitics exert different power tactics to politicise 
the issue, which was formerly securitized. Therefore, it appears that politicization of the 
water issues, which was already securitized, is one of the goals of relatively weaker actors in 
hydropolitics. Actors conduct different politicization strategies such as counter-securitization 
moves, non-violent actions, providing alternatives and so on. As stated above, when 
relatively weaker actors are able to ‘politicize’ the issue, they gain further bargaining power 
capabilities and are able to, to some extent, level the playing field. Moreover, politicization of 
water issues renders use of coercive mechanism impossible for the relatively more powerful 
party.  
 
However, such attempts to politicize water issues are often confronted by de-politicization 
moves and use of other types of power. As I discussed in the previous section, actors de-
politicize water issues by casting their positions in the same line with scientific, legal grounds 
and by aligning their sanctioned discourses with internationally accepted norms concerning 
water management.  
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3.4.6.5. De-Securitization  
 
De-securitization moves conducted by actors can be considered as a source of ideational 
power. Securitization of water often results in conflictual interactions between actors. 
Therefore, to foster cooperation, actors may follow de-securitization. In Chapter 9 I will 
discuss how actors conduct de-securitization moves. Considering hydropolitical contexts, 
both stronger and weaker actors may initiate de-securitization speech acts to foster 
cooperation on water. In some cases, external actors play a vital role in de-securitization 
processes. For example, Cascao (2009:260) argues that multilateral cooperative mechanisms 
in the Nile basin are considered by Ethiopian authorities as an effective strategy to counter 
the existing regime in the Nile basin. Such multilateral cooperative mechanisms can be 
considered a way of de-securitization.   
3.4.6.6. Framing  
 
Framing is a discursive process, which creates social facts and determines relationship 
between different actors (Snow and Byrd 2000: 119). In hydropolitics, actors use framings to 
communicate with the audience and strengthen their structural (ideational) power capabilities. 
 
Framing here refers to social construction of the issues. Accordingly, sociologists argue that 
cognitive frames evolved as a result of interactions between actors in society and they enable 
actors to interpret certain events and experiences. In this respect, perceptive abilities such as 
memory and judgments based on previous experiences or/and socialization processes can be 
considered as cognitive frames (Libertatore 1997: 66). In framing, an issue is ‘created’ by the 
actors through naming, interpreting and dramatizing. In other words, through framing, actors 
seek to reveal reinterpretation and renaming of the process (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 
897). For example, as shown in hydraulic mission dams are portrayed as symbols of states’ 
progress and a source of socio-economic prosperity for countries. Analogies are also made to 
better communicate with the audience. For instance, Veysel Eroğlu, the Turkish minister of 
water affairs and forestry, portrays dams on the rivers as ‘golden necklaces’ (Aydilek 2005). 
Conversely, Osman Baydemir, who is the mayor of Diyarbakir and critical to constructions of 
dams in the Southeastern Anatolia Region, describes them as “Berlin Wall, which is 
constructed through water” (Su Hakkı Org.2011). Finally non-verbal framings such as 
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televisual, visual framings are frequently used by the discursive elites and verbal framings to 
better communicate with the audience in hydropolitics.  
3.5. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this chapter was to develop a distinctive theoretical framework, called an 
Enhanced Analytical Framework of Power in Hydropolitics, drawing upon constructivist 
approach and its application to transboundary water analysis. The theoretical framework was 
established to guide the following analytical chapters (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) and aimed to 
cover the identified shortcomings, outlined in the final section of Chapter 2. Given the 
discussion above, the following conclusions can be made.  
 
The chapter shows the importance of scalar analysis in understanding relations among variety 
of actors in the context of different layers of hydropolitics. Scale, here, is understood both in 
spatial realms and levels of interactions between actors, which are labelled as spatial scales 
and scales of governance respectively. Moreover, the discussion regarding scales also shows 
the concept of scale must be understood as a social construction rather than given and power 
applies in the constructions of scales. For further clarification, the study also delineated actors 
involving in political processes on water issues, based on their position in state-society 
relations. Accordingly, actors may come from public sector, private sector and civil society 
and they engage in hydropolitical processes at different scales.  
 
 
The theoretical framework assesses the explanatory value of existing conceptual frameworks 
on power developed by the critical body of literature in understanding the role of power 
explaining patterns of conflict and cooperation in hydropolitics. It argues that existing 
conceptual frameworks on power do not provide a sufficient account in understanding water 
conflict and cooperation. Drawing upon constructivism, this study argues that we need to 
look at values, norms, ideas, narratives are constructed by actors in any given hydro-social 
context to understand conflictual and cooperative relations between actors in the context of 
different layers of hydropolitics. While some norms, values, ideas can be generalised that are 
applicable to different hydro-social context, others change according to different empirical 
cases. The former is labelled as prevailing water paradigms and the latter is labelled as the 
broader political context in this study. Those norms, ideas, values constructed in hydro-social 
contexts enable us to understand conflictual and cooperative patterns between actors. 
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Understanding of values, norms, and ideas also enhances our understanding of power, since 
they are linked with power.  
 
Finally, the theoretical framework developed by this study confirms the utility of the critical 
conceptual frameworks regarding power in understanding how outcomes (who gets what) are 
determined as a result of power relations between actors in transboundary water basins. 
However, the theoretical framework of this study extends utility of these conceptual 
frameworks by applying them to transnational hydropolitics in the context of the Ilısu dam 
conflict in Chapter 8.  
 
 
After having established the theoretical framework, the study will look at the way in which it 
is applied to the empirical case studies, which will be discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
However, before analysing Chapters 6,7 and 8, the study will first provide the 
methodological framework in Chapter 4. Then, it will provide background information 
regarding empirical case studies in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
4.1. Introduction – Deepening the work of the London Water Research Group 
through the research cycle 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to describe the research methodology used in this study. How 
research is conducted, data obtained, gathered, analysed and what type of data is used 
constitute an important part of scientific research. These inquiries form the research 
methodology, research methods and techniques of social research study. The chapter 
highlights the relevance of research techniques, and discuss the strengths and limitations of 
this research.  
 
The concepts, and conceptual frameworks developed by the research circle, namely the 
London Water Research Group, have established the departure point of this research project. 
Particularly, the frameworks of Hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun and Warner 2006) and Counter 
Hydro-hegemony (Cascao 2009) including the literature that critically looks at water conflict 
and water cooperation (Mirumachi and Allan 2007, Mirumachi 2010, Warner 2012) have 
been reviewed and their applicability to the empirical case studies analysed. Being informed 
by the theoretical frameworks, concepts such as water conflict, water cooperation, water and 
power were examined in the context of the hydropolitics of ET basin.  
 
Analysing the relevance of conceptual frameworks and their applicability to the ET basin has 
revealed the weak spots in these frameworks that are being used in this study. Therefore, the 
empirical data gathered through the research project, particularly during the fieldwork, have 
informed the conceptual framework, which led to establishment of the theoretical framework. 
Thus, the standpoints of constructivism in the international relations theory and the concepts 
of scalar approach to hydropolitics were integrated into the theoretical framework. Therefore, 
the research does not have a linear approach from outlining theoretical and empirical ground 
to data gathering, assessment and analysis. Rather, both theoretical framework and primary 
and secondary data gathered during the research project were visited iteratively.  
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Figure 13, below, illustrates how theoretical framework, empirical data, research questions 
and hypothesis were visited during the research project.  
 
    
Figure 13 The Research Cycle 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
 
The structure of this chapter will be as follows. Firstly, I will highlight the methodological 
approach which the research adopts and I will explain how the above mentioned ‘theory and 
analytical framework’ will be combined. Secondly, I will explain the research methods 
briefly and highlight importance and relevance of them for the research. Thirdly, the 
pluralistic characteristic of the research in terms of theory, environment (the research place), 
and data gathering will be highlighted. Finally, possible problematic fields, which might form 
obstacles to conduct the research project, will be stated.  
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4.2. Research Methodology  
 
4.2.1. Combining Methodology with Ontology and Epistemology 
  
Two separate research method branches- quantitative and qualitative can be identified in 
social research methodology. The methodological approaches vary in terms of type of data, 
data collection, data production and data analysis. Although some scholars advocate 
flexibility in selection of social research (e.g.: Bryman 1988:109), others argue that there are 
different approaches for research in social sciences and they are not only different in terms of 
methodology they use, but also from ontological and epistemological standpoints (Henwood 
and Pidgeon 1992:14). In other words, ontological, epistemological and methodological 
perspectives are intertwined with each other and each approach sets out its own distinct 
perspective. In my view, the research methodology is not independent from epistemology (Is 
social reality knowable?) and ontology (does a social reality exist) that the research study and 
researchers adopts, although a mixed method style can be suitable for certain studies. Thus, 
the research methodology used should be consistent with ontological and epistemological 
considerations, since they are a prerequisite for selecting research methodology. 
 
As shown both in theoretical and analytical chapters, constructivism constitutes the backbone 
of this study. According to the ontological standpoints of social constructivism, the study 
opposes the view that “…the facts of world are essentially there for study. They exist 
independently of us as observers, and if we are rational we will come to know the facts as 
they are” (Gergen in Schwandt 1994:125). It rather argues knowledge and truth are 
constructed; they are not discovered by human activity. In other words, it supports the claim 
that “contrary to common sense, there is no unique ‘real world’ that pre-exists and is 
independent from human activity and human symbolic language” (Bruner 1986 in Schwandt 
1994:125). This study can be safely located in the umbrella of interpretivist paradigm in 
social research. Considering the ontological standpoints of constructivism, it would be argued 
that studies drawing upon constructivism could be located within interpretivist paradigm in 
social research.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to illustrate the characteristics of methodological 
approaches used in interpretivist paradigm and to identify differences from other 
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methodologies. Yet the main standpoints of the interpretivist paradigm can be summarised as 
follows. According to interpretivist approaches “reality is not simply to be observed but 
rather interpreted” (Corbetta 2003:2). In terms of ontology, interpretivist paradigm adopts a 
constructivist and relativist approach, which claims that knowable world, is not out there but 
it is subject to human interpretation and there is no absolute social reality valid for everyone. 
In terms of epistemology, it is argued that objectivity is impossible in social research, since 
researcher and the object being researched cannot be separated (Corbetta 2000). In terms of 
methodology, unlike the positivist and post-positivist approaches that adopt quantitative and 
to some extent qualitative methods, studies located in the interpretivist paradigm are 
conducted through qualitative analysis (Von Wright 1993, Guba and Lincoln 1998, Corbetta 
2003). Thus, qualitative research methods have been used throughout this research project.  
 
4.2.2. Case Study Approach 
 
Indeed, each case has its own features, history and dynamics. Thus, making generalisations 
from a particular case study and applying them to another similar case can lead researchers to 
wrong conclusions. Even though cases cannot readily be generalised, the findings of several 
case studies can serve to refine our theoretical frameworks. Case study approach is frequently 
used in studying hydropolitics. Particularly, transboundary water basins are analysed as case 
studies. However, approaches vary in terms of looking at transboundary water basins as case 
studies.  
 
Scholars have studied transboundary basins as empirical cases in three ways. First, studies 
look at transboundary water basin(s) in general (e.g.: Kistin 2010, Allouche 2005). Second, 
some look at particular parts of transboundary water basins and analyse relationships between 
actors in (e.g.: Cascao 2009). Third, some select particular relations between actors in a given 
transboundary water basin and examine relationships over the course of time (e.g.: 
Mirumachi 2010).  Among these different approaches in analysing case studies, this study 
can be situated within the third category. The transboundary water basins analysed in this 
study are the ET and Orontes basins. However, these are not studied as an empirical context 
as a whole; rather the study seeks to analyse hydropolitical relations between particular actors 
in these basins. Thus, the inter-state relations between Turkey and Syria and relations 
between opponents and proponents of the Ilısu dam located in the ET basin are discussed and 
analysed.  
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Based on the actors and spatial focus the study adopts, the sub-case studies analysed are as 
follows.  
 
1) Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the first era (1923-1998)  
 
2) Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the second era (1998 and 2011) and a brief 
analysis of the current political crisis between the two states on water issue s since 2011.   
 
3) Dispute over the construction of Ilısu dam between pro-dam actors consisting of those 
from public and private sectors and anti-dam actors largely from civil society, which 
covers the period from 1997 to 2013. 
 
4.3. Research Design  
4.3.1 Integration of Theory and Methodology  
 
As pointed out in Section 4.1, this research was designed as a research cycle in which both 
theoretical and analytical frameworks will be mutually visited. However, a detailed account 
of the stages in which this research project was done is as follows:  
 
Stage 1: In the first stage, after defining the research area, the main research questions and 
the hypothesis were outlined. During the first stage, I also enrolled in professional 
development courses and attended and organised seminars related to my study area.  
 
Stage 2: In the second stage, I did a review of empirical and theoretical literature on the 
research topic; this was done in three-folds. First, I revised the conceptual frameworks and 
main concepts developed by scholars from the LWRG and other foundation thinkers of 
hydropolitics, and assessed the applicability of such concepts to the ET basin.  This led to the 
development of theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3.  Second, I conducted an 
extensive literature review on secondary literature that dealt with hydropolitics of the ET 
basin from different aspects. An assessment of the conceptual framework based on collected 
secondary literature enabled me to address the theoretical and analytical gaps in existing 
studies. Thus, fieldwork activities, interviews with relevant parties, gathering documents, 
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were designed to address the gaps. Third, considering the gaps, I explored and revised other 
empirical case studies both in the MENA region and across the world to identify similar 
dynamics before I started my fieldwork. For example, to understand role of civil society 
actors against certain hydraulic projects, I looked at empirical case studies in Spain and India 
to understand political dynamics on anti-dam activism and assess whether there are similar 
patterns in the case of Turkey.  
 
Stage 3:  The fieldwork was conducted between February 2011 and February 2012 and the 
third stage of the study constituted the first part of my fieldwork. During stage 3, I attended 
an international training program called “the Advanced Training Program in Regional 
Development in the ET region”, in Aleppo and Stockholm in January 2011 and April 2011 
respectively. This three- week program gave me a great opportunity to interact with high-
ranking policy makers associated with water resources development and academics from 
riparian states of the ET basin. Moreover, I had an opportunity to visit the Southeastern 
Anatolian region and see the hydraulic development schemes in detail. I also prepared two 
papers required by my University– the Analytical Paper related with my PhD and a 
Procedural Paper on the application of TWINS framework to the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. As I will show in the next section in detail, I had a chance to present 
the latter on two occasions. During this period, I conducted interviews with actors from civil 
society and public sector. Before starting my fieldwork, one of my aims was to arrange field 
trips to Syria to gather data. However, I had to cancel this plans because of the prevailing 
security conditions in Syria.  
 
Stage 4: Stage 4 constitutes the second part of my fieldwork. During this stage, I intensified 
my data gathering. I organised several trips to Ankara, Sanliurfa to interview policy makers, 
politicians, civil society representatives and academics. During these trips, I also gathered 
considerable amount of institutional data and secondary literature. Moreover, I continued to 
attend conferences and workshops held in Istanbul and Stockholm and interviewed more 
academics, policy makers and NGO representatives. Finally, after obtaining primary and 
secondary data during the fieldwork, I did the initial analysis and systematic organisation of 
data.  
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Stage 5: The classification and initial analysis of data gathered during the fieldwork was 
conducted in stage 5. I continued to attend conferences and seminars one of which was held 
in Baghdad where I also gave a presentation.  
 
Stage 6: Here, the analytical chapters and theoretical framework were discussed and 
described based on previous analysis. Given the on-going character of the empirical case 
studies, further primary data was gathered, analysed and integrated into the analysis by 
conducting interviews and obtaining institutional documents and mass media literature.  
 
Stage 7: In the final stage, the writing up was finalised. The research questions and 
hypothesis were tested based on analysis of primary and secondary data.   
 
4.3.2. Development of Theoretical and Analytical Framework  
 
The research aimed at establishing a comprehensive theoretical framework on hydropolitics 
drawing upon constructivism and its existing application to the study of hydropolitics. The 
study has particularly focussed on issues such as multiple and complex characters of actors- 
mapping and scales, factors leading actors to conflictual and cooperative relations and the 
role of dimensions of power conducted at different scales. As stated above, the literature 
developed by scholars from the LWRG has had considerable influence in this research 
project.  
 
The primary and secondary empirical data, largely gathered during the fieldwork, and 
concepts integrated into the theory have played an important role in development of the 
theoretical framework. However, another important factor is numerous training programs, 
seminars, workshops and conferences held in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, UK and Sweden. Table 8 
shows some meetings I attended through my research project and their contributions to 
development of my theoretical framework and empirical data gathering.  
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Table 8 Conferences, seminars, training programs attended during the research project 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
Title of the Meeting Date-Place Contribution to the Research Project Activity 
The 5th International Workshop of Hydro-
Hegemony : Competing Discourses 8/05/2010 9/05/2010  
London  
This meeting was organised in the initial stages of my research and the presentations as well 
interactions with the prominent academics have a significant influence in development of my 
theoretical framework.  
-Participant 
The 2nd Advanced International Training 
Program on Regional Development in The 
Euphrates and Tigris Region 
16/01/2011-
27/01/2011 
Aleppo 
The program was organised by the SIWI and it gathered academics, 
policy makers from riparian states of the ET basin. I have attended this 
training program as a participant from Turkey. Through the program, 
held in Aleppo and Stockholm, I was able to interact with academics, 
decision-makers from the riparian states.  
-A Project, namely, Applying the 
TWINS Approach to the 
hydropolitics of the ET basin, 
was prepared. 
-A presentation was given. 
11/04/2011-
15/04/ 2011 
Stockholm 
Istanbul Second International Water Forum: 
An Istanbul Perspective on Regional Water 
Problems and Search for Solutions 
03/05/2011-
05/05/2011 
Istanbul 
The conference gathered politicians, academics, decision-makers from across the world, 
especially from the MENA region. During the conference, I interacted with policy makers 
from Turkey as well as gathered primary empirical data for my research project.  
-Participant 
International World Water Week 2011  21/08/2011-
27/08/2011 
Stockholm 
 
During the event, I was able to conduct interviews with decision-makers, academics from 
riparian states of the basin as well as prominent academics in the field of hydropolitics. 
Moreover, during the event, the SWI introduced to the participants from the riparian states of 
the ET basin a hydro-economic modelling that prospect for solutions of issues in the ET basin 
regarding transboundary water management. During the event, I was able to observe this 
process.  
-Participant 
The 3rd Advanced International Training 
Program on Regional Development in The 
Euphrates and Tigris Region 
25/09/2011 
06/10/2011 
Istanbul 
I attended to the program, organised by SIWI, as an observer and I was able to interact with 
academics, policy makers from the riparian states of the basin. Moreover, I enrolled in a 
simulation game in which the participant of the program acted as representatives from 
riparian states of an imaginary transboundary water basin in a role play.  
-Observer 
International Workshop: Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) Alumni Workshop 21/11/2011-25/11/2011 
Istanbul 
I attended to this workshop as an observer. During the workshop I was able to conduct 
interviews with academics from riparian states as well as interacted with policy makers and 
academics. 
-Observer 
International Conference Advancing 
Cooperation in Euphrates and Tigris Region 
Institutional Development and Multi-
disciplinary Perspective 
2/05/2012-
4/05/2012  
Istanbul 
I attended to the conference as a participant. The conference enabled me to update myself 
regarding the recent development in hydropolitics of the ET basin.   
-Participant 
The application of international law in the 
protection of water rights in common waters 
with non-Arab countries. 
31/05/2012-
01/06/2012 
Baghdad 
The conference enabled to interact with decision-makers, academics 
from the riparian states. I gave a presentation regarding the 
application of the TWINS framework to the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations and received feedback.  
A presentation was given namely, 
the application of the TWINS 
framework to the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. 
The 6th International Workshop of Hydro-
Hegemony : Transboundary Water Justice  
12/01/2013 
13/01/2013 
London 
The conference enabled me to update my tehoratical framework and to interact with key 
academics across the world.  
-Participant 
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4.4. Methods of Data Collection  
 
This section will explain research methods used during the research and highlight their 
importance and relevance. Two types of data have constituted the main primary resources of 
this study. First, documents ranging from biographies to policy papers were gathered and 
analysed throughout the research period. In addition, personal communication with different 
actors both in person and online and participant observation was conducted as 
complementary methods. Second, unstructured interviews conducted with different actors to 
acquire insight on the research topic. These interviews were mainly conducted during the 
fieldwork period.  
4.4.1. Analysis of Documents as the Main Method  
 
In today’s world, societies produce a huge range of documents such as policy documents, TV 
programs, newspapers etc. Institutional documents comprise of ideas and documents; they 
provide empirical material of social phenomena (Corbetta 2003:287).  
 
In this research such documents will also provide another important source of primary data, 
since the discourses, ideas and arguments of different actors are revealed through this data. 
Given the political sensitivity of the hydropolitics of the ET basin, they provided more 
insightful information on the research area. The information acquired from institutional 
documents also enabled to triangulate the data with other primary and secondary sources. 
This study draws on a wide range of documents to analyse historical and current dynamics in 
hydropolitics of the ET basin.  
 
First, institutional documents published by government bodies (policy papers, law-decrees, 
action plans and so on), civil society actors (reports, declarations, audio-visual sources and so 
on) have been obtained and analysed in the study. I obtained institutional documents from my 
interviewees during interactions in my fieldwork. As stated above, I have also conducted 
studies in various libraries and obtained both institutional documents published by different 
authorities and secondary data. The web sites of various government bodies and NGOs have 
also enabled me to access diverse institutional documents. Here, Turkish as my native 
language was a particular advantage to access and gather information from such online 
sources.  
130 
 
 
Second, mass media documents including newspapers, TV programs, and documentaries 
provided invaluable data in analysing the case studies. Various media documents, gathered 
during the research, had following advantages. Mass media documents enabled the study to 
gather speech acts conducted by the discursive elites from state and non-state actors. By 
gathering mass media documents extensively, the study was able to obtain and analyse 
statements and interviews made by the discursive elites such as politicians, activists, 
academics and so on. Given the contemporary characteristic of this research, gathering mass 
media documents (either current or recent) helped understand sanctioned discourses 
promoted by discursive elites. Furthermore, mass media documents did provide rich sources 
in analysing previous developments in empirical cases, particularly the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations during the first era as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Third, treaties, protocols, joint declarations issued by governments, appeals to the judicial 
authorities, decisions taken by judicial bodies all are extensively used in the study. This 
information is mainly obtained by accessing the databases of official web sites such as the 
Official Gazette of Turkey and directly from the interviewees.  
 
4.4.2. Interviews  
  
Qualitative interviews aim ‘to grasp subject’s perspectives’ in a particular social research 
(Corbetta 2003:265). Understanding the factors determining conflictual and cooperative 
relations on water among various actors and analysing the role of power in such relations 
required understanding of the self-perceptions of actors on the case studies. The qualitative 
interviews enabled me to gather primary data for understanding self-perceptions of different 
actors in the basin.  The interviews also helped understand the views of actors about one 
another, which gave me better understanding of conflictual and cooperative relations between 
actors.  
 
Most of the qualitative interviews conducted in this study were semi-structured interviews. 
The questions and main themes were prepared with an aim to understand conflictual and 
cooperative patterns between actors, the strategies and tactics used to pursue their goals, 
important events related to the empirical cases and actors’ view on the key events. The 
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interviewees were also asked about their perception of actors involved in hydropolitical 
processes. It should be noted that although the questions and general outline of the interviews 
were prepared before the interview was conducted, different aspects of the topic often 
emerged during the interview and were further discussed with the interviewees. The 
interviews conducted can be considered as unstructured interviews. Semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews were found more useful than structured interviews, given the political 
sensitivity of the issues being investigated. It was observed that the interviewees tend to 
reveal their perceptions more freely in semi-structured and unstructured interviews.  
 
Although both secondary the secondary and primary data which shows Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations in inter-state level in the ET basin until 2000s (this period is covered 
in the first empirical chapter (Chapter 7) are rich and diverse, it is relatively less diverse in 
the context of recent developments. The same pattern exists in the context of the Ilısu dam 
dispute in which transnational hydropolitics have been analysed in Chapter 8. Therefore, 
interviews along with primary institutional data has been particularly important in these two 
empirical cases due to lack of adequate secondary literature.  
4.4.2.1. Time ad Place of the Interviews  
 
Most interviews were conducted during the fieldwork period (2011 February-February 2012). 
The interviews were taken in London, Ankara, Istanbul, Stockholm and Sanliurfa, located in 
the Southeastern Anatolia Region. These interviews were done at ministries, universities, 
research institutions and NGOs and conferences attended during the research project. I also 
conducted some interviews through e-mail exchanges.  
 
During the fieldwork, I visited to Ankara and Sanliurfa several times to interview politicians, 
policy makers, academics and researchers having previous official background. During these 
visits, I conducted research in the DSI Library, the library of the GAP RDA, the library of the 
Turkish National Assembly, the National Library of Turkey and libraries of several 
universities to obtain both primary and secondary data.  
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4.4.2.2. The Target Groups in Interviews 
 
The interviews were conducted with various actors. The actors included former politicians, 
policy makers from different parts of the hydraucracies, representatives from civil society, 
academics, researchers who were previously part of the decision-making bodies and 
journalists. Table 9 shows target groups with whom I conducted interviews.  
 
Table 9 Target group of interviews 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014   
 
Once most of the interviews were complete during the fieldwork, I maintained open 
communication with the target groups for obtaining further data. This approach was essential 
owing to the dynamic character of the research area. Thus, I have been in touch with my 
interviewees and conducted further rounds of interviews in person for further clarifications 
regarding their contribution to the research project and reviewing their attitude towards recent 
developments in empirical cases that the study deals with.  
 
Finally, all the interviews were anonymized due to the political sensitivity of the research 
area. A coding system was applied to keep the anonymity of the interviewees. Accordingly, 
numbers were given to each interviewee and detailed information including affiliation of 
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interviewees, time and place of interviews and type of interviews was given as illustrated in 
table in Annex 3.   
 
4.4.3. Other Research Methods  
 
4.4.3.1. Statistical Information  
 
In fact, statistical analysis is considered within quantitative research methods. However, in 
my view, it is essential to provide basic facts and figures on the physical context of any water 
resources to make an accurate analysis. Moreover, various actors in hydropolitics are able to 
produce facts and figures regarding water, which often constitutes the backbone of their 
arguments and conflicts. Therefore, analysis of such data is particularly vital for 
understanding the discursive power of actors. This study gathers facts and figures produced 
by different actors in hydropolitics of the ET basin. The actors producing the data have been 
particularly specified. However, here the aim is not to assess the accuracy of facts and figures 
produced by different actors; it is rather to provide a clear picture of the physical context of 
the ET basin to the reader and show how data is an inherent part of actors’ discursive power 
and provides a more accurate analysis. Such data will primarily be obtained from institutional 
documents produced by hydraucraices, civil society organisations and international actors.  
 
4.4.3.2. Participant Observation  
 
Participant observation is one of the conventional techniques used in qualitative research. 
Although this method is frequently used by different social sciences such as ethnography and 
development studies, it is rarely used in international relations or political science disciplines 
(Cascao 2009). However, due to the nature of this study, participant observations provided 
insightful information in understanding actors’ perceptions in hydropolitics of the ET basin.  
 
As stated above I attended various meetings during my research. Throughout these meetings, 
I had an opportunity to observe interactions between officials from the riparian states and 
witnessed discussions among actors. Likewise, attending conferences also enabled me to 
observe particular political processes on water resources management in the ET basin. For 
example, since I was able to attend the advanced training programme on regional 
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development in the ET basin and thereafter the World Water Week in 2011, I could closely 
follow the process on the report prepared by the SIWI, which prospects solution of water 
issues in the ET basin.  
 
4.5. Analysis and Interpretation of Data  
 
Analysis of qualitative data is relatively more difficult than the analysis of quantitative data 
owing to lack of well-established and widely accepted rules in qualitative data analysis 
(Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2010:344, Bryman 2012:565). The following methods were used in 
this study to interpret and analyse data obtained from various sources.   
 
4.5.1. Discourse Analysis  
 
Discourse analysis is one of the key methods that was used in this study for data analysis. 
The discourse is defined as “being derived from and dependent on social practices- the 
complex mix of cultural norms, disciplines and rituals- which govern discursive formations” 
(Hajer 1995 in Hewitt 2009:2).  
 
Based on the definition above, discourse analysis seeks to answer the impacts of discourse as 
social facts, they way in which discourses are constructed by actors and the available 
resources enabling construction of discourses. In other words, discourses are not considered 
as a neutral tool to convey meaning, but are rather constructed as verbal or non-verbal speech 
acts by certain actors to realise certain goals (Bryman 2012:529). Discourse analysis was 
used as a primary method in the document analysis including institutional documents, mass 
media sources and bibliographies and so on. It has also constituted one of the primary 
methods in the analysis of interviews.   
4.5.2. Analytic Induction  
 
As indicated above, this research adopted an iterative approach that consists of revisiting 
research questions and hypothesis, theoretical framework and analytical framework. In this 
regard, an analytic induction was used to analyse collected data. The process was as follows. 
First, research questions and interim hypotheses were identified based on conceptual 
frameworks located within the critical body of literature. Second, based on the primary and 
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secondary data the research questions and hypotheses were tested and a theoretical 
framework established. As the empirical case studies were further examined (gathering 
further primary and secondary data), research questions and hypotheses were reformulated 
and a distinctive theoretical framework was outlined. Figure 14 shows analytical induction 
model adopted by this study drawing upon Bryman’s model of analytic induction. 
 
 
Figure 14 The process of analytical induction during the research project 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Bryman (2012:522) 
 
 
4.5.3 Triangulation  
 
Triangulation is defined as “the combination of multiple methods in a study of the same 
project or event to depict more accurately the phenomenon being investigated” (Mitcbell 
1986:19). Cascao identifies two main purposes of triangulation as verifying the reliability of 
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the data and providing multiple insights (2009:126). Different types of triangulation methods 
can be identified in theory, such as data triangulation, methodological triangulation, theory 
triangulation, investigator triangulation and environmental triangulation (Guion, Diehl et al. 
2011). Among these triangulation methods, this study has used the following.  
 
 
First, data triangulation was extensively used in this study. Data triangulation refers to 
‘multiple sources of data within the same study’ (Mitcbell 1986:20). Data triangulation is 
particularly important for this study, given the fact that the research sought to analyse 
different and often contradicting self-perceptions and discourses of various actors. Moreover, 
contradictory accounts were found on hydrological facts and figures provided by different 
actors. Due to these reasons, data triangulation was essential to verify the gathered data. D 
Various types of gathered data were triangulated for accurate analysis. For example, the data 
collected from mass media sources was triangulated with the interviews, or vice versa. 
Furthermore, same types of data collected from different sources were triangulated to 
highlight differences and make accurate analysis. Second, methodological triangulation, 
which refers to inclusion of various methods and procedures, were used in the study (Mitcbell 
1986:21).  
 
4.6. Potential Problematic Fields and Limitations  
 
Even though this study uses a pluralistic approach for data gathering and analysis, some 
problematic fields and limitations can be identified and summarised as follows.  
4.6.1. Data Validity  
 
Data validity can be considered, as one of the problematic fields owing to politically sensitive 
character of the case studies discussed in this study. This study supports the view that social 
reality is socially and politically constructed. In other words, discourses and ideas are 
constructed to achieve certain goals. Given the conflictual views between actors, data validity 
constitutes one of the problematic fields in this study. Therefore, wide range of data was 
gathered and triangulated along with using other methods of data analysis to overcome this 
problem.  
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4.6.2. Scope of the Study  
 
One of the main contributions of this study is to provide a multi-scalar account by 
acknowledging the different layers in hydropolitics.  The aim was not only to look at the 
layer of inter-state hydropolitics, but also to analyse the layer of transnational hydropolitics in 
the context of the ET basin. As pointed above, the case study approach is adopted and 
particular sub-cases were used and others excluded in the analysis.  
 
Analysing different layers of hydropolitics necessarily requires a focus on certain actors in 
specific periods, since it would be beyond the scope of this study to adopt a basin wide 
approach and include all the riparian states in hydropolitics of the ET basin. Therefore, the 
study restricts itself by looking at the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the context of 
the layer of inter-state hydropolitics can be considered as a limitation. However, it should be 
noted that the reason why Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations was selected as a sub-case 
study is its rich empirical account on conflictual and cooperative patterns in the hydropolitics 
of the ET basin. Moreover, there are number of watershed that are transboundary in nature 
between Turkey and Syria and located either in upstream or downstream riparian states. This 
unique aspect enables the study to make further theoretical assessments.10  
 
4.6.3. Major Political Changes in the ET Basin  
 
The Turkish-Syrian political rapprochement was in its zenith, when I started my PhD in 
2010. However, unprecedented political changes, which are coined as the Arab Spring or the 
Arab Uprising, in the MENA region had completely changed this situation by 2011. By the 
second half of 2011 and onwards, Syria had gradually become destabilized and Turkish-
Syrian political relations worsened. The major political changes that occurred during my 
research provided both disadvantages in terms of conducting fieldwork and advantages in 
assessing the theoretical considerations and empirical findings.  
 
                                                        
10 More information can be found on why this study chose the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations as an 
empirical case study in the ET basin in Chapter (See Section 1.4.6).  
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There were some obstacles in this research due to the uprising in Syria; I had to cancel my 
field trip to Syria that I was planning at the beginning of my fieldwork. This limited the 
primary data gathered particularly to understand the Syrian perspective on the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. I have tried to overcome this limitation by conducting interviews at 
international meetings with the Syrian academics, collected institutional data and mass media 
documents and reviewed secondary literature in detail.  
 
 
Major political changes in the Syrian context also provide advantages in assessing theoretical 
standpoints and empirical findings of this study. One of the consequences of the uprising in 
Syria is rapidly deteriorating political relations between Turkey and Syria in general and 
hydropolitical relations in particular since 2011. As will be analysed in detail in the empirical 
chapters, one of the main aims of this study is to understand patterns of high conflict-low 
cooperation and vice versa in the context of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. 
While in Chapter 6, the study seeks to understand patterns of high conflict and low 
cooperation; it discusses why there has been a notable positive change in hydropolitical 
relations in Chapter 7. Therefore, rapidly deteriorating bilateral relations have enabled to 
assess use of empirical findings regarding conflictual and cooperative patterns in the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations.  
 
4.6.4. Researcher’s Identity and Language Issues  
 
 
Since I am from Turkey this led to problematic fields, limitations and advantages during the 
research project. The main problematic field concerning researcher’s identity can be 
associated with objectivity. As pointed earlier in this chapter, this study adopts an 
epistemological position where objectivity in social research is impossible, since the 
researcher and the object being researched cannot be separated. Therefore, I explicitly stated 
my identity of being a Turkish researcher during the fieldwork. Moreover, even though I 
received funding from the Turkish Ministry of Education during my research, the Ministry of 
Education has not interfered at any stage of my research project.  
 
Researcher’s identity also established both limitations and advantages, which can be 
associated with language. Since my Arabic is at the beginners level, I was not able to access 
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documents in Arabic. Therefore, language barrier can be considered one of the limitations in 
this study. However, since Turkish is my native language enabled me to access and interpret 
a wide range of documents produced by different institutions and individuals. Moreover, it 
also helped me to communicate better with most of my interviewees.  
 
4.7. Conclusion  
 
This chapter outlined the research methodology used in this study. Considering the 
epistemological and ontological standpoints adopted by this research project, this study can 
be located within the interpretivist paradigm. In consistency with the methodological 
approach, qualitative research methods were used in this study. The research project also 
used an iterative approach consisting of revisiting research questions and the analytical and 
theoretical framework continuously. Given the complexity of the research project, different 
types of primary and secondary data were gathered. Interviews and documents including 
institutional documents and mass media were the main primary data sources used in this 
study. In addition, statistical data and participant observation were used along with review of 
extensive secondary literature in developing empirical and theoretical chapters. The 
complexity of the research project also necessitated using a pluralistic approach for data 
analysis. Discourse analysis, analytical induction and triangulation were the main methods 
used in the analysis and interpretation of data. The methodological limitations and 
problematic fields of the study are related with data validity/availability, scope of the study 
and major political changes in the ET basin. These limitations were addressed by gathering a 
wide range of primary and secondary data and by using a pluralistic approach in data 
analysis.  
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CHAPTER 5 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION on EMPRICAL CASE STUDIES  
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on the empirical cases to be 
analysed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 1 illustrated the ET basin is the main spatial context 
of this study with different layers of hydropolitics. In Chapter 1 it was also stated that the 
study would examine hydropolitical relations between certain actors to understand inter-state 
and transnational layers in the ET basin. In the analysis of the layer of inter-state 
hydropolitics in the ET basin, the Turkish and Syrian governments formed the main focus of 
the study. In the analysis of transnational hydropolitics in the construction of the Ilısu dam 
project in ET basin, variety of actors from public sector, private sector and civil society, 
which either support or oppose the project, formed the main focus.  
 
 
Before making the analysis regarding the case studies, hydrological and geographical facts 
and figures and major political developments on transboundary water issues with respect to 
case studies must be outlined in detail. This chapter was designed to cover this gap in the 
thesis. The aims of this chapter are two-fold. First, it seeks provide background information 
regarding the facts and figures of transboundary water resources with respect to case studies. 
Second, the chapter seeks to provide and empirical literature review regarding the key events 
with respect to case studies.  
 
 
Bearing these two aims in mind, the chapter will be composed two sections. In the first 
section, hydrological and geographical facts and figures about the ET basin and hydraulic 
development projects conducted by the Turkish and Syrian governments will be outlined. 
Similar illustration will be briefly made about the Orontes Basin and transboundary water 
aquifer systems are located along the borderline between Turkey and Syria, as other major 
transboundary watersheds between the two countries. In the second section, major 
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hydropolitical developments and key events, which occurred in the context of the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations in the course of time and the recent Ilısu dam conflict between 
opponents and proponents, will be discussed in detail.  
 
5.2. Basic Hydrological and Geographical Facts and Figures: ET and Orontes 
Basins  
 
This section seeks to provide geographical and hydrological data regarding empirical case 
studies for accurate analysis in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. In this respect, hydrological and 
geographical facts and figures about the ET and Orontes basins will be provided. Hydraulic 
development projects conducted or prospected by the Turkish and Syrian governments will 
also be outlined in detail in subsequent sections. The data was collected from various 
institutional documents published by riparian states and intergovernmental organisation. 
Moreover, some of the data was gathered from secondary sources that refer to these 
institutional documents. These gathered data was also triangulated to provide clear picture 
regarding spatial contexts. These facts and figures will help to make a more accurate analysis 
regarding the empirical case studied in analytical chapters. The following map provides a 
general overview of the ET and Orontes transboundary water basins and major hydraulic 
development projects conducted by the Turkish and Syrian governments.  
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Map 2 Map of Euphrates and Tigris and Orontes Basins 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
 
As shown in Map 2, while Turkey is located as an upstream state in the ET basin, Syria is the 
mid-stream (upstream riparian states in relation to Turkey) riparian states in the Orontes 
basin. Reverse positions of Turkey and Syria in these two transboundary water basins enable 
this study to derive fruitful theoretical insights in understanding transboundary water politics. 
As Map 2 illustrates both governments have conducted series of hydraulic development 
projects to realise their water potential. Particularly, the extensive hydraulic development 
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project conducted in the context of the Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP Turkish 
acronym) by Turkish government enables it to control pivotal waters of the ET basin. In the 
Orontes basin, the Syrian government has the upper hand in terms hydraulic development in 
relation to Turkey and Lebanon, downstream and upstream riparian states of the Orontes 
basin respectively. As will be explained in the subsequent sections, Turkey’s hydraulic 
development is limited in comparisons with Syria in the Orontes basin.  
 
Finally, Map 2 shows two important hydraulic development projects, which are underway, 
introduced in the ET and Orontes basins. In the ET basin, the Ilısu dam along with other 
dams particularly in the Tigris leg of the GAP is currently under construction. In Orontes 
basin, the joint Friendship dam was introduced by the Turkish and Syrian governments 
prospected to be built in the Turkish-Syrian borderline. While the Ilısu dam ushered a 
widespread controversy both within and outside of Turkey, the Friendship dam was coined as 
the symbol of the Turkish-Syrian political rapprochement in 2000s. These two cases will be 
analysed in detail in analytical chapters (see Chapters 7 and 8). In the subsequent sections 
these above-stated points will be further uncovered.  
5.2.1. Euphrates and Tigris Basin: Geographical and Hydrological Data  
 
The ET basin is the second largest transboundary watershed after the Nile basin in the MENA 
region. The Euphrates and Tigris rivers rise in the highlands of southeastern Turkey. They 
pass through Syria and Iraq and unite near Basra and form the Shatt-al-Arab in lower Iraq 
near Qurna. After the Karun River joins the Shatt-al-Arab, it empties in the Persian/Arabian 
Gulf (Erdem 2003). Turkey, Syria and Iraq constitute the upstream, mid-stream and 
downstream co-riparian states of the ET Rivers, respectively. However, ET Rivers as a 
hydrological basin also includes Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran.11 Map 3 shows the 
vast catchment area of the ET basin in the MENA region.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11
 The tributaries originating from Iran are also very important. Several tributaries originating from Iran feed the 
mainstream Tigris from its west banks. Therefore, those tributaries themselves form a transboundary water 
context between Iraq and Iran as upstream and downstream co-riparian states respectively.  
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Map 3 The Catchment Area of the Euphrates and Tigris Basin 
 
Source: South West Asia Project (2004)    
 
 
The total length of the Euphrates River is roughly 3000 km. that is divided between Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq as 1230km, 710km and 1060km respectively (FAO 2009). While Turkey 
contributes 89-90% to the flow of the Euphrates, Syria’s contribution is estimated 10-11%. 
The contribution of the other riparian states, including Iraq, to the Euphrates is negligible 
(Bilen 2009:35, FAO 2009). The length of the mainstream of the Tigris River is 1850km, 
which is divided between Turkey, Syria and Iraq 400km, 32km and 1418km respectively. In 
terms of contribution of water flow from each co-riparian state to the Tigris basin, Turkey 
contributes the largest share of 51%, while Iraq and Iran contribute 39% and 10%, 
respectively (FAO 2009). Syria does not contribute to the flow of the Tigris River, since very 
tiny part of the Tigris River flows through Syria. Compiling information from different 
sources, Bilen (2009:35) illustrates the average annual flows and contribution of the riparian 
sates as follows in Table 10.  
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Table 10 Average flows and contributions of the riparian states in the ET basin 
 
Source: Bilen 2009:35 
 
As Table 10 shows while Turkey contributes %90 and %40 of the water potential of the 
Euphrates River and Tigris River respectively. Contribution made in Syria  %10 for 
Euphrates. Syria does not contribute Tigris River, as very tiny part of mainstream Tigris 
River flows through Syria. The following section will outline existing and future hydraulic 
development projects conducted by the Turkish and Syrian governments.  
5.2.2. Hydraulic Development Conducted by Turkey and Syria in the ET Basin  
 
Due to the relatively enormous volumes of water in the basin, the rivers are of vital 
importance for both states meant for irrigation and hydropower generation. Therefore, all 
three riparian states Turkey, Syria and Iraq have developed extensive water development 
projects in the basin.  
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5.2.2.1. The Hydraulic Development Conducted by Syria in the ET Basin  
 
In Syria, the ET Rivers alone constitute 62% of the entire available water resources. If we 
include the Khabur Basin, this figure goes up to 71% (Varela-Ortega and Sagardo 2001:16). 
According to the World Bank report (2001), 63% of the entire area in Syria is irrigated by 
using the Euphrates basin (in World Bank, 2001 Salman and Mualla 2003: 3). The Syrian 
government has made an ambitious hydraulic development attempt in the Euphrates basin 
area owing to this great dependency. Therefore, the first large-scale project was the 
construction of the Euphrates dam, which became operational on 5th July 1973. The Syrian 
government decided to establish General Administration for the development of the 
Euphrates Basin in 1968. In 1971, the government decided to establish the Ministry of 
Euphrates dam project to deal with hydraulic development issues. Water stored after the 
completion of the Euphrates dam was expected to open 640.000 ha of land for irrigation (Bari 
1977:234,235). Subsequent to completion, the Syrian government continued to pursue large-
scale development projects. Baath and Tishreen dams were constructed in 1987 and 2001 
respectively (Alhamood and Ahmad 2011). Moreover, it is worth noting that the dams 
constructed on the mainstream Euphrates River have also been the main suppliers of 
hydropower generation, which covers roughly 20% of the entire electricity production in 
Syria (Interviewee 19 pers. comm. 2011, October 15).  
 
 
The Syrian government has also conducted series of hydraulic development projects in the 
Khabur basin, one of the largest sub-basin systems of the Euphrates basin. The Khabur River 
joins mainstream Euphrates from its east bank near the town of Busayrah. In spite of this 
geographical fact, the Khabur basin is not considered part of the Euphrates basin, instead 
associated with the Tigris basin according to the official classification of sub-basins of Syria 
(Kout 2008:2312). The Khabur basin is mainly utilised for irrigation due to its suitability for 
agriculture in the surrounding topography (Interviewee 19 pers. comm. 2011, August 23). 
The Syrian government has so far constructed three dams in the Khabur basin, namely Basil 
Asad Dam, 8 March dam and Khabur dam (Barnes 2009:522, Tigrek 2012). The hydraulic 
development on the Tigris was limited until recently owing to geographical reasons 
illustrated above. However, in the context of recent memorandum of understanding between 
Syria and Turkey, Syria started to conduct new irrigation projects aimed at transferring water 
from the Tigris to Khabur basin (Interviewee 19 pers. comm. 2011, August 23). The 
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following map shows irrigation projects conducted by the Syrian government across the 
country.  
 
Map 4 Irrigation Projects in Syria 
 
Source: Ababsa 2011:89 
 
The Map 5 illustrates major irrigation areas in water resources of Syria. As the Map 5 shows 
irrigation projects are mainly concentrated on the Euphrates and Khabur basins.  
 
5.2.2.2. The Hydraulic Development Conducted by Turkey in the ET Basin  
 
The ET basin constitutes 31% of Turkey’s entire water resources potential (Ünal, Sargın et al. 
2009:14). Therefore, the initial large-scale hydraulic projects were planned and conducted by 
the Turkish government in the ET basin. The Keban dam, the first large-scale project located 
in upper part of the ET basin, commenced in 1965. Meanwhile, feasibility studies were also 
conducted during 1960s in the lower Euphrates and Tigris basin to realise this potential These 
studies pioneered the introduction of the Southeastern Anatolian project, also known as the 
GAP (Turkish acronym), designated as a regional development project, in 1980 (GAP RDA 
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2012). The area previously labelled as the lower ET basin started to be identified as the GAP 
Region. It is expected that twenty-two dams and nineteen HPPs are to be built in the GAP 
region. By the time the project is completed, 27 billion kWh will be generated annually and 
1.8 million ha land will be opened for irrigation – this is equivalent to 21% of Turkey’s entire 
irrigable lands currently (Ünal, Sargın et al. 2009:45, GAP-RDA 2011:22). Map 5 depicts the 
projects within the GAP region and hydraulic development infrastructures either constructed 
or under planning phase.  
 
Map 5 The GAP region and hydraulic development projects conducted by the Turkish government 
 
 
Source: Ayboğa 2009 
 
 
The GAP, as a regional development project, includes thirteen hydraulic development 
projects. While seven projects were on the Euphrates part, six projects have been designated 
on the Tigris. Each hydraulic project consists of irrigation schemes and HPPs.  Six dams have 
already been completed on the Euphrates and three on the Tigris. Notably, large-scale dams, 
such as Karakaya Dam, Ataturk Dam and Birecik Dam have already been completed on the 
mainstream Euphrates. Large-scale dams such as the Ilısu dam, the Silvan dam and the 
Garzan dam are either under construction, or in the planning phase on the Tigris (DSI 2013: 
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43). Table 11 provided by the DSI, illustrates dams that are in operation, under construction, 
in the master plan, in planning or in program in the GAP.  
 
 
Table 11 Statuses of dams in the GAP 
 
       Source: DSI 2013:42 
  
Concerning hydropower generation, the GAP is defined as, a “locomotive of hydropower 
generation in Turkey’’ (DSI 2013:42). In 2012, the GAP was already supplying 32% of the 
entire hydropower generation in Turkey annually. This figure corresponds to 9% of the total 
electricity produced in Turkey (DSI 2013:42). The estimated hydroelectricity potential was 
60% in 2012 (DSI 2013:44).  
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While the total irrigated area in the GAP region was roughly 300.000 ha in 2009. This figure 
escalated to 377.672 ha according to the recent figures published by the DSI in 2013 (DSI 
2013: 74). The government spending in the GAP to expand irrigation has significantly 
increased since 2007 (Interviewee 5 pers. comm. 2011). In the 2008 GAP action plan, the 
government set targets to reach 1.058.000 ha for irrigation by end of 2013 (DSI 2012:41). It 
appears that realising the target for irrigation and developing large-scale hydraulic 
infrastructure such as the Ilısu dam on the Tigris are the main goals of hydraulic development 
infrastructure in the GAP.  
 
5.2.3. Orontes Basin: Geographical and Hydrological Data  
 
 
The Orontes river basin, which is also called the Asi River in Turkish and Nahr el-Assi (the 
‘rebellious stream’) in Arabic, is one of the major river basins in the MENA region. 
However, in spite of its importance, it is also one of the least studied river basins as compared 
to other transboundary river basins in the MENA region (Naff and Matson 1984:115). 
Therefore, the hydrologic data is also very limited between Turkey and Syria. The basin is 
also one of the main areas of contestation between downstream Turkey and upstream Syria 
(Naff and Matson 1984, Scheumann, Sağsen et al. 2011). The Orontes River originates a few 
kilometres northeast of Litani River in the western part of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. It 
flows, approximately 46 km through northeast Lebanon where it enters into the Syrian 
territory. Thereafter, the river continues to flow northward and enters into Ghab Valley by 
passing through Syrian cities of Homs and Hamah. After acting as an international border for 
31 km between Turkey and Syria, the Orontes River enters Alexandretta Region in Turkey by 
flowing westward where it empties in to the Mediterranean Sea. Map 6 shows the Orontes 
River basin and hydraulic infrastructures built by the riparian states. It has also a particular 
importance in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, as both countries are riparian states 
of the basin along with Lebanon.  
  
151 
 
 
Map 6 The Map of the Orontes Basin and Major Dams 
 
Source : Kibaroğlu, Klaphake et al. 2005:66 
 
The hydrologic data on Orontes Basin varies and is inconsistent according to different 
sources (Maden 2011). For example, in terms of catchment area of the Orontes basin for each 
riparian state, while the data produced by the US Army Corps of Engineers estimates the total 
catchment area as 22.500 square kilometres, the FAO figures are 24.660 square kilometres. 
Almost the same figure has been estimated, 22.624 square kilometres, by the DSI (FAO 
2009, Korkmaz and Karatas 2009:22, Maden 2011:12). 
 
In spite of this varying data from different sources, it is clear that Syria is in a leading 
position on catchment area and length of the river flow as compared to other riparian states. 
A recent study jointly conducted by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (ESCWA) and the German Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources 
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(BGR) shows while the catchment area of the Orontes basin in Syria is 17.881 square 
kilometres, they are 6.633 and 2.026 square kilometres in Turkey and Lebanon respectively 
(ESCWA-BGR Cooperation 2012: 8). Table 12 shows the total catchment area of the basin 
and the percentage share of each riparian state. 
 
Table 12 The share of the catchment area for each riparian states of the Orontes basin 
 
Source:  ESCWA-BGR Cooperation, 2012: 8 
 
 
The tributaries and groundwater resources in the catchment areas in Turkey and Syria are the 
main contributions to annual discharge of the basin. It is estimated that while 46% of the 
annual discharge originates in Turkey, 43% comes from Syria, and the remaining 11% from 
Lebanon (Kibaroğlu, Klaphake et al. 2005:67) The estimations on the annual potential of the 
entire basin ranges from 2.5 BCM to 2.8 BCM according to different sources (Kibaroğlu, 
Klaphake et al. 2005:67, Bilen 2009:87, Maden 2011:12).  
 
 
Since the 1950s, Turkey and Syria have been applying hydraulic development schemes to 
utilise the Orontes Basin for different purposes. Turkey’s hydraulic development projects 
conducted in the Orontes basin are limited, since the basin constitutes a tiny part of Turkey’s 
entire water resources potential. According the figures provided by the DSI, the Orontes 
basin constitutes only 0.6% of Turkey’s entire water potential (DSI 2013: 24). Nevertheless, 
the Turkish government has introduced few hydraulic infrastructures in the basin. These 
infrastructures are operational or under construction or planning include dams and irrigation 
schemes and HPPs. In the Turkish territory, there are already three dams and HPPs, four 
irrigation schemes, already in operation in the Orontes basin. The dams, which have been 
already constructed, are Yarseli, Tahtaköprü and Yayladağı dams.  Currently, Reyhanlı dam 
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is under construction. The DSI also conducts works to heighten the body of the Yarseli dam  
(DSI gov.tr.).  It is estimated that 60.000 ha land will be further opened to irrigation in the 
fertile Amik Plain upon the completion of the Reyhanlı dam (DSI 2012). These projects 
mainly seek to expand irrigable lands in the Hatay (Alexandretta) region.  
 
 
Syria’s water development is much more diversified and extensive than Turkey and Lebanon 
being the downstream and upstream riparian states of the Orontes basin respectively. The 
Orontes basin is utilised by Syria for irrigation, hydropower generation and domestic 
purposes. The bulk of water is utilised for irrigation, which corresponds to 77% of total use 
from the basin (ESCWA-BGR Cooperation 2012: 14). The Orontes basin supplies the main 
water resources along with the Khabur and Euphrates sub-basins in Syria (El Hindi 2011:18). 
According to the data produced by the Syrian Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform 
(2001), 253.427 ha of area is being irrigated using groundwater and surface water resources 
(Fiorillo and Vercueil 2003:343). The Orontes basin is also important for the domestic 
supply, as the basin meets roughly 22.4% of the total domestic water supply (El Hindi 
2011:18). The Orontes supplies domestic water needs of major cities in Syria such as Hama 
and Homs (Interviewee 19 pers. comm. 2011, August 23). The basin also meets the lion’s 
share, approximately 40.8%, of the industrial water needs (Salman and Mualla 2003:3). The 
high proportion of water for industry from the Orontes mainly stems from the fact that the 
main industry is located in western Syria. The basin delivers 16.52% of the domestic water 
supply. Since hydraulic infrastructures are mainly designated for irrigation, domestic and 
industrial supply, the hydropower capacity is relatively limited in the Orontes basin 
(Interviewee 19 pers. comm. 2011, October 15). The Syrian government has developed more 
than forty dams in the Orontes basin to tackle with increasing water needs particularly in the 
agricultural sector. The total storage capacity of these dams has reached 950 MCM (million 
cubic meters) by 2006 (ESCWA-BGR Cooperation 2012: 15).  
 
There are two main agricultural zones irrigated by utilising the Orontes basin, the region 
located between Homs and Hama and the Ghab Valley. The Syrian government has been 
developing the Ghab Valley project, which consists of several dams located in the 
mainstream and tributaries of the basin and irrigation schemes, since the 1950s. The main 
purpose of the project is to irrigate the Ghab Valley region, which constitutes one of the most 
fertile areas in Syria. As there is a relative water surplus during the winter season, the surplus 
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waters drained through the dams constructed on the tributaries of the basin are pumped into 
the mainstream Orontes and stored in the reservoirs, mainly for irrigation (Interviewee 19 
pers. comm. 2011, August 23). Therefore, all these hydraulic development projects 
conducted by the Syrian government have enabled an extensive control in the Orontes basin.  
 
Finally, Turkish and Syrian governments agreed on construction of a joint dam project in 
2009, called as the Friendship Dam, where it forms a political boundary between the two 
states. The dam will be jointly utilised by both states for irrigation and hydropower purposes. 
It will also regulate the water flow during flood. The total area to be irrigated is estimated at 
roughly 8000 ha. The power capacity of the dam will be 9 MW, in which the annual 
hydroelectricity generation will be 16 GWh (Maden 2011:23).  
 
 
Apart from the Orontes basin, there are transboundary aquifer systems along the borderline 
between Turkey and Syria. These aquifer systems are also connected with the surface water 
systems (Özbay, Yıldız et al. 2011, Kibaroğlu, Klaphake et al. 2005:73). Transboundary 
groundwater resources management has not come between Turkey and Syria as a separate 
hydropolitical issue. However, existing overexploitation of resources in the region (World 
Bank 2001:17) and future plans for further exploitation (GAP-RDA 2011:4) show the 
necessity for joint actions in transboundary groundwater management. 
 
 
To sum up, two overarching conclusions can be made on the facts and figures of the ET and 
Orontes basins as the spatial realms of this study. First, the ET basin forms the largest water 
potential for hydraulic development in both Turkey and Syria. Thus, both states have 
extensive hydraulic projects in the ET basin. In particular, both states have largely realised 
the large-scale hydraulic projects on the Euphrates. Therefore, it forms the main area of 
concern in hydropolitics in Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. Turkey and Syria also 
conduct hydraulic development projects on the Tigris. Given the fact that only 32 km. of the 
Tigris River flows through Turkish-Syrian border, Turkey’s development attempts are much 
more extensive than Syria. Therefore, it is less likely that the Tigris may form an area of 
contestation in Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. Thus, as will be explained in the 
following chapters, it has become one of the areas of hydropolitical cooperation in Turkish-
Syrian relations.  
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Second, hydraulic development conducted by Syria is much more diverse than its 
downstream riparian state, Turkey, on the Orontes basin. Given the significance of the 
Orontes basin, it appears that Syria, as the mid-stream co-riparian state, has established 
control over the basin. This fact provides insight on the role of geography (riparian position) 
in power analysis in hydropolitics.  
 
5.3. Major Political Development in the Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and 
Tigris Basin  
 
The ET basin is one of the most politically contested transboundary water basins with 
patterns of conflict and cooperation between varieties of actors including riparian states of the 
ET basin, inter-governmental organisation, private sector, NGOs and so on. It can be argued 
that bilateral and trilateral hydropolitical relations among riparian states, Turkey, Syria and 
Iraq, dominated hydropolitics of the ET basin until 2000s. This is mainly due to lack of third 
party actors to be part of inter-state negotiations, lack of societal forces in domestic contexts 
to influence water policies of riparian states and limited involvement of the private sector 
actors in decision making processes.  
 
 
As stated above this study looks at prolonging hydropolitical relations between the Turkish 
and Syrian governments in the ET basin, as it provides a rich empirical account of 
understanding Turkey’s transboundary water policy, inter-state hydropolitics and patterns of 
conflict and cooperation in inter-state relations. This study analyses the long-standing 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations by dividing it into two eras. The first era covers the 
period between 1923 and 1998, in which patterns of high conflict and low cooperation can be 
identified. The second era is 1998-2011 when patterns of cooperation and relatively less 
conflictual relations between the riparian states begin to emerge. Each of these eras will be 
further divided into different phases to provide a systemic account on the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations over time.  
 
Although inter-state hydropolitical relations between riparian states of the ET basin remain 
intact, we may also observe emergence of a new political dynamics in hydropolitics of the ET 
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basin by 2000s. These dynamics are growing involvement of private sector both within and 
outside the domestic context of riparian states and involvement of societal forces such as 
NGOs, informal networks, and activists to influence in decision-making processes in the 
hydropolitics of the ET basin. The conflict between opponents and proponents of Ilısu dam 
project, which is under construction in the mainstream Tigris River by the Turkish 
government, shows how actors from civil society and private sector become influential. 
These political dynamics are classified as the layer of transnational hydropolitics in this study 
and analysed in Chapter 8 by taking the Ilısu dam conflict (1997-2013) as an empirical case 
study. The temporal focus is on the period between 1997 and 2013. It starts with 1997, when 
the Turkish government decided to conduct the Ilısu dam project as a public-private 
partnership and explains conflictual relations between the opponents and proponents of the 
project until 2013. This will be discussed in the subsequent sections of this Chapter. 
 
5.3.1. Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Relations in 1923-1998: Patterns of High 
Conflict and Low Cooperation in Inter-state Hydropolitics of the ET Basin  
 
As stated above, the temporal focus of the first era covers the period between 1923 and 1998.  
It starts from creation of the Republic of Turkey (1923) and the Syrian Arab Republic (1946) 
as nation states. Since Turkey was founded as a nation state 23 years before Syria gained its 
full independence from France in 1946, we observe hydropolitical relations between Turkey 
and the French Mandatory Authorities acting on behalf of Syria during this 23 year period 
between 1923 and 1946). The temporal focus of this section ended in the 1998 October crisis, 
which brought the two states on the verge of war. During the first era, although occasional 
patterns of cooperation can be identified, however hydropolitical relations between Turkey 
and Syria have gradually become a conflictual issue. Therefore, the main pattern of these 
relations can be labelled as ‘high conflict and low cooperation’. Nevertheless, given the 
temporal focus on the first era, the long-term period can be further sub-divided into three 
phases (e.g. Sağsen 2006, Kibaroğlu 2012). 
 .  
1. Water as a Non-Politicised Issue in the Turkish-Syrian Relations (1923-1960): 
Water is considered a non-politicised issue between Turkey and Syria at 
transboundary scale in this period. The main theme of this period is low conflict 
and low-cooperation. The first phase starts with establishment of Turkey and Syria 
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as nation states and lasts until introduction of large-scale hydraulic development 
projects.  
 
2. Domestic Securitisation of Water and Emergence of Water Dispute between Turkey 
and Syria (1960-1980): Water has emerged as a dispute in the Turkish-Syrian 
relations; as a result of domestic securitizations of water resources development 
thereby led the states to introduce their initial large-scale water resources 
development schemes. The main theme is low cooperation and high conflict. The 
second phase covers the period between initial large-scale hydraulic works to 
introduction of the GAP by Turkey in 1980. 
  
3. Water as a Securitised Issue in the Turkish-Syrian Relations (1980-1998): Water 
conflict between Turkey and Syria has further escalated, as Turkey introduced 
comprehensive regional development program labelled as the GAP. The main 
theme of this period is also high conflict and low cooperation. The main difference 
in this period is, while confrontation between riparian states has further escalated, 
the interactions remained limited. The third phase covers introduction of the GAP 
by Turkey and it lasts until the Ocalan Crisis in 1998, where states reached the 
verge of war.  
 
5.3.1.1. Phase 1–Water as a Non-Politicized Issue in the Turkish-Syrian Relations (1923-
1960): 
 
Although we do not identify conflictual interactions on water issues between Turkey and 
Syria during the first phase, interactions for transboundary water management are limited 
during this period. Therefore, I call this period as water as a non-politicised issue at 
transboundary scale. However, as I will discuss in the following part non-politicization at 
transboundary scale does not necessarily mean that decision-makers do not consider the 
importance of water for development and security. But they do not have adequate capacity to 
introduce large scale hydraulic works in the ET basin. Yet, water related issues were included 
in a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements in Turkish-Syrian relations. It is also 
worth mentioning that since Turkey became an independent state 23 years earlier than Syria, 
most of the agreements in the first period were signed between Turkey and the French 
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Mandatory Authority on behalf of Syria. The agreements including water clauses can be 
outlined as follows. 
5.3.1.1.1. Clarifying the Borderline and Dealing with Small Hydropolitical Issues  
 
The legal documents signed between Turkish and Syrian governments (the French Mandatory 
Authority until Syria’s full independence) have constituted the main essence of hydropolitical 
relations during the first phase.  
 
The first legal document is the Ankara Agreement signed between France and the Ankara 
Government during the Turkish liberation War in 1921. Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement 
sets out water distribution from the Kuweik stream to Aleppo city under Turkey’s control 
(See Annex 1, Ankara Treaty). Thus, the article is specifically designated to meet the water 
needs of Aleppo, largest city in the region, and its surrounding areas in Turkey  (Durdular 
1995).  
 
The second legal document is the Lausanne Peace treaty, which provided international 
recognition of republic of independent Turkey in 1923. Article 109 of the treaty anticipates 
future inter-state arrangements among neighbouring states, in case they conduct hydraulic 
projects on transboundary watersheds (See Annex 1, Lausanne Treaty Article 109). After the 
Lausanne Peace treaty, Turkish and French Mandatory authorities on behalf Syria signed 
several protocols to clarify the borderline between these two states. Transboundary 
watersheds were also subject to those protocols between the parties. Thus, the protocol signed 
between Turkey and French Mandatory Authorities on 3rd May 1930 in Aleppo sets out 
technical issues on the Tigris River which includes use of water for navigation or fishery and 
for industrial and agricultural purposes (Durdular 1995:7) Another protocol was signed 
between Turkey and the French Mandatory Authority on 19th May 1939, which clarifies the 
final borderline between Turkey and Syria. According to Article 3 of this protocol, the 
Thalweg Line constitutes the Turkish-Syrian border in parts of Orontes River, Afrin River 
and Karasu stream. The article also states that the parties will benefit from these waters with 
an equal amount along the borderline (Durdular 1995:7).   
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5.3.1.1.2. A Brief Evaluation of the Signed Documents between Turkey and Syria Concerning 
Water  
 
Although water was the subject of bilateral or multilateral agreements or protocols, none of 
them has designated a general rule such as particular entitlement of water to the each co-
riparian state with respect to the ET or the Orontes basins. Therefore, there are no 
overarching agreements on the ET basin in the initial stages of hydropolitical relations among 
co-riparian states, as is the case of the Nile Basin. Both the 1929 Agreement signed between 
Egypt and the British Mandatory Authority on behalf of Sudan and the 1959 Agreement 
signed between Egypt and Sudan on the Nile basin are examples of such overarching 
agreements establishing a status quo on the Nile basin. Today those agreements have become 
one the essential parts of the discursive power of Egypt and Sudan (Cascao 2009:55,56). This 
is particularly the case for Egypt, since maintaining the existing status quo on the Nile is the 
main strategy. The discourse on Egypt acquiring historical rights on the Nile backed by both 
historical facts and legal documents constitutes a discursive power capability in the 
hydropolitics (Cascao 2009:245).  
 
 
In these initial phases of ET basin hydropolitics, however, we do not identify such 
multilateral or bilateral agreements among the co-riparian states. Neither Turkey, as the 
upstream co-riparian state of the basin, nor Syria or Iraq as the mid-stream and downstream 
users respectively have been able to reach this arrangement of establishing the existing status 
quo. This supports the argument although water issues were included in bilateral and 
multilateral agreements water was not considered a ‘securitised’ issue in Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations.  
 
 
It is crucial to examine whether Turkish government in those days could have followed a 
same strategy by projecting future importance of water issues. Şalvarcı (2003:98) argues that 
if Turkey had signed an agreement it would have secured its existing and future water needs 
with the French Mandatory Authority; that would have also been a good leverage over the 
Damascus administration in future water relations. In other words, securing such agreement 
for the Turkish government would have provided an important bargaining power capability in 
its future interactions with the Syrian government and would have become an important part 
of Turkey’s discursive position. To Şalvarcı, such an agreement would have been binding for 
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Damascus administration, since the Syrian government after independence declared that it 
would respect the treaties and agreements signed by the French Mandatory authority on 
behalf of Syria (Soysal 1998:101, Şalvarcı 2003:98).  
 
However, it should be noted that political conflict between Turkey and Syria over the status 
of Hatay province continued, even though Turkey and French Mandatory authorities signed a 
final agreement confirming Turkey’s sovereignty on the region. Syrian government has 
continued to deny Turkey’s sovereignty on Hatay. Similar outcome can be expected on water 
issues too. Therefore, such an overarching agreement, which may clarify critical issues such 
as water allocations, would serve as a source of conflict rather than a tool for cooperation. 
Yet it may still be argued that since governments of neither Syria nor Turkey was unable to 
impose such agreement in the initial stages of hydropolitical relations, they do not exert the 
discourses such as ‘historical acquired rights’ or ‘respecting the existing agreements’ in their 
discursive power capabilities through their interactions in later phases.  
 
5.3.1.2 Phase 2 – Domestic Securitization of Water Resources Development and 
Emergence of Water Dispute in the Turkish-Syrian Relations (1960-1980)  
 
The second phase in hydropolitics occurred when governments of Turkey, Syria and Iraq 
commenced the large-scale dams, the Keban Dam, the Euphrates Dam and the Haditha 
Dam respectively, on the Euphrates mainstream river. Such constructions, which can be 
considered as the first outcomes of riparian states’ hydraulic mission in the ET basin, 
initiated talks to discuss these projects on bilateral and trilateral basis during 1960s and 
1970s, clearly placing the issue of hydropolitics from being non-politicised quickly into 
politicised and securitised categories.  
 
Exchange of data on existing projects and dealing with impounding periods of dams 
were the main issue of bilateral and trilateral talks (Daoudy 2009:374). These rounds of 
negotiations also revealed different positions of the co-riparian states of the ET basin. 
Although, the co-riparian states agree on offsetting up a joint committee to serve as a 
platform for data exchange, they did not agree with the mandate of a proposed trilateral 
committee, the Joint Technical Committee (JTC). While Turkey prefers to have a 
committee, which would coordinate the existing, and future hydraulic works in the basin, 
Iraq argued that the committee should supervise the final agreement on the Euphrates 
161 
 
River. Moreover, while Turkey argued that both the rivers must be subject of trilateral 
negotiations, Iraq refused to negotiate or discuss matters on the Tigris River (Kibaroğlu 
and Ünver 2006:35).  
 
 
It is worth noting that during the first rounds of trilateral negotiations the Syrian side 
suggested that the JTC should also conduct studies to assess possible alternatives to 
transfer water from the Tigris to the Euphrates. This suggestion was in accordance with 
Turkey’s main overarching position on the ET basin stating the basin should be treated 
as a single hydrological unit. Compensating water shortages of the Euphrates via water 
transfer from the Tigris River is also suggested by Turkey as an inherent part of ultimate 
solution to the problem (Bilen 2009). Considering the discursive positions of the riparian 
states of the ET basin, clear differences can be identified between Turkey and Iraq in the 
initial phase of negotiations. It appears that these differences are still prevailing in spite 
of the on-going dialogue between Turkey and Iraq at different platforms established 
during the 2000s.  
 
 
However, we can identify discursive changes in Syria at different time periods 
(Interviewee 20 pers.comm. 2012). As stated earlier, Syria also introduced Euphrates 
development project roughly in the same period when Turkey commenced the 
construction of Keban Dam. For Iraq, Syria’s development attempt was equally as 
alarming as Turkey’s initial development attempts. Moreover it is worth noting that the 
Euphrates development project, which consists of the second largest dam at that time in 
the MENA region (after the Aswan High dam in Egypt), included a 11.9 billion cubic 
meter water storage capacity which was not only designed for hydro-power generation, 
but also aimed at irrigating 640.000 ha land. Therefore, in comparison with the Keban 
dam in Turkey, the Euphrates Project was a far more ambitious hydraulic development 
attempt.  
 
Syria’s hydraulic development on the Euphrates was confronted by strong criticisms by 
the Iraqi government, which resulted in first major diplomatic crisis in the ET basin in 
1974 (Yetim 2006:39-48).  Nureddin El-Rifai, the Syrian Minister of Industry at that 
time, suggested flat topography of Iraq allows inter-basin water transfer from the Tigris. 
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In doing so, possible water shortages can be compensated. El-Rifai emphasizes the 
reliance of Syria on irrigated agriculture to sustain its economy and tackle its rapidly 
growing population (Bari 1977:237). In other words, the Syrian minister points out the 
argument of socio-economic needs of the riparian states. From the remarks of El Rifai, it 
appears that the Syrian government has adopted a more ‘pro-upstream position’ against 
Iraq’s claims on ‘historical acquired rights’ on the ET basin in 1970s. Moreover, the 
elements of broader political context, such as rivalry between two Baath regimes over 
the leadership of pan-Arabism supporting opposition groups within their domestic 
contexts in the region, further increased mistrust between two regimes (Schultz 
1995:110, Yetim 2006:47). Therefore, hydropolitical relations between the riparian 
states of the ET basin shows that, unlike the clear difference between Turkey and Iraq as 
the upstream and downstream co-riparian states, Syria, as the mid-stream state of the 
basin took a more ‘flexible position’, seeking to maximise its interests between the two 
relatively more powerful upstream and downstream riparian states in the ET basin. 
 
5.3.1.3. Phase 3 – Water as a Securitised Issue in Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical 
Relations (1980-1998)  
 
As shown in the second phase, transboundary water issues have already emerged as 
securitised issue in regional politics during 1960s and 1970s, as all the riparian states were 
beginning to realise their respective hydraulic missions. Therefore, securitised feature of 
hydropolitical relations between the riparian states of the ET basin had largely remained 
intact during 1980s and 1990s. However, relations were further exacerbated and water 
emerged as one of the main issues leading to conflictual bilateral relations between Turkey 
and Syria. In my view, factors leading to such a change in Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations can be outlined as follows.  
 
Firstly, as I have shown in the previous chapter, Turkey’s water utilisation and control 
significantly increased in the ET basin, as GAP commenced in early 1980s and large-
scale dams were realised during 1980s and 1990s one by one. Therefore, the Iraqi and 
Syrian decision-makers immediately perceived GAP as ‘an existential threat’. This 
helped in the establishment of ‘common downstream position’ against Turkey’s 
development attempts during 1980s and 1990s.  
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Secondly, the introduction of GAP also corresponded with the long-standing armed 
conflict between Iraq and Iran between 1980 and 1988. Turkey’s neutral position during 
the conflict provided economic benefits to Turkey during 1980s (Aydın and Aras 
2004:108). Moreover, shortly after the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq was preoccupied with number 
of severe political issues, armed conflicts, international sanctions and internal turmoil. In 
other words, the political developments in the ET basin during 1980s provided a 
strategic advantage to Turkey in hydropolitics. The vacuum left by Iraq was filled by 
Syria to balance Turkey’s hydraulic attempts in the ET basin. Therefore, Syria became 
more salient opponent of the GAP during 1980s and 1990s (Interviewee 20 pers.comm. 
2012). 
 
Third, one of the leverages available for Syria to hinder the GAP was the support to PKK 
and its leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1980s and onwards. The PKK became a formidable 
security threat to territorial integrity of the state in the late 1980s and 1990s in Turkey. 
Unlike the other leftist paramilitary organisations, the PKK does not only challenge the 
political regime of the country but also it was claiming an independent Kurdish state. In 
other words, the PKK’s challenge was putting Turkey’s security concerns since its 
foundation back in to the political agenda. As the PKK’s attacks backed by Syria were 
intensified in the second half of the 1980s, the tense relations between the two states 
were further exacerbated (Bulloch and Darvish 1993:62,63). These above-stated points 
will be analysed in detail in the context of power relations between the Turkish and 
Syrian governments during the first era in Chapter 6.  
 
5.3.1.3.1. JTC Meetings in 1980s: Disputed Views between Riparian States  
 
 
During 1980s, the co-riparian states of the basin continued to negotiate their respective 
hydraulic development projects. The riparian states finally agreed on establishing JTC on 
a permanent basis in 1983 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996:9). The technical exchange 
of hydrologic data on both operational infrastructures and infrastructures under 
construction are the main topics in the JTC meetings. However, during negotiations the 
parties have not even been able to define the essence of negotiations. While Turkey 
argued that both rivers should be negotiated collectively, Iraq and Syria contended a 
separate negotiation.  Thus, this disagreement was also reflected in the use of 
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terminology. The conflict on terminology, which signals great degree of polarization, has 
become clearer in this period. Turkey prefers to label the basin as ‘the Euphrates and 
Tigris Transboundary Basin’’, the governments of Iraq and Syria tend to use “the 
Euphrates and Tigris International Basin(s)’’. Moreover, while the Turkish government 
tends to use the term ‘allocation’, the governments of Syria and Iraq adopted the term 
‘share’ of the rivers. The contestation over the terminology is an outcome of the 
difference in understanding the socio-spatial context of the issue. By using the term 
allocation Turkey stresses on the sovereign rights of the states over their territory. 
Whereas, the terms ‘share’ refer to the ET basin as ‘an international’ basin and should be 
considered a ‘joint property’. The basin vs. basin(s) debate refers to the main division 
between the upstream and downstream co-riparian states; that only the Euphrates should 
be the subject of negotiations considering the Tigris and Euphrates basins as a single 
basin (Kibaroğlu and Ünver 2006:37). The study will discuss this debate between Turkey 
and Syria in detail in Chapter 6. Due to the above-mentioned conflicting views and 
understandings, the JTC could neither align on-going unilateral hydraulic development 
of the co-riparian states, nor could it prevent water crisis.   
 
In the JTC meeting held in 1984, Turkey proposed the ‘three stage plan’ which prospects 
for permanent solutions in the ET basin. Accordingly, the plan suggests to conduct 
inventory studies regarding water and land resources in the ET basin and thereafter to 
determine water consumptions of each co-riparian states through trilateral negotiations 
(Bağış 1997:579). Although the proposal was discussed in several JTC sessions, the 
parties have not been able to reach an agreement for possible implementation of the 
proposal (Bilen 2009:77).  
5.3.1.3.2. Contentious 1987 protocol: Establishing a Status Quo in the Euphrates  
 
In the late 1980s, the PKK’s attacks on civilian and military targets intensified in 
Southeastern Anatolia and the PKK became a formidable security threat to territorial 
integrity of Turkey. In the context of Syria’s continuing support to the PKK and other 
political problems Turgut Özal, the Turkish Prime Minister (PM) at that time, took an 
initiative to ease Turkish-Syrian relations. He made a vital visit to Damascus 
accompanied by a large delegation in 1987. The PKK issue and water were on top of the 
165 
 
agenda. In the discussion, the Peace Pipeline project12, which prospected to transfer a 
portion of waters from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers in Turkey to Saudi Arabia, was 
also on the agenda (Birand 1987, July 18). 
 
Picture 2 Cartoon depicting the 1987 Economic Protocol signed between Turkey and Syria 
 
Turkish cartoonist, Bedri Koraman, neatly captures the link between water and PKK nexus. The cartoon, 
which depicts the 1987 water protocol, shows former Syrian PM Assad threatening the Kurdish issue in 
response to Turkish PM’s Özal control over water 
 
Source: Milliyet Daily (July 18, 1987)  
 
 
During Özal’s visit to Syria, Turkey and Syria signed two protocols, which are 
particularly important for the ET basin hydropolitics. According to the first protocol, on 
security, both states agreed to cooperation. They also agreed not to allow any activities 
that would undermine the security of either country. The second protocol sets out 
cooperation in several economic fields. According to this economic protocol, Turkey 
                                                        
12
 The Peace Pipeline project was initiated in 1984 and officially suggested to Arab states in the region. The idea 
was to transfer water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers, located in southern Turkey, to the Saudi Arabia and 
Oman. It was argued that the transfer cost of the water would be less than de-salinization plants. However, this 
initiative was rejected by the Arab states including Syria (Kut 1993:481).  
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agreed to release an average of 500 cubic meters water per second from the Euphrates. 
The 6th article of this protocol is as follows:  
 
“During the filling up period of the Ataturk Dam reservoir and until the final allocation of the 
waters of Euphrates among the three riparian countries, the Turkish Side undertakes to 
release a yearly average of more than 500 MVSec. at the Turkish-Syrian border and in cases 
where the monthly flow falls below the level of 500 M 3/S e c., the Turkish Side agrees to 
make up the difference during the following month. (1987 Water Protocol 1987)” 
  
With the 1987 agreement the parties for the first time agreed on particular amount of 
allocation on the Euphrates River. Three years after the 1987 agreement, Iraq and Syria 
agreed that the latter would release 58% water from Turkey (See Annex 1, 1987 Protocol 
on Economic Cooperation).  
 
Considering the 1987 and 1990 agreements to allocate waters of the Euphrates to the co-
riparian states, each is designated to establish a temporary status quo on the conflict. As 
stated above, the 1987 economic protocol, which includes the water allocation clause, 
was considered as an unexpected development in the visit. It was not a product of 
detailed studies and negotiations on the issue (Birand 1987, July 18, Interviewee 1 pers. 
comm. 2011, October 6).  
 
 
Tugrut Özal was openly criticised by the politicians for signing the protocol in domestic 
politics. For example, Deniz Baykal, former minister of energy and senior member of the 
social democrat people’s party at the time, accused Özal of selling waters of the 
Euphrates cheaply. Baykal argued that Turkey lost a significant leverage towards Syria 
by committing to annually release 500 cubic meters per second in any circumstance – 
even during extended drought periods. He also contended that fulfilling this commitment 
would be more difficult for Turkey in the future, when it starts using dams for 
consumption purposes (Milliyet Daily, 1987, July 18). 13 From a Turkish perspective, 
another shortcoming of the protocol is that although it was designated to establish a 
                                                        
13
 By the time Deniz Baykal gave this statement, no irrigation infrastructure was operational in the GAP.  
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temporary measurement on the issue, it lacks a clear sunset provision.14 Finally, the 
protocol was criticised for setting out water allocation in absolute numbers rather than 
percentage. Imer argues that if the total amount of water, in this case the average flow, 
decreases in the Euphrates due to external factors, Turkey would be still committed to 
release the same amount of water to the downstream co-riparian states. Therefore, the 
allocation should have been made in terms of percentages in the 1987 agreement as it 
was done between Syria and Iraq on utilizing the Euphrates River (Interview with Imer 
2011).  
 
The 1987 protocol was followed by another bilateral agreement signed by Syria and Iraq 
in 1989. The amount of water that crosses the Turkish-Syrian border will be shared by 
Syria and Iraq as 52% and 48% respectively (Daoudy 2009:373). Since the protocol 
signed by Syria and Iraq specifically states ‘the amount of water which crosses the 
Turkish-Syrian border’, it gives direct reference to the 1987 protocol.  
 
The agreements discussed above were to be interim arrangements setting out water 
entitlement for each co-riparian state in the Euphrates River. Yet, they are still in force, 
since the actors have not reached a final solution to the issue. Therefore, it appears that 
they have established a status quo on the Euphrates hydropolitics. During 1990s and 
2000s these numbers have become the reference points in which actors tried to act 
accordingly through their interactions (Interviewee 1 pers. 2012, December 21). 
Although the 1987 protocol established a long-term status quo between Turkey and Syria 
on the Euphrates, it cannot be considered as an effective tool for conflict resolution. 
Since the protocol merely provides a certain amount of allocation without any detailed 
overarching cooperative framework, it must rather be understood as a tool for conflict 
management.  
5.3.1.3.3. Diplomatic Crises on Water during 1990s.  
 
The protocols, signed between Turkey and Syria and Syria and Iraq, did not prevent the water 
crisis between Turkey and Syria during 1990s. As Turkey has realised the goals of the GAP 
during 1990s, diplomatic crisis have erupted between the two states.  The first crisis erupted 
                                                        
14 A sunset clause is a legislative provision that provides for the expiry of legislation at a fixed point in time 
(McGarrity, Gulati et al. 2013: 307) 
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during the impounding period of the Ataturk dam, the largest dam on the Euphrates River. 
Syria, along with Iraq, sent diplomatic notes to Turkey, in which they demanded establishing 
an immediate agreement based on ‘equal share for the each co-riparian states’ and shortening 
the impounding period. In the JTC meeting convened in 1993, the Syrian side claimed that 
the JTC meetings had not established common ground in the water talks among the co-
riparian states (Kibaroğlu and Ünver 2006:37).  
 
Syria also suggested negotiations between high-level officials to reach a final agreement, 
which would be coordinated by the Syrian and Turkish foreign ministries. The parties have 
reached an agreement on negotiation over the issue at the higher officials’ level. However, 
the first bilateral meeting, held in 17-20 May 1993, once again revealed   irreconcilable 
positions of the parties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996:12,13). The second notable crisis 
erupted during the construction of the Birecik Dam. The Syrian government issued a 
diplomatic note to the Turkish government on 3rd December 1995, arguing that the dam 
would jeopardise both quality and quantity of water in the Euphrates River (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 1996:13).  
 
Referring to the PKK’s involvement in water dispute, providing sanctuary to the PKK was 
not the only power tactic levelled against Turkey by Syria concerning the water dispute. As I 
will analyse in detail in Chapter 6, other power tactics can be identified such as galvanizing 
the Arab solidarity and bringing the issue to the Arab League, blocking international credits 
provided by the international creditors to finance the dams and adopting a common 
downstream position with Iraq (Daoudy 2009).  
 
 
However, it was the clear and active support to the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan, 
which severely jeopardised bilateral relations during 1990s. As the PKK became a formidable 
security threat to Turkey and caused numerous civil and military casualties during 1990s, it 
was impossible for decision-makers of Turkey to reach any deal with the Syrian government 
concerning water or any other disputes. Tense bilateral relations endured during the second 
half of 1990s. Syria continued to provide logistic support to the PKK and sanctuary to its 
leader Abdullah Ocalan. Moreover, both states also engaged in cooperation in military fields 
with their respective regional rivals. While Turkish-Israeli military cooperation deepened, 
Syria cooperated with Greece in the military field (Olson 1997). Thus, this situation 
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eventually led to another political crisis, which brought the states to the brink of war. 
However, the crisis was defused when Syria expelled Abdullah Ocalan from Damascus and 
accepted Turkey’s demands. Turkey and Syria also signed the Adana Security protocol that 
sets out cooperation on security (Aykan 1999, Tür 2010). 
 
5.3.2. Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Relations in 1998-2011: Patterns of High 
Cooperation and Low Conflict in Inter-state Hydropolitics of the ET Basin  
 
 
After prolonging tense relations in general and with respect to water issues, a notable political 
rapprochement occurred in the Turkish-Syrian relations after the Adana Security Protocol. In 
parallel with thee political rapprochement between the two governments, we may also 
observe patterns of cooperation with respect to water issues. This section seeks to discuss 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the second era between 1998 and 2011 and 
interpret the history of relations on the basis of conceptual frameworks outlined in the 
Literature Review (Chapter 2) and the Theoretical Framework (Chapter 3).   
 
 
A wide range of developments should be considered when making an accurate assessment of 
the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations during the second era (1998-2011); an analytic 
approach is suitable in demonstrating such developments. I argue that cooperative actions on 
water issues that could be realised between Turkey and Syria during 1998 and 2011 can be 
sub-divided into three different phases. In the first phase (1998-2003), as the 1998 political 
crisis was diffused and the political relations were relatively normalised, the Turkish and 
Syrian governments initiated cooperative actions through low-level water institutions. In the 
second phase (2003-2007), as high-level interactions intensified, water became one of fields 
in which both the parties to establish cooperative actions. Although no agreement was 
reached on transboundary waters, the governments started to identify possible fields for 
cooperation and carefully avoided argumentative discourses. The actors then began to 
institutionalise cooperation on water issues, during the third phase (2007-2011). 
Institutionalisation was realised by opening new spaces for interaction, revitalising previous 
spaces that were closed and codifying agreed issues on transboundary water management. As 
the parties institutionalised cooperation on water, they also implemented joint actions on 
mutually agreed issues such as constructing joint dams and organising training programs. 
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Figure 15 shows the trajectory of cooperative actions in the Turkish-Syrian relations at 
different phases.  
 
 
Figure 15 Phases of the cooperative relations between Turkey and Syria regarding water 2000s 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
 
5.3.2.1. Phase 1 – Normalization of Bilateral Relations and Water (1998-2003)  
 
Both the diffusion of the Ocalan crisis, which brought Turkey and Syria on the verge of an 
armed conflict, and the Adana Security protocol can be considered as a turning point in 
normalization of the Turkish-Syrian bilateral relations (Alantar 2000:160, Maden 2012: 94). 
In the Adana Protocol, signed on 20th October 1998, the Turkish and Syrian governments 
agreed to strengthen dialogue on security to combat terrorist activities (Milliyet 21 October, 
1998).  
 
Relations over water issues warmed up soon after the Adana Accord. The first development 
was the protocol between the South Eastern Anatolian Project Regional Development 
Agency (GAP RDA-hereafter) and its Syrian counterpart, the General Organisation for Land 
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Development (GOLD, hereafter) signed on 23rd August 2001. The main aim of this protocol 
was to provide training to Syrian experts by organising international training programs and 
bilateral joint programs and exchange experts between the parties and conduct joint water 
development projects (Kibaroğlu and Scheumann 2011). Both parties also signed an 
implementation document in 2002 in Aleppo to facilitate cooperation (GAP-RDA 2012). 
Interactions continued between the two region-based hydraucracies in succeeding years 
(Interviewee 5 pers. comm. 2011).   
 
The rationale behind the Turkish GAP RDA and the Syrian GOLD cooperation was the 
establishment of cooperative relations in relatively less contested fields and to spill over 
cooperative relations in contested fields (Interviewee 8 pers.comm. 2011). It appears that 
both Turkish and Syrian policy makers aim to establish confidence building between the 
parties without challenging their respective political positions concerning hydropolitics of the 
ET basin. Here it should be noted that, given the centralised character of both state structures, 
such cooperation in lower ranking hydracuracies could not have been realised without 
approval from high-ranking decision-making bodies. In my view, this also enables us to 
understand why broader political context has such a determinant impact in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. Therefore, the initial cooperative actions between Turkey and Syria 
on water issues were a product of normalization of bilateral relations after the diffusion of the 
Ocalan crisis in 1998.  
 
However, in spite of existing protocols between the two institutions, the implementation of 
agreed principles largely remained limited. In any case, the rapprochement realised through 
two lower-level hydraucracies established the initial basis for cooperative interactions 
between Turkey and Syria. It is argued that owing to government change in Turkey the GAP 
RDA-GOLD cooperation could not produce concrete cooperative outcomes (Interviewee 8 
pers.comm. 2011). However, the newly elected Justice and Development Party (AK Party –
Turkish acronym) government, which came to power in 2002, did not hinder existing 
cooperative attempts; rather introduced a new initiative to strengthen bilateral relations with 
the MENA states including Syria.  
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5.3.2.2. Phase 2 – Initiating High Level Cooperative Actions at Ministerial and 
Presidential Level on Water –De-securitization of Water Issues in Inter-state Relations 
(2003-2007) 
 
As leadership changes occurred on both sides and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq created 
converging security concerns, high-level interactions between the decision-makers increased 
dramatically in 2003. For example, between 2000 and 2009, nine high level meetings were 
conducted between Turkey and Syria. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former chief advisor to Prime 
Minister Erdoğan (and current Turkish foreign minister), alone made 46 visits to Damascus. 
After 17 years, Naci Otri in 2004 became the first Syrian PM to visit Turkey in 2004. In the 
same year, Bashar Al-Asad became the first Syrian president to visit Turkey in 47 years. 
Through these high level interactions the decision makers sought fields in which the parties 
could realise cooperation. Water was one such field and discursive elites of both states 
indicated their ‘political will’ for cooperation. For example, Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish 
PM, paid an official visit to Damascus in 2004, in which the Turkish-Syrian governments 
signed a Free Trade Agreement and both sides indicated their willingness for further 
cooperation. During Erdoğan’s visit, when Naci Otri, the Syrian PM, was asked whether the 
water dispute between two states has ended or not, he replied that: “We now have a deal. We 
wish comprehensive regional development. We try to do whatever is needed for that matter. 
Other issues are forgotten [author’s own translation] “(ANKA News Portal 22 December, 
2004).  
 
 
During Erdoğan’s 2004 visit the governments also, in principle, agreed on construction of a 
joint dam on the Orontes River and Syria’s water transfer from the Tigris River, both of 
which are discussed in greater detail in the following sections. Likewise, to point out the new 
era in inter-state relations, Veysel Eroğlu, the Turkish minister of water affairs, states that: 
“No war over water resources will erupt in the region. Instead of having problems over water 
with our neighbours, we prefer developing joint projects. Contrary to what some people 
claim, a war over water resources in this regions won't emerge, though people may always 
find reasons to wage wars. We believe that the water resources in the region can be 
effectively used to satisfy its water needs. However, we must develop joint projects for their 
effective use (Yavuz 2008, March 12). ” 
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Apart from such speeches conducted by the discursive elites stressing the importance of 
cooperation in water issues, we also observe that actors deliberately avoided conducting 
previous speech acts regarding water or other long-standing disputes such as Hatay issue 
(Birand 7 January, 2004). As I will discus in Chapter 9, this pattern can be considered as one 
of the ways to de-securitise the formerly securitised issues in the securitization theory.  
 
5.3.2.3. Phase 3 –Materializing Cooperation on Water between Turkey and Syria (2007-
2011) 
 
As interactions between the high-level and lower level policy-makers were dramatically 
intensified we can observe two major developments with respect to Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations.  
 
The first development was the re-construction of spaces which were previously open and 
construction of new spaces for decision-making. These spaces formed the main platforms 
where cooperative frameworks could be realised. The revitalisation of the Joint Technical 
Committee (JTC) in 2007 can be an important development in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. The JTC meetings were suspended in 1993, since the riparian states 
were unable to produce a concrete outcome during the 16 JTC meetings held between 1983-
1993 (Kibaroğlu and Ünver 2006:35,36, Kibaroğlu and Scheumann 2011:284). As political 
relations improved between Turkey and Syria, the parties decided re-establishment of the 
JTC as a medium for negotiations among the co-riparian states in 2007. As a result, the first 
two JTC meetings were convened in 7-11 May 2007 and 11-11 January 2008 in Syria. In 24-
25 February 2009, the third JTC was convened and the parties agreed to exchange data on 
past, present and future meteorological patterns and water quality issues on the ET basin 
(Kibaroğlu 2012). Two months after the third meeting Turkey and Syria decided to 
reconvene in the 5th World Water Forum held in Istanbul without participation of Iraq 
(Kibaroğlu and Scheumann 2011:295, Maden 2011:37). The MoUs that establish the legal 
basis of the cooperative relations on water are also formulated through the JTC meetings. 
Therefore, referring to Gaventa’s power cube approach, revitalization of the JTC can be 
considered as re-construction of closed space for cooperative actions between the riparian 
states.  
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Parallel to the re-vitalization of the JTC, the Turkish and Syrian governments established the 
High-Level Strategic Cooperation Councils (HLSCC) in inter-state relations. The HLSCC 
was convened as joint cabinet meetings with the involvement of ministers from the both 
Turkish and Syrian governments and served as the highest decision making body in 
ministerial level to discuss wide-ranging issues for cooperative actions. Water was one of the 
areas where parties sought to establish cooperative actions. Thus, among the 50 MOUs 
signed in the first high-level strategic cooperation council convened in Damascus in 22-23 
December 2009, four of which were directly related with water issues (HLSCC 2009).  
 
The second development was codification of the cooperative framework between Turkey and 
Syria. Both governments started cooperation in various fields by signing memorandum of 
understandings, protocols, and treaties. Four Memorandums of Understandings (MoU-
hereafter) were signed in the field of water. MoUs regarding water issues can be considered 
as concrete outcomes of cooperative actions between Turkey and Syria and are of particular 
importance. All MoUs are designated to conduct joint projects between the actors, as 
indicated by Veysel Eroğlu above. They can be divided into two different categories. The 
first group sets out cooperative joint actions in two specific issues: effective utilisation of 
water and water quality, while the other group prospects cooperative actions in specific water 
contexts shared by the parties. In other words, while the first group are issue-specific, the 
second group are more case-specific. Table 13 summarises the MoUs signed between Turkey 
and Syria based on their subject area.  
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Table 13 MoUs with respect transboundary water issues signed between the Turkish and Syrian 
governments based on subject areas 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014   
  
 
The issue-specific MoUs propose cooperation between the parties on wide ranging issues in 
water management. These issues include assessing water resource availabilities in each part 
through meteorological and hydrological data exchange, applying modern water treatment 
techniques and advanced irrigation techniques such as drip irrigation, applying closed 
systems to decrease water losses due to evaporation, remediation and protection of water 
resources on the basin level, conduct of joint studies to decrease pollution on water resources, 
which stem from urban, agricultural and industrial development, establishing emission 
standards, applying the principle of ‘polluter pays’ and so forth. These goals will be achieved 
by exchange of experts, data, information and past experiences, conducting joint technical 
and scientific projects and organisation of training programs, symposiums and conferences 
(MoU on Improving Water Quality 28 March, 2011, MoU on Efficient Utilization Water and 
Combatting Drought 28 May, 2011).  
 
The second group of MoUs prospect cooperative actions in the Tigris and the Orontes Rivers. 
The first MoU prospects cooperative actions on the Tigris River. It designates construction of 
a pumping station where Tigris River makes a border between Turkey and Syria. The 
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pumping station would allow Syria to utilise water from the Tigris to meet its growing needs 
(MoU on Tigris River 28 May, 2011: Article 1).  
 
The MoU regarding the Tigris River states that the Syrian side would conduct hydraulic work 
on the River without making any change in thalweg and it will constantly inform Turkey 
regarding the hydraulic projects. According to the MoU, the maximum amount of water that 
Syria would extract from the Tigris is 1.25 BCM/year (until the final agreement was reached 
on the ET basin). The MoU also prospects Syria’s maximum monthly extraction from the 
Tigris during the year as follows.  
 
Table 14 Syria's monthly extraction from the Tigris River according to MOU with respect to Syria’s 
water extraction from the Tigris River 
 
Source:  Turkey-Syria MoU on Tigris River 28 May, 2011:Article 4 
 
The MoU is the first ever agreement that allocates water on a temporary basis until the 
riparian states reach a final solution on the ET basin. The MoU also stipulates that Syria is 
obliged to inform Turkey on any water extraction on a monthly basis (MoU on Tigris River 
28 May, 2011:Article 5). 
 
The second case specific MoU is on the Friendship Dam that designates a construction of a 
joint dam on the Orontes River. It is called the Friendship Dam to symbolise the new era in 
MONTH  UTILIZATION (m3/sec)  Volume (million m3)  
October 15 40 
November  15 39 
December  10 27 
January  15 40 
February  25 60 
March  90 241 
April 100 259 
May  100 268 
June  50 130 
July 25 67 
August  15 40 
September  15 39 
               Total                                                                             1250 
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Turkish-Syrian political relations in general and water issues in particular. The MoU with 
hydropolitical significance was undoubtedly to construct a Joint Dam for a substantial 
settlement on the Orontes River, which has established long-term dispute in Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. It should be noted that the MoU on the Orontes is the first legally 
binding arrangement between Turkey and Syria, which, as we will note in Chapter 6, has 
significant implications for the long-standing conflict over recognition of 
Hatay/Alexandretta. The MoU prospects creation of a technical working group which would 
be co-chaired by the head of the DSI and head of the Syrian Arab republic General 
Commission of water resources. The Technical Working Group will be responsible for 
feasibility studies of the project and finalise its works before the end of 2010 (MoU on 
Friendship Dam 5 July, 2011:Article 2-3).  
 
The Friendship dam was designed both for hydropower generation and irrigation. Both sides 
would invest in the projects as they benefit from it. Although the MoU does not specify the 
amount of water that each side is entitled to, it states the parties will inform each other on 
water usage for consumption at the beginning of the each year. Therefore, the MoU does not 
only set out a joint construction of the dam, but it also aims a joint administration 
mechanism. Thus it prospects an establishment of a permanent commission for 
administration of the dam (MoU on Friendship Dam 5 July, 2011:Article 8). With all these 
features, the agreement on the construction of a joint dam on the Orontes river is not only a 
major step for cooperation, but it also proposes a specific model for further cooperative 
actions between the two governments with respect to transboundary water issues.   
 
 
The parties continued to conduct cooperative actions to materialise their agreements on those 
MoUs. The cooperative actions to implement agreed issues on transboundary water 
management continued until the recent political crisis erupted between Turkey and Syria. For 
instance, to implement the agreed issues, the parties established a working group on 
remediation of water resources. This working group, consisting of experts from the both 
hydraucracies, convened on 20th April 2011 in Mardin (Turkey) to discuss water quality 
problems on small streams shared by the parties. They decided to conduct some 
measurements on the agreed issues to seek solutions (Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs 
April 20, 2011).  
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The construction of the Friendship Dam started on 6th February 2011 with an inaugural 
ceremony in the presence of the Turkish and Syrian PMs and ministers.  
 
Picture 3 Inaugural Ceremony of the Friendship Dam 
 
The Turkish and Syrian PMs and the ministers., from left to right: Sadullah Ergin, Minister of Justice and the 
MP from the Alexandretta Province ; Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R. Tayyip 
Erdoğan, Turkish PM ; Naci Otri, Syrian PM, Waleed Muallem, Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,; Veysel 
Eroğlu, Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, Turkey,  
 
Source: DSI Press Bulletin 2011  
 
Finally, other positive outcomes of general rapprochement among the co-riparian states and 
between Turkey and Syria are intensification of lower level hydraucracies and applying 
temporary solutions to acute problems in the ET basin. For example, to tackle with the 
drought season in 2009, Turkey accepted to increase the average amount of water from the 
Euphrates from 500 m3/sec to 550 m3/sec. as requested by the downstream co-riparian states 
(Interviewee 4 pers.comm. 2011).  
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5.3.3. Conflict on Construction of the Ilısu Dam Project (1997-2013): Emergence 
of the Layer of Transnational Hydropolitics in the ET Basin  
 
 
The previous two sections showed inter-state relations between Turkish and Syrian 
governments over time. They also showed that hydropolitical relations in the ET basin have 
been largely about relations between riparian states.  
 
However, meanwhile the intergovernmental networks have been intact in the hydropolitics of 
the ET basin by 2000s and onwards; we also see the emergence of actors from civil society 
and private sector. These actors are involved in or seek to be involved in decision-making 
processes. With involvement of these actors we can also identify constructions of new scales. 
To examine this dimension, labelled as layer of transnational hydropolitics in the ET basin, 
this section will explain the recent historical account on relations between opponents and 
proponents with specific reference to the Ilısu dam project.  
 
The Ilısu Dam and HPP project, currently under construction, is one of the largest hydraulic 
infrastructure projects in the GAP. The dam is located on the mainstream Tigris River, 45 km 
before the Tigris River leaves from Turkish territory. 
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Map 7 Map of the Ilısu dam project 
 
Source: Atzl, 2009: 55  
 
 
When the Ilısu dam is completed, it will be the largest hydraulic project on the Tigris part of 
the GAP, with approximately 3.833 GWH annual energy productions. The dam reservoir area 
will cover 313 square kilometres to make it the second largest dam after the Ataturk Dam in 
the GAP in terms of reservoir capacity (DSI 2009:4). 
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Picture 4 Recent pictures from the construction work that is currently underway in the Ilisu dam project 
area 
 
Source: DSI (2013) 
 
 
The Ilısu Dam project can be traced back to the origins of the DSI in 1954. The DSI 
conducted preliminary studies in all Turkish basins during 1960s, which have constituted the 
preliminary studies of the Ilısu Dam project. In 1972, the initial report was prepared on 
construction of the Ilısu Dam by the DSI. With the initiation of the GAP in early 1980s, the 
project was included as an integral part of the GAP and the state investment plan in 1988 
(DSI 2009:4, Özkaya 2010:30). In 1997, the Turkish government decided to conduct the 
project as a private-public partnership model, which led to establishment of an international 
consortium. As will be analysed in Chapter 8, the Ilısu dam project has been one of the most 
controversial dams with environmentally and politically driven civil society groups 
confronted by public and private sector actors both within and outside Turkey since 1997. 
The Ilısu dam conflict can be analysed within three different phases. Figure 16 below shows 
these three phases and the outcomes.  
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Figure 16 The Phases of the Ilısu dam conflict between opponents and proponents of the project and 
outcomes in each phase 
 
Source: Author‘s own compilation  
 
 
As Figure 16 shows the first phase on controversy regarding construction of the Ilısu dam 
started with the establishment of the first international consortium which brought public 
infrastructure TNCs, private companies based in Turkey, Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) and 
banks. However, an anti-dam campaign composed civil society actors confronting the first 
international consortium. The campaign waged against the project resulted in dissolution of 
the first consortium. The second phase starts with the establishment of the second 
international consortium and revitalization of the previous anti-dam network against the 
project. The second campaign waged against the project resulted in withdrawal of the 
European ECAs, banks and most of the private companies based in Europe. The third phase 
started with the withdrawal and re-organisation of the second consortium in 2009. After the 
withdrawal of these actors, the second consortium did not collapse but re-organised to be led 
by the Turkey-based private sector actors and banks. The conflict on construction of the 
project still continues as the project is currently under construction. The following section 
will look in detail at the key events that have occurred during the conflict.  
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5.3.3.1. Phase 1 – The First Ilısu Dam Consortium and The Anti-Dam Campaign  
 
Like the Birecik Dam and HPP, which has been previously built on the Euphrates as part of 
the GAP, the Turkish government decided to finance the project adopting the private-public 
partnership model, namely ‘Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)’. As a result of this first 
international consortium, which gathered major European public infrastructure TNCs along 
with the companies from Turkey, was established in 1997. After the establishment of this 
consortium some public infrastructure TNCs, including Balfour Beatty (UK), VA Tech 
Hydro/Andritz (Austria), Skanska (Sweden), applied for export credit guarantees from the 
export credit agencies (ECA) from Austria, Germany, Japan, Portugal, the UK and the US 
(Scheumann 2008:70).   
 
The first consortium soon faced a wide-ranging anti-dam campaign led by NGOs across 
Europe. According to the NGOs perspective, the project has major problems related with 
environmental protection, cultural preservation and human rights issues. Particularly the 
lobbying of the UK-based NGOs – including the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), 
Friends of Earth (FoE) and the Corner House – over the public infrastructure TNCs and the 
UK government had considerable impact. In accordance with the British based NGOs, 
international NGOs critical to overseas investment of the ECAs, such as the Berne 
Deceleration (Switzerland), ECA Watch (Austria), and the World Economy, Ecology & 
Development (WEED) also criticised the Ilısu Dam, targeting in particular the ECAs (Atzl 
2009:54).   
 
As a result of these anti-dam campaigns, the ECAs providing financial support to the project, 
decided that the Turkish government should fulfil certain criteria to retain their financial 
support to the project in 1999 (Scheumann 2008:70). The issues and the conditions that the 
Turkish government must meet are shown in Table 15.  
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Table 15 Issues and conditions stipulated by ECAs to be fulfilled by the Turkish government regarding 
the Ilısu dam project 
 
Source: Hildyard, Tricario et al. 2000 
 
To assess whether the above stated criteria, illustrated in Table 15 above, was fulfilled by the 
Turkish government or not, the NGOs from the UK, US, Germany and Italy established an 
international fact finding mission in 9-16 October 2000. Shortly after the release of the 
report, the British public infrastructure TNC Balfour Beatty, announced its withdrawal from 
the consortium. Swedish and Italian TNCs and the ECA from the Switzerland also announced 
their withdrawal from the consortium in 2001 and 2002 (KHRP 2009:5).  
 
5.3.3.2. Phase 2 – Second Ilısu Dam Consortium and Anti-Dam Campaign  
 
Although the consortium ended with failure, the controversy over the project did not finish. 
In 2005, a new agreement was signed between the DSI and the newly established 
international consortium regarding the Ilısu dam. The second consortium was composed of 
Nurol, Cengiz and Temelsu (Turkey), Zublin (Germany), Stucky (Switzerland), and VA Tech 
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Hydro –thereafter taken by Andritz- (Austria) (Interviewee 1 pers. 2012, December 21 ). The 
consortium also sought for government-backed financial guaranties. As a result, it 
approached the Oesterrieichiche Kontrolbank (OeKB) from Austria, the Euler-Hermes from 
Germany and Exportsigiguarntie (SERV) from Switzerland.  
 
 
Establishment of the second consortium revitalised the previous NGO network across the 
Europe. Since the second consortium was composed of TNCs and ECAs from Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland, a new NGOs network, including the WEED (Germany), ECA-
WATCH (Austria) and Berne Deceleration, which were partly involved in the first campaign, 
became more important actors over anti-dam activism over the Ilısu Dam (Atzl 2009:56). 
After the second consortium filed the updated version of the previous Environment Impact 
Assessment Report (EIAR) to the ECAs for credits, the NGOs operating both within and 
outside Turkey also published their assessments of the EIAR which claimed that the updated 
version of the EIAR is still insufficient to meet the required conditions from environmental 
and human rights aspects. It is also claimed that the EIAR does not provide sufficient 
transboundary impact analysis of the project due to lack of sufficient hydrological data 
henceforth it cannot be subject to decision making for the ECAs (Amnesty International 
Österreich 2006, Doğa Derneği 2006, Teodoru, Wüest et al. 2006).  
  
However, in spite of the pressures from the anti-dam activism led by the NGOs across 
Europe, the ECAs, OeKB, Euler Hermes and SERV signed a MoU with the DSI on the issue 
of credit guarantees on 6th October 2006 on conditions that DSI will meet certain criteria 
defined in the MoU as terms of references (ToRs).  This ToRs includes tasks that should be 
fulfilled on environmental, cultural heritage and resettlement issues (MoU Between ECAs 
and DSI 2006).  
 
 
Moreover, the ECAs and the DSI also agreed to the establishment of Project Implementation 
Unit (PIU) and three sub-committees, the Committee on Environment, the Committee on 
Resettlement and the committee on cultural heritage. Accordingly, each committee would be 
composed of experts both within and outside Turkey to monitor whether the tasks defined in 
the terms of references are fulfilled or not (MoU Between ECAs and DSI 2006). 
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As financial guarantee was provided by the ECAs, the international credit agreement was 
signed between the Undersecretary of the treasure, Republic of Turkey and consortium of 
international bank on 15th August 2007. The Turkish government on 22nd October 2007 
approved this agreement and the Ilısu dam project eventually could commence on 16th May 
2008 (Interviewee 1 pers. 2012, December 21). Meanwhile, the NGO networks in Europe 
continued to pressurise the European decision-makers to withdraw from the project in 2007 
and onwards. Approaching the ECAs, government officials to explain why they oppose the 
project through stressing on the problematic points of the project, organising demonstrations 
across Europe particularly in front of the centres of the TNCs, ECAs and government 
buildings were actions conducted by NGO networks across Europe. For instance, NGO 
networks organised a demonstration on 14th March 2007 in Berlin and occupied Brandenburg 
Gate. Likewise, on 30th November 2007 NGOs organised demonstration in front of the local 
branches of German banks financing the project across Germany. On 13th March 2008, 
demonstrations were organised by the NGO networks across the Europe including Berlin, 
Rome, Paris, and Frankfurt (International Rivers 2007, March 14, International Rivers 2007, 
November 30 , International Rivers 2008, March 13). 
 
 
While anti-dam activism against the second construction consortium was going on across the 
Europe, NGOs performing within the Turkish domestic context have become active too. The 
first important development is the establishment of the initiative ‘Keep Hasankeyf Alive’ (the 
Hasankeyf Initiative hereafter) in 2006 to galvanize the public and civil society support in the 
Southeastern Anatolia region. The Hasankeyf Initiative was composed of 87 civil society 
organisations active in the region (İlhan 2012). The second important development in the 
Turkish context is the initiation of a nation-wide campaign against the project by the Nature 
Association (Doğa Derneği). The campaign, led by the Nature Association, has made the 
Ilısu dam project and particularly the future of Hasankeyf an issue within public debate in the 
Turkish domestic context. The third development in the Turkish domestic context is the 
growing anti-dam activism against small-scale HPPs around Turkey by the local NGO 
networks on the basis of historical-cultural, environmental and social (anti-privatization 
movements against privatised small-scale HPPs) grounds. Therefore, as local and national 
networks have become more active in the Ilısu dam controversy in the second half of the 
2000s, the transnational and national scales were established in the ET basin.  
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In accordance with the MoU, the committee of experts (CoE) on environment, resettlement 
and cultural heritage regularly conducted field visits in 2007, 2008 and 2009, whether the 
tasks defined in the ToRs are fulfilled or not. The initial field visits conducted in 2007 and 
2008 revealed that, although clear progress has been made in environment, resettlement and 
cultural heritage issues, the ToRs defined in the MoU have not yet been in the project (Atzl 
2009:58).  
 
The European governments decided to suspend the export credit guarantees on 23rd 
December 2008. They warned the Turkish government to withdraw export credit guarantees 
if the Turkish side could not meet the conditions by 6th July 2009 (Atzl 2009:58). Therefore, 
the construction works were also halted due to the suspension of the credit guarantee. To 
assess whether the ToRs are fulfilled or not on three issues, the Experts Committees 
conducted their final visits in May and June 2009. In the context of the field visits and reports 
by the CoEs, the ECAs announced on 7th July “Despite some significant improvements, the 
requirements tied to this insurance cover in the areas of the environment, cultural heritage 
and resettlement could not be fulfilled within the contractually stipulated timeframe.” 
(SERV-OeKB-Euler Hermes 2009). As a result the second consortium shared the same 
destiny with the previous one but the dispute did not end.   
5.3.3.3. Phase 2 – Re-organization of the Second Consortium and Anti-dam Campaign in 
Turkey   
 
The 2009 decision by ECAS to withdraw was celebrated by NGO networks in Europe and 
Turkey as a great victory, while it created disappointment and resentment in the Turkish 
government. In response to this decision, the Turkish government emphasised its 
determination to continue the project. Eroğlu, the Turkish minister of Forestry and Water 
Affairs, made even harsher statements in the Turkish media by defining the three European 
governments of being ‘fickle’ and not honouring their commitments (Milliyet Daily 2009, 
December 31). The Andritz, one of the leading companies in the second consortium, has also 
shown its disappointment on the decision, in spite of considerable progress made by the 
Turkish side to meet the conditions defined in the context of the ToRs. The company 
declared it would decide to be involved or not in the project according to Turkey’s decision 
on the issue (HydroWorld.com 2007).  
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In spite of the withdrawal of the European ECAs from Germany, Switzerland and Austria the 
consortium revealed its intention to continue the project by finding new financial resources. It 
was reported that China would fill the gap left by the European ECAs (Strauss 2009, July 
14). However, in response to the Hasankeyf Initiative, the Chinese Embassy in Ankara made 
it clear that Chinese companies were not involved in the project in December 2009 (KHRP 
2009:7).  
 
On 30th December 2009, Eroğlu announced that Turkish creditors would fill the financial gap 
left by the European banks. He reported that the talks between the Undersecretaries of 
Treasury and three Turkish banks were underway (Hürriyet Daily 2009, December 30). As a 
result of negotiations between the Undersecretary of Treasury and the Turkish private and 
public bank, an amended credit agreement was signed between the Undersecretary of 
Treasury and the Turkish banks on 20th January 2010 (Interviewee 1 pers. 2012, December 
21). Accordingly, it was revealed that the two private Turkish banks, Garanti and Akbank, 
and a public bank, Halkbank, would provide necessary funding for the project (Nature 
Association 2011:7). Thus, after the financial problem was resolved, construction work 
resumed on 27th January 2010.  The new deal also resulted in changes within the consortium. 
Accordingly, the Swiss and German companies, Alstom and Zublin respectively, withdrew 
from the project on 29th June 2010 and the new consortium is composed of Nurol 
(consortium leader), Cengiz, Stucky, Temelsu and Andritz Hydro (Interviewee 1 pers. 2012, 
December 21).  
 As the European ECAs has withdrawn from the project, the transnational NGO networks 
against the project have lost significant spaces for influence. Therefore, activities of NGOs 
located within Turkey have become more important in anti-dam campaign against the Ilısu. 
NGOs, particularly the Nature Association and the Hasankeyf Initiative have developed 
different strategies against the on-going project. Pressurizing for two Turkey-based private 
banks, Garanti and Akbank, was one of the strategies adopted by the NGOs to hinder the 
project. NGOs, such as the Nature Association, the Hasankeyf Initiative organised various 
activities ranging from demonstrations to produce short films to blame them publicly during 
2009 and 2010.15 As a result they directly interacted with high-level officials in the banks to 
                                                        
15
 For example, the Association produced short animations to blame the banks for financing the Ilısu. Online at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qR7okKMk7bQ&list=PLRggTd_tpzZKaM_46RwuxtTKKYpUL_7Ln 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zOCoCeXulPU 
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discuss the issues. In this respect, the Nature Association passed an alternative solution 
prepared by the academics from the Middle East Technical University (METU). Accordingly 
the alternative solution prospects 5 smaller dams instead of building one single dam on the 
Tigris basin. It is argued that the alternative plan would not only rescue Hasankeyf from 
submerging, but also initiate more hydropower generation (Tigrek 2012). Feasibility studies 
were conducted on behalf of the Garanti and Akbank banks in 2011 to assess applicability of 
the alternative solution. Accordingly, it concluded that while the proposed projects could 
provide more annual hydropower production than the existing project, there are technical 
problems in location of the four dams due to geological and geophysical reasons. Moreover, 
the DSI was also strongly opposed to the alternative solution of the existing project since it is 
argued that it does not suit technical facts. 16  
 
 
Other tactics used by Turkey based NGOs during 2010 and 2011 were to ‘nationalise’ and 
‘internationalise’ the Ilısu dam campaign. In order to establish a nation-wide opposition 
across Turkey against the HPPs such as the Ilısu dam NGOs like the Nature Association, 
sought alliance with other local anti-dam movement against small-scale HPPs, which have 
significantly increased during 2000s. For example, the Nature Association joined ‘the Great 
Anatolian March’ in April 2011, which brought different activist groups to raise 
environmental awareness and protest against environmental policies conducted by the 
government. Although, the Association sought to establish a nation-wide alliance during the 
event, these attempts were not successful due to ideological and political differences between 
groups (Interviewee 11 pers. comm. 2013, February 19). Regarding internationalising the 
Ilısu dam issue, NGOs based in Turkey either organised or were part of conferences, 
demonstrations. For example, with the help of NGOs based in Europe and MEPs of the EU 
Parliament, the Nature Association organised a conference on Turkey’s water policies and 
projects in the late 2010. After the conference the representatives from Nature Association 
also met Turkish officials with participation of other NGOs like the Hasankeyf Initiative and 
Turkish Foundation for Combatting Soil Erosion (TEMA-Turkish acronym), an 
environmental NGO operating nation-wide in Turkey, in February 2011.However, there was 
no concrete outcome between the governmental authorities and the NGOs. 
                                                        
16
 Author’s own observation after the presentation made by Sahnaz Tigrek in Advancing Cooperation in the 
Euphrates Tigris Region: Institutional Development and Multidisciplinary Perspectives regarding the alternative 
solution of the Ilısu dam reflections of the representatives from the DSI.  
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While the campaign against the Ilısu dam has continued, led by the Turkey-based NGOs 
since 2009 and onwards, the construction work accelerated during 2012.  To speed up the 
project, the prime ministry issued an official memorandum on 4th April 2012, which was 
designated to overcome administrative hurdles between different public authorities involved 
in construction and other works on the Ilısu dam project. Moreover, the memorandum also 
states that complementary constructions works, which are part of the main construction of the 
project, will be exempted from the EIA law, which came in to force in 1993 (The Prime 
Ministry 2012, April 4). On 29th August 2012, an inaugural ceremony was organised to 
celebrate the completion of the derivation channels of the Ilısu dam. In the ceremony, Eroğlu 
stated 45% of the construction work has already finished and the dam would become 
operational by 2014 (AK Party 2012).  
 
Picture 5 Inaugural ceremony of the diversion canals of the Ilisu dam project 
 
The ceremony was held in 29.08.2012  
Source: akparti.org; http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/Ilısu-barajinin-yuzde-45i-
tamam/30376 
 
 
Meanwhile the construction of project is underway; the opponents continue to stop the 
project by using different tactics. Thus, the official memorandum issued by the Prime 
Ministry to speed up the project was brought to the court (the Council of State) to be 
cancelled. The appeal was made by the NGOs on the basis that complementary construction 
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work could not be exempted from the EIA, since they are planned after the Turkish EIA law 
came to force in 1993. The court has decided that the complementary parts of the project are 
subject to EIA law. Therefore, it ruled out Article 7 of the above stated memorandum issued 
by the Prime Ministry, setting out exemption of axillary constructions of the works (Arslan 
and Genç 2013, January 12). The opponents argued that construction must be halted based on 
the decision, since the main construction works cannot start without finalising the EIA 
process. However, the DSI argued the decision does not rule out the main construction 
therefore it cannot be a basis to halt construction works. It appears that the conflict between 
the proponents and opponents of the dam is likely to continue, although construction work is 
still underway.   
 
5.4. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this chapter was to provide background information on the empirical cases for 
making hydropolitical analysis, which will be made in chapters 6, 7 and 8. The chapter, first, 
outlined geographical and hydrological data on the ET transboundary basin, as the main 
spatial focus of this study. Give the fact that this study analyses Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations in particular, geographical and hydrological data regarding the transboundary 
watersheds, the Orontes basin and transboundary aquifers along the Turkish-Syrian 
borderline, the study also briefly illustrated facts and figures regarding these two 
transboundary watersheds. Providing these facts and figures along with hydraulic 
development conducted by the Turkish and Syrian governments in transboundary watersheds 
will serve to make a more comprehensive analysis in the following analytical chapters.  
 
Second, hydropolitical relations between the Turkish and Syrian governments in 
transboundary basins, and the Ilısu dam conflict between the opponents and proponents of the 
project also were also explained in detail. The historical account on empirical cases also 
enables us to understand the trajectory of hydropolitics of the ET basin. Accordingly, while 
inter-state hydropolitical relations between riparian states have been the main layer of 
hydropolitics in decision-making processes in the ET basin until 2000s. However, 
involvement of new actors particularly those coming from civil society and private sector 
have become more salient since 2000. This newly constructed layer is labelled as the layer of 
transnational hydropolitics and will be analysed by taking the Ilısu dam conflict, explained 
above, as an empirical case in Chapter 8.  
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After outlining the geographical facts and figures on transboundary water basins (primarily 
the ET basin) and discussing major political development on empirical cases in this chapter, 
hydropolitical analysis will be made informed by theoretical framework (Chapter 3) in the 
subsequent analytical chapters 6, 7 and 8. The analytical format can be summarised as 
follows. Each analytical chapter will be composed of three analyses section, A, B and C.   
 
• In section Analysis A, the study will problematize the politics of scale and its relation 
with power. In this section, actors involved in decision-making processes are also 
mapped out at different scales.  
 
• In section Analysis B, the study sought to understand the factors resulting in patterns 
of conflict and cooperation within different layers of hydropolitics.  
 
• In section Analysis C, power relations between actors in empirical cases and how 
power has shaped the outcome on hydropolitical relations.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS I: INTER-STATE HYDROPOLITICS 
UNDERSTANDING WATER CONFLICT between TURKEY and SYRIA 
(1923-1998)  
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in 
the first era (1923-1998). As explained in detail in Chapter 5, the main pattern in inter-state 
hydropolitcal relations between the Turkish and Syrian government is high conflict and low 
cooperation (See Section 5.3.1). Informed by the theoretical framework, this chapter will 
show overarching reasons behind the predominantly conflictual relations and power relations 
that occurred between the two states.  
 
Thus, the aim of this chapter is three fold. First, the chapter problematizes the politics of scale 
and its relation with power. Second, it seeks to understand the rationale behind the patterns of 
high conflict and low cooperation during the first era between two states. Finally, it seeks to 
analyse how both states exerted material and discursive power tactics to achieve their goals.  
These above-mentioned points will be discussed and analysed in three sections. In the first 
section (Section 6.2), I will analyse how spatial scales were constructed in the context of the 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitcal relations and how they became the core political contestation 
between two states. Moreover, this section will also analyse how invıted, close and claimed 
spaces were constructed in the context of power relations and it will also show involvement 
of the third party actors. In the second section (Section 6.3), the chapter will discuss why 
there were lack of cooperation and patterns of high conflict and low cooperation in the 
Turkish-Syrian relations during the first era. In the final section (Section 6.4), the chapter will 
analyse power capabilities of both states and how each state exerted material and discursive 
power tactics in their bilateral relations to establish a status quo in transboundary water 
resources, the ET and the Orontes basin 
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6.2. ANALYSIS A: Politics of Scale and Power in the Turkish-Syrian 
Hydropolitical Relations (1923-1998)  
 
6.2.1. Scales as Socio-political Constructions: Basin vs. Basin(s) Debate in 
Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Relations 
  
In Chapter 3, the study showed that spatial scales such as basin, sub-basin, and region are not 
given but socially constructed (See Section 3.2). The empirical case on hydropolitical 
relations between Turkey and Syria between 1923-1998 shows how spatial scales are socially 
constructed and politically contested.  
 
The socially constructed character of spatial scales is where both the Turkish and Syrian 
governments define their sub-basins. Looking at how sub-basins are represented in the 
official documents published by the Turkish and Syrian governments, we find lack of 
consensus in defining the ET basin. In the official documents published by the Syrian 
hydraucracies, the Euphrates and Tigris watersheds are considered as two separated sub-
basins. Moreover, as Barnes (2009: 518) rightly points out sub-basins defined by the Syrian 
water authorities do not correspond with the physical context. For example, although Khabur 
basin in hydrological terms is one of the major tributaries of the Euphrates basin, both 
Khabur and Tigris basins are considered together and but separate from the Euphrates basin. 
Map 8, produced by the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation regarding sub-basin of Syria, clearly 
shows that Khabur Basin, which is a part of the Euphrates basin in hydrological terms, is 
considered a part of the Tigris basin and the sub-basin is defined as Tigris and Khabur sub-
basin. The map also illustrates that the Khabur-Tigris basin and the Euphrates basin are 
considered two separate sub-basins in Syria.  
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Map 8 Water Resources and Hydrological basins of Syria 
 
Source: Kout (2008:2304) 
 
Unlike this understanding, the Euphrates and Tigris watersheds are considered a single basin 
according to the Turkish government. Thus, they are defined as a single hydrological unit in 
the official documents on Turkey’s sub-basins (See Map 1 in Chapter 1). This understanding 
is also reflected in the rationale behind the GAP.17  In the designation of the GAP, the project 
was developed based on the Euphrates and Tigris watersheds constituting a single 
hydrological unit.  
 
These different understandings between the two governments are also reflected in inter-state 
negotiations. As mentioned in basins vs. basin(s) debate in Chapter 5, the Turkish 
government has argued that the Euphrates and Tigris watersheds should have been 
considered s a single transboundary basin from the very beginning of the hydropolitical 
interactions among the riparian states. The view that the ET basin must be considered a single 
hydrological unit has constituted one of the main components of Turkey’s official position in 
negotiations. The single basin approach constitutes two important components of Turkey’s 
official position in the hydropolitics of the ET basin. According to the official position of the 
                                                        
17 In one of my interviews with the high-ranking DSI official, when I asked about the Tigris part of the 
GAP, I was immediately corrected that the GAP must be considered as a whole rather than being separate 
parts of Euphrates and Tigris.  
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Turkish government, it is argued that the total water potential of the basin can meet the needs 
of the three riparian states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). This understanding implies 
that possible water shortages in the Euphrates basin can be compensated as of the surplus 
from the Tigris River (Bilen 2009:55). Therefore, the single basin approach does not only 
stand as a scientific fact alone, but it also constitutes the backbone of Turkey’s position in 
transboundary water politics.  
 
Contrary to Turkey’s single basin approach, the argument that ET basin must be considered 
two separated basins so any agreement on these two basins must be negotiated separately, 
this appears to be the downstream position of Syria and Iraq. Here, particularly Iraqi 
governments have defended the view for decades and avoided dealing with the issue of the 
Tigris through tri-partite or bi-partite negotiations with other two riparian states of the ET 
basin. It is worth noting that the ‘two basins approach’ has remained an important standpoint 
of the Iraqi position for decades, even after the ousting of the Saddam Regime.18  
 
However, it appears that Syrian governments have adopted a more flexible position that has 
had deviations at different periods. For example, in the trilateral negotiations between 1965 
and 1983, Syria suggested that the proposed JTC should not only conduct studies on the 
Euphrates but also on the Tigris basin. It, thus, appears that the Syrian government took a 
similar line to Turkey’s single basin approach. However, the introduction of the GAP by 
Turkey was immediately considered as an existential threat thus securitised by the Syrian 
discursive elites. This has led the Syrian government to adopt a similar approach as the Iraqi 
government. After all, given a tiny part of the mainstream Tigris River flows through the 
Syrian territory, the Syrian government did not have much to lose in the exchange of 
establishing a common downstream position with the Iraqi government as a bargaining power 
tactic against Turkey’s extensive development attempts in pivotal waters of the ET basin. 
Therefore, the Syrian government also claimed that the ET Rivers must be considered as two 
separated basins like the Iraqi government during 1980s and 1990s.  
 
                                                        
18In his anecdote, Hikmet Özgöbek (2006), who was previously in a senior position in DSI, narrates that in their 
interactions with Iraqi officials to discuss water issues both before and after the Saddam Regime, the Iraqi 
delegation insisted on the view that the ET rivers should be considered as separate basin; In my personal 
communications with a high-ranking Iraqi official, when I described Euphrates and Tigris as transboundary 
water basins, I was immediately corrected by him on the basis that the Euphrates and Tigris  rivers should be 
labelled as international basins.  
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Similar lack of consensus also exists in the Orontes basin between Turkey and Syria. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, Syria has declined to negotiate the Orontes issue with Turkey for 
decades, due to the territorial dispute on the Hatay (Alexandretta) region. According to this 
view, the Orontes basin cannot even be considered as a ‘transboundary basin’ between 
Turkey and Syria. Therefore, until recently, Syria has not been responsive towards Turkey’s 
appeals to discuss the Orontes issue and recognised Lebanon as the only riparian state of the 
basin.  As a result, while Syria and Lebanon interacted with each other as mid-stream and 
upstream riparian states to deal with transboundary water issues in the Orontes basin, Turkey 
did not enrol in inter-state interactions until 2000s. For example, Turkey was excluded from 
the Syrian-Lebanese accord (1994) on the el Assi (Orontes), which in fact codifies Syria’s 
supreme position on water entitlement in the Orontes basin (Syrian Lebanese Higher Council 
1994).  
 
In spite of the political rapprochement between Turkey and Syria during 2000s, the Syrian 
officials were still referring to the Orontes River as completely within Syrian and Lebanese 
territories. For example, the study conducted by Wsam Kout (2008) from the Syrian ministry 
of irrigation is worth mentioning. When Kout describes the sub-basins of Syria, he portrays 
the Orontes River as follows: “The Orontes River originates in Lebanon, runs through 
territory of Syria from south to north and drains into the Mediterranean Sea” (Kout 
2008:2314). Kout does not even consider Turkey as the riparian state of the Orontes basin. 
Thus, the visual representation of the basin is also represented according to this definition. As 
Map 9, shows the hydrographical map of Syria, produced by the Syrian Ministry of 
Irrigation, the Hatay region is included within the Syrian territory.  
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Map 9 Hydrogrpahic map published by the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation Water Resources Directorate 
 
Source: Kout (2008:2304) 
 
After having identified how spatial scales basins and sub-basins are constructed and 
politically contested between the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, the next section will 
examine the scales of governance in which interactions have occurred and different platforms 
for decision-making are established in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations (1923-
1998).  
 
6.2.2. The Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Relations: Scales and Power do mix  
 
In Chapter 3, the study showed that the concept of scale also refers to levels of representation 
and interactions between different actors at those levels. As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
dimension of scale was defined as scale of governance (See Section 3.2.1). Accordingly, 
actors pursing converging or conflicting goals interact with one another at those scales.  
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During the first era (1923-1998), inter-governmental networks between politicians, 
hydraucracies established the main scale of governance. This scale can be labelled as 
transboundary scale; it was constructed as both bilateral (Turkey and Syria) and trilateral 
basis (Turkey, Syria and Iraq).  
 
In chapter 3, the study also showed that spaces, in which decision-making occurs and actors 
influence in decision-making process, can be identified at different scales. Thus, invited, 
claimed and closed spaces can be identified in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
during the first era. The empirical case derived during the first era shows that construction of 
spaces was subject to power relations between the riparian states.  
 
 
Considering the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations (1923-1998), the main invited space 
is the establishment of the Joint Technical (JTC) Committee in 1983. However the JTC, as 
the main decision making body at transboundary scale, had very limited impact in fostering 
cooperation owing to its limited mandate. Apart from the JTC, we may also observe ad hoc 
bilateral meetings as constructed spaces for decision-making in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. For example, the well-known 1987 economic protocol, which was 
discussed in Chapter 5 in detail, is a product of such ad hoc bilateral meetings between 
Turkish and Syrian decision-makers.  
 
 
We may also observe attempts made by both the riparian states to keep closed spaces for 
excluding the other party or the third parties in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
(1923-1998). For example, Syria’s refusal not to negotiate the Orontes issue with Turkey, in 
spite of Turkey’s persistent attempts to include the issue in inter-state negotiations, can be 
considered as an example of how actors may prefer certain closed spaces. Here, non-
cooperation is a power tactic used by the Syrian government to exclude Turkey from 
decision-making processes in inter-state hydropolitics of the Orontes basin. Likewise, as will 
be discussed in the following section, one of the main discursive positions adopted by the 
Turkish government is not to include third parties such as intergovernmental organisations in 
inter-state negotiations in the ET basin. This discursive position adopted can be an attempt to 
keep the closed space not accessible for third party actors.   
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We may observe attempts to claim new spaces for influencing in decision-making processes. 
We observe this particular pattern in the actions of the Syrian government. For example, the 
diplomatic attempts made by the Syrian government to bring water dispute regarding the ET 
basin to the Arab League can be an attempt to open new claimed spaces for influence. Here, 
the main aim of the Syrian government was to increase its bargaining power in the 
hydropolitics of the ET basin, particularly to balance Turkey’s upstream development.  
 
Finally, political opportunity structures may result in construction of new claimed spaces 
thereby change bargaining power capabilities of riparian states. For example, Turkey’s 
attempts to finance its water development projects by mobilising international funds from 
third party actors as the World Bank enabled the Syrian government to pressurise actors not 
to release necessary funding. In doing so, the Syrian government sought to hinder the 
hydraulic projects of the GAP by cutting the money flow. In other words, Turkey’s attempts 
to mobilise external funding has increased bargaining power capabilities of Syria against 
Turkey, which enabled the Syrian governments to claim for new spaces by pressurising 
creditors. Turkey’s decision to finance the GAP purely in its national budget can be 
considered to hinder opening new claimed spaces and thus decrease the bargaining power of 
the Syrian government.  
 
6.2.3. Mapping Actors and Scales in the Hydropolitics of the Turkish-Syrian 
Relations 1923-1998 
 
Although hydropolitical relations between the Turkish and Syrian governments can be traced 
back to 1920s, these relations in general remained limited until 1960s. This was due to the 
following two reasons. First, political and economic relations were limited similar to those 
associated with water issues. Second, both governments started their hydraulic development 
projects in the ET basin in 1960s.  Therefore, the initial rounds of interactions on water issues 
commenced when Turkey and Syria initiated their large-scale hydraulic development 
projects.  
 
 
Perhaps, one of the distinguishing features of hydropolitics of the ET basin is the limited 
involvement of the third party actors such as intergovernmental organisations, third party 
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states as mediators unlike other major transboundary water basins across the world. Third 
party actors were not directly involved in inter-state relations among the riparian states of the 
ET basin. As discussed in the previous section, although the Syrian government as the 
downstream riparian state of the ET basin attempted to bring third parties in inter-state 
relations at transboundary scale, such attempts were vetoed by the Turkish government on the 
premise that water related issues must be resolved on bilateral and trilateral relations between 
or among riparian states.  
 
Nevertheless, we may observe indirect involvement of third parties such as 
intergovernmental organisations and third party states during the first era. Both Turkish and 
Syrian governments appealed to get political and financial support from the 
intergovernmental organisations, which allowed these organisations to get involve in 
decision-making processes indirectly. Turkey’s credit appeal to the World Bank and Syria’s 
appeal to the Arab League to get political support are examples of involvement of the inter-
governmental organisations. As pointed in the case of attempts made by the Syrian 
government to curb release of funding to Turkey, the interactions of the riparian states also 
enabled other riparian state to claim new spaces. Furthermore, third party states were also 
indirectly involved in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the first era. For example, 
the US and the USSR, as third party states, provided financial and technical support to 
Turkey and Syria respectively in the development of large-scale hydraulic projects in the ET 
basin. Table 16 illustrates actors-scale mapping in the context of the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations 1923-1998.  
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Table 16 Mapping actors and scales in hydropolitics of the ET basin (1923-1998) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
 
 
As Table 16 shows, transboundary scale is the main scalar dynamic where state apparatuses 
of both governments interacted with one another during the first era. We also observe indirect 
involvement of third party states; inter-governmental organisations that interact with either of 
the riparian states. The table also illustrates that actors involved in decision-making are from 
public sector, referring to governmental and inter-governmental organizations. Thus, another 
distinguishing character of this era in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations (1923-1998) 
is lack of involvement of actors coming from private sector and civil society at transboundary 
scale.  
 
 
In sum, the above section shows that spatial scales such as ‘village’, ‘region, ‘basin’ and 
‘sub-basin’ are not only physical realties but also products of socio-political relations 
constructed within certain historical contexts. The Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
provide a rich empirical case confirming socio-political constructions of spatial scales in 
inter-state hydropolitics.  Furthermore, intergovernmental networks between the two riparian 
states are the main scale of governance in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations (1923-
1998). This is labelled by this study as transboundary scale. We may observe construction of 
invited, closed and claimed spaces within transboundary scale. As will be discussed in the 
following sections actors exert different power tactics to increase their influence in diverse 
spaces. Moreover, power tactics are also exerted by the Turkish and Syrian governments to 
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open new claimed spaces and keep closed spaces inaccessible. Finally, this section also 
provided an actor mapping in the context of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. 
Subsequent to analysing the politics of scale and its relation with power, the following 
section will seek to understand factors, which led to patterns of high conflict and low 
cooperation in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations (1923-1998).  
 
 
6.3 ANALYSIS B: Understanding Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Relations in 
1923-1999 
 
This section problematizes the rationale for patterns of high conflict and low cooperation 
between Turkey and Syria in relation to water issues during the first era. It responds to how 
patterns of high conflict and low cooperation can be understood in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations (1923-1998). Being informed by the theoretical framework outlined 
in Chapter 3, predominantly conflictual relations between Turkish and Syrian governments 
during the first era stem from the following reasons.  
 
 
First, the concept of hydraulic mission as a prevailing paradigm has become part of the state-
making and nation-making process in the context of Turkey and Syria from the early period 
of foundation of both riparian states. The state elites promote the ideas constructed around the 
hydraulic mission ideology and they have become embedded in hydro-bureaucratic 
structures. By informing the actors’ interests, they have led extensive unilateral hydraulic 
development on the respected watershed of which they are co-riparian states.  
 
Second, broader political context, where negative mutually perceived identities and interests 
were constructed within historical context between Turkey and Syria, resulted in patterns of 
enmity in bilateral relations. Within this broader political context, inter-state interactions 
remained limited and their respective actions securitized with one another both in water 
related issues and other matters.  
 
 
Third, power relations that occurred within this broader political context with respect water 
issues also shaped predominantly conflictual relations during the first era. In the context of 
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the asymmetrical power configurations between Turkey and Syria, which favours the former, 
the Syrian government exerted different power tactics to curb Turkey’s upstream hydraulic 
development in the ET basin. Those attempts further exacerbated patterns of conflict (1923-
1998). Figure 17 shows how patterns of high conflict and low cooperation occurred during 
the first era.   
 
 
Figure 17 Factors leading to patterns of conflict in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
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6.3.1. Two Hydraulic Missions over the Same Transboundary Water Basins. 
 
6.3.1.1. Hydraulic Mission in Turkey  
 
‘’Let’s construct lakes of humanity on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers”  
                                                                                                                 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk  
 
 
As the republic of Turkey emerged as a nation-state in 1923, establishing socio-
economic and political integration between the central government and the periphery has 
become one of the overarching aims of the newly born republic from the very beginning 
of the nation-making and state-making processes. Cizre (2001:232) argues that 
infrastructural modernisation is one of the main components of Turkey’s national 
integration and promotion of national unity along with electoral participation, military 
conscription and extensive primary school education in the early period.  According to 
this view, the national unity and integrity of the state and society can only be realised by 
reducing the socio-economic disparities between the rural areas and the urban centres. 
Ataturk expresses this vision to his adopted daughter’s personal memoirs as follows: “ I 
would like to see factories, planted agricultural fields, nice roads, electrified villages, but 
also small houses in which people can live in healthy conditions and places where we 
pass through. I would like to provide the same ‘civilization’ that Istanbul has, and we try 
to bring Ankara all around the country… Entire Turkey should be prosperous and 
thriving…[author’s translation] ” (Verel 1982 in Topdemir 2009:37). 
 
Given the fact that bulk of population was living in rural areas in the early period and 
there has been an inherent link between water and agricultural activities, water resources 
development such as constructing dams and irrigation schemes are considered to be the 
main tools to improve socio-economic development.  
 
Thus, numerous past Turkish politicians illustrate the importance of water resources 
development in achieving socio-economic growth. For instance, Adnan Menderes, the 
former Turkish PM from 1950 to 1960, declared “no one can deter us from constructing 
those dams (referring to Keban Dam and others), which would make our make our 
country our land prosperous [author’s translation]” (Yıldız 2009:25).  Likewise, 
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Süleyman Demirel, one of the most influential figures in Turkish politics for decades, 
explains in his biography, A Life On the Pursuit of Water, how poverty and hardship of 
rural life in Anatolia drove him to study engineering at university. As a young engineer, 
the main ideals of the country and his generation were irrigating the plains of Turkey, 
electrifying cities, towns, and villages, expanding the working opportunities for people 
and industrialization (Turgut 2005:24). Thus, this perception of linking water resources 
development with socio-economic modernisation and national integrity can be clearly 
identified in the rationale behind the GAP as the largest regional development project of 
Turkey (Eder and Çarkoğlu 2001). Although we may observe similar patterns in other 
regional development projects, which were recently introduced by the government, the 
GAP is the first and most ambitious regional development project containing all 
elements of Turkey’s hydraulic mission.  
 
 
The main elements of Turkey’s hydraulic mission can be identified in the context of 
above discussed objective as follows. Firstly, hydraulic development was and is an 
important tool meeting energy need of Turkey. Given the fact that prevalence of 
electricity for domestic use is very low and only concentrated in some major urban 
centres in the first decades, extending electricity use both in urban and rural places has 
become one of the main aims of Turkey’s overall development. Thus, the Electric Power 
Resource Survey Administration was founded in 1935 to assess the potential of 
hydropower generation (Demir 2001:9). One of the first assessment surveys was 
conducted in the Euphrates River. The initial surveys have constituted the roots of the 
Keban Dam, the first large-scale dam that is purely built for hydropower generation on 
the mainstream Euphrates River. This shows from early periods, the Turkish decision 
makers considered the potential of the rivers to meet country’s energy needs. Owing to 
their great potential, the ET basin had great importance. However, such large-scale 
projects on the Euphrates were not realised until the 1960s due to lack of financial 
resources and expertise. However, several HPPs have become operational in the first 
decades of the republic era, which also served as the basis for upcoming projects.  
 
The second element of Turkey’s hydraulic mission is water resources development is to 
improve agricultural development. As stated above, Turkey was predominantly a rural 
society in its early period. Therefore, agriculture constituted the main element of the 
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Turkish economy. Thus, decision-makers emphasised the importance of agriculture for 
the economy. Therefore, categorising rural lands based on water and climate 
availabilities and establishing agricultural centres have been the key elements for 
improving the rural economy along with other measurements such as providing land 
ownership to peasants and conducting scientific assessment studies (Atatürk's Speech 
1937). 
 
Thirdly, the rehabilitation of Marshlands and spring flooding had also occupied the state 
agenda in the early period of the Turkish Republic. Süleyman Demirel points out, in his 
biography, how marshlands were a big threat to public health since they were sources of 
fatal diseases such as malaria (Turgut 2005:16) Therefore, dealing with swamps and 
flooding in flat areas led to water resources development. Thus, the initial codification of 
water illustrates water related issues were considered by the policy makers in the context 
of public health (Sümer 2012).  
 
 
The fourth element of Turkey’s hydraulic mission is the link between socio-economic 
progress of the state and hydraulic projects. As Turkey has been able to conduct large-
scale hydraulic projects, the infrastructures are frequently portrayed by the Turkish 
discursive elites as symbols of achievement of the Turkish state and the Turkish nation. 
This symbolism is particularly clear in projects developed in the ET basin. Demirel’s 
inaugural speech in the construction of the Keban dam is worth quoting. Demirel states, 
“While Murat stream, originating from the Lake Van and flowing via the Malazgirt Plain 
forms one tributary of the Euphrates, another tributary is added from the outskirts of the 
Ararat Mountain by taking snows and rains of highlands. When the Euphrates River 
reaches to this location [referring to Keban Dam site], the Euphrates says I am under 
the command of the Turkish nation [Author’s translation] [emphasis added]” (Turgut 
2005:184).  
 
  
Similar patterns are identified in the context of the GAP. Demirel considers “the GAP as the 
messenger of Turkey’s coming golden age’’ (Demirel 1994). According to him, “… The 
Turkish Nation proves its capabilities by finishing the GAP gradually. Therefore, the GAP 
symbolises the progress of Turkish technique, engineering and labour, and also shows 
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determination of the nation. With these aspects, the GAP is a masterpiece of republic of 
Turkey getting its power from the Turkish nation [author’s translation]” (Demirel 1994:3). 
Likewise, in the inaugural ceremony of the Ataturk Dam, the largest dam of the GAP, Turgut 
Özal, the president of Turkey at that time, states, “…we have been able to overcome our 
inferiority against the West… This Dam is a symbol of our oneness and integrity [Author’s 
translation]”.  In the same ceremony, Erdal İnönü, the deputy of prime minister of the 
coalition government at that time and head of the Social Democratic Party, interestingly links 
the Ataturk dam project with the Turkish liberation War (1918-1923) by stating, “ the 
willpower that waged the liberation war is the same willpower that realized this project. 
[Author’s translation]’’ (Akdemir 1992, July 26). Thus given the fact that the dam is the 
biggest hydraulic infrastructure of the GAP and one of the largest dams in the World, the 
name has been given after Ataturk, the founder of Turkey.  
 
The fifth element of Turkey’s hydraulic mission is while water resources development is an 
important tool in establishing state legitimacy and authority in general, security concerns 
such as territorial integrity of the state has played an important role in the context of the GAP 
(Eder and Çarkoğlu 2001). Although the PKK emerged as a security threat in the second half 
of 1980s, the Kurdish issue can be dated back to early period. During this early period 
numbers of reports were prepared to address the issue. Accordingly, these reports converged 
on the view that the existing problems in the region stem from the socio-economic 
backwardness (Topdemir 2009). Moreover, three ethno-religious insurgencies, the Sheik Said 
(1925), the Ararat (1930-1931) and the Dersim (1937-1938) occurred during the early period 
which exacerbated the fears that ethno-religious dynamics in the eastern and south-eastern 
Anatolia can pose a major threat to national and territorial integrity of the state in the eyes of 
the state elites (Yavuz 2001:8). 
 
Finally, the idea that nature must be controlled, which is one of the elements of hydraulic 
mission, can also be identified in the discourses regarding Turkey’s water resources 
development. For instance, in the same inaugural speech quoted above, Demirel also points 
out the difficulty of ‘domesticating’ the Euphrates River. He defines the process of hydraulic 
development as the struggle for ‘civilizationalisation’ (Turgut 2005). Likewise, hydraulic 
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development attempts conducted by the DSI are portrayed as battle between the steppe and 
the green, the darkness and the light; the poverty and prosperity (Demir 2001) 
 
6.3.1.2. Hydraulic Mission in Syria  
 
Teacher: -What did the Euphrates River turn into after  
going to revolution school?  
Child student: -It turned into a ‘civilized river’.  
 
The epigraph, above, is quoted from Omar Amiralay’s fascinating documentary, A Flood 
in Baath Country (2003), illustrating how the Euphrates project has influenced the area it 
was built upon. In the quoted scene, the primary school teacher asks the pupils how the 
revolution (referring to Ba’th revolution) changed the Euphrates River. One of the 
student replied the revolution turned the Euphrates into a ‘civilised river’. In the same 
documentary one of the pupils recited from the textbook about the inaugural date of the 
Euphrates dam as follows: “In the 5th of July, the Euphrates River went to the new 
school how to read and write and how to practice love with the plains and trees in a 
modern day. At the school gate, president Hafiz el Asad took of the muddy cloak of the 
Euphrates cuts its shaggy hair and long nails, gave him a pen, a notebook and a green 
inkpot to write his diary as a civilized river.” (Amiralay 2003)  
 
 
The initial periods of independent Syria (1946-1963) witnessed a political contestation 
between the traditional elites descendants of the Ottoman Empire and the French 
Mandate, representing upper classes and resting their power upon feudal social base and 
the counter-elites representing middle and lower classes and peasants in rural areas. The 
army and radical political parties form the bases of these rising counter-elites. Therefore, 
Syria experienced a politically unstable period when several coup d’états occurred. The 
political contestation between the traditional elites primarily composing the state and the 
counter-elites ended with overthrow of the former by the Ba’th movement, which is the 
strongest movement among other counter-movements against the previous regime 
(Hinnebusch 2001). 
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As the Ba’th party came to power with a coup d’état on 8 March 1963, it immediately 
accelerated the land reform that came in to force on 27 September 1958 in the period of 
United Arab Republic (UAR) experience. Additional land was confiscated and 
redistributed to the peasants (Perthes 1995:81, Butatu 1999:162,163). More importantly, 
the Ba’th party introduced an agrarian reform to establish state-led socialist agricultural 
sector. The state farms and peasant unions were the main elements of this structure 
(Hinnebusch 2011:3).   
 
 
The agrarian reform radically transformed the socio-economic structures, power 
configuration among different actors and state-society relations. It resulted in reduction of 
large estates, dominance of landowners over peasants and penetration of the bureaucracy 
over rural areas. The result of this process was the creation of small peasant and medium 
capitalist rural structure (Hinnebusch 2011:8).  However, it would be misleading to 
consider the agrarian revolution as merely an ideological choice in terms of socio-
economic development. The Ba’th party inherited a weak state and experienced strong 
opposition from the urban centres. Therefore, the survival of the regime was subject to 
bringing new participants to the regime and empowering rural classes (Hinnebusch 
2001:6). As a result, involvement of people having rural origins gradually increased in 
state apparatus. Butatu (1999:145) describes this process as ‘ruralisation’ of the army, the 
party and to some degree state bureaucracy during 1960s. The main political outcome of 
this process was the incorporation of peasants to the regime. As Hinnebusch concisely 
states: “The Ba’th Party, coming out of the village, initially pursued an agrarian 
revolution that largely benefited to rural areas and incorporated peasantry into national 
life. This constituted the social base of ba’thism, imparting stability of the regime it would 
otherwise have lacked. ” (Hinnebusch 2011:14).  
 
 
Expanding agricultural areas is one of the major goals of the agrarian reform conducted 
by the Ba’th regime to improve rural economy. Moreover, achieving food security also 
became one of the priorities of the regime. In particular, as oil prices increased in the 
1970s, the Syrian political elites like their counterparts in the Middle East were worried 
that ‘food weapon’ could be used as a ‘counter measure’ against oil exporters (Barnes 
2009:523). Therefore, the Syrian decision makers planned new irrigation areas and 
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relevant hydraulic infrastructure. Soviet model of hydraulic development became a 
prevailing view among the ruling elites. According to this logic, large-scale irrigation and 
reclamation projects was the only conducive solution for agricultural development. With 
the Soviet expertise and financial resources, plans were made to transform existing small-
scale projects to large-scale dams and irrigation schemes (Springborg 1981:192).  
 
Among various projects introduced, the Euphrates dam project was the most ambitious 
during the Ba’th regime, which carries all the above-stated elements of Syria’s hydraulic 
mission. The project aimed to open 640,000ha land under irrigation around the Euphrates 
basin, which was more than the agricultural land existing throughout Syria at the time 
(Bari 1977:234).   
 
Another important aim of the project was to extend development from west to east. 
Traditionally, the main population of the country was concentrated south to north from 
Damascus to Aleppo. With the introduction of the Euphrates development project, the 
government sought to open new living spaces for the rapidly growing population (Seale 
1995:444). The decision-makers also prospected that the project would resolve uneven 
distribution of rapidly growing rural population that was congested in the western part of 
Syria (Garzouzi 1963:83). Nureddin El-Rifai, the former minister of industry defines the 
Euphrates development project as follows: “The Syrian Euphrates project is Syria’s 
future. The Euphrates region is the new Syria, and Syria will not be able to stand on its 
own feet and to ensure a stable and prosperous economy in future unless it is capable of 
benefiting from its share of the Euphrates water. There is no other way’’ (Bari 1977:235)  
 
The Euphrates development projects led to creation of two new towns, El-Tabqa and El-
Thawra on the banks of the reservoir lake of the Euphrates dam. The ancient city of 
Raqqah, which is the capital of the Euphrates basin governorate, became a symbol of 
Ba’th revolution and its population has grown rapidly since then (Seale 1995:445).  
 
The symbolism that connects the hydraulic projects with state progress is identifiable in 
the case of Syria with even greater degree. For example, the reservoir lake of the 
Euphrates Dam was named as the Asad Lake, after Hafez Asad. One of the newly 
established towns on the banks of Asad Lake was named as El-Thawra, which means 
revolution in Arabic. In the following years of Syria’s hydraulic mission other 
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infrastructures were similarly named such as the Ba’ath Dam on Euphrates and the 8 
March dam (referring to the day when Ba’th party came to power in Syria) on the 
Khabur River (Barnes 2009:522).  
 
Finally, as was the case with the hydraulic mission of Turkey, the idea that nature must be 
controlled for people and the nation is also part of the hydraulic mission of Syria. The 
following description of the Euphrates from a schoolbook quoted from Amiralay’s above-
mentioned documentary concisely shows this fact: “On the 5ht of July, the Euphrates 
woke up to find that the Syrian Arabs have moved him with his bed and cover to a new 
address. I understand the sadness of rivers when they are forced to leave their childhood 
play grounds and their old places of love and friendship with birds and trees. But I 
understand the ambition of the revolution to harness everything in nature for the benefit of 
man” (Amiralay 2003). 
 
6.3.2. Uncovering the Broader Political Context: Construction of Negative 
Mutual Identities  
 
 
The above section showed both riparian states are driven by similar sets of norms and 
ideas in water resources development, which can be conceptualised in the context of 
hydraulic mission. This has resulted in unilateral development over transboundary water 
basins that are located as riparian states thereby leading to patterns of high conflict and 
low cooperation on water issues.  
 
However, competing hydraulic missions adopted by the Turkish and Syrian government 
do not alone explain predominantly conflictual relations between the riparian states. As 
discussed in the theoretical framework (Chapter 3), the broader socio-political context in 
which interactions between riparian states take place must be taken into consideration in 
understanding hydropolitical relations in inter-state hydropolitics. Thus, the broader 
political context in particular had played an important role in water conflict between 
Turkey and Syria during the first era (1923-1998).  The elements of broader political 
context, which led patterns of high conflict and low cooperation in the first era, are 
illustrated in the previous figure (See Figure 17). These elements can be further 
uncovered in the subsequent sections as follows.  
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6.3.2.1. Legacy of the Past: Arab and Turkish Nationalisms  
 
Although Turkey and Syria have emerged as nation states after the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire, mutual identity construction can be traced to the late period of the Empire. 
The Arab nationalist movements, which emerged this late period of the Ottoman Empire, 
played an important role in construction of perceived identities. The idea of nationalism had 
become widespread among the nations in the Balkans and the Middle East during the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Although the Arab nationalist movements initially sought to get more 
autonomy from the central government, it also carried separatist tendencies and unification of 
the Arab world (Choueiri 2005:297).  The confrontation between Arab nationalism and 
centralisation policies of the government resulted in several unrests and uprisings in the Arab 
provinces of the empire (Kayali 1997).  
 
In this context, the execution of Arab nationalists in Damascus and Beirut by Jamal Pasha, 
the governor of Syria who is named as Jamal el-Saffah (Jamal the butcher) owing to his harsh 
rule in Syria, had profound impacts on Syrian domestic politics. The Marjeh Square, where 
the executions were conducted, is named as Martyr Square and the day is commemorated as 
the Martyrs day in Syria. On martyr’s day, 6 May 1916, protests were organised in front of 
the Turkish embassy to retain memories of the Arab nationalist being executed (Interviewee 6 
pers. comm. 2011). Moreover, the fall of the Ottoman Empire is interpreted as the 
emancipation from the ‘Ottoman Imperialism’ and the era of the Ottoman Rule is considered 
as decay in the Arab historiography (Aras and Köni 2002, Davutoğlu 2004:409). 
Interestingly, we can identify these perceptions in very recent Turkish-Syrian political crisis 
that developed after the Arab uprisings. In a response to Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current 
Turkish foreign minister, Umran Zuabi, the Syrian minister of Information, recently stated, 
“we no longer live in the era of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish foreign ministry does not 
appoint governors to Damascus, Mecca, Cairo and Jerusalem [author’s own translation]” 
(Hürriyet Daily 8 October, 2012). Likewise, in one of his recent interviews, current Syrian 
President Bashar al Asad accused the Turkish PM Erdoğan for considering himself as the 
new Ottoman Sultan (Interview with Bashar al Asad 2012).  
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Another cornerstone event that has profoundly impacted on the Turkish-Syrian relations is 
the Arab Revolt (1916-1918) against the Ottoman Empire during the 1st Wold War. The 
revolt was portrayed as “Arabs stabbed us in the back’’ or “the betrayal of Arabs’’ in 
historical writings and literature in Turkey. Aras and Koni (2002:50) argue that the patterns 
of enmity towards Arabs can hardly be identified in the Turkish mental map until the mid 
1910s. For example, Arabs are represented with their positive sentiments such as sincerity, 
hospitality and loyalty in Ottoman literature. These sentiments had fundamentally 
transformed into anger against Arabs in the early period republic of Turkey. In Falih Rifki 
Atay’s seminal book, Zeytindağı, it is reflected as “Ne Arab’ın Yüzü, Ne Şam’ın Şekeri 
(Neither face of Arab, nor candy of Damascus” (Aras and Köni 2002:50).  
 
 
The narratives constructed within historical context are also reflected in identities of the state 
and therefore in their preferences in foreign affairs. The identity of the Turkish state is a 
modernisation and civilisation project constructed by the founders in the early republican era. 
Westernisation, nationalism and secularism formed the main pillars of the state identity. 
Westernisation refers to adoption of western culture as a whole. Accordingly, the new 
republic envisaged to reach beyond the ‘developed civilisations’, which could only be 
possible by adopting western values as a whole and abandoning Islamic-oriental identity 
(Robins 2002:319). This view was reflected in the Turkish foreign policy as subornation of 
politics of the Middle East. The cold war dichotomy led Turkey to distance itself further from 
the Middle East, since Soviet-friendly regimes were established in the major Arab states 
including Syria, Iraq and Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
 
Considering the central position of Damascus in the development of Arab nationalism, the 
Syrian elites portrayed Syria as the beating heart of Arab nationalism and pan Arabism in the 
Middle East (Hinnebusch 2002:142). Therefore, it is not just coincidence that the Ba’th 
ideology, which theorises the secular Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism in the Middle East, 
emerged in the social context of Damascus. According to Michel Aflaq, one of the founders 
of the Ba’th ideology, Arabs have been under foreign domination for centuries. After having 
ruled by the Ottomans for four centuries, it is Western imperialism that has carved the Arab 
lands to non-Arab states and partitioned Arabs within several political entities (Seale 
1995:31).   
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Syrian political elites particularly considered their country as the victim of the status quo 
established after the First World War, since the Greater Syria (Bilad ash-Sham) was divided 
into Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon. The Ba’th ideology became the doctrine of Syria, 
when the Ba’th party part took power in Syria with a military coup in 1960s. In the context of 
this anti-imperialist tone of the Baath ideology, Turkey was considered as the proxy agent of 
Western imperialism in the Middle East. Map 10 illustrates the territories of Greater Syria 
(Bilad ash-Sham), derived from the primary school geography textbook in Syria (Yazgan 
2007:120).  
 
Map 10 Map of Greater Syria (Bilad ash-Sham) in the geography textbooks in Syria 
 
Source: Yazgan 2007:120 
 
6.3.2.2. Legacy of Hatay (Alexandretta) and the Orontes River 
 
The Turkish and Syrian governments could not realise cooperation on Orontes basin as in the 
case of the ET basin until 2000s. However, why have the Turkish and Syrian governments 
not been able to establish a water regime or even any temporary deal on the Orontes basin? 
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Although we may observe that hydraulic mission of the both states were also applied to 
Orontes basin, the answer mainly lies with another long standing bilateral dispute between 
Turkey and Syria which is the Hatay (Alexandretta) territorial dispute.  
 
The dispute over Hatay province has a particular importance in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. The Orontes River flows through the Hatay province in the Turkish 
territory before it empties in to the Mediterranean Sea. Owing to this simple geographical 
fact, Syria has neither recognized Turkey’s sovereignty over the province, nor has it engaged 
in any deal with Turkey regarding the Orontes basin. This persistent denial stems from 
Turkey’s annexation of the province in 1939, which has had profound impact on Syrian 
domestic politics and in particular the perception of Syrian decision-makers (See Annex 2). 
Therefore, specific attention must be given to understand the nature of the Hatay dispute 
between Turkey and Syria. The case also provides a clear example of how a non-water issue 
may affect water issues in inter-state relations. In Annex 2, the study provides a detailed 
account on the history of the Hatay (Alexandretta) dispute and how it has shaped mutually 
constructed identities between Turkey and Syria.  
 
6.3.2.3. The Cold-War Dichotomy  
 
During the Cold War period, both foreign policies of the Turkish and Syrian governments 
were largely determined by systemic dynamics. As pointed out in the previous section, 
westernization is one of the elements of the identity of the republic of Turkey and it has been 
reflected in the Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of the republic of Turkey. 
However, the direct threat from the Soviet Union in the early period of the Cold War and 
threat of communism in the later periods added new security concerns for the securitizing 
actors of state. Therefore, Turkey became part of the security and political alliances of the 
Western bloc and the international dynamics of the Cold War strongly shaped Turkey’s 
foreign policy during the Cold War (Hale 2002). The political and military alliance with the 
Western Bloc was also reflected in Turkey’s economic relations. Particularly after the pursuit 
of the Turkish governments to be part of the European integration process since 1960s, the 
European countries have increasingly become the main trading partner in Turkey’s economic 
relations. Turkey’s political, military and economic alliance with the Western bloc during the 
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Cold War had the following implications to Turkish-Syrian relations in general and 
hydropolitical relations in particular.  
 
 
First, the Turkish government has adopted a pro-western approach in its relations with the 
MENA countries particularly in the early period of the Cold War. Turkey’s willingness to be 
part of the Middle East Command, Baghdad Pact, which was signed among the UK, Iraq, 
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey and turned into Central Treaty Organisation as Iraq left the Pact, 
are examples of Turkey’s pro-western foreign policy in the Middle East.19 However, this 
policy was rejected by the Arab nationalist movements and it reinforced the idea that Turkey 
is acting as a proxy agent of the West the in the Middle East. Within this political context, the 
first major political crisis erupted in Turkish-Syrian relations in 1957 (Soysal 1998: 107). 
Second, Turkey   pursued relatively more balanced and low profile policy foreign policy to 
the Middle East particularly after 1960s and onwards in the Cold War period. This low 
profile approach is also in accordance with Turkey’s pursuit to be treated as a European state 
rather than a state in the Middle East (Hale 2002). As a result, political and economic 
relations with the Middle Eastern states including Syria remained limited during the Cold war 
(Mufti 2002). Third, the political and economic alliances with the Western bloc were also 
reflected in Turkey’s hydraulic development. The initial hydraulic development projects, 
conducted during 1950s and 1960s, were realised by acquiring financial support and technical 
expertise from the Western bloc, primarily from the US.  
 
 
On the contrary to Turkey’s security, political and economic alliance with the Western bloc, 
Syria became one of the allies of the Soviet Union in the Middle East after the Ba’th party 
came to power. Counter alliances, established in the in the context of the Cold War, resulted 
in limited political and economic relations between Turkey and Syria during the Cold War 
period. Moreover, as in the case of Turkey, the Syrian government became recipient of the 
Soviet Union to conduct its hydraulic development projects. Particularly, the Syrian 
                                                        
19
 The Middle East Command is a British-led defence system in the Middle East, which is attached to the 
NATO. However, the attempt was failed due to the Egypt’s refusal (Mufti 2002: 83, Hale 2002: 127). Baghdad 
Pact is another security alliance established within Western bloc. It was composed of the UK, Turkey, Iraq, Iran 
and Pakistan and the US as observer status. However, as the military coup d’état that overthrew pro-Western 
Hashemite Kingdom in Iraq in 1958, Iraq withdrew from the pact in 1959. The Baghdad Pact was reconstructed 
as CENTO, composed of the UK, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as member and the US as a observer status (Hale 
2002: 127).  
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government acquired financial assistance and technical expertise in the conduct of Euphrates 
Development Project during 1960s. Therefore, dynamics of the Cold War played a vital role 
in the construction of the broader political context in which hydropolitical relations occurred 
between the Turkish and Syrian governments.  
 
6.3.2.4. Syria’s Sanctuary to the PKK  
 
The PKK has had an important role in Turkey’s foreign policy during 1980s and 1990s. As 
Robins states, the role of the PKK in Turkey’s foreign relations can be grasped within this 
simple equations; “If you abhor the PKK you are our friend. If you (are perceived to) help or 
nurture the PKK you are our enemy” (Robins 2002:318). As explained in Chapter 5, the 
Syrian government was the primary sponsor of the PKK providing logistical help and 
sanctuary during 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, the presence of the PKK in Syria became the 
main international dispute between Turkey and Syria, which was a major obstacle for 
cooperative relations. Thus, this longstanding situation, which started in 1980, ended with 
one of the most severe political crisis in the history of bilateral relations in 1998.  
 
6.3.2.5. Turkey’s Pivotal Position in the ET basin and Downstream Fears  
 
Given the patterns of enmity constructed within the historical context, Turkey’s large-scale 
hydraulic development attempts in the ET basin, particularly the GAP, were perceived by the 
Syrian officials as an existential threat; in other words it was securitised by the Syrian 
discursive elites. As I will discuss in the final section the discourse on Turkey using water as 
a weapon in the Middle East has become an inherent part of Syria’s discursive position in 
spite of persistent denials from the Turkish decision-makers.  
 
6.3.3. The Role of Power in Understanding the Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical 
Relations (1923-1998)  
 
Apart from these two overarching factors, which led to predominantly conflictual 
hydropolitical relations in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, we may consider 
power configurations between the two states and their use different material and bargaining 
power tactics exacerbated the hydropolitical relations in the first era. As will be analysed in 
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the subsequent section, although we may observe an asymmetrical power configuration 
between the Turkish and Syrian governments, favouring former in terms of material and 
discursive power capabilities of actors, the Syrian government is not entirely powerless. For 
example, while Turkey’s large-scale hydraulic development projects in the ET basin were 
securitised by the Syrian discursive elites, variety of power tactics such as providing 
sanctuary to the PKK, mobilising Arab solidarity by bringing the issue to the Arab League, 
lobbying on the World Bank were used by the Syrian government to curb hydraulic projects 
conducted by Turkey in the ET basin. As it will be analysed in detail in the sub-sequent 
section, both states exerted different power tactics to achieve their goals regarding water 
issues. Therefore, these power relations further exacerbate the predominantly conflictual 
relations between Turkey and Syria regarding water issues.  
 
Furthermore, as discussed in the theoretical framework, actors’ material and discursive power 
capabilities are directly linked with hydraulic missions of Turkey and Syria, and the broader 
political context. Extensive hydraulic development projects, justified in the context of 
hydraulic mission as a prevailing paradigm, were considered by the both governments as a 
means to increase material capabilities, legitimacy and authority of the states. As will be 
discussed in the following sections, ideational power tactics such as 
securitised/opportunitised speech acts and framings also play a vital role in promoting 
hydraulic missions at national scales by discursive elites. Finally, broader political context 
affected actors’ power capabilities in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. For 
instance, the Cold War enabled Turkey and Syria to get financial support and expertise from 
the US and the USSR in their hydraulic development projects.  
 
6.4. ANALYSIS C: Power as Explaining the Outcome: Power Struggle in 
Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Relations (1923-1999) 
 
 
The study argues that power strongly shapes the outcome in hydropolitics at different scales. 
Considering the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the first era, we may observe that 
both the parties exerted material and discursive power tactics influencing both at 
transboundary and national scales. Being informed by the hydro-hegemony framework 
(Zeitoun and Warner 2006), elements of power relations between the Turkish and Syrian 
governments can be outlined as geography (riparian position), material power, bargaining 
220 
 
power and ideational power tactics. The following sections will make a power analysis in the 
context of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations.  
 
6.4.1. Geography (Riparian Position)  
 
Geography, referring to riparian position of the state in transboundary water context, forms 
the first dimension of power in theory. Turkey enjoys geographical supremacy over Syria and 
Iraq in the ET basin. Turkey is not only the upstream co-riparian state of the ET basin, but 
also 75% of the entire ET basin watershed originates from here (Freeman 2001:129). 
Moreover, the topography and territory of the ET basin in the Turkish territory is conducive 
in building hydraulic infrastructure for both hydropower generation and utilisation of water 
for agricultural activities. Syria, however, is almost entirely dependent on Turkey in the ET 
basin. Moreover, since only a tiny part of the Tigris River flows through Syria, which 
constitutes borderline between Turkey and Syria, Syria’s potential use of the Tigris is very 
limited. Moreover, disadvantageous riparian position comparing to Turkey also limits Syria 
in conducting certain power tactics in its interaction with Turkey. For example, upstream 
riparian states of the Nile basin can use unilateral infrastructure construction and/or 
cooperation without involving Egypt. As Egypt is the most powerful riparian state of the Nile 
basin, this is a useful bargaining power tactic for upstream riparian states. However, these 
tactics are simply not available for either Syria or Iraq due to their geographical location in 
the ET basin (Cascao and Zeitoun 2010).  
 
The picture of the Orontes basin, however, is completely reversed in Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. Although Syria is located as the mid-stream riparian state of the 
Orontes basin, it is able to control the entire basin due to its extensive hydraulic development. 
The hydraulic infrastructure has enabled Syria to utilise the lion’s share of the basin. 
Moreover, in 1994 the Syrian government codified existing asymmetrical status by signing a 
bilateral treaty with Lebanon. According to the treaty on Orontes, while Lebanon is entitled 
to utilise roughly 20% of the basin, the remaining part can be used by Syria (Syrian Lebanese 
Higher Council 1994). An opposite relationship is prevalent in Turkey and Syria. While Syria 
is located as a mid-stream co-riparian state and most of the tributaries of the basin originate 
within Syria, Turkey is located as the downstream co-riparian state of the basin. Table 17 
summarises the riparian positions of the states in the ET and Orontes basins.  
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Table 17 riparian positions of states in the ET and Orontes basins and reverse positions of Turkey and 
Syria 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014   
 
In the hydro-hegemony literature, which seeks to analyse the roles of different power 
dimensions, it is widely accepted that Turkey and Egypt are the most powerful riparian states 
(henceforth hydro-hegemons) in the ET and the Nile basins respectively. Warner and Zeitoun 
(2006) question how some states consolidate control on watercourses, whereas others don’t. 
For example, Ethiopia and Turkey are located in similar geographic positions in the Nile and 
ET basins respectively.  Yet, Turkey maintains control in the ET basin, whilst Ethiopia does 
not have such power on the Nile basin.  Given the fact that Syria as the mid-stream co-
riparian state maintains an almost absolute control over the Orontes, another comparison can 
be made between Turkey and Egypt in the Orontes and Nile basins respectively. The question 
that needs to be posed is why Egypt, a so-called hegemon of the Nile, could establish control 
on the Nile basin, whereas Turkey, as so called hegemon of the Euphrates, could not 
consolidate similar control over the Orontes? If Turkey enjoys power supremacy over Syria 
in terms of material, bargaining and ideational power capabilities, then according to the 
theory we might expect to see a similar control on the Orontes basin too. Yet it is the 
midstream Syria that establishes an effective control on the Orontes basin.  
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The following points can be made on the comparison discussed above. First, although states 
adopt water policy of extensive hydraulic development (sanctioned in the context of 
hydraulic mission), it is not necessarily manifested in every sub-basin with the same degree. 
Here, water potential of the basin, feasibility of projects, political incentives, security 
concerns, and symbolism attached to a certain project determine the degree of prioritisation 
for discursive elites. The ET basin forms the largest potential sub-basin for both Turkey and 
Syria. Therefore, the GAP and Euphrates Development Project conducted by Turkey and 
Syria respectively carry all elements of their hydraulic missions. The Orontes basin 
constitutes one of the important resources of Syria. The main population and industrial zones 
are located in the north-south axis in Western Syria (Interviewee 19 pers. comm. 2011, 
October 15). However, hydraulic development that could be conducted by Turkey is 
relatively limited. Moreover, Syria’s absolute control and reluctance in cooperation in the 
Orontes provides a strong discursive position to Turkey in hydropolitics of the ET basin. It is 
argued that while Syria accuses Turkey of not releasing enough water from the ET Rivers, 
Syria has been following an unfair policy on the Orontes, revealing inconsistency in the 
Syrian position (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996:9). Bilen criticises Syria’s policy as 
“[what’s] mine is mine, but [what’s] yours is negotiable [emphasize added]” (Bilen 2009:90). 
Thus this inconsistency was also highlighted by the Turkish government. It has been argued 
that the Orontes basin must also be subject of trilateral negotiations on the Joint Technical 
Committee (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996:13). Therefore, Syria’s reluctance to even 
negotiate the Orontes issue has increased Turkey’s bargaining power in inter-state 
negotiations.  
 
 
Second, a comparative analysis between Turkey and Syria on their reverse riparian positions 
on the ET and the Orontes basins also shows that geography does constrain or widen 
opportunities for power use for the actors. For instance while Syria can impose its status quo 
with Lebanon and defy the most powerful co-riparian states in the Orontes basin, cooperation 
without the most powerful riparian state as a leverage mechanism is simply not an available 
option for Syria due to Turkey’s pivotal position in the ET basin.  
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6.4.2. Material Power  
 
The second dimension of power in hydropolitics is the material power that includes military 
force, economic power, technical capacity and expertise.  
 
Concerning the role of military force in the ET basin, Frey (1993:62) correctly argues that 
Turkey has enough military force to deter Syria and Iraq from using military force as a 
material power tactic.  In my view, this perception also makes it impossible for Syria to use 
coercive-pressure mechanisms in its hydropolitical relations with Turkey in the ET basin. 
Therefore, we do not identify speech acts conducted by the Syrian government such as 
threatening statements for possible use of force, deployment of arms, and military drills in 
water issues against Turkey. This supports the constructivist view that material power must 
be considered as a relational concept, which is mutually constituted. Yet, these mutual 
perceptions of material power asymmetry between Turkey and Syria did not prevent the 
Syrian government to support the PKK until the Turkish government conducted coercive-
pressure mechanisms such as threat for possible use of force and deployment of arms in the 
Turkish-Syrian borderline during the 1998 October crisis. As discussed above, although the 
crisis erupted due to Syria’s sanctuary to the PKK, water is inherent part of the 1998 October 
crisis, since the Syrian decision-makers considered the PKK as leverage against Turkey. 
However, as will be discussed in the following chapter, providing sanctuary to the PKK was 
no longer an option for Syria, since both parties preferred to have more constructive relations 
owing to the fundamental change in broader political context. This change in state’s 
behaviour of Syria supports the view that broader political context does widen or narrow use 
of certain power tactics by riparian states in inter-state hydropolitics.  
 
 
Economic capabilities of the co-riparian states have directly impacted large-scale hydraulic 
development projects in the ET basin. Given the fact that the projects conducted on the ET 
basin require large sums of funding, economic performance of the states have affected on-
going hydraulic projects. Syria experienced considerable economic growth during 1960 and 
particularly 1970s. After a modest investment increased during 1960s, the annual investments 
quadrupled during 1970s (Perthes 1995:25). This has allowed the state to introduce several 
projects in industry, energy and communication. Particular attention was given to dam 
building and land reclamation process during 1970s under Hafiz Asad’s rule. The Euphrates 
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dam was completed and the government continued to open new areas for irrigation in the 
Euphrates basin (Perthes 1995:43). Similar pattern can be identified in the case of Turkey. 
For example, major economic crisis directly affected public funding allocated to the GAP in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Figure 18 shows public funding allocated to the GAP were at its lowest 
in 1995 and 2001 when Turkey had two major economic crises.  
 
Figure 18 GAP investment allocations 
 
Source: Tokdemir 2011 
 
Given the long history of their water resources development, both Turkey and Syria have 
strong hydraucracies with the ability of producing hydrological data. Thus, conflicting data 
on water and land resources formed one of the major areas of negotiations among riparian 
sates of the ET basin (Bağış 1997:574). 
 
Finally, as shown above, sanctuary to the PKK provided by the Syrian government can be 
considered as a material power tactic, a covert action, in the Turkish-Syrian relations. 
Although this tactic was used by the Syrian government as a bargaining chip in water 
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negotiations against Turkey, it is worth noting that it has also created the biggest obstacle for 
cooperative actions between the two countries on transboundary water management.   
 
6.4. 3. Bargaining Power  
 
As stated in chapter on theoretical framework (Chapter 3), bargaining power tactics are the 
most frequently used power tactics in hydropolitics. It refers to actors’ capabilities to 
construct social, political or institutional values, practices and rules to limit other actors’ 
capabilities. Asymmetrical power configurations can be identified between Turkey and Syria, 
favouring the former in terms bargaining power capabilities of Turkey and Syria. Further on; 
the bargaining power capabilities of the Turkish government will be discussed. 
 
 
Turkey’s supreme riparian position in the ET basin served as a bargaining power due to the 
following reasons. First, Turkey’s supreme position in the ET basin limited other riparian 
states’ bargaining power capabilities. For example, while cooperation without Egypt can be 
strong leverage mechanism exerted by the upstream riparian states in the Nile basin, this 
option is not available in Syria and Iraq being downstream riparian states of the ET basin. 
Second, Turkey’s supreme riparian position makes the Turkish government a key actor for 
basin-wide cooperation.  In other words, while it is vital that the Turkish government must be 
part of any basin-wide initiative to foster cooperation, there are few incentives to be offered 
or advantages, which would drive it to be part of such basin wide initiatives. This advantage 
enables Turkey to shape the rules of the game largely. For example, the Turkish government 
has been successful in keeping intergovernmental networks between riparian states as a 
‘closed space’ for the third parties in the ET basin.  
 
 
Moreover, Turkey has had strong political and economic ties with the West; economic and 
political alliances have increased Turkey’s bargaining power capabilities in its relations with 
Syria. As discussed briefly in the previous section, Turkey was part of the Western bloc 
during the Cold War. The alliance with the West, in particular with the US, provided the 
Turkish government financial support and technical expertise to develop its large scale 
hydraulic projects in the ET basin and provide political and military support. By having 
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strong military power and security alliances with the West (Turkey is a member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization- NATO) has deterred the downstream riparian states, Iraq and 
Syria, to use military force or even to use military power as a coercive-pressure mechanism 
(e.g.: conducting speech acts for possible use of force).  
 
 
Finally, as pointed out in Chapter 3, completed infrastructure can be considered as a 
bargaining power capability in inter-state relations, since one of the main strategies adopted 
by riparian states is to curb hydraulic projects of other states in transboundary water politics. 
The strategy to hinder Turkey’s upstream development also formed the main aim of the 
Syrian government during the first era. Therefore, as the Turkish government began to realise 
its large-scale development projects in the ET basin during 1980s and 1990s, their bargaining 
power increased over Syria. Furthermore, given the fact that Turkey’s hydraulic mission can 
be traced back to the foundation of the country, technical and institutional capacities of the 
Turkish hydracuracies have gradually increased thus expanding their capacity to influence at 
transboundary scale.  
 
However, the points discussed above do not necessarily suggest that the Syrian government is 
entirely powerless. On the contrary, the Syrian government has exerted a variety of 
bargaining power tactics to hinder Turkey’s upstream development and balance asymmetrical 
power configurations in the ET basin (Daoudy 2009). Although these power tactics did not 
prevent the Turkish government from completing its large-scale projects, they could slow 
them down. The bargaining power tactics by Syria to reduce its power shortcomings in terms 
of geography and material power can be outlined as follows.  
 
First, the Syrian government sought to establish a ‘common downstream position’ with Iraq 
against Turkey’s extensive hydraulic development project. As stated above, the fundamental 
policy change in Syria’s political position after 1980s was an attempt to align downstream 
interests.  
 
Second, bilateral and trilateral negotiations are platforms exerting bargaining power tactics in 
numerous ways. First, the Syrian officials imposed their agenda in negotiations often by 
referencing international law and existing agreements. However, both the parties did not 
agree on how principles of international law should be interpreted and how they guide the 
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negotiations on water in the ET basin. Second, the Syrian officials in water talks considered 
the PKK as a bargaining chip. The two bilateral protocols (protocol on cooperation in 
security fields and protocol on cooperation in economic fields) signed in 1987 show Syria’s 
attempts to use the PKK as a bargaining power tactic in bilateral water talks.  
 
Third, lobbying and pressurising targeted groups to cut the money flow is another important 
bargaining power tactic used by Syria. Given the fact that a project like GAP requires 
enormous financial resources, the Turkish government sought to mobilise international 
funding to finance several hydraulic infrastructures. To cut this money flow, the Syrian 
government approached the World Bank and third party states to hinder crediting the projects 
(Jouejati 2005:140, Daoudy 2009:379).  
 
Fourth, internationalising the issue was used as a bargaining power tactic by Syria. Thus, 
galvanizing the Arab solidarity was one of the tactics used by Syria to increase international 
pressure on Turkey. Syria and Iraq brought the issue to the Arab League meeting to get 
support from other Arab states. To counter these attempts Turkey also used diplomatic tools 
to lobby on the Arab states. For example, Suleyman Demirel, the Turkish president at that 
time, paid an official visit to Egypt shortly after the Arab League meeting, in which a 
declaration was issued calling Turkey to stop the GAP until the final agreement with 
downstream states. One of the purposes of this visit was to explain Turkey’s arguments on 
the ET basin issue (Dogan 1996, 21 March). Likewise, Turkish officials paid official visits to 
the Arab states including Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Egypt, Jordan and Libya to provide 
information about the Ataturk dam and Turkey’s other hydraulic projects shortly before the 
impounding of the Ataturk Dam in 1990 (Bilen 1990).  
 
Fifth, the Syrian government sought to open new ‘claimed spaces’ for decision-making 
processes. For example, one of the core political positions of Syria during bilateral and 
trilateral negotiations is that the international disputes stemming from transboundary water 
management must be resolved through international bodies such as the International Court of 
Justice. Moreover, the Syrian side also supports the view that international observers must be 
part of negotiation processes on water and there should be enforcement mechanism 
sanctioned by the UN in case any basin states hinders such procedures. This constituted the 
core elements of the Syrian position bilateral and trilateral negotiations between riparian 
states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996:17). Here, Turkey’s discursive position must be dealt 
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with through bilateral and trilateral negotiations without involvement of the any third parties 
can be considered as a counter bargaining power tactic in bilateral and trilateral negotiations 
with Syria and Iraq (Unal and al 2009:53, Gurel, Degirmencioglu et al. 2013:27). Therefore 
seeking to construct new claimed space can be considered as a bargaining power tactic used 
by the Syrian government.  
 
Finally, opportunity structures have affected the bargaining power capabilities of the states. 
For example, Turkey’s attempts to finance the dams in the ET basin during 1980s provided 
the Syrian government an opportunity to pressurise the targeted groups for not releasing the 
required credits. However, as the Turkish government decided to finance large-scale projects 
such as the Ataturk Dam and the Birecik Dam with its own national budget, this decreased 
the bargaining power capabilities of Syria. 
 
6.4.4. Ideational Power  
 
Ideational (structural) power refers to capacity of actors to sanction certain sets of norms, 
rules and practices in hydropolitics.  The Turkish and Syrian governments exerted the 
following ideational power tactics.  
 
Imposing respective sanctioned discourses, as outlined in the context of hydraulic mission of 
Turkey and Syrian, discursive elites successfully promote discourses at national scales. In the 
first era sanctioned discourses were promoted throughout interactions. Thus, both the Turkish 
and Syrian governments proposed long-term plans for the final resolution on water conflict 
and its utilisation from the ET basin. These plans, which were attempts to establish a status 
quo through negotiations, failed due to conflicting elements. Accordingly, Turkey proposed 
joint inventory studies on water and land resources and water needs of riparian states will be 
determined after the completion of those inventory studies. Simultaneously, the Syrian 
proposal entailed the following steps. First, the riparian states will declare their respective 
demands on each river separately. Second the water potential of both rivers will be calculated 
by the JTC and the amount of water will be shared according to the needs. In case water 
potential does not suffice water needs of riparian states, there will be proportional deduction 
from water quotas of riparian states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996:16,17). As Jouejati 
(2005:144) indicates the plan is based on the premise that water potential of the ET basin is 
229 
 
not sufficient for the needs of riparian states unlike Turkey’s above-stated position. 
Moreover, while the Syrian plan supports self declaration of water demands by the riparian 
states, the Turkish plan argues that joint works must evaluate these demands and needs.  
 
Furthermore, both Turkish and Syrian discursive elites seek to sanction particular 
terminology in their transboundary water policies. For instance, Turkey prefers to label the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers as ‘transboundary’ rivers rather than ‘international’. According to 
this understanding, rivers that make national boundaries are labelled as international rivers, 
while those that transcend such boundaries are transboundary rivers (Interviewee 6 pers. 
comm. 2011). On the contrary, both Syria and Iraq prefer to label the Euphrates and Tigris as 
‘international’ rivers instead of being called transboundary rivers.  Likewise, while Turkey 
prefers ‘allocation’ to refer to water entitlements, Syrian and Iraqi officials prefer to use the 
term ‘share’.  
 
Securitization: There has been securitization of water resources development by the Turkish 
and Syrian discursive elites both at national and transboundary scales. In the case of Syria, 
empowering rural population is vital for the survival of the Ba’th regime. Therefore, a direct 
link between political security (the survival of the regime) and water resources and 
agricultural development has been established. Moreover, the idea of food self-sufficiency is 
securitized by the Syrian discursive elites on the perception that ‘food weapon’ can be used 
against the Arab states for oil in the context of increasing oil prices in 1970s. Furthermore, 
opening new living spaces for the rapidly growing and unevenly distributed population of 
Syria is regarded as a vital task by the discursive elites for the stability of the regime. Given 
the great hydraulic potential of the ET basin area (Euphrates, Khabur and Tigris sub-basins 
within the Syrian territory), water resources and land resources projects in the ET basin area 
is the main tool for this purpose. Nureddin el-Rifai above quoted speech “The Syrian 
Euphrates project is Syria’s future. The Euphrates region is the new Syria…” in the previous 
section represents this understanding.  
 
In Turkey, water resources development is seen by the discursive elites as a key tool in socio-
economic modernisation and national integrity of the state. Therefore, political sector 
(political legitimacy and stability of the central government) is being securitized by the 
discursive elites. A further security dimension, territorial integrity of the state (military 
sector), is added to the GAP in the context of the Kurdish issue.  Given Turkey’s energy 
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dependency, it appears that energy security constitutes important aspects of water resources 
development. Thus, the recent extensive hydropower development attempts by the state and 
private sector are justified on the basis that Turkey’s hydropower potential could help to meet 
their energy needs and produce 75% of the country’s annual energy, the lion’s share of 
energy imports (Eroğlu 2011).  
 
We can also identify securitization processes at transboundary scale. Turkey’s realisation of 
infrastructure on the Euphrates is considered an existential threat to water resources 
development in Syria. Moreover, tense bilateral relations and in the field of water and 
particular speech acts by the Turkish discursive elites also increased ‘insecurity’ in 
downstream riparian states (Interviewee 22 pers. comm. 2011) 20. Moreover, Turkey’s 
hydraulic projects in the ET basin are perceived by Syrian discursive elites as an attempt to 
dominate the Arab states in the region by controlling the tap of the pivotal waters (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 1996: 17). In other words, the Syrian discursive elites argue that Turkey 
attempts to use water as a ‘political weapon’ to dominant the region. Here, the legacy of 
Ottoman rule in the Arab world has played an important role in construction of this perceived 
threat to Turkey’s hydraulic development in the ET basin (Freeman 2001: 133). It also 
appears that Syrian officials seek to ‘recast’ the water issue as ‘Turkish-Arab’ conflict to 
attract more support from its fellow Arab states by promoting this discourse. Moreover, as 
shown in the previous section, mutual perceived identities constructed within the historical 
context, also influenced such perception. The Turkish officials, however, persistently have 
denied these accusations. It is argued that projects in the ET basin are purely driven by socio-
economic needs and technical necessities. Moreover, the downstream riparian states will 
benefit from Turkey’s hydraulic development projects, since they will regulate erratic water 
flow of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers (Bilen 1990).  These perceptions towards Turkey’s 
upstream development in the ET basin have been justified to take measures necessary to 
eliminate threats. The Syrian sanctuary to the PKK during 1990s and 1980s was securitized 
by the Turkish discursive elites. The Syrian government was considered as the primary 
supporter of the PKK and portrayed as an archenemy of Turkey. Thus, the discourse that 
                                                        
20 For example, Süleyman Demirel’s well-known statement, “water is an upstream resource and downstream 
users cannot tell us how to use our resource. By the same token oil is an upstream resource in many Arab 
countries and we do not tell them how to use it (Bağış 1997:577)” were securitized by the Syrian discursive 
elites (Interviewee 22 pers. Comm. 2011).  
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‘Syria wages an undeclared war against Turkey by using terrorism’ was the main securitizing 
discourse of the Turkish decision makers during the October 1998 crisis (Makovsky 1999:2).  
 
Opportunitisation: The dynamics of opportunitisation can be found in the rationale behind 
extensive hydraulic developments of Turkey and Syria. In Syria when Hafiz al Asad came to 
power in 1970, the consolidation of power by the central government had deepened. The 
economic boom also enabled the Syrian decision-makers to introduce number of state-led 
projects in communication, food industry, and textile and so on. Dam building became one 
the development aims of the central government. Here, the development is equated with the 
power of the state by the decision-makers. Therefore, according to this logic it is vital to 
transform Syria into a ‘developed’ country, which would make it as a ‘regional power’ of the 
Middle East (Perthes 1995:41-43). Dynamics of opportunitisation can also be identified in 
speech acts conducted by the Turkish discursive elites to justify large sums of money 
allocated from the national budget to finance the project. As quoted in the previous section, 
the GAP is regarded as a symbol showing Turkey’s coming golden age and its increasing 
power (Demirel 1994).  
 
De-politicization: As illustrated in the theoretical framework, discursive elites often de-
politicise water disputes by casting their position in accordance with scientific or legal 
grounds. We may observe this pattern in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. For 
example, large-scale dam building was done by the Turkish discursive elites on a technical 
basis. It is argued there is great need for building reservoirs, provided fresh water resources 
while abundant, are unevenly distributed throughout the country and there are seasonal 
changes in precipitation, despite the general portrayal that Turkey is not a ‘water-rich’ 
country (Ünal and al 2009). Since water regimes of both rivers are erratic, a ‘scientific’ 
approach requires building large-scale reservoirs on both rivers to control the flow 
(Interviewee 3 pers.comm. 2011).  
 
For example, it is argued by the Turkish discursive elites that a scientific approach, which 
also constitutes the backbone of Turkey’s water policy, is also impetrative in the solution of 
transboundary water disputes. In other words, politicization of water disputes is the main 
obstacle for cooperative relations among the co-riparian states (Interviewee 3 pers.comm. 
2011). Likewise, in his comparison between Turkey’s three staged plan and Syrian proposals 
on the ET basin, Jouejati (2005) defends the Syrian proposal on the basis of scientific 
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grounds. He states “What is interesting about Syrian proposal through its attempt to be 
scientifically based and hence apolitical’’. In similar vein, both parties claim that their 
respective positions are similar to the principles of the international water law. Both sides 
consider ‘equitable and reasonable utilizations’ as the main norm in transboundary water 
politics. However, they interpret the norm rather differently. For example, each has proposed 
conflicting plans for overarching agreement in the ET basin, which, they argue, in 
compliance with equitable and reasonable utilization.  
 
Framings: As discussed in the previous part framings are frequently made by discursive 
elites to justify the large/mid/small-scale hydraulic development projects. They are used to 
better communicate with the audience. In both states, massive projects like the GAP or the 
Euphrates Project are portrayed as symbols of state progress. Such framings are not made 
only through verbal speech acts, but the actors also use visual elements or symbolism. For 
example, infrastructures, reservoir lakes are named after founding figures or important 
concepts of the ruling ideology. For example, pictures of dam sites such as the Euphrates dam 
and the Ataturk dam are represented on currency notes. The following illustrations (Pictures 
6 and 7) show how visual framing are used as ideational power tactics by both riparian states 
in hydraulic development projects. 
 
Picture 6 Banknote of 500 Syrian pounds and illustration of the Euphrates Dam in the back side of it 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
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Picture 7 Public invitations to the inaugural ceremony of the Atatürk Dam made by the Turkish 
president at that time, Suleyman Demirel 
 
The invitation says, “Tomorrow, Turkey is greater. The Ataturk dam, the biggest stage of the GAP, opens 
tomorrow. ”  
Source: Milliyet Daily (July 24, 1992) 
 
6.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has analysed the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations during the first era 
between 1923 and 1998. The findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows.  
Firstly, the chapter makes an empirical case providing rich literature on how spatial scales 
such as basin, sub-basin, and transboundary basin are constructed within certain historical, 
geographical and political contexts. The role of nation-state in the construction of those 
spatial scales is crucial. Moreover, the debate on basin vs. basin(s) supports the view that 
those spatial scales are not only socially constructed but may be politically contested between 
riparian states. The chapter concludes that transboundary scale is the main scalar dynamic in 
which different divisions of state apparatus, intergovernmental organisations and third party 
state interact with each other. Moreover, varieties of invited, closed and claimed spaces are 
constructed as platforms of decision-making and influence in this process. Power plays a vital 
role in construction of spaces. Finally, the involvement of third parties such as 
intergovernmental organisations, third party states, actors from civil society and private 
sector is very limited in the hydropolitics of the ET basin in general and the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations in particular. Unlike the other major transboundary water basins, this 
is peculiar in the ET basin. Nevertheless, the chapter also shows that third parties were 
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involved directly by interacting with each riparian state in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations.  
 
Secondly, three factors led to conflictual relations in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations between 1923-1998. First, the two competing hydraulic missions conducted by the 
Turkish and Syrian governments on the same transboundary water resources have driven both 
states unilateral development thereby conflictual relations in inter-state relations. Second, the 
negative mutual identity constructions due to repeated interactions on water and non-water 
issues have resulted in conflictual relations (or lack of interaction). Third, both the 
governments exerted variety of material and discursive power tactics to achieve certain goals, 
which further exacerbated conflict in inter-state relations on transboundary water issues.  
 
 
Thirdly, material and discursive power capabilities of riparian states strongly shape the 
outcome at both national and transboundary scales. Turkish and Syrian governments were 
able to impose their sanctioned discourses at national scales. At transboundary scale, the 
Turkish government enjoys material and discursive power capabilities in comparison with 
Syria in the ET basin. This power supremacy has enabled the Turkish government to 
complete its large-scale hydraulic projects in spite of attempts made by the downstream 
riparian states to hinder these projects in the ET basin. The study finds that the performance 
of the Turkish economy directly affected the sums of money being allocated to the GAP 
thereby causing further delays in completion of the project. Moreover, the study finds that the 
Syrian government, to some extent, was able to slow down the projects by exerting variety of 
bargaining power tactics against Turkey.  
 
After having identified the Turkish-Syrian water conflict between 1923 and 1999, the 
following chapter will look at the more recent relations during 2000s, in which we identify 
notable changes in conflict and cooperation patterns in Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations.  
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CHAPTER 7 
ANALYSIS II:  INTER-STATE HYDROPOLITICS 
UNDERSTANDING TURKISH-SYRIAN COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 
on WATER (1998-2011) 
7.1. Introduction  
 
 
In the previous chapter, I had illustrated conflictual patterns are more salient than cooperative 
patterns in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the first era (1923-1998). The 
chapter also showed the overarching reasons behind these conflictual relations and how the 
actors apply different dimensions of power to interact on water issues. However, while 
patterns of high conflict and low cooperation on water was the main pattern in the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations, this pattern fundamentally changed; cooperative actions have 
become more salient during 2000s. As in the previous chapter, the aim of this chapter is 
three-fold. First, the chapter seeks to problematize politics of scale and it seeks to analyse 
whether there are any changes in scalar dynamics, spaces for decision-making and 
involvement of actors in the second era. Second, it seeks to understand the notable change 
from patterns of high conflict and low cooperation to low conflict and high cooperation in the 
second era (1998-2011).  Finally, it assesses the role of power in patterns of high cooperation 
and low conflict.  
 
The above-mentioned points will be discussed and analysed in three sections. In the first 
section (Section 7.2) I will analyse construction of new spaces and involvement of non-state 
state actors in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. In the second analysis section 
(Section 7.3) the main factors leading to patterns of high cooperation and low conflict will be 
discussed. Finally (Section 7.4), the cooperative actions on water between Turkey and Syria 
will be assessed through power dynamics in inter-state relations. Finally, even though the 
main temporal focus of this chapter is to analyse the period from 1998 to 2011, a brief 
assessment will be made of the existing political crisis that erupted in 2011 between Turkey 
and Syria.  
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7.2. ANALYSIS A:  New Invited Spaces at Transboundary Scale in the Turkish-
Syrian Hydropolitical Relations (1998-2011)  
 
 
Transboundary scale, referring to interactions between the different state apparatuses of both 
riparian states, has continued to be the main scalar dynamic in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. However, the variety of invited spaces, in which decision-making 
processes occurred, dramatically increased in the second era (1998-2011).  
 
The newly constructed spaces in the second era can be outlined as follows. The first invited 
space was constructed by two lower-ranking hydraucracies, the GAP RDA (Turkey) and the 
GOLD (Syria), with establishment of the GAP RDA and GOLD protocol signed in 2001. 
Although the implementation of the agreed issues specified in the protocol remained limited, 
these two hydraucracies continued dialogue and cooperation on transboundary water 
management (Interviewee 5 pers.comm 2011).  
 
The second invited space constructed by the two riparian states is dramatic intensification of 
ad hoc bilateral meetings at ministerial and presidential levels. A constant dialogue realised 
within political rapprochement, decision-makers from both countries sought cooperation in 
bilateral relations in various fields including water. Therefore, ad hoc meetings between the 
high-ranking decision-makers constituted the political will for cooperation between the two 
countries.  
 
The third invited space was the re-vitalisation of the JTC. As explained in the previous 
chapter, the JTC was the main decision-making body at the transboundary scale. However, 
JTC was suspended in 1993, as it was not productive. This resulted in dissolution of main 
decision-making body at transboundary scale. Therefore, even though the mandate of the JTC 
is very limited, it’s revitalisation can be considered an important development in the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations.  
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The fourth invited space was the foundation of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council 
(HLSCC) acting as the main decision making body at transboundary scale. As explained in 
Chapter 5, the HLSCC was founded as a joint cabinet at ministerial level and adopted number 
of protocols, MoUs, treaties in various fields including transboundary water issues. The four 
MoUs on transboundary water issues, discussed in Chapter 5, are products of those HLSCC 
meetings. Therefore, it could be argued that while the JTC has become a platform where both 
the hydraucracies identify fields for cooperation and discuss collaboration on transboundary 
water issues, the HLSCC has acted as the main decision-making body to codify cooperation 
on transboundary water issues.  
 
7.2.1. Involvement of Non-State Actors  
 
 
One of the distinguishing characters of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the 
second era is involvement of new non-state actors. Although it was shown in Chapter 6 that 
third parties including third party states, intergovernmental organisations, were involved in 
the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical interactions concerning the ET basin, the newly emerged 
actors in the 2000s differ from those actors due to the following reasons.  
 
 
First, the third parties identified in the previous chapter did not interact between the co-
riparian states. Their interaction was limited to one riparian state. However, third parties 
emerging during 2000s foster cooperative actions between the co-riparian states in the 
context of the ET basin. Second, while third party actors came from the public sector in the 
first era, these actors acting as facilitators for cooperation come from either civil society or 
private sector. Third, these actors construct new spaces for interaction to foster cooperation in 
the ET basin between the riparian states. As a result, individuals from co-riparian states such 
as academics and state officials were able to interact with each other in those newly opened 
spaces apart from inter-governmental networks.  However, this study does not suggest that 
official spaces were replaced by newly constructed spaces. The following analysis explains 
how they are added to existing official inter-governmental networks. Further on, I will look at 
two actors from public sector and civil society, the Euphrates Tigris Initiative for 
Cooperation (ETIC) and Swedish International Water Institute (SIWI), as two prominent 
examples of third parties involved in fostering cooperative action in the following sections.  
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7.2.1.1. The Euphrates Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC) 
 
The Euphrates and Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC) was founded in 2005 and was 
initially hosted by the Kent State University in the US. It is a non-profit and ‘track-two’ 
initiative, composed of academics and policy makers from the riparian states of the ET basin 
(Kibaroğlu and Scheumann 2011:295,296, Rifai, Attasi et al. 2012)21.  The stated aims of the 
ETIC are to facilitate dialogue and establish mutual understanding concerning transboundary 
water management in the ET basin among the riparian states. The ETIC emphasises the 
importance of water resources for socio-economic regional development and how 
transboundary water contexts establish inter-dependencies among the co-riparian states. It 
argues that the recent historical relations in various transboundary water contexts across the 
globe have proved cooperation is a more likely outcome than conflict in inter-state relations 
(Interviewee 18 pers. comm. 2011). However, cooperation among the riparian states has not 
been the case in the ET basin, mainly because negotiations have focussed on water 
entitlement for decades. Therefore, the ETIC advocates adopting a socio-economic 
development strategy instead of purely looking at relative entitlement of water (Interviewee 
18 pers. comm. 2011). This new socio-economic strategy must integrate the concepts of 
environmental protection, social and gender equity, governance, and grassroots participation 
within a holistic multi-stake holder framework (Interviewee 18 pers. comm. 2011).  
 
The role of the ETIC, as the first ever established non-governmental initiative in the ET basin 
at transboundary scale, could be outlined as follows.  
 
First, the ETIC establishes new invited spaces for academics and policy-makers to influence 
in main decision-making mechanisms established between/among the riparian states in the 
ET basin. This feature is particularly important since invited spaces in which decision-
making takes place at transboundary scales in the ET basin are not stable. They may be 
closed or re-opened in different eras.  For example, the JTC, established in 1983 were 
suspended in 1993 due to the deteriorating bilateral relations and deadlock in negotiations. 
Likewise, the HLSCC was suspended as political crisis erupted between two governments in 
2011 and onwards. These examples show the broader political context strongly influence the 
                                                        
21
 Here, inter-governmental networks among the co-riparian states constitute the track-one channels; the ETIC 
seeks to establish a second informal channel. Therefore, the ETIC defines itself as a ‘track-two’ initiative. 
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construction of these spaces. Therefore, as Kibaroğlu (2012) points out basin wide initiatives 
like the ETIC can provide a space for engagement among academics and policy makers from 
riparian states even in the context of tense political relations.   
 
Thus, the very foundation of the initiative is a venue for interactions, since it serves as an 
informal platform mainly for academics and policy makers from co-riparian states. Through 
the ETIC, the academics who specialise in different aspects of water resources management 
have established a constructive informal environment for a constant dialogue and mutual 
understanding on water management in the ET basin. Moreover, the ETIC has also provided 
a venue for the policy makers and water experts from the riparian states by organising 
workshops in international forums, conferences and particular training programs (ETIC Info 
2010, Kibaroğlu 2012). Although ETIC was founded mainly as an academic initiative it also 
includes officials from hydraucracies of the riparian states of the ET basin. The links between 
the academia and hydraucracies are also realised in the field projects conducted by the ETIC. 
These crossovers between the academia and decision-making bodies make the ETIC as an 
appealing actor for other international organisations (Interviewee 18 pers. comm. 2011). 
Thus, other third parties such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), FAO, 
Advancing the Blue Revolution Initiative (ABRI), Arab Centre for Studies of Arid Zones and 
Dry Lands (ASAD) approached ETIC to conduct conferences, workshops and training 
programs (ETIC Info 2010).  
 
Second, the ETIC avoids conducting actions, projects and so forth in disputed fields among 
the riparian states. Rather, it seeks to operate projects in undisputed areas. According to this 
view, as mutual trust is established among the policy makers in the ET basin through 
cooperative actions, it fosters cooperation in relatively more disputed fields among the 
riparian states (Interviewee 8 pers.comm. 2011). The above-stated features suggest that the 
initiative promotes certain set of norms. In other words, the ETIC fosters cooperative actions 
in the ET basin by promoting the fundamental elements of the fifth paradigm. Therefore, the 
ETIC is able to promote common norms, goals and practices to foster cooperative actions; in 
doing so, it serves as a de-securitizing actor in hydropolitics of the ET basin in general. 
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Third, it can be argued that the ETIC seeks to re-frame spatial scales to avoid long-standing 
dispute between the riparian states on whether the ET watershed represents a single basin or 
two separated basin(s) (Rifai, Attasi et al. 2012). The ETIC frames the catchment area of the 
ET watershed as “Euphrates and Tigris Region” instead of labelling it as basin. Thus it is 
stated in one of the official documents published by the ETIC “The creation of boundaries 
has split the Region to upstream and downstream countries where specific agro-ecological 
zones (e.g., marshlands, traditional cropping systems and other agricultural heritages) are 
threatened by common risks” (ETIC Info 2010). In my view, re-framing the ET watershed as 
ET Region can also be considered as an attempt to re-define the ET watershed as a spatial 
scale.  
 
In spite of these roles, the impact of ETIC is still limited. This mainly stems from the fact the 
ETIC is unable to be part of decision-making process at transboundary scale. In other words, 
invited spaces such as JTC, HLSCC where decision-making takes place, are still closed 
spaces for the ETIC like other governmental or non-governmental third parties. Moreover, as 
discussed in the previous section, one of the components of Turkey’s discursive position is 
that water related issues in the ET basin must be dealt with between/among riparian states 
through bipartite or tripartite basis (Rende 2012). Considering the cooperation between 
Turkey and Syria in 2000s on water, it appears that the Turkish government has not only 
retained this view but has also been able to codify it in MoUs establishing the main essence 
of cooperative actions on water (MoU on Efficient Utilization Water and Combatting 
Drought 28 May, 2011). Therefore, as long as the discursive positions of riparian states 
remains intact on involvement of third parties, the impact of governmental and non-
governmental actors like the ETIC, SIWI is likely to be limited in inter-state hydropolitics. 
7.2.1.2. Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI)  
 
The SIWI, founded in 1991 and based in Stockholm, is a policy-oriented organisation acting 
globally. It conducts research, provides assistance and helps improve capacity building of 
actors from public and private sector on water governance, transboundary water management, 
climate change and water, water energy-food nexus and water economics (SIWI).  
 
To foster cooperative actions in the ET basin, the SIWI organised three advanced regional 
development programmes in the ET basin between 2009 and 2011. The Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), a governmental organisation operating under the 
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Swedish Foreign Ministry, funded these programs.22  Similar to the ETIC, these programs 
gathered policy-makers and academics from the riparian states of the ET basin and explored 
fields for cooperative actions among the riparian states. During the same period, the SIWI 
also conducted a project, which aims to explore options for cooperative actions among the 
co-riparian states in the ET basin. The project, which suggests a hydro-economic modelling 
in the ET basin, also presented to the policy-makers and academics from the riparian states 
during the World Water Week held in Stockholm in 2011.23 Like the ETIC, the SIWI also 
acts as a facilitator for cooperative actions and forms new spaces of interaction for the policy-
makers, academics from the riparian states of the ET basin.  
 
However, the approach of the SIWI on cooperative action differs from the ETIC. While ETIC 
adopts the view that cooperation in relatively less contested areas will result in cooperation in 
contentious issues, the SIWI provides a more holistic approach by conducting a general 
framework for cooperative actions. Thus, a report on options for cooperative actions between 
the riparian states of the ET basin was prepared by the SIWI and presented to academics and 
policy-makers from the riparian states reflecting this view (Granit, Joyce et al. 2012).  
 
In sum, involvement of non-state actors from civil society and private sector is one of the 
distinguishing features of the inter-state relations in hydropolitics of the ET basin during 
2000s. In my view, the most important feature of these actors is their ability to construct new 
invited spaces where policy makers and academics interact with each other. These actors 
establish spaces by organising workshops and training programs. However, as pointed out 
earlier, these new spaces of interactions do not replace the existing inter-government 
networks but are added to them.  
 
Furthermore, being informed by the concepts developed in Chapter 2, the role of non-state 
actors is two-fold. First, they provide alternative solutions to existing disputes. Second, they 
act as de-securitizing actors, diffusing the existing conflicting view by conducting 
constructive discourses, avoiding certain narratives and terminology that form conflictual 
relations.  
 
                                                        
22
 During my PhD research, I was enrolled as a participant in one of the advance training programs in 2011 
organised by the SIWI. Moreover, I attended to Istanbul part of the following program as a visitor.  
23
 I also attended to the World Water Week in 2011 and I was able to follow the process in person.  
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However, it appears that the influence of non-state actors in decision-making processes have 
been limited, since inter-governmental networks have remained the main space. These 
official spaces have also remained closed for the non-state actors.   
 
7.3. ANALYSIS B: Understanding Hydropolitical Cooperation between Turkey 
and Syria in 2000s  
 
This section problematizes the rationale behind the patterns of high cooperation and low 
conflict between Turkey and Syria during the second era (1998-2011). It answers the 
question how patterns of high cooperation and low conflict on water issues can be understood 
in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the second era. Being informed by the 
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3, predominantly cooperative relations between 
Turkey and Syrian during the second era can be explained through a) introduction of hydro-
liberalism as a prevailing discourse b) major shift in broader political context that led to de-
securitisation of formerly securitised issues, and c) shift in power capabilities.  
 
While hydraulic mission was the dominant paradigm both at national and transboundary 
scales, we observe elements of the fifth paradigm (the holistic approach to water resources 
development) at national scales and its reflections (promoting hydro-liberalism as a 
hegemonic discourse) at transboundary scales in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
(1998-2011).  
 
Furthermore, the broader political context in which the hydropolitical relations occurred 
between the two governments transformed to such an extent that mutually perceived 
identities and interests were reconstructed in bilateral relations. This transformation provided 
a suitable environment for cooperative actions at transboundary scale.  
 
Finally, power relations are at work in cooperation as well as conflict in inter-state relations. 
In other words, actors’ power capabilities are also reflected thereby the cooperative 
frameworks may be imposed with relatively more powerful actor. Bearing this in mind, the 
study argues that Turkey’s rise of power in material, bargaining and ideational power 
capabilities enabled the Turkish government to impose its discursive position in cooperative 
framework realised by the two governments. Therefore, this shift in material and discursive 
power capabilities also played an important role in establishment of cooperative actions. As 
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analysed in the following sections, this is noticeable when looking at the MoUs discussed in 
Chapter 5. Figure 19 shows the rationale behind the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
cooperation during the second era (1998-2011).  
 
Figure 19 Factors leading to patterns of cooperation in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations (1998-
2011) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
 
As Figure 19 shows change in prevailing water paradigms, broader political context and 
power configurations shape mutually constructed identities and interests in the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations (1998-2011) thereby they show how patterns of low conflict 
and high cooperation were constructed during this era. We may observe growing salience of 
the fifth paradigm in transboundary water politics fostering collaboration and cooperative 
actions in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. In the second point, re-visiting 
historical legacy, freezing the territorial dispute over the Hatay province, changes in global 
and regional political dynamics and end of the PKK dispute in the Turkish-Syrian relations 
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can be considered as elements of the broader political context in which hydropolitical 
relations occurred. Finally, Turkey’s rise of material, bargaining, and ideational power 
capabilities did not only shape the outcome, but it also played a vital role in establishment of 
cooperative actions on water between Turkey and Syria. Assessing cooperation in power 
dynamics also enables us to evaluate water cooperation that could be realised during the 
second era (1998-2011). The remaining sections of this chapter are devoted to understand and 
uncover these three points. 
7.3.1. Reflections on the Fifth Paradigm in Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical 
Relations during 2000s 
 
In Section 6.4.1, I argued that hydraulic mission as a prevailing paradigm has been 
sanctioned by discursive elites both in Turkey and Syria. This resulted in development of 
large-scale projects in the same water resources unilaterally.  Therefore, even though Turkey 
and Syria have negotiated issues on water entitlement and exchanged data on their respective 
hydraulic works in the ET basin, bilateral and trilateral (including Iraq) have not produced 
concrete outcomes for decades.  
 
However, I argue that during 2000s elements of the fifth paradigm, discussed in the 
theoretical framework (Section 3.3.1.1), have gradually become more salient in 
transboundary water interactions between Turkey and Syria. In my view, we can identify the 
elements of the fifth paradigm, which propose an integrated approach in transboundary water 
management thereby collaboration between riparian states.  
 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, issues such as effective utilisation of water, water quality, and 
environmental concerns form the main issue areas in water resource management according 
to the holistic approach. Considering the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in 2000s, the 
discursive elites of Turkey and Syria have mainly sought ways to identify cooperative actions 
in these fields rather than focussing on water entitlement issues in bilateral relations. As 
rightly argued by Kibaroğlu, patterns of the ‘new resources management paradigm’ can be 
reflected in the MoUs outlined in the previous section (Kibaroğlu 2012: 80). For example, 
environmental concerns such as water pollution and new challenges such as tackling with 
climate change and drought constitute main areas of issue (MoU on Improving Water Quality 
28 March, 2011).  
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Moreover, both the Turkish and Syrian discursive elites agree, in principle, to include actors 
from private sector, academic institutions and NGOs to realise the goals set out in the MoUs. 
Moreover, both parties agreed to invite their respective private sector actors in prospected 
water resources development projects (MoU on Improving Water Quality 28 March, 
2011:Article 5). In other words, involvement of private sector in new cooperative framework 
between Turkey and Syria is specified in the MoUs. The points specified in the agreed MoUs 
are also in accordance with the inclusive approach of the fifth paradigm that supports 
involvement of different stakeholders from private sector and civil society in transboundary 
water management.  
 
 
Furthermore, the MoUs not only reflect general principles promoted, but they also include 
certain norms and practices that are inherent part of the fifth paradigm. For example, the 
principle of ‘polluter pays’ is adopted as a common norm in tackling environmental concerns. 
Likewise, the parties agree on conducting installation of modern irrigation methods such as 
drip or sprinkler irrigation methods and modernisation of the existing schemes in MoUs (e.g.: 
MoU on Improving Water Quality 28 March, 2011, article: 2; MoU on Efficient Utilization 
Water and Combatting Drought 28 May, 2011: Article 2).  
 
The above-stated points propose elements of holistic approach (the fifth paradigm), 
considering different aspects of water resources management (environmental, social, 
economic), have been promoted and largely reflected in the agreed MoUs, forming the main 
essence of cooperation in the Turkish-Syrian relations. After identifying the paradigmatic 
change in Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, it is crucial to examine the conditions that 
have rendered such change.  
 
In my view, as the standpoints of the fifth paradigm have become a prevailing sanctioned 
discourse globally, they have also been diffused through the Turkish and Syrian domestic 
contexts. Given the fact that the concept of the IWRM has become a useful tool carrying 
elements of the fifth paradigm, the concept has been reflected in the Turkish and Syrian water 
policies at national scales (Droubi 2006, Mukhtarov 2009). Turkey’s accession process to the 
EU has particularly played a vital role in the promotion of new sanctioned discourse, since 
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Turkey is obliged to adopt the EU legal framework – including the stipulations, for example, 
of the Water Framework Directive – to its national framework during the negotiation process. 
As the EU Water framework Directive became part of the Turkish Water Law, the main 
standpoints of the EU water framework such as the basin level planning, participation of 
different stakeholders in decision making, prevention of water pollution at the resource, 
polluter paying principle, water pricing were the main tenets of the Turkish law henceforth 
reflected in the legal framework (Interviewee 7 pers.comm. 2012, July 21, Interview with 
Kınacı 2012, Sümer 2012). Furthermore, changes in Turkey’s water policy and legal 
framework are also reflected in Turkey’s hydropolitical relations with its neighbours. For 
example, as Kibaroğlu (2012: 80) points out that the experience of the Turkish hydraucracy 
in harmonising the EU framework is reflected in the issue specific MoUs outlined above.  
 
7.3.2. From Arch Enemies to Brothers: Transformation in Broader Socio-
Political Context in Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Relations in 2000s 
 
The previous chapter has illustrated the role of broader political context in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. In Chapter 6, long standing disputes, stereotypes/narratives 
constructed within historical context, global and regional political dynamics also played a 
vital role in construction of perceived identities with one another henceforth the culture of 
anarchy in inter-state relations were discussed (See Section 6.4.2). The factors in Figure 20 
uncovered the components of broader political context and showed what prevailing norms are 
at work in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. This section adopts a similar approach 
and shows how components of broader political context have changed. 
  
7.3.2.1. Re-constructing the Historical Legacy 
 
In the previous section I have shown that the historical legacy of the past has impacted on 
mutually constructed identities in the Turkish-Syrian political relations.  The role of Turkey’s 
‘western, secular’ identity played an important role in its relations with the Middle East in 
general and with Syria in particular. However, this foreign policy identity has been 
challenged in course of time. As Yavuz (1998:19) eloquently puts it: “Few countries in the 
modern period have had their identity contested as bitterly and interpreted as variously as the 
Republic of Turkey. Interpretations of Turkey’s modern national identity range from those 
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perceive it essentially as being either Western or Islamically oriented to those that view it as a 
‘pivotal state’ or a ‘country torn apart’ ”  
 
Such wide-ranging and competing views are also reflected in foreign policy making during 
different time periods. Turkey’s foreign policy attitude to the Middle East shows contested 
identities is represented within two competing paradigms. The ‘western-secular identity’ 
accompanied by bitter experiences of the First World War (e.g.: the Arab Revolt against the 
Ottoman Empire) is reflected in Turkey’s foreign policy as adopting less assertive role in the 
Middle East and avoid being part of regional conflicts. This approach was promoted by early 
republican elites, who were the founders of the Republic of Turkey; it has remained intact 
over time. The counter paradigm argues that Turkey must adopt a more assertive policy in the 
Middle East. Cultural and religious commonalities and the Ottoman legacy are influential in 
construction of this counter paradigm; the paradigm is promoted by the elites including 
politicians and bureaucrats in state apparatus (Mufti 2002:81,82).  
 
 
The first example of the counter paradigm in the Turkish foreign policy is of the Democrat 
Party period during 1950s. Turkey adopted an assertive approach in its relations with the 
Middle East. However, as explained in the previous chapter briefly, systemic factors (the 
Cold War dichotomy) played a determining role in adopting an assertive role in the Middle 
East politics (Mufti 2002:82,83).  The second example was when Turgut Özal and his 
Motherland Party were in power during 1980s. As a strong personal figure, Özal himself 
followed an active policy in the Middle East. According to Özal, Turkey must have an active 
role and be an influential actor in the Balkans or the Middle East, where it shares cultural, 
historical, religious commonalities owing to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire (Yavuz 
1998:24). Therefore, it is not just coincidence initiatives such as the peace pipeline projects, 
the 1987 water agreement with Syria, and the three-stage plan for the ultimate solution of the 
ET basin dispute between the riparian states were also proposed during the Özal era. 
Likewise, the short-term Islamist Welfare Party coalition government also carries motives of 
the Ottoman-Islamic discourse, although the Islamic features are more visible in foreign 
policy making of the WP. The WP improved relations with the Middle East states through 
‘Muslim brethren’ (Bilgin 2008).  A reflection of this approach was short-term political 
rapprochement in bilateral relations (Olson 1997:184).  
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The AK Party government, which has been in power since 2002, can be considered as the last 
representative of this continuity. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the architect of the Turkish foreign 
policy during the AK Party era, argues that Islam has established the ‘civilizational base’ of 
Turks’ great political units such as the Seljuk Empire or the Ottoman Empire in his prominent 
book, Strategic Depth (Davutoğlu 2004:406). Such great-scale political units established by 
Turks can also be considered as successors of the great Muslim Empires such as Abbasids, 
Umayyads as they carry political and cultural inheritance. Due to this legacy and historical 
continuity, the region where today’s Turkey and MENA countries are located share the same 
cultural unity. According to Davutoğlu these cultural bindings were attempted to be eroded 
by nation-state structures that started to define with one another as significant others. This 
resulted in alienation in Turkish-Arab relations for decades (Davutoğlu 2004:407,409).  
 
 
This notion of understanding is also clearly reflected in the inaugural speech of the Turkish 
PM Erdoğan in the ceremony of construction of Friendship Dam on the Orontes River. In his 
speech Erdoğan states: “We are now realising an inaugural ceremony that would change the 
course of history. From now on, the Orontes will no longer be a river that divides us, that 
makes a boundary between us. But it will be a river that will bring us together, that will 
embrace us…. We are two nations that history has made us brothers. We always have had a 
shared destiny… [Author’s own translation]” (Erdoğan 2011).  
 
Considering Demirel’s famous speech in the inaugural ceremony of the Ataturk Dam there is 
a remarkable contrast between two politicians in understanding what is ‘WE’ and ‘THEY’.24  
During his speech Erdoğan particularly stresses Turks and Arabs share same cultural grounds 
and are brothers. Therefore, Erdoğan considers the disputes between Turkey and Syria as 
artificial problems gradually being solved.  
 
In fact, the Turkish foreign policy in the AK Party era attempted to conduct several initiatives 
to foster cooperative relations with the neighbouring countries. This initiative in the AK Party 
era is coined as ‘zero problem with neighbours’. Given the ideational and strategic reasons, 
                                                        
24
 As stated in the previous chapter Demirel states “…. The water resources are Turkey’s, the oil resources are 
theirs. We don’t say we share the oil resources and they cannot say they share our water resources’’ (Alam 
2002: 327)  
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realising a rapprochement with Syria was considered as the symbol of this initiative in 
foreign policy.25 Thus, it is argued that the recent cooperation on water between Turkey and 
Syria can be a reflection of this new notion of Turkey’s foreign policy (Interviewee 6 pers. 
comm. 2011, Interviewee 2 pers.comm. 2012, January 27).  
 
7.3.2.2. Changes in Global and Regional Dynamics  
 
As stated in Chapter 6, since Turkey and Syria are located at different sides in the context of 
the Cold War, these dynamics have conditioned their hydropolitical relations for decades. 
Therefore, tense relations or lack of political, economic and social relations were the main 
patterns during the Cold War period. Conflictual relations have largely remained intact, even 
exacerbated, during 1990s in the context of bilateral disputes such as the PKK problem, water 
disputes and counter regional alliances (Turkish-Israeli and Syrian-Greek Cooperation in 
security fields) (Olson 1997).  
 
However, regional and global political dynamics have transformed in such a way that both 
the Turkish and Syrian decision-makers were able to realise a political rapprochement in 
inter-state relations during 2000s. The rationale behind this change can be understood as 
follows.  
 
From the Syrian perspective, Turkey is an important actor to enhance its relations with the 
West. In fact, Syria, under Hafez al-Asad, sought to improve relations with the West and with 
the US in the post-Cold war period. Syria supported Gulf War coalition against Iraq and 
thereafter was involved in the Madrid Peace processes. In the late 1990s, the Syrian 
leadership also made a strategic decision and decided to initiate direct peace talks with Israel 
(Hinnebusch 2005:3). After Bashar Asad succeeded his father as the new president of Syria, 
the policies to deepen strengthening ties with the West have accelerated. In initial years of his 
rule, Bashar Asad declared political and economic liberalisation reforms (Perthes 2004:8-13). 
According to Bashar Asad and new generation political elites, although the regime must 
maintain its central position in the country, it is imperative to reform state structures and 
policies to cope with changing international and regional environment (Perthes 2004:15). 
                                                        
25
 Owing to this reason, the current state of crisis, which brought parties on the verge of war, represents the 
failure of AKP’s zero problems with policy of the neighbours.  
250 
 
Syria’s willingness to improve bilateral relations with Turkey can be understood within this 
context. 
 
Unlike the expectations, the rapid changing international environment in the early 2000s 
hindered improvement of relations with the US; it also added considerable pressure on 
Damascus. A series of events increased US pressure on Syria in the early 2000s such as the 
break down of the Syrian and Israeli peace talks, the 9/11 and the US strategy of ‘global war 
on terror’, the assassination of former Lebanese president Rafiq Hariri and Syria’s opposition 
to US invasion of Iraq (Hinnebusch 2009:8). Within this international political environment, 
Turkey’s alliance became even more important for Syria, since the alliance was strategically 
important for a dialogue with the West. In spite of this growing pressure from the US, Turkey 
continued to maintain momentum in Turkish-Syrian relations during the first half of 2000s 
(Ayhan 2009).  
 
 
From a Turkish perspective, the post-cold war era provided to Turkey both new opportunities 
and challenges in international politics. Issues like the PKK problem and the Gulf War 
created new security concerns, which led Turkey to abandon its low-profile policies in the 
Middle East during the cold war era (Sayari 1997, Davutoğlu 2008). Moreover, while Turkey 
was no longer a southeast flank of the Western bloc during the Cold war, its central 
geographical position enabled expansion of its influence. In fact, adopting more active 
foreign policy in the Middle East was considered to be strategic choice to expand its 
bargaining power capabilities with the US and Europe (Oğuzlu 2008).  
 
The AK Party government, which came to power in 2002, continued and accelerated this 
more pro-active policy towards the Middle East. Ahmet Davutoğlu (2004: 331) argues that 
Turkey neither can adopt an isolationist policy towards to MENA region, nor can it develop a 
foreign policy by simply depending on the global actors acting in the region. It is vital for 
Turkey’s security to develop its own strategy towards MENA region. In this respect, the 
Ottoman Empire experience in the region and its legacy inherited to Turkey can be used as a 
good basis for developing such a strategy, which would also serve peace and stability in the 
region.  
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Davutoğlu describes passive relations and lack of interactions as ‘an irrational policy’ for 
both Turkey and Syria. Having the longest common borderlines Syria is an opening gate for 
Turkey to its south; Turkey is an opening gate for Syria to its north and west. Davutoğlu 
argues that there are in fact fields in which both the parties can foster cooperation. For 
example, although water has constituted a disputed field for decades, it may also enable 
extra-ordinary cooperative opportunities in of agriculture, trade and transportation 
(Davutooğlu 2004:402). Thus, Turkey sought to improve political and economic relations 
with the MENA countries. For example, Turkey’s trade with the MENA countries has 
remarkably increased during 2000s (Aydın and Aras 2005). In the context of political 
rapprochement Turkish-Syrian trade have increased, particularly after signing the free trade 
agreement in 2007. Regarding the economic dimension Syria is not only considered as an 
important economic partner, but also opening door to the Middle East for Turkey’s economic 
relations. 26 
 
Turkey and Syria have also been able to establish converging positions on certain regional 
issues. For instance, they adopted a common position against the invasion of Iraq by the US. 
Having Kurdish populations, both Turkey and Syria opposed possible independent Kurdish 
state in northern Iraq and converged on stating Iraq’s territorial integrity and stability are also 
vital for stability in the region. Therefore, in the intensified high-level interactions during the 
2000s, the issue of Iraq held an important part of the political agenda in Turkish-Syrian 
bilateral relations (Tür 2010:168, Köylü January 6, 2004). Likewise, Turkey and Syria 
adopted a common position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Turkey and Syria called for 
Israel to withdraw from the occupied lands, stop settlement work in the occupied lands and 
remove the blockage in Gaza. Thus, the consensus on the issue of Iraq and other regional 
issues is also reflected in the legal documents signed by Turkey and Syria. For example, in 
the declaration of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, both sides stress the 
importance of territorial integrity and stability of Iraq for peace in the region (HLSCC 2009). 
Moreover, Turkey’s worsening relations with Israel and blunt criticisms of the Turkish 
decision-makers have increased sympathy towards Turkey at public level in the Arab World 
(Altunışık 2010:8,9).  
                                                        
26The PM Erdoğan states ‘’ we do not only see Syria as a market with a 20 million population, but also as an 
opening gate for entering the Middle East Market with 320 million population [author’s own translation]’’. See 
Dunya Daily online at: http://www.dunya.com/suriyeyi-orta-dogu-pazarina-giris-kapisi-olarak-goruyoruz-
72478h.htm  
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7.3.2.3. The End of the PKK Dispute in the Turkish-Syrian Relations  
 
Syria’s support of the PKK was the main political dispute between Turkey and Syria during 
1980s and 1990s, which eventually brought the parties to the verge of war in October 1998 
crisis. The expulsion of Abdullah Ocalan from Damascus and the Adana security protocol 
signed by Turkey and Syria did not only diffuse the crisis, but also removed the PKK issue 
from the political agenda in bilateral relations. The Syrian government shut down the 
activities of the PKK, stipulated by the Adana Security Protocol in the following period 
(Alantar 2000:166).  Therefore, Syria was no longer coined as the overarching enemy of 
Turkey by the Turkish decision makers. Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s, the Turkish president at the 
time, attendance at Hafiz Asad’s funeral in 2000s was considered a diplomatic gesture, 
showing normalisation in Turkish-Syrian relations (Alantar 2000:166, Togay 2010, Tür 
2010:166). The initial cooperation between lower level hydraucracies (the cooperation 
between the GAP-RDA and GOLD) could be realised within this positive political 
atmosphere.  
 
7.3.2.4. Freezing the Alexandretta (Hatay) Dispute and Friendship Dam 
 
In the previous chapter I indicated long-standing Hatay dispute had a profound impact on the 
Turkish-Syrian relations particularly in the initial stages of political interactions between the 
two governments. The dispute formed the main obstacle for cooperation in water resources 
management on the Orontes basin. Although the dispute became less silent in Syria’s 
political agenda after the creation of Israel in 1947 and its occupation of Golan Heights 1967, 
it continued to be the part of Syria’s political rhetoric. Thus, in spite of political 
rapprochement, the Syrian decision-makers have never stated that Syria withdraws its 
territorial claims over the Alexandretta region during political rapprochement. However, they 
also carefully avoided from bringing the issue to the political agenda through their bilateral 
integration with their Turkish counterparts (Birand 7 January, 2004). According to Syrian 
new political rhetoric, the issue is postponed for future generations so that existing 
cooperation with Turkey is not jeopardised (Pipes 2005).  
 
The Turkish and Syrian governments were able to realise cooperation on the Orontes River 
(the joint construction of the Friendship dam) considering the Syrian decision-makers 
perspective on the dispute. Nevertheless, although the Syrian politicians avoided from 
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bringing the issue to the political agenda, the issue made obstacles during the technical 
negotiations regarding the Friendship dam (Interviewee 2 pers. comm. 2013, February 26). 
The empirical cases regarding the Hatay dispute and the cooperation on the Orontes during 
the political rapprochement provide suitable examples of changes concerning non-water issue 
leading to cooperation in water related issues.  
 
To sum up, changes in broader political context are one of the overarching factors in 
establishing patterns of high cooperation and low conflict in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations in the second era. This also supports the argument that elements of 
broader political context strongly influence patterns of conflict and cooperation. Thus, the 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the second era provide a typical empirical case on 
how cooperation in broader political level also fosters cooperation in inter-state hydropolitics. 
In my view, the following points can be identified on why broader political context strongly 
influence conflictual and cooperative patterns. First, actors’ identities and interests are 
mutually constructed within the broader political context. Therefore, there may or may not be 
political will for hydropolitical cooperation. Second, this broader political context affects 
interactions between different state apparatuses of Turkey and Syria and availability of 
invited spaces for decision-making. Third, securitization and de-securitization processes 
occur within the context of broader political context. Fourth, as analysed in Chapters 6 and 7, 
there are particular linkages between water and non-water issues. I will discuss how the 
broader political context shapes hydropolitical relations between riparian states in Chapter 9. 
Furthermore, both the Turkish and Syrian state apparatuses are centralised state structures, 
conflictual and cooperative relations between high-ranking decision makers directly affect 
relationships between the hydraucracies of Turkey and Syria. Therefore, the centralised state 
structures of both Turkey and Syria are another reason why broader political context is a vital 
factor for patterns of conflict and cooperation in inter-state relations.  
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7.4. ANALYSIS C: Role of Power in Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Cooperation 
(1998-2011) 
 
 
In the previous two sections it has been shown that the broader political context and changes 
in prevailing water paradigms condition Turkish-Syrian relations at transboundary scale. The 
constructive change in bilateral relations resulted in intensified interactions and establishment 
of mutual trust. The significant changes in broader political context have also allowed 
involvement of new actors to facilitate cooperation and create new spaces for interaction.  
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that dimensions of material and discursive power, a 
determinant a factor in the outcome of predominantly conflictual relations before 2000 (see 
Chapter 6), are not at work in the Turkish-Syrian cooperative relations with respect to water 
issues. In Chapter 6 it was illustrated that Turkey enjoys power supremacy in material, 
bargaining and ideational power capabilities. I argue that Turkey’s material, bargaining and 
ideational power capabilities further increased both in absolute (power as/puissance) and 
relative (power over/pouvoir) terms during 2000s. Therefore, this shift in power 
configurations enabled the Turkish government to reflect on elements of discursive position 
in the four MoUs. This shift in power configurations strongly shaped the outcome in 
cooperation and the processes itself. Assessing cooperation in power relations between the 
two governments also enabled assessment of cooperation critically in the second era.  
 
The following sections will, first, analyse Turkey’s increasing power capabilities in the ET 
basin and thereafter it will examine cooperation realised between the Turkish-Syrian 
governments mainly looking at the MoUs as outcomes.  
 
7.4.1. Turkey’s Rise of Material Power Capabilities  
 
As pointed out Chapter 3, economic capabilities have a decisive affect on hydraulic 
development projects conducted by states (See Section 3.4.3). Turkey’s growing economic 
capabilities due to economic growth in 2000s has increased its material power in its 
hydropolitical relations with the other actors.  
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Apart from the economic decline in 2009, the total GDP of Turkey has steadily risen during 
2000s. The total GDP has risen from 196 billion $ to 772 billion $ between 2001-2011 (TUIK 
in Bozkurt and Ay 2013). The average growth rate during the same period was %6 per year 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The following chart shows the compound growth rate of 
Turkey between 2000-2012.  
 
Figure 20 Annual Compound Growth Rate, Turkey, 2000-2012 
 
 
Source: (Karagül 2013: 28) 
 
 
We may observe how economic capacity of the Turkish government thereby its material 
power, have affected on its hydraulic development by looking at the DSI. As stated in the 
context of Turkey’s hydraulic mission, the DSI is the main bureaucratic body in Turkey’s 
complex hydraucratic structure. It is located as a directorate within the Ministry of Forestry 
and Water Affairs. With its huge budget and regional sub-divisions across the country, the 
DSI is the responsible state institution for executing state-led hydraulic projects such as 
dams, HPPs, irrigation schemes and so on, establishing partnerships with other actors 
including other bureaucratic bodies, private sector actors, NGOs, intergovernmental 
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organizations and so on and monitoring private-led hydraulic development projects.27  
Therefore, the DSI commands significant portion of Turkey’s annual investment spending of 
the Turkish government.  
 
In parallel with the general increase in GDP, the investment budget of the DSI has increased 
in 2000s. During the period between 2003 and 2011, the investment budget has risen from 
3.6 billion Turkish Liras (roughly equivalent to 2.5. billion USD) to 5.5 billion Turkish Liras 
(roughly equivalent to 3.3. Billion USD) between 2003-2011 (DSI 2012:92). As result, the 
DSI spent 46.1 billion Turkish Liras, which is roughly equivalent to 21.9 billion dollars, 
during this period (Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs 2012). Table 18, acquired from 
DSI Report published in 2011, illustrates spending made by the DSI. Based on this table, the 
following figure illustrates changes annual spending of the DSI over years.  
 
Table 18 DSI investment budgets 2003-2011 
 
Source: DSI Activities Report 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
27 For example, the annual budget allocated to the DSI in 2011 was 7.36 billion Turkish Liras, which is roughly 
equivalent to 3.5 billion dollars (DSI 2011). In spite of such huge economic capacity, however, it has limited 
power in determining national and transboundary water policies of the Turkish government. Regarding national 
water policies, strategies the newly established Directorate of Water Resources Management within the Ministry 
of Forestry and other divisions within this ministry are responsible for developing national water policies, 
strategies and goals (Sümer 2011). Regarding transboundary water policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
remains the main bureaucratic to set goals, policies.  
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Figure 21 Changes in annual spending of the DSI (2003-2011) 
 
 
Source: Authors own compilation based on the previous table. (The peak of 5 billion Turkish Liras is roughly 
equivalent to 2.9 billion USD)  
  
 
Since the GAP is the largest ever-hydraulic development project in Turkey, an increase in 
investment of the DSI has resulted in allocation of more financial resources to finalise the 
project. With the adoption of the GAP Action Plan in 2008, financial allocations from the 
national budget increased significantly (Interviewee 1 pers.comm 2011, July 18). 
Particularly, more resources have poured in to realise irrigation aims of the project and realise 
hydraulic infrastructures on the Tigris part of the project, which are relatively less developed 
parts of the project (Interviewee 5 pers. comm. 2011). 
 
Another important factor to increase Turkey’s material power capabilities in hydraulic 
development is the rapidly growing involvement of the private sector during 2000s. As I will 
explain in the following chapter, there has been a gradual involvement of the private sector 
actors in construction of hydropower plants (HPPs) with the enactment of electricity market 
law (Law no: 4628) that de-regulates the energy markets in Turkey. Involvement of the 
private sector in water sector (particularly in the field of constructions of HPPs) has also 
provided the DSI further financial resources such as feasibility costs and administrative 
expenditures to be paid to the DSI (Interviewee 1 pers.comm. 2013, February 26).  
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The increase in economic capabilities is also reflected by the discursive elites, through speech 
acts. For example, Mehmet Şimşek, the minister of the fiscal affairs, states in the opening 
ceremony of the derivation channels of the Ilısu Dam: “Even the construction of basic ponds 
used to take decades before. Today, the average realisation of a public investment project is 
3.3 years. In other words, the large-scale projects like the Ilısu Dam can be finished within 
few years [author’s translation]’’ (Zaman Daily 2012, August 29).  
 
The rapid economic growth in 2000s also resulted in increased need for energy. Since 
Turkey’s energy dependency on foreign sources is around 70 per cent, diversifying resources 
and realising national resources has become one the core aims of Turkey’s energy policy. 
Given the fact that the energy imports form the lion’s share of Turkey’s import and are the 
main reason for Turkey’s current account deficit, exploiting hydropower potential has 
become a vital resource to improve this energy dependence (Eroğlu 2011). Therefore, while 
increase in the GDP has enabled - allocation of more public investment for hydraulic 
development, meeting the growing energy needs of the country requires more development in 
hydropower generation.  
 
7.4.2. Turkey’s Rise of Ideational Power 
                                                                                                   
“Water flows, Turk gazes. We have changed this into Water flows, Turk builds’’ 
Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
 
As discussed in the previous section, while environmental discourse had become an integral 
part of Turkey’s water resources development framework in 1980s, the hydraulic mission 
mindset has largely remained intact. It appears, given the newly emerged material incentives, 
the desire to realise entire water resources development of the country has been one the 
important tools of the development strategy of the AK Party government during 2000s.  
 
The epigraph, stated above, has become current Turkish PM Erdoğan’s motto of his speeches 
in several inaugural ceremonies of the HPPs and other hydraulic developments conducted 
either by state or private sector. A constructivist reading of such statements interprets them as 
deliberate speech acts to stress Turkey’s ability in realising various hydraulic projects to 
realise socio-economic development. Like previous administrations, the AK Party leadership 
also share the view that hydraulic infrastructural development is a key issue to modernise the 
country and improve people’s wellbeing. Erdoğan states in one of his inaugural HPP 
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speeches: “…Whatever exists in the west of Turkey, this will exist in the east. Whatever exist 
in the north this will be exist in the south. We are going to modernise the entire 780.000 
square kilometres of our homeland [author’s translation]’’ (Erdoğan 2012).  
 
The hydraulic development is considered as one of the main tools for the AK Party to retain 
and attract popular support. Thus, each achievement in hydraulic development either realised 
by the state or private sector is portrayed as the ability of the state to improve people’s well 
being.  
 
Erdoğan may have realised how hydraulic development can be transformed into a public 
support, when he was the mayor of Istanbul in 1995-1998. One of his first decisions, as a 
mayor, was to appoint, Veysel Eroğlu, an academic in hydraulic engineering, as the head of 
Istanbul Water and Sewerage Administration (ISKI-Turkish acronym) to tackle with chronic 
water quality and quantity issues. Erdoğan and Eroğlu made considerable improvement in 
Istanbul municipal water issues.  
 
When the AK Party came to power under Erdoğan’s leadership in 2002, Eroğlu was 
appointed as the head of the DSI. Later, he became the minister of Environment and Forestry, 
ensuring DSI would be under his ministry.28 A decade later, in his welcome speech in the 2nd 
Istanbul International Water forum in 2011, Eroğlu, portrays the water management as a 
success story showing how water shortages in a mega-city like Istanbul can be tackled. He 
states the need for a ‘great vision’ (Eroğlu 2011). Thus, realisation of Turkey’s entire water 
potential in 2023 at the 100th anniversary of the Republic has become one the goals 
(Interviewee 1 pers. 2011, August 24). 
 
We can also identify patterns of securitization to justify hydraulic development leap during 
the AK Party period. For example, recent extensive hydraulic development attempts have 
been justified on the basis of having large-scale storage capacity as a necessity in Turkey, 
since water resources are unevenly distributed and suffer from high seasonal fluctuations as 
already pointed out by the discursive elites (Interview with Eroğlu 2011, Interviewee 3 
pers.comm. 2011).  
                                                        
28
 The DSI was previously under the Ministry of Energy and Natural resources. When Eroğlu became the 
Minister of the Environment and Forestry, the DSI has also been moved under the Ministry. Recently, this 
Ministry has been transformed into Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs.  
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Moreover, we can also find patterns of opportunitisation speech acts in the policy documents 
published by government authorities. As shown above, the growing economy and high 
dependence on external energy has further exacerbated the concerns of Turkey’s discursive 
elites on country’s future energy needs. Hydraulic development is also considered as vital 
alternative to tackle with this problem. Thus, in the Strategic Plan document prepared by the 
Ministry of Energy Natural Resources, it is clearly stated that while having renewable energy 
resources and Turkey’s advantageous geo-strategic position are considered as ‘opportunities’, 
the foreign intervention in transboundary water resources and need for high financial sources 
to realise domestic renewable energy resources are ‘threats’ for energy security (Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources 2009:8).  
 
 
Finally, as rightly argued by Williams (2011: 210), the discourse that Turkey is not a ‘water 
rich’ country has also been stated by the discursive elites to de-construct the perception that it 
is a water rich country. For instance, in their recent statements, both Veysel Eroğlu, the 
minister of water affairs, and Ahmet Mete Saatçi, the head of the Water Institute, specify that 
Turkey is not a ‘water rich country’. Therefore, hydraulic development is vital for Turkey’s 
water resources management (Eroğlu 2013, Saatçi 2013).  
 
7.4.3. Turkey’s Rise of Bargaining Power Capabilities over Syria   
 
As stated in Chapter 3, bargaining power is one actor’s ability to limit other capabilities by 
constructing or promoting social, political or institutional values, practices and rules. 
Turkey’s bargaining power capabilities have increased vis-à-vis Syria in this period (See 
Section 3.4.4). The following factors can be identified to understand Turkey’s increasing 
bargaining power capabilities.  
 
First, global and regional political dynamics was rendered to Syrian leadership to seek 
alliance with Turkey. As stated above, Turkey is seen as an important regional actor in 
facilitating relations with the West. Particularly, as the US intensified political pressure in 
Damascus after the invasion of Iraq, Turkey’s alliance was considered as a ‘buffer’ against it 
(Hinnebusch 2010:11). Within this political context, Syrian leadership put aside the long-
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standing disputes and sought to improve bilateral relations with Turkey. Thus, Abul Halim 
Khaddam, the Syrian vice president informed the visiting Turkish delegation in 2002 about 
the strategic decision of Syrian leadership to improve bilateral relations with Turkey 
(Türkmen 2002, May 18, Altunışık 2006:240). In addition, economic incentives have played 
a vital role in Syria’s decision to improve relations with Turkey. The Syrian economy was in 
a delicate position and it was likely to face a crisis owing to diminishing oil revenues that had 
financed the budget for decades. Then, the Turkish investment became a vital tool to 
overcome economic difficulties (Hinnebusch 2010:10). Therefore, bargaining power tactics 
to hinder the GAP in the previous era were no longer used by the Syrian government to 
jeopardise on-going cooperation in different fields including water. Thus, it can be concluded 
that broader political context not only condition inter-state relations between riparian states, 
but also changes broader political context directly affecting bargaining power of actors.  
 
 
The second factor supporting the increase in Turkey’s bargaining power is related to growing 
economic inter-dependencies favouring Turkey. Turkey’s economic relations with Syria have 
largely remained marginal until 2000s. Lack of strong economic relations also limited the 
socio-economic interdependencies consequently leading to lack of bargaining power leverage 
mechanisms in general and water in particular.  However, this pattern completely changed 
since political rapprochement during 2000s. The Turkish-Syrian trade volume jumped from 
539.2 million dollars to 2.511 billion dollars between 1999 and 2010 (Aydın and Aras 
2004:122, Tür 2011:35). Syria’s exports from Turkey increased almost ten times between 
2000-2010. Accordingly, while export from Turkey was merely about 190 million $ in 2000, 
this rose to 1.672 billion $ in 2010 (Bilgiç-Alparslan 2012:2,3).  
 
The dramatic increase in trade since 1999 has established economic inter-dependencies 
between Turkey and Syria. However, the export and import ratios in bilateral trade show that 
the Syrian economy has become much more dependent on export from Turkey than the 
latter’s dependence on trade with Syria. Thus, with the volume of 1.6 billion $ export, Turkey 
became the largest trading partner of Syria in 2010 (Bilgiç-Alparslan 2012:3). Figure 22 
shows the asymmetrical bilateral trade between the two countries.  
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Figure 22 Turkey’s import and exports ratios over the years to Syria 
 
 
Source: Foreign Economic Relations Board 2012:19  
 
 
Finally, the main strategy of Syria was to hinder Turkey’s hydraulic development attempts in 
the ET basin during 1980s and 1990s. Syria exerted different leverage mechanisms to hinder 
realization of the GAP. It was illustrated in the theoretical framework (Chapter 3) that 
completed infrastructure increases bargaining power capabilities of riparian states in 
transboundary water politics. Therefore, as Turkey realised hydraulic infrastructure in the 
GAP, the tactics to hinder projects was no longer attainable for Syria. Moreover, large-scale 
dams, that had been already completed, were located on the mainstream Euphrates River, 
which created the main hydropolitical dispute between Turkey and Syria concerning the ET 
basin. 
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After having identified Turkey’s increasing material, bargaining and ideational power 
capabilities in the second era, it is crucial to examine how this change in power 
configurations affected cooperative actions that could be realised by the Turkish and Syrian 
governments at transboundary scale.  
 
7.4.4. Examining the Cooperation in the Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Relations 
(1998-2011)  
 
This study supports that symmetrical and asymmetrical power relations between riparian 
states are often reflected in treaties, protocols, MoUs and so on, which is considered as 
indicators of cooperation. Therefore, how power relations are reflected between riparian 
states need to be examined in such legal documents. As already stated in this chapter, the four 
MoUs, setting cooperative actions in transboundary water management are the main 
outcomes of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the second era and therefore vital 
to understand patterns of cooperation.  
 
It is also crucial to examine what extent interactions between parties in the second era can be 
labelled as ‘cooperation’. After all, in many empirical cases, treaties, protocols and other 
legal documents primarily justify and codify domination of one actor over others in 
hydropolitics (Selby 2003). According to several scholars, cooperation in inter-state relations 
occurs “when actors adjust their behaviour to actual or anticipated preferences of other 
through process of policy coordination” (Lindblom in Milner 1992:467). Bearing this 
definition in mind, the hydropolitical processes that occurred between the Turkish and Syrian 
governments in the second era can be labelled as ‘cooperation’, since we may observe 
defined goals by actors and mutual gains –albeit at different degrees- by looking at the legal 
documents signed by the parties.29 
 
There are different types of cooperation in inter-state hydropolitics. Cascao and Zeitoun 
(2010:38) argue there are two types of cooperation in inter-state hydropolitics. There are 
long-term and all-inclusive cooperation between riparian states in transboundary water 
                                                        
29 In unpacking the above-stated definition of cooperation in inter-state relations, Milner points out two 
elements of definition of cooperation. First, the definition implies that actors direct their behaviors towards 
particular defined goals. Second, the definition assumes that there are mutual gains and rewards for both states, 
even though the net gain for each state may not be the same. (Milner 1992: 468) 
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basins. In such cooperation, not only riparian states are involved in decision-making 
processes but there are also other actors such as river basin organisations, stake-holders from 
public, private sectors and civil society engaging in decision-making processes at different 
scales. These actors address different aspects of water resource development and 
management. They also seek ways to identify areas of cooperation (Ibid.). However, in most 
cases, cooperation between riparian states is short term and occurs in limited fields. 
Involvement of actors in decision-making processes is also very limited. Cascao and Zeitoun 
argue that patterns of cooperation in the MENA region are examples of such narrow 
cooperation (Ibid). In my view, the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical cooperation is closer to the 
second category rather than the first category, even though it provided a promising path for 
further deepening cooperation in transboundary water issues. The MoUs regarding 
transboundary water management provides empirical evidence to support this argument. 
Considering MoUs in general, they neither set out an agenda for ultimate resolution of 
transboundary water issues nor do they provide comprehensive framework for cooperation in 
the ET and Orontes basins. Rather, as pointed in previous sections, realising cooperation in 
relatively less contested fields and prospecting limited cooperation in particular issues form 
the main rationale behind the MoUs.  
 
 
For example, the MoUs on Effective Utilisation of Water Resources and Improving Water 
Quality set out joint actions such as training programs, pilot projects, research programs, 
conferences, symposiums and so forth regarding water quality and quantity. Likewise, the 
MoU that provides the Syrian government to extract certain amount of water from the Tigris 
River sets out a temporary arrangement on water allocation until the riparian states of the ET 
basin reach a final resolution. Thus, this temporary character of the MoU is specifically stated 
in the MoU (MoU on Tigris River 28 May, 2011: Article 6). Finally, the second issue specific 
MoU which prospects construction of a joint dam in Orontes River can be considered as a 
major step for transboundary water cooperation between Turkey and Syria, since it is not 
only the largest joint action ever made between the two governments, but it is also the first 
legal document setting out cooperation. Nevertheless, the MoUs on construction of a joint 
dam (the Friendship Dam) in the Orontes River does not provide a comprehensive framework 
on transboundary water management in the Orontes basin. Therefore, it can be argued that 
although the MoUs constitute a promising path for further cooperation, they do not provide a 
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comprehensive framework regarding the ultimate resolution of water conflict between the 
parties.    
 
Finally, cooperation can be assessed as how it is realised in inter-state relations. Milner 
(1992: 468) argues that cooperation can be achieved through several ways. First, cooperation 
can be achieved, even though the actors do not have communication or explicit argument. 
This is labelled as tacit cooperation. Second, cooperation can be achieved via negotiation in 
which variety of bargaining processes occurs between states in some cases; this is negotiated 
cooperation. Finally, in some cases, relatively stronger party in negotiations force the other 
party to change its policies and called as imposed cooperation. Considering the patterns of 
cooperation between the Turkish and Syrian governments in the second era, we may observe 
both patterns negotiated and imposed cooperation. 
 
With respect to the negotiated cooperation, it was shown in Chapter 5 even though the 
political rapprochement between the Turkish and Syrian governments commenced in the 
early 2000s, the riparian states could materialise cooperation in the late 2000s. Thus, the 
MoUs regarding transboundary water issues were signed in the third stage of the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations. Moreover, prolonging differences in discursive positions of 
both governments created obstacles and delayed bilateral negotiations (Interviewee 2 
pers.comm. 2013, February 14). Therefore, it can be argued that cooperative actions, which 
could be realised through MoUs and other legal documents, were products of inter-state 
negotiations during 2000s.  
 
As far as imposed cooperation is concerned even though the parties could realise cooperation 
in limited fields as a result of series of negotiations processes during 2000s, it can be argued 
that the Turkish government successfully reflected its discursive position in hydropolitical 
relations. The Turkish government imposed its discursive position in the MoUs signed by the 
parties. The following points can be made in support of this argument.  
 
First, Turkey’s discursive position in hydropolitics of the ET basin has reflected in the MoUs 
as similarities between the Three-stage plan and some points indicated in the MoUs. As 
shown in the previous chapter, the Three-Stage plan was proposed to the riparian states as 
conflict resolution mechanism and still promoted as an effective tool by the Turkish 
discursive elites for resolving existing disputes (Saatçi, 2013). Considering the MoUs in 
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general and the Three stage plan together, assessing water resource availability through 
existing meteorological and hydrological data exchange, conducting joint studies on water 
quantity and quality, calibration of existing data are reflected both in the MoUs and the Three 
Stage Plan. Thus, cooperative actions reflected in the MoUs and the protocols signed by the 
hydraucracies (e.g. GAP-RDA-GOLD protocol) are perceived by the Turkish discursive 
elites as the materialisation of initial phases of the Three Stage Plan (Interviewee 8 
pers.comm. 2011, Interviewee 2 pers.comm. 2012, January 27).  
 
Second the view that, water issues should be negotiated by co-riparian states either on 
bilateral or trilateral basis without the involvement of third parties is also reflected in the 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in 2000s. The MoUs signed in bilateral basis between 
Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iraq indicates that Turkey has reached this aim at the 
transboundary scale. Moreover, the MoUs indicate the outcome of cooperative actions can 
only be shared in accordance with the both parties (MoU on Improving Water Quality 28 
March, 2011:article 7, MoU on Efficient Utilization Water and Combatting Drought 28 May, 
2011:article 6).  
 
Thirdly, the MoU on water extraction for Syria from the Tigris River can be seen as a clear 
departure from ‘the two basins’ approach adopted by Syria during 1980s and 1990s. As 
highlighted in the previous chapter, Iraqi government considered transboundary water 
management in the Tigris River as a separate issue in trilateral negotiations. During 1980s 
and 1990s, Syria also adopted this view to establish a ‘common downstream position’ as 
advantage against Turkey’s upstream development in the ET basin. Therefore, water 
extraction from The Tigris by Syria was perceived by the discursive elites of Iraq as a major 
blow to Iraq’s ‘water rights’ on the Tigris and criticised by the Iraqi officials (Interviewee 4 
pers.comm. 2011).  
 
Finally, the MoU on construction of the Friendship Dam on the Orontes River is also a clear 
departure from Syria’s view on the Orontes, given the history of long-standing Hatay 
(Alexandretta) Dispute and its importance in Syrian domestic politics. It is argued that along 
with the previously signed Free Trade agreement, which prospects the establishment of joint 
customs along the borderline including the Hatay Region the construction of the Friendship 
Dam shows de-facto recognition of the Hatay province as a Turkish territory (Interviewee 22 
pers. comm. 2011). Syrian officials have never officially declared de jure recognition of 
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Turkey’s sovereignty on Hatay but they rather tend not to mention the issue to avoid 
jeopardising existing cooperation during the rapprochement. Nevertheless, the MoU on the 
Friendship Dam is Syria’s recognition of the Orontes River as a transboundary water context 
between Turkey and Syria and clear departure from Syria’s discursive position on refusing to 
negotiate water issues concerning the Orontes River.   
 
7.5. Back to Square One: A Brief Analysis of the Recent Turkish-Syrian Crisis 
since 2011 and its Reflections on Hydropolitics  
 
When I started my PhD project in 2010, the political rapprochement between Turkey and 
Syria was still underway in various fields including transboundary water issues. The Turkish-
Syrian relations were portrayed as a model for cooperation in the MENA region (Coşkun 
2011). However, this picture completely changed and bilateral political relations gradually 
worsened since 2011 (Institute of 21st Century 2013). Both the governments have gradually 
withdrawn their achievements in bilateral relations, which could be considered in the context 
of the political rapprochement. For instance the Free Trade Agreement signed between 
Turkey and Syria in 2004 was suspended in 2011 (Ministry of Economy 2011). While I was 
conducting my fieldwork one of my interviewees, an expert on the Turkish-Syrian relations 
and Middle East politics, described the new situation as ‘the honeymoon between the two 
states is over’ (Interviewee 22 pers. comm. 2011).  
 
In November 2011, the Turkish government announced conducting sanctions in certain fields 
against the Syrian government (Anatolian News Agency 2011, November 29). However, 
when Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister (FM), was asked whether these 
sanctions would include water issues or not in the press conference, Davutoğlu clearly stated 
that the Turkish government has no intention to cut the waters from the ET basin as a 
leverage against Syria (Anatolian News Agency 2011, November 29). On November 30th, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu announced that the activities of High Level Strategic Cooperation Council 
(HLSCC) were suspended between Turkey and Syria along with other sanctions in bilateral 
trade and economic relations (Haberturk 2011, November 30). As indicated in previous parts 
the HLSCC acted as the main space for interactions, in which the parties agreed on MoUs, 
protocols in various fields including water. As political crisis between the two governments 
continued, interactions between the hydraucracies dissipated. The Syrian side refused to join 
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technical studies conducted by lower ranking hydraucracies (Interviewee 2 pers.comm. 2012, 
January 27, Interviewee 1 pers.comm. 2013, February 26).  
 
The on-going political crisis, which is gradually worsening, neither refutes the theoretical 
framework established by this study, nor falsifies the conceptual frameworks this study is 
drawn upon. It rather supports the explanatory power of conceptual frameworks. This study 
considers the broader political context as one of the main factors leading to conflictual and 
cooperative hydropolitical relations. Suspension of on-going cooperative actions during the 
political crisis shows the importance of broader political context in hydropolitical relations. 
Second, as discussed in Chapter 2, the critical body of literature on transboundary water 
politics does not consider water conflict and water cooperation in transboundary contexts as 
opposing ends. Rather, it is argued, there is a circular change from conflict to cooperation or 
vice versa and they may co-exist at the same time at different degrees. Referring to the 
analogy made by Tony Allan, transboundary water relations between riparian states are like 
relations between the married couples (see Section 2.6.5). The trajectory of the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations supports the changing and circular character of hydropolitical 
relations between the two countries. As indicated above, one of my interviewees also 
implicitly uses ‘marriage analogy’ to describe the end of general political rapprochement as 
the ‘end of the honeymoon’, although he refers to bilateral relations including water. It 
appears that Turkey and Syria, as parts of two important transboundary watersheds in the 
MENA region the ET and Orontes basins, do have inseparable social, cultural, economic and 
geographical ties and transboundary water resources that they are part are one of those ties, 
leading to conflictual (or lack of interaction) and cooperative relations over time. 
 
 
 7.6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has analysed patterns of high cooperation and low conflict in the Turkish-Syrian 
relations during 1999 and 2011. The findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows.  
 
The study illustrates one of the main changes in Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in 
2000s is proliferation of spaces and actors who seek to foster cooperation between the two 
governments. Regarding spaces, both inter-governmental networks (creation of High Level 
Strategic Cooperation Council) and non-governmental networks established by the NGOs 
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like the ETIC and SIWI can be considered as newly constructed spaces where actors 
interacted with one another. Non-governmental actors such as the ETIC and the SIWI, as de-
securitizing and politicizing (in a sense that providing counter-factuals for cooperation 
between the riparian states) actors, were involved in the political processes. However, this 
study argues that in spite of involvement of those intergovernmental actors, their impact 
remained limited in decision-making processes.  
 
Secondly, this chapter illustrates that three factors can be identified, leading to cooperative 
relations in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in the given period. First, the 
standpoints of the fifth paradigm and its reflections in transboundary water relations between 
the riparian states (adopting basin-wide integrative approach, fostering dialogue and 
cooperation with the involvement different stakeholders) have been promoted in inter-state 
relations and were the basis for cooperative actions in the Turkish-Syrian relations. Second, 
significant change in broader political context, revisiting perceived identities and interests 
provided a suitable environment for cooperation on water. Third, Turkey’s increasing 
material, bargaining and ideational power capabilities also influence in construction of 
predominantly cooperative relations between the riparian states in the second era. 
Furthermore, although cooperation is in limited issues, the Turkish government was able to 
reflect its discursive position successfully in the cooperative frameworks realised by the two 
riparian states in this second era. Therefore, the study argues cooperative actions between 
Turkey and Syria cannot be understood without considering the changing power capabilities 
in bilateral relations. Accordingly, we may observe how power shifts are reflected in the 
agreed documents thereby we may critically examine patterns of cooperation in bilateral 
relations.  
 
Finally, recent political crisis between Turkey and Syria since the uprising in Syria does 
reinforce the theoretical framework developed by this study in the following ways. First, it 
shows determining affect on the broader political context for patterns of conflict and 
cooperation in inter-state relations between Turkey and Syria. The crisis shows political 
rapprochement between Turkey and Syria ended and the states entered into prolonging crisis, 
one of the fields directly affected by this political development was immediate stop in 
cooperative actions regarding transboundary water issues. Second, the political crisis states it 
would be misleading to consider water conflict and cooperation as opposing ends. Instead 
cooperative and conflictual relations evolve over time and we may observe different 
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intensities of patterns of conflict and cooperation (e.g.: patterns of high conflict-low 
cooperation or vice versa) in inter-state hydropolitics in different periods.  
 
After having analysed the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical conflict and cooperation in different 
eras, the following chapter will turn to another dynamic, which has become more salient in 
the recent period in hydropolitics of the ET basin, which is transnational hydropolitics with 
special reference to the case study of Ilısu dam.  
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CHAPTER 8 
ANALYSIS III: TRANSNATIONAL HYDROPOLITICS  
UNDERSTANDING ILISU DAM CONFLICT BETWEEN 
PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS OF THE PROJECT (1997-2013)  
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
 
The previous two analytical chapters illustrated the overarching reasons behind conflictual 
and cooperative relations and how different dimensions of power work in hydropolitics in 
inter-state relations by taking the Turkish-Syrian relations on transboundary water issues as 
empirical case studies in two main eras. The previous two analytical chapters also show 
hydropolitical relations in the ET basin have been largely about relations between riparian 
states, although other actors apart from riparian states can be identified.  
 
Meanwhile, intergovernmental networks labelled as transboundary scale in this study, have 
been intact in the hydropolitics of the ET basin; we see emergence of actors from civil 
society and private sector that have become part of the decision making processes on 
hydropolitical relations in the ET basin. With involvement of these actors we can also 
identify construction of new scales of governance in hydropolitics of the ET basin. The recent 
conflict over the construction of the Ilısu dam project (1997-2013) in the mainstream Tigris 
River in Turkey between these actors supporting the construction of the dam and those 
opposing it provides a rich empirical account on involvement of various state and non-state 
actors as well as scales and spaces in hydropolitics of the ET basin. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to understand this dynamic in hydropolitics of the ET basin by looking at the 
conflict over construction of the Ilısu dam project between the opponents and proponents. 
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 will be applied to the empirical case.  
 
The aims of this chapter are three-fold. First, the chapter seeks to understand scales, space 
constructed in the Ilısu dam conflict and maps out involvement of various actors in decision-
making processes. This first section will also problematize the relationship between scale, 
space and power. Second, the chapter seeks to understand factors leading to patterns of high 
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conflict and low cooperation between the opponents and proponents of the project. Third, the 
chapter seeks to answer how power relations occur between different actors and how they 
shape the outcome in hydropolitical relations of the Ilısu dam project. Each of these aims will 
be discussed in three Analysis sections A, B and C.  
 
8.2. ANALYSIS A: Politics of Scale and Power in the Ilısu Dam Conflict between 
the Opponents and Proponents  
 
 
8.2.1. Hydropolitical Relations between Opponents and Proponents of the Ilısu 
Dam Project: Scales and Power do mix  
 
 
In Chapters 6 and 7, the study showed that although we may observe number of invited, 
closed and claimed spaces and limited indirect involvement of the third parties, 
intergovernmental networks is the main scalar dynamic in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations in the first and second eras. However, recent conflict on construction of the Ilısu 
dam between the opponents and proponents shows multi-scalar sets of relations among 
various state and non-state actors from public sectors (governmental organizations), private 
sector and civil society. The conflict shows how third parties such as transnational 
corporations (TNCs), ECAs as credit guarantors, banks may actively involve in decision-
making processes and how transnational opposition movements may challenge hydraulic 
development projects conducted by the riparian states of the ET basin.  
 
Considering the Ilısu dam conflict in general, there are two main scales of governance. The 
first is national scale that refers to variety of interactions, alliances among actors from public 
sector, private sector and civil society within domestic context of Turkey. The general 
patterns in relations among various actors in national scales can be outlined as follows. The 
DSI acting on behalf of the Turkish government establishes partnerships with the private 
sector to conduct the Ilısu dam project. Whereas, the actors from civil society which operates 
nation-wide or locally act against the construction of the dam by interacting with different 
parts of the state apparatus (e.g.: interacting with other ministerial divisions, appealing to 
judicial bodies) and private sectors actors (construction companies and private banks as 
creditors).  
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The second is international scale that refers to variety of interactions, alliances between 
actors active at national scale and those active outside of Turkey. Such actors, involved in 
decision-making processes from outside Turkey, include, TNCs, banks, ECAs, the third party 
governments, political parties, international NGOs (INGOs). As in the case of national scales, 
the DSI establishes partnerships with private sector actors, namely infrastructure TNCs and 
involvement of the TNCs also bring international banks as creditors of the project and ECAs 
as credit guarantors. The actors also ally with other private sector actors active at the national 
scale. To counter this public-private partnership with both national and international 
dimensions, INGOs specializing in different aspects of reverse effects of large-scale 
hydraulic development projects ally with civil society groups within Turkey. We may 
observe different sets of transnational interactions among actors to influence or be part of 
decision-making processes.  
 
A number of invited, closed and claimed spaces can be identified within these two scales 
discussed above. As it will be elaborated in the following sections in detail, the international 
consortium, established to conduct the Ilısu dam project, and the relationships established 
between the DSI and the consortium is the main space for decision-making in the case of 
Ilısu dam. This relation also results in construction of invited spaces, since the consortium 
seeks to get credits from banks and credit guarantee from their ECAs. For example, the 
Project Implementation Unit (PIU) established as a result of MoU between the ECAs and the 
DSI to monitor project on environmental, cultural and resettlement concerns can be 
considered as an invited space for those opposing the project. By using different power 
tactics, such as lobbying on third party governments, conducting fact-finding missions, 
organising demonstrations, opponents of the project seek to curb the construction work.  
 
 
With respect to claimed spaces, actors opposing the Ilısu dam often appealed to judicial 
bodies in Turkey to influence in the decision-making processes as a bargaining power tactic, 
which can be considered as an attempt to claim new spaces. Likewise, organising field visits 
to downstream riparian states and informing actors from downstream riparian states on 
adverse effects of downstream of the Ilısu dam can be considered as attempts to open new 
claimed spaces. The Ilısu dam issue was in parliaments of the third party states and the EU 
(Interviewee 10 pers. comm. 2011, July 26). Such activities conducted by the anti-dam 
networks can be considered as attempts to open new spaces to influence decision-making.  
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Furthermore on closed spaces, opponents of the Ilısu dam project seek to hinder opening new 
claimed spaces. For example, considering the official memorandum issued by the Prime 
Ministry of Turkey in April 2012, one of the articles of the memorandum states 
complementary construction work would be exempted from the EIA (environmental impact 
assessment) Law as in the case of the main body of the projects (see Section 5.3.3.3). Given 
the fact the EIA process stipulated by the Turkish environmental law enables the civil society 
groups to engage in judicial processes against the construction of dams, buildings, bridges 
and so on, the attempt to exempt the complementary construction work in the Ilısu dam 
project made by the Prime Ministry can be considered to hinder possible opening of new 
claimed space by the anti-dam actors.  
 
Finally, the political opportunity structures, which will be analysed in the following sections, 
shape the ability of anti-dam actors to claim for new spaces. As will be analysed, elements of 
political opportunity structures such as growing influence of civil society in Turkey, 
privatization of hydraulic development enabled those opposing the project to claim for new 
spaces.   
 
8.2.2. Mapping Actors in the Ilısu Dam Conflict  
 
The first analytical chapter showed although we can identify third parties from the public 
sector, co-riparian states are the primary actors and transboundary scale has been the main 
area of interaction at least during 1920-2000. Thus in the dam controversies such as the 
Euphrates dam constructed by Syria, Ataturk and Birecik dams constructed by Turkey, 
interactions among co-riparian states formed the main pattern in hydropolitics of the ET 
basin. In the Ilısu dam case, however, the interactions among various actors are much more 
complex in comparison with the inter-state interactions between the riparian states. To 
illustrate the actors involved in the project, I will analyse them by dividing into two broad 
categories;  
 
1. The opponents of the hydraulic development being conducted in the context of the GAP 
in the Southeasrtern Anatolia. Such actors include wide-range of anti-dam interest groups 
within and outside Turkey. In particular, they have established transnational networks to 
hinder the Ilısu dam project, as the largest on-going hydraulic infrastructure in the GAP. I call 
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them Ilısu anti-dam actors or opponents of the Ilısu dam project in this chapter. These actors 
are mainly from civil society.  
 
2. The proponents of the hydraulic infrastructures being developed in the context of the 
GAP. They, in principle, support the construction of on-going infrastructures in the GAP. I 
will call them as ‘pro-Ilısu dam actors or proponents of the Ilısu dam project’. This group 
includes the Turkish government, third party governments, International export credit 
agencies (ECAs), TNCs, and other actors mainly from either public or private sectors.  
 
8.2.2.1. Anti-Dam Activist Network in the Ilısu Dam  
 
Mapping out the anti-Ilısu dam actors is a difficult task, since various actors having different 
interests and geographical origins are involved in the process during the campaigns. 
Moreover, these actors easily establish informal networks, which make it almost impossible 
to identify them as a whole. In this regard, Atzl’s classification of anti-dam actor in the Ilısu 
dam helps map out the actors and their interactions (Atzl 2009).    
 
Atzl (2009:61) classifies anti-Ilısu dam activist network according to two criteria: 
1. Actors in terms of their issue area through which they enter the political processes  
2. Actors in terms of their geographical location  
Atzl further identifies issues into four categories: 
a. Non-state actors involved in monitoring ECA processes on social and environmental 
grounds.  
b. Non-state actors involved in human rights campaigns in particular and the Kurdish 
question in general.  
c. Non-state actors involved in campaigns based on environmental problems caused by 
the construction of the Ilısu dam.  
d. Non-state actors coming from other issues.  
Atzl (2009:61) further classifies geographical location into four different categories: 
a. Non-state actors based in Germany, Switzerland and Austria  
b. Non-state actors based in other European countries, i.e. external actors 
c. Non-state actors within the project area (South-eastern Anatolia), i.e. ‘local’ actors 
d. Non-state actors in Western Turkey, i.e. Turkish non-state actors 
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The actors-scale mapping provided in Chapter 3 allows us to merge these two criteria 
developed by Atzl. Accordingly the anti-dam activist networks are located either within or 
outside of the Turkish domestic context. While the Turkish domestic context constitutes the 
domestic/national scales that can be further sub-divided into national and local scales, the 
outside of the Turkish domestic context can be labelled as transnational scales. Given the fact 
that these scales are social constructions, the actors located within each category can establish 
horizontal, vertical and diagonal interactions with other actors. Table 19 maps out actors 
opposing the Ilısu dam project.  
 
Table 19 Anti-dam activists networks in the Ilısu dam dispute 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014   
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As Table 19 above shows actors opposing the project can be positioned in two broad 
categories: international and national/domestic scales. International scale can be further 
delineated in to transnational scale, since actors in this category act transnationally by 
establishing informal alliances with the NGOs from Turkey30. National scale can be divided 
into two sub-categories: sub-national and local scales. This division is made to differentiate 
actors’ geographic origins. So, there are actors in the Southeasrtern Anatolian region where 
Ilısu dam is constructed, and those outside the Southeasrtern Anatolian region in Turkey, who 
are part of opposition movement. Both actors from local and sub-national scales form 
transnational and nation-wide links with other actors.  
 
Drawing upon conceptualisation provided by Atzl, anti-dam actors can also be categorised on 
the basis of their specialisation. In the first issue area, ECA reform campaign, there are NGOs 
based in Europe, that are critical to export credit guarantees to their respective government 
due to social, political and environmental reasons. These NGOs actively enrolled in the Ilısu 
dam campaigns are the Cornerhouse (UK), Berne Declaration (Switzerland), ECA-Watch 
(Austria) and World Economy, Ecology and Development WEED (Germany).  Since the UK 
had central importance in the first Ilısu campaign, the KHRP, the Friends of Earth (FoE) and 
the Cornerhouse were particularly active NGOs in the first anti-dam campaign. However, as 
the weight of the consortium shifted from the UK to Germany, Switzerland and Austria, the 
ECA-Watch, the Berne Declaration and the WEED had more importance in the second 
campaign (Atzl 2009:64). Since hindering the credit guarantee provided by ECAs is, perhaps, 
the most effective method of stopping the project, activities of Europe-based NGOs for 
export credits were particularly important in the campaigns against Ilısu. Moreover, as shown 
above, NGOs also provided connections for Turkey-based actors with the European decision-
makers.   
 
 
In the second issue area, Human Rights and the Kurdish issue, there are actors particularly 
looking at the social consequences of the Ilısu dam rather critically. The KHRP and 
Hasankeyf Initiative are the main actors located in transnational and local scales respectively. 
                                                        
30 Since the study provides an actor mapping to include both inter-state and transnational hydropolitical 
relations, the category of international scale will be further unpacked.  
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The KHRP, which was founded in 1992 to address human rights issues of the Kurds, played a 
leading role during the first campaign. It mainly looked the Ilısu dam in terms of 
displacement issues and human rights. In the early, 2000s the KHRP initiated the first Ilısu 
dam campaign through lobbying on the European decision makers (particularly in the UK) 
and conducting fact-finding missions. However, as the campaign shifted to continental 
Europe owing to involvement of German, Swiss and Austrian companies in the second 
consortium, its leading position was replaced by the Hasankeyf Initiative and NGOs based in 
continental Europe.  
 
The Hasankeyf Initiative, founded in 2006, is another leading NGO in the Ilısu dam 
campaign. While the Ilısu dam matter is one of the issues dealt by the KHRP, the Hasankeyf 
Initiative specifically deals with Ilısu dam project. Therefore, although the human rights 
issues and the Kurdish question constitute an important part of its sanctioned discourse, the 
Hasankeyf Initiative adopts a more holistic approach by addressing problems related with 
environmental protection, cultural heritage and human rights (Interviewee Person 15 
pers.comm. 2012).  Moreover, it has particular importance in construction of transnational 
scale owing to its connections with the NGOs based in Europe. Finally, the Hasankeyf 
consists of NGOs dealing with other issues, municipalities, and professional chambers, 
unions and so on at the local scale. Therefore, Hasankeyf Initiative serves as a platform for 
actors performing at the local scale (Süer 2006). 
   
 
The NGOs addressing environmental problems caused by construction of the Ilısu dam 
constitute the third issue in the anti-dam activism against the project. Here, we can identify a 
similar pattern like that of the previous category. In the first campaign, the Friends of Earth 
(FoE), the environmental NGO based in the UK, has been one of the main NGOs opposing 
the project along with KHRP and the Cornerhouse. However, as the campaign shifted to the 
continental Europe, the environmental NGOs such as the Nature and Biodiversity 
Conversation Union (NABU), WWW-Austria based in Germany and Austria respectively 
have become part of the anti-dam activist network against the Ilısu dam project (Atzl 
2009:67).   
 
As stated above, the Nature Association was founded in Turkey in 2002 and launched a 
nation-wide campaign in the Turkish domestic context against the Ilısu dam in 2008. 
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Examining the discursive position of the Nature Association suggests that environmental 
aspects of the dam constitute its main focus, although we can identify discourses of human 
rights and displacement. Such environmental focus has allowed the NGO to get public 
attention and support across Turkey rather than merely from the project area. The Nature 
Association has sought support from prominent people in the society including pop-singers, 
writers, and artists to make the case as a politicised issue in the public realm (Interviewee 10 
pers. comm. 2011, July 26, Nature Association 2012). In this regard, Nature Association uses 
visual and audio-visual framings to get public attention and support for the campaign, as we 
see in the example of Picture 8.  
 
Picture 8 Sezen Aksu, famous Turkish pop singer and composer, showing her support to Ilisu anti-dam 
campaign waged by the Nature Association 
 
A flyer prepared by the Nature Association, which reads ‘I am from Izmir, I was born in Hasankeyf’   
Online at: http://fotogaleri.hurriyet.com.tr/galeridetay/42960/2/5/hasankeyf-yok-olmasin 
 
 
Despite their domestic focus, the campaign led by the Nature Association is also integrated 
into the transnational anti-dam activist network. Atzl (2009:67) indicates there are already 
organisational links between the Nature Association and the NABU, as they both are partners 
of the same NGO, the Birdlife Association, in Turkey and Germany respectively. More 
importantly, the campaign led by the Nature Association in Turkey was a joint initiative by 
the ECA-Watch, the Hermsen Foundation and the Nature Association (Atzl 2009:67) 
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Therefore, while the Hasankeyf Initiative acts as a leading organisation in addressing human 
rights issues of the affected people as well as representing the NGO-network performing at 
the local scale, the Nature Association acts as a leading actor in addressing environmental 
aspects of Ilısu dam.  
 
Some of the opponents of the Ilısu do not easily fit into the issue areas illustrated in the 
above-figure. Generally, actors involve in the issue by joining NGOs active in the campaign 
or declare their views on the project. For example, NGOs such as Sudwind, FIAN are 
members of the ECA-Watch and involved at the transnational scale (Atzl 2009:68). Likewise, 
the civil society networks at the local scale are indirectly involved by being partner of the 
Hasankeyf Initiative. Some actors such as Universities, Professional Chambers reveal their 
criticisms on the issue and become part of the political debate. This pattern is particularly 
evident at the national scale within the Turkish domestic context.  
 
Finally, recent developments in the Ilısu dam controversy show that a regional scale for anti-
dam activism can also be identified as an emerging constructing scale.  This new pattern 
occurred as a result of intensified interactions among NGOs from Turkey, Iraq and Iran 
(Interviewee 15 pers.comm. 2012). 13 NGOs from Turkey, Iraq and Iran recently established 
a regional non-governmental initiative namely the Web of Tigris and Euphrates: Ekopotamya 
(inspired by the words ecology [ekoloji in Turkish] and mesopotamia [mezopotamya in 
Turkish]). This new initiative also looks at socio-cultural affects of dams on the people and 
seeks to influence government policies. It is the first region-wide network gathering civil 
society actors from riparian states. It should also be noted that the Hasankeyf Initiative is also 
member of the Ekopotamya network (Ekopotamia 2012).  The Ekopotamya initiative seeks to 
organise conferences, seminars to increase awareness and galvanize support from actors, 
particularly civil society actors, in other riparian states of the ET basin. Recently, members of 
the network convened in Diyarbakir to discuss social and environmental impacts of dams and 
HPPs with participation of NGOs from Turkey, Iraq and Iran on 27th September 2012 (İlhan 
2012). Therefore, Ekopotamia initiative can be considered as an attempt to construct a 
regional scale by the opponents of the Ilısu dam project.  
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8.2.2.2. Pro-Dam Network in the Ilısu Dam  
 
Since “build-operate-transfer (BOT)” model is adopted in the construction of the Ilısu dam 
project, the ‘pro-dam’ side of the controversy also consists of various actors from public and 
private sector within and outside the Turkish domestic context. From the theoretical 
framework this study has developed, these very sets of relations among different actors which 
support the project and particularly the involvement of international actors have enabled the 
anti-dam activist network to claim new spaces for influence in the decision making processes. 
In other words, the anti-dam network has exerted bargaining power tactics to open new 
claimed spaces by using structural links in the components of the ‘pro-dam’ network. For 
example, involvement of the ECAs in decision-making has given the opponents a significant 
leverage to hinder the project. The cast of actors is shown in Table 20 and subsequently 
discussed.  
 
Table 20 Ilısu pro-dam network 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014 31 
                                                        
31Here it should be noted that the degree and extent of actors support towards the project varies. For instance, 
although the ECAs support the project, in principle, as shown above, their support is conditioned by a certain 
criteria. Likewise, different views can also be identified towards the project in the third party states located at 
international scale. The figure, above, is based on the involvement of actors in international consortium 
established for the project.  
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As illustrated in the Table 20, while we can identify ECAs backed by the European 
governments at the international scale, the Undersecreteriat of Treasury provides credit 
guarantees to banks as in the amendment of the second consortium. ECAs are public agencies 
providing loans backed by governments (eca-watch.org). Therefore, involvement of ECAs 
necessarily brings third party governments and legislative bodies into the political processes.  
For example, the Ilısu dam project became a debated issue in the House of Commons in the 
UK in the first consortium due to possible involvement of the Export Credit Guarantee 
Department (ECGD).  (Commons Debates Westminster Hall 2000, February 15). 
 
The DSI, as an actor in public sector, has particular importance, since the DSI, acting on 
behalf of the Turkish government deals with negotiations with the private sector on 
implementation of the project. Moreover, it deals with issues of environment, cultural 
heritage and resettlement. It is the responsible institution that finances and coordinates work 
with other governmental institutions.   
 
Lending banks are another important actor group in the pro-dam network. Several public and 
private banks from Turkey (domestic scale) and Europe (international scale) have already 
been involved in the project as creditors. For example, while Garanti bank and Akbank at the 
domestic scale provide credits to the project as private banks, state-led Halkbank became one 
of the creditors of the final withdrawal of ECAs. Finally, there are private companies, which 
include infrastructure TNCs, nation-based infrastructure companies, consultancy companies 
and those dealing with electro-mechanical works.  
 
While the anti-dam Ilısu network is formed as informal set of relations among various actors 
at different scales, the pro-dam Ilısu network is formed by formal agreements between 
private and public sector actors. Therefore, identifying relations among different actors is 
relatively easier than the anti-dam Ilısu network. Regarding the organisational structure of the 
pro-dam network, it appears that the set of relations are subject to structure and actors’ origin 
of the consortium. For example, the involvement of Balfour Betty in the first consortium has 
led to involvement of ECGD, which is the UK ECA. Therefore, NGOs such as KHRP, FoE, 
and Cornerhouse formed the main opposition group against the project. However, as Balfour 
Beatty withdrew from the consortium, the ECGD was no longer part of the Ilısu dam dispute 
(Stern 2004, Scheumann 2008). Therefore, although NGOs based in UK continued to oppose 
the project, their impact relatively decreased.  
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Regarding the relations between different actors in the pro-dam network, Atzl (2013) 
illustrates the relations among the DSI, the ECAs and the Banks in the context of the second 
consortium as follows. First, the contract was signed between the DSI (the project owner 
acting on behalf of the Turkish Government) and the consortium. The consortium provided 
required credits for the project from European and Turkish banks. However, since private 
banks stipulate export credit guarantees from the ECAs, the consortium also applied to the 
European ECAs. Given the fact that, the ECAs are obliged to consider social and 
environmental aspects of any large-scale project, they negotiated with the DSI on social and 
environmental standards. This resulted in the establishment of the ToRs that should be met by 
the DSI before the ratification of the ECAs for credit release. This mechanism in the second 
consortium provided spaces for influence on the Ilısu anti-dam network to hinder the project. 
Figure 23 shows the relationship among the DSI, the Ilısu Dam International Consortium, 
ECAs and Creditors in the context of the second international consortium. 
 
Figure 23 The actors in the second Ilısu consortium and their interrelationships 
 
Source:  Atzl 2013   
  
After the first withdrawal of the ECAs, these relations among the actors have fundamentally 
changed as shown in Figure 24 below. Notably, while the contract signed between the 
consortium and the DSI remained intact, the Turkish Undersecreteriat of Treasury started 
negotiations on the new credit package deal with the two Turkish private banks (Akbank and 
Garanti Bank) and one Turkish public bank (Halkbank). After agreeing on the new credit 
deal, the three Turkish banks became the new creditors of the project under the guarantee of 
the Turkish Undersecreteriat of Treasury. According to the deal the credit package provided 
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by the banks covers 33.5% of the project and the remaining 66.5% is directly financed from 
the Turkish budget. Figure 25 shows the relations among the DSI, the Consortium, the 
Turkish Banks and the Turkish Undersecreteriat of Treasury (Interviewee 1 pers.comm. 
2013, February 26). Based on the above figure by Atzl, Figure 24 shows the amended 
structure of the pro-dam actors and relationships among each other.  
  
Figure 24 The third consortium; pro-dam actors structure 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on Atzl 
 
 
As Figure 24 illustrates, the structure of the consortium is illustrated as a pyramid to show the 
division of labour among companies in the consortium. Since the DSI made separate 
contracts with the consortium in the construction side and with companies located within 
Engineering and Consultancy services (ECS), the figure illustrates the private companies 
such as Colenco, Maggie, Dolsar and Rast under the title of ECS. Moreover, the Turkish 
Undersecretariat of Treasury replaces the ECAs. Moreover, the foreign banks are no longer 
part of the process as creditors. Private companies within the consortium are largely 
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dominated by nation-wide private sector actors. Looking at the relationships between 
different actors in the amended structure of pro-dam actors, similar mechanisms can be 
identified as in the case of the second Ilısu dam project consortium visualised by Atzl. 
However, the most important difference between former and latter pro-dam structures is lack 
of terms of references (ToRs) stipulated by the ECAs as conditions for credit guarantee. 
Therefore, in my view, the Ilısu anti-dam network has lost an important space to engage in 
decision making with the establishment of new amended pro-dam actor structure in the 
project. As shown in the previous section the private banks, the Garanti and Akbank, 
remained the only sphere of influence in the context of this newly established structure.   
 
8.3. ANALYSIS B: Understanding Conflict in Transnational Politics of Water in 
the Context of the Ilısu dam Conflict 
 
This section problematizes the rationale for patterns of high conflict and low cooperation 
between the proponents and opponents of the Ilısu dam project. It responds to how 
predominantly conflictual relations occur between proponents and opponents. Being 
informed by the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, such conflictual relations can be 
explained through a) conflicting prevailing paradigms adopted and promoted by the 
opponents and proponents respectively, b) broader political context, c) asymmetrical power 
relations between opponents and proponents of the Ilısu dam project.  Figure 25 shows 
factors leading to predominantly conflictual relations.  
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Figure 25 Factors leading to patterns of conflict in the case of the Ilısu dam project 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014  
 
 
In relation to the prevailing paradigms, as it was shown in the figure above, while elements of 
hydraulic mission and holistic approach are promoted by the proponents of the Ilisu dam 
project, opponents of the project endorse sanctioned discourse of ecological and political 
resistance as discussed in Chapter 3. The Kurdish issue forms the broader political context in 
which hydropolitical relationships occur among state and non-state actors. As the following 
sections will show the Kurdish issue provides both advantages and obstacles for anti-dam 
actors to mobilise opposition against the project. Furthermore, we may clearly observe 
asymmetrical power relations between proponents and opponents, which favour the former. 
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However, this does not necessarily mean that anti-dam actors are entirely powerless. This 
study argues while opponents of the project may be short of material power capabilities, they 
possess bargaining and ideational power capabilities to achieve their goals. More importantly, 
power relations between the actors strongly shape the outcome in hydropolitical relations in 
the case of the Ilısu dam. The remaining parts of the chapter will uncover each of these 
points.   
 
8.3.1. Conflicting Prevailing Paradigms in Water Resource Management: The 
Case of Ilısu Dam  
 
In the previous two chapters, the study has shown the importance of prevailing paradigms 
leading to conflictual and cooperative relations in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
in the ET basin. Accordingly, two competing hydraulic missions adopted by the Turkish and 
Syrian governments have driven unilateral development in water thereby playing a important 
role in shaping conflictual inter-state relations. On the other hand, the standpoints of the 
holistic approach (the fifth paradigm elaborated in Section 3.3.1.6) and its reflection in 
transboundary water relations have played an important role in realising limited cooperative 
actions in the Turkish-Syrian relations in the second era.  
 
However, during 2000s, promotion of another prevailing paradigm sanctioning particular 
discourses and those challenging sanctioned discourses promoted by riparian states emerged. 
As we observe in the context of the Ilısu dam conflict, promotion of sanctioned discourses 
against those promoted by the riparian states lead to another area of political contestation, in 
hydropolitics of the ET basin.  
 
 
The prevailing water paradigms operational in transnational hydropolitics can be discussed 
under following arguments. The pro-dam actors have promoted the hydraulic mission and 
standpoints of the holistic approach as prevailing paradigms. However, the Ilısu anti-dam 
networks have promoted discourses of political and ecological resistance. In this study while 
the former will be labelled as the ‘prevailing sanctioned discourse’, the latter is called 
‘counter sanctioned discourse’.  However, this study also argues it would be misleading to 
examine the Ilısu dam case as a single case study. Instead it must be considered as a pioneer 
case carrying all the elements of the counter sanctioned discourse promoted by NGOs, 
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informal networks and activists in the context of recently growing anti-dam activism across 
Turkey. Moreover, the transboundary nature of the conflict and its specific political context 
adds further dimensions to the sanctioned discourse promoted by oppositions of the project. It 
also plays an important role in creation of transnational anti-dam networks against the 
project. In the following two sections, I will briefly discuss the recently growing anti-dam 
activism, particularly against privatised small and mid-scale HPPs across Turkey and the 
elements of sanctioned discourse promoted by the opponents of the project.  
8.3.1.1. Growing Anti-dam Activism across Turkey: Construction of the Counter 
Sanctioned Discourse  
 
As explained in Chapter 7, Turkey’s hydraulic development attempts have dramatically 
increased during 2000s. Given the importance of hydropower generation within Turkey’s 
general water resource development, the increase has also been reflected in the construction 
of HPPs. According to recent figures provided by the DSI, while 370 HPPs have already been 
constructed which corresponds to 40% of Turkey’s entire viable hydropower potential, 213 
HPPs are currently under construction and another 1117 are in the development stage which 
corresponds to 20% and 40% of the entire viable hydropower potential respectively (DSI 
2013: 35,36). 
 
Table 21 Turkey's Hydraulic potential and future development of hydropower plans 
 
Source: DSI 2013 
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The private sector has played a vital role in increase of HPPs during 2000s. In particular, 
involvement of private sector actors rapidly increased during 2000s with the enactment of the 
Energy Market Act (Law Decree No: 4628), which came into force in 2003 and was 
subsequently revised in 2004 and 2005. The data, below, illustrates rapid growth of private 
sector involvement in HPP development since the enactment of Energy Market Law (DSI 
2013: 39). Figure 26 acquired from the recent report prepared by the DSI shows developing 
role of the private sector in hydropower generation in Turkey.  
 
Figure 26 Annual installed capacity of hydropower generation made by the state and private sector 
 
Source: DSI 2013  
 
 
As the figure above shows while the share of private sector was very small in comparison 
with the state-led hydropower generation in 2003, this gradually increased in the following 
years. The figure also prospects continuous growth of private-led hydropower generation in 
the coming years. The main driver behind is Turkey’s growing energy needs. Here, the main 
challenge is limited energy resources and dependency on external resources, mainly oil and 
natural gas. Due to this, Turkish discursive elites consider HPPs in different sizes as a vital 
alternative energy resource, which would to some extent cover energy deficit (Interview with 
Eroğlu 2011).  
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Dramatic increases in HPPs have been confronted by number of local and nation-wide anti-
dam networks, or in the case of Ilısu dam transnational anti-dam networks have emerged in 
2000s. These anti-dam movements led mainly by the actors from civil society act as societal 
forces to promote the discourse of ecological and political resistance against the hydraulic 
development projects.32 In other words, the opposition movements developed against 
growing number of state-led and private sector-led HPPs has resulted in constriction of the 
counter-sanctioned discourse against the existing discourse.  
 
Here, it is crucial to examine and explore ‘what are the components of the emerging counter 
paradigm being promoted by the civil society actors performing at different scales. Given the 
fact that anti-dam network groups performing at different scales raise a wide range of 
objections on Turkish hydraulic development, it is difficult to uncover the main components 
of the ‘counter-sanctioned discourse’. I argue that the components of the emerging counter-
sanctioned discourse in Turkey can be analysed in three main categories as follows:  
 
a) Social aspects of the anti-dam opposition: The main focus here is on people. The 
concepts such as ‘right to water’, ‘opposition to commodification of water’, ‘opposition 
to privatisation of water services and infrastructures’, ‘issue of displacement’ are within 
this category.  
b) Environmental aspect of anti-dam opposition: The main focus is on nature; preservation 
of natural habitat and ecosystem are the main issue areas here. 
c) Historical and cultural aspects of anti-dam opposition: Cultural heritage and culture of 
the society is the main focus; protection of religiously or culturally sacred places and 
preservation of cultural sites are the main issue areas.  
 
In addition to these elements, transboundary impacts of hydraulic development project in 
downstream riparian states can be considered as a fourth category. Here, the main focus is to 
reveal possible adverse affects of the project on downstream users. The Ilısu dam anti-dam 
                                                        
32 The discourse of political and ecological resistance is discussed in detail in the theoretical framework in 
Section 3.3.1.5 
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activism is unique in this aspect, since it is being criticised and opposed for its downstream 
impact on the riparian states of the ET basin, along with other elements.   
 
Of course, the categorisation does not suggest there are clear boundaries between the 
components. Indeed, they overlap in many cases. For example, preservation of environment 
necessarily includes people and where they live, or protection of cultural heritage is also 
inherently ‘social’. Therefore, while actors focus on particular aspects of adverse effects on 
the hydraulic development project, they may also borrow other discourses promoted by other 
actors. This allows them to establish coalitions to increase their influence.  
 
This study argues that, the Ilısu dam, as one of the largest privatised HPPs, not only has all 
the components of the growing counter-sanctioned discourses against hydraulic mission and 
marketization of water, it has also played a pioneer case study in the growing resistance 
against the construction of HPPs. Therefore, this aspect must be analysed within the context 
of growing resistance movements against the HPPs across Turkey. As Güven Eken, the head 
of the Nature Association, states: “Hasankeyf is the tip of the iceberg for us. It is the symbol 
of the HPP struggle [in Turkey]. There are thousand more dams under it [author’s own 
translation, emphasize added].” (Interview with Güven Eken 2009). The Tigris River basin 
also remains the only large river basin, in which no large-scale dams have yet been 
constructed by the Turkish government. Therefore, nation-wide NGOs like the Nature 
Association consider anti-dam opposition against the Ilısu dam as an attempt to preserve the 
largest remaining water basin from being ‘dammed’ in Turkey. The possible success in the 
Ilısu dam case could also be a suitable example for other anti-dam movements across the 
country (Interviewee 10 pers.comm 2011). Furthermore, the Ilısu dam dispute is one of the 
few examples, in which anti-dam actors are able to establish transnational networks. 
Therefore, the case does not only symbolise the anti-dam activism in Turkey, but constitutes 
a case study where actors mostly from civil society act as societal forces in the diffusion and 
promotion of certain international sets of norms within the Turkish normative context 
(Scheumann 2008). The following section will analyse each of the elements of the counter 
sanctioned discourse, stated above. It will also discuss how these elements are reflected in the 
case of the Ilısu dam conflict.  
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8.3.1.2. Elements of the Counter-Sanctioned Discourse in the Context Anti-Dam Activism 
across Turkey and in the Context of the Ilısu Dam  
8.3.1.2. 1. Social Aspects of Anti-dam Opposition Counter and the Case of Ilısu: displacement and 
privatisation  
 
Social aspects are important part of the counter-sanctioned discourse promoted by the 
opponents of the Ilısu dam as well as the general opposition against HPPs across Turkey. 
Here we can analyse social aspects of anti-dam opposition within two main categories.  
 
The first facet of social aspects is displacement of people from the project area and its 
adverse impacts. NGOs such as the KHRP or the Hasankeyf Initiative emphasise 
displacement and its adverse effects on displaced people due to the project. The issue of 
displacement also allows opponents to ‘recast’ this as a human rights issue and purely an 
environmental problem (Warner 2004). The issue of displacement constitutes one of the 
important aspects of anti-dam campaign waged against the Ilısu dam, since the project 
proposes to displace large number of people. Thus the issue of displacement formed one the 
criteria to tackle with the conduct of the project as stipulated by the ECAs to the DSI as a 
condition to provide credit guarantee (See Section 5.3.3.1). Although the area that would 
submerge is less in small and mid-scale HPPs than large-scale dams, the argument that these 
HPPs will cause domestic immigration is also the part of the counter-sanctioned discourse. It 
is argued that construction of cascades of small and mid-scale HPPs in small streams would 
render it impossible to access water resources for the local population, which would result in 
their forced domestic immigration (Interviewee 11 pers.comm 2011).  
 
 
The second facet is the issue of marketization and privatisation in water resource 
development. The discourse of anti-marketization and anti-privatization forms the main 
element of the anti-dam campaigns against the HPPs across Turkey. Since the involvement of 
private sector has dramatically increased owing to de-regulation of the energy market, left 
wing oriented NGOs, trade unions, chambers, lawyers, academics and activists established 
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informal networks to oppose these projects. For instance, the platforms of ‘No to 
Marketization of Water’, ‘Fellowship of Streams’, ‘the Black Sea is in Revolt’ are examples 
of informal nation-wide networks against the HPPs across Turkey. Activists, academics, 
lawyers who are active in such networks oppose the HPPs by using judicial processes and 
engaging with the local NGOs and local people from the project areas (Interviewee Person 17 
2011). We also observe local NGOs oppose the project on the basis of privatization and 
marketization of water resource development. For example, in the Munzur Valley, located in 
upper part of the Euphrates River in Turkey, privatization and marketization of water 
resource development forms one of the issue areas of opposition against the construction of 
cascades of small-scale HPPs. We may also observe alliances between actors to increase their 
influence. Local NGOs support their campaign one another by organizing joint 
demonstrations and protests. They are also often part of the same nation-wide informal 
platforms against HPPs across Turkey (Interviewee 11 pers.comm. 2011, Interviewee Person 
15 pers.comm. 2012).  
 
 
Although the issue of displacement forms the main aspect of the Ilısu dam campaign, there 
are also discourses on anti-privatization and marketization in such campaigns. For instance, 
Akgün İlhan, an activist from the Hasankeyf Initiative and an academic by profession, 
identifies two paradigms on water resource development in Turkey as already elaborated in 
the theoretical framework on prevailing water paradigms. According to İlhan (2011:41), the 
first paradigm considers the water resource paradigm as a national security issue that requires 
realisation of Turkey’s water resources potential for hydraulic development. The second 
paradigm claims that marketization and privatization of water is the main source of water 
related problems in Turkey. Therefore, concepts such as justice and ecology must be taken 
into consideration. İlhan also argues that water must be regarded as a public value rather than 
a commodity henceforth public sector actors must be responsible actors in water resources 
management. However, for İlhan, this does not necessarily mean that hydraucracies must 
have monopoly in decision-making. Akgün states the importance of public participation and 
de-centralisation in water resources management (İlhan 2011:42,43). Likewise, Ayboğa, an 
activist from the Hasankeyf Initiative, argues that privatization of water at the global scale is 
the main problem in water resources management. Ayboğa describes this as “an attack on our 
lives [author’s own translation] ” (Ayboğa 2010:16).  Therefore, the discourse on anti-
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marketization and anti-privatization is an inherent part of anti-dam opposition in the Ilısu 
dam conflict.  
 
The discourses on anti-privatization also allow the opponents to form coalitions with other 
local anti-dam actors. For example, the Hasankeyf Initiative has also interacted with other 
local anti-dam movements and established coalitions (Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm. 
2012).  
 
To sum up, social aspects of anti-dam activism form one of the important aspects of the 
counter-sanctioned discourse promoted by NGOs (nation-wide or local), informal networks, 
activists, academics, lawyers in general anti-dam campaign across Turkey and in the case of 
anti-dam campaign against the Ilısu dam. The issue of displacement and anti-
marketization/privatization are the main elements of social aspects of the counter sanctioned 
discourse. Similarities in issue areas, ideological affinities between among the opponents and 
converging interests enable actors to establish alliances.  
8.3.1.2. 2. Preservation of Cultural Heritage 
 
 
The argument that dams destroy cultural, historical and religious sites constitutes the third 
element of the counter-sanctioned discourse promoted by actors opposing the HPPs in 
general across Turkey and the construction of the Ilısu dam in particular. There are empirical 
examples in which preservation of cultural heritage forms one of the most important elements 
of anti-dam activism. For example, in the context of the anti-dam activism on construction of 
dams in the Munzur Valley, another important aspect of anti-dam activism is cultural and 
religious importance of the Valley for the Alawi faith and culture. One of the interviewee, an 
activist from the campaign and supporter of the Ilısu dam campaign, equates Munzur Valley 
with the historical Blue Mosque in Istanbul or Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem to emphasise its 
cultural and religious value (Interviewee 11 pers.comm. 2011).  
 
 
Likewise, the construction of Yortanlı Dam on the Yortan River located western Turkey, the 
protection of the Ancient Allainoi Spas which dates back to the Roman Empire constituted 
the main cause for development of anti-dam activism (Yaraş 2006:161). Likewise, in the case 
of anti-dam opposition against small scale HPPs in the Munzur Valley, which is located in 
the upper part of the Euphrates basin, preservation of the Valley due to its cultural and 
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religious importance forms the main argument against hydraulic development projects in the 
region (Interviewee 11 pers.comm. 2011).  
 
 
Issues related with cultural heritage also constitute one of the components of the ‘counter-
sanctioned discourse’’ in the Ilısu dam conflict.  People active at the core of the struggle 
testify submergence of the ancient town of Hasankeyf has put both environmental and human 
rights campaigns led by the Nature Association and the Keep Hasankeyf Alive Initiative 
respectively to the core for discussion (Interviewee 10 pers. comm. 2011, July 26, 
Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm. 2012). 
 
Picture 9 Ancient town of Hasankeyf 
 
 
 
Perhaps preserving the cultural assets of Hasankeyf is the only convergence point between 
the DSI and the Ilısu anti-dam activist network. However, their respective approaches to 
preserve the cultural heritage of Hasankeyf are entirely contradictory.  
296 
 
 
The DSI advocates cultural assets in Hasankeyf can be relocated and preserved. Moreover, 
the archaeological work financed by the DSI have revealed number of cultural assets 
(Interviewee 3 pers.comm. 2011). Veysel Eroğlu considers the project as an opportunity to 
keep Hasankeyf. He contends that relocation of cultural assets and their preservation in 
archaeological and open-air museums would be near new Hasankeyf to enable the town to be 
a cultural and touristic centre (Eroğlu 2012, August 29).   
 
On the contrary, the Ilısu anti-dam activist group consider relocation of cultural assets is 
technically impossible, and destruction of Hasankeyf cultural heritage site is therefore 
inevitable. For instance, an archaeologist and activist against the construction of Ilısu dam 
coins the project as ‘a monument to barbarism’’ (Ronayne 2006). She contends that “this dam 
is weapon of cultural mass destruction, not only because of the large number of monuments 
there, but also because of the living culture, the people.’’ (Erdem 2006, August 10). Other 
archaeologists also reveal their sceptic views on the relocation of cultural assets with a 
relatively low tone. For example, Oluş Arık, who had previously worked in the excavation, 
works in the project area and stresses on technical difficulties of relocation works (Interview 
with Arık). Likewise, Abdusselam Uluçam, who also worked as the head of excavation team 
in the project area, emphasise the difficulty of relocating cultural assets without fortification 
(Söylemez 2006).  
 
 
The argument of protection of cultural and historical heritage provides certain advantages for 
the Ilısu anti-dam network. First, cultural importance and natural beauty of Hasankeyf 
enables the network to reach wider audience within and outside Turkey’s domestic context. 
Therefore, it may not be a coincidence but rather a strategic choice while the Hasankeyf 
Initiative and Nature Association focus on different issue areas, they both put Hasankeyf at 
the core of their campaigns. Second, the commonality of cultural heritage issues in different 
case studies enables the respective NGO groups to establish common alliances against similar 
issues. For example overlapping interests between the ‘saving Allainoi’ and ‘saving 
Hasankeyf’ campaigns resulted in cooperative actions between the Hasankeyf Initiative and 
the local NGO-networks against the Yortanlı dam. Likewise, activists from the campaign 
against Munzur Valley dam projects also support the campaign protecting Hasankeyf and 
vice versa. In other words, commonality in terms of cultural heritage provides anti-dam 
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networks further leverages to influence. Such similarities between different cases are also 
reflected in discursive positions of opponents of the Ilısu dam project as “we will not give up 
Hasankeyf, Munzur, Allainoi”, “Hasankeyf is our value but Munzur, and Allainoi are also 
our value” (Interviewee 15 pers.comm 2011). Third, issues on cultural heritage attract more 
public support and enable the NGO-networks to propose alternative development strategies. 
For example, in both the anti-dam activism in the Ilısu and Yortanlı dam, the activist groups 
suggest cultural tourism as an alternative socio-economic development.  
8.3.1.2.3. Preservation of the Environment  
 
The environmental discourse constitutes the third component of counter-sanctioned discourse 
on the Ilısu dam and general anti-dam activism in Turkey. In fact environmental aspects have 
been addressed and included in the Turkish legal context since the early 1980s.33 As a result, 
environmental aspects have gradually become an inherent part of Turkish water policy and its 
hydraulic development. The negotiation with EU for full membership has further accelerated 
the role of environmental aspects in hydraulic development (Scheumann, Baumann et al. 
2011:144). However, since Turkey’s hydraulic development is still underway; reconciling 
hydraulic development with fulfilling the environmental criteria has become a difficult task 
for the decision makers. Moreover, growing involvement of private sector, in hydraulic 
development, creates further challenges (Topçu 2011). 
 
 
Therefore, Turkey’s water policy on hydraulic development is often criticised by 
environmentally driven NGOs, and environmental dimension constitutes one of the main 
pillars of the opposition of such projects. We may observe involvement of NGOs both at 
local and national scales, who criticise private and state-state-led hydraulic development 
projects. For example, the WWF Turkey, an environmental NGO also performs nation-wide 
like the Nature Association, and criticises Turkish hydraulic development policy. It is argued 
by the WWF Turkey that growing number of HPPs across Turkey pose a major threat to 
wetlands of the country owing to inadequate ecological impact on the environment (WWF 
                                                        
33
 In relation to environmental aspects being part of the Turkish legal context, the Environmental law came to 
force in 1983. Based on the Environmental Law, the By-Law on water pollution control was adopted in 1988; 
which was replaced by another by-law in 2004 to harmonise with the EU legal order. Another important 
development is adoption of by-law on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in 1992. With the adoption of 
the EIA, preparing EIA plan became obligatory for the hydraulic development projects. The EIA by law was 
also revised twice in 1997 and 2002 (Scheumann, Baumann et al 2011:141,142;Sumer, 2011: 241-244). 
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Turkey 2010). Therefore, to increase awareness in environmental issues, the WWF Turkey 
conducts projects for increasing the capacity of different stakeholders, organise campaigns in 
certain watersheds, conduct projects with the state and use legal instruments in necessary 
cases (Interviewee 13 pers.comm. 2011).  
 
Here, it is worth noting that unlike the previous two categories, WWF Turkey does not 
oppose HPPs in principle but defends environmental impact of projects must be better dealt 
with; and Turkey, as a candidate member of the EU, must take into consideration 
environmental norms and principles adopted by the EU in water resources management and 
development. Therefore, the view adopted by the WWF Turkey is not as rigid as other actors 
focussing on previous two aspects of the counter sanctioned discourse. Similar observation 
was made in local opposition movements waged against cascades of HPPs from the 
environmental point of view. For example, the İkizdere Association, which is a hometown 
NGO, opposes the construction of small-scale HPPs in the İkizdere Valley, located in Eastern 
Black Sea Region (north-east part of Turkey). 34 The anti-dam campaign led by the İkizdere 
Association, does not in principle oppose construction of the HPPs but claims that natural 
flora and fauna of particular sites, that are unique, must be preserved (Interviewee 16 pers. 
comm. 2011).   
 
 
The discourse on environmental protection is an important aspect in counter sanctioned 
discourse. As mentioned in the previous section, the Nature Association is the leading NGO 
along with the European based environmental NGOs, which criticise the project. 
Accordingly, the core argument on construction of the Ilısu dam by the environmental NGOs 
is that the large reservoir would cause environmental destruction in the Tigris Valley, which 
has a unique flora and fauna. Thus, several endangered species such as griffon and soft-shell 
turtle (Rafetus Euphraticus) will become extinct. According to Nature Association, the dams 
built on the mainstream Euphrates have already wiped out some unique species in the region. 
Therefore, with the construction of the Ilısu dam, the last remaining habitat for the species 
will be lost (Interviewee 11 pers. comm. 2013, February 19). To increase public attention 
                                                        
34
 The İkizdere Ascociation can be considered as a typical hometown organisation, which acts as an 
environmental NGO at local scale. Hometown Organisations (Hemşehri Dernekleri in Turkish) are civil society 
organisations, bringing people with same geographical origins together in urban centres. From this respect, the 
hometown organisation is a product of the rapid urbanisation process in Turkey and they have flourished during 
1990s (Hersant and Toumarkine 2009; Aktaş, Aka et al. 2006). As in the case of anti-dam activism in İkizdere 
Valley, hometown organisations play a key role in terms of organisation of oppositions against dams.    
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towards the issue, the Nature Association, has portrayed the Rafetus Euphraticus (inspired by 
its Latin name, it is called as a Turkish male name ‘Rafet’) symbol of its environmental 
campaign.  
 
Picture 10 Activists from the Nature Association are trying to approach Veysel Eroğlu, the Minister of 
Forestry and Water Affairs 
 
In the picture activists from the Nature Association along with the Rafet, the mascot of environmental campaign 
against the Ilısu dam, tries to explain why they are opposed to the project in the 5th World Water Forum (2009) 
held in Turkey  
Source: Nature Association (2009) 
 
However, the Ilısu dam case is not criticised by the NGOs on its own merits. Although, 
Nature Association particularly focuses on the Ilısu dam, it also adopts a very critical view 
towards to Turkish water policy and especially its hydraulic development program. 
According to the Nature Association, Turkey’s water policies pose greatest threat to 
‘significant natural sites’ in Turkey (Interviewee 10 pers. comm. 2011, July 26). According to 
Nature Association, the success in dam dispute will not only save certain Significant Natural 
Areas, but will be an example for other environmental movements in the anti-dam activism in 
Turkey. Therefore, it will directly influence the fate of Turkey’s natural environment (Nature 
Association 2011:19).  
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8.3.1.2.4. Transboundary Impacts of the Ilısu Dam Project  
 
The argument that Ilısu dam would have severe adverse impacts on downstream riparian 
states is the final aspect of the counter-sanctioned discourse promoted by the opponents. 
Since most other anti-dam campaigns are waged in in-boundary water resources of Turkey 
and are relatively small-scale hydraulic projects, we do not observe this argument in other 
anti-dam campaigns. Therefore, the case of Ilısu dam is unique in this aspect. According to 
this, the opponents argue that the Ilısu dam would have adverse impacts on downstream users 
of the Tigris River. For example, the KHRP conducted a fact-finding mission in Iraq and 
Syria to assess possible adverse impacts of the dam on local downstream stakeholders 
(KHRP 2002). KHRP made considerable effort to raise awareness to mobilise support in Iraq 
by approaching civil society actors in Iraq, especially those based in Kurdistan regional 
government. The KHRP also approached Iraqi central government to get support at the 
political level (Interviewee 14 pers.comm. 2013). Like the KHRP, the Hasankeyf Initiative 
has also approached civil society groups regarding downstream consequences of the Ilısu 
dam as well as on-going projects conducted in Iraq (Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm. 
2012). These interactions paved the way for establishment of the previously discussed 
Ekopotamia platform. Finally, recent developments show local communities as downstream 
users have become involved in the Ilısu anti-dam network apart from the NGOs. For 
example, the tribal leaders of the Iraqi marshlands together with the Nature Association, 
Hasankeyf Initiative, ECA Watch and Nature Iraq signed the ‘Tigris Declaration’, that was 
sent to the UN, on behalf of the people of Hasankeyf and Marshlands. In the declaration, the 
downstream impacts of the Ilısu project on the communities as well as its upstream impact to 
the upper part of the Tigris are specified (Manfred-Hermsen Foundation 2012).    
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Picture 11 Marsh Arabs from Iraq signed the Tigris Declaration in Hasankeyf 
 
Source: Menfred Hermsen Foundation online at http://m-h-s.org/Ilısu/front_content.php? Idart=772 
 
 
To sum up, the Ilısu dam dispute between the pro-dam network and the anti-dam activist 
network cannot be analysed without considering the on-going ‘anti-dam (anti HPP)’ 
movements that have become active across Turkey. In my view, these have led to the 
construction of ‘counter sanctioned discourse’ against sanctioned discourses on hydraulic 
mission and marketization with the help of international normative context which critically 
looks at hydraulic development. Thus, the role of the Ilısu dam dispute is two-fold. First, as a 
pioneer case study, the Ilısu dam dispute carries all the elements of a newly ‘promoted 
counter-sanctioned discourse’’. Second, owing to its strong transnational network dimension, 
the dispute has enabled the diffusion of international set of norms that are critical to large-
scale dams.  
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8.3.2. The Role of the Broader Political Context in the Ilısu dam dispute:   
 
In the previous two analytical chapters, I have shown how broader political context have 
played a determinant role in conflictual and cooperative relations within Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations in different eras. This study argues that broader political context has a 
determinant role in the Ilısu dam dispute, as in the case of inter-state hydropolitical relations. 
Here, the main factor influencing hydropolitical relations between the pro-dam and anti-dam 
actors in the Ilısu dam dispute is the Kurdish issue. The link between the Kurdish issue and 
water has already been elaborated by number of academic studies (Eder and Çarkoğlu 2001, 
Harris 2002, Oktav 2003, Warner 2012). Referring to elements of the hydraulic mission, 
promoted by the Turkish state elites, hydraulic development in the Eastern and Southeastern 
Anatolian region has particular importance due to the following reasons.  
 
First, Eastern and Southeasrtern Anatolian regions rank lowest in terms of socio-economic 
development among other regions in Turkey. For example, both regions constitute 
approximately 6% of Turkey’s entire GDP, which is mainly produced in agricultural sector 
(Kurmuş, Kudat et al. 2006, Eşiyok and Sekmen 2012, Mıhcı 2012). Therefore, regional 
hydraulic development projects such as the GAP is considered a vital tool for covering socio-
economic disparities of the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia with rest of the country.  
 
Second, as briefly discussed in Chapter 6, there were several ethno-religious insurgences in 
the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, which the central government dealt with in the early 
period of the republic. Therefore, the ethno-religious demography of the regions (particularly 
the Southeastern Anatolian region) added further security concerns on national and territorial 
integrity of the state in eyes of the state elites. Thus, as the PKK, claiming an independent 
Kurdish state in the region, became a formidable threat to territorial integrity of the state, 
hydraulic development projects such as the GAP is the main tool for the ultimate solution of 
the Kurdish issue. According to this point of view, the socio-economic backwardness of the 
Southastern Anatolian region is the roots cause of violent conflict in the Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolian regions. Therefore, the GAP would remedy the socio-economic 
disparities thereby solve the Kurdish issue on a permanent basis (Eder and Çarkoğlu 2001). 
The Turkish discursive elites consider the Ilısu dam project as one of the most important 
element of the GAP in achieving socio-economic aims of the GAP.  
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While the PKK conflict is portrayed as violent issue stemming from socio-economic 
backwardness of the Southeastern Anatolian region, particular segments of Ilısu anti-dam 
network claim that the root cause of conflict is the denial of the Kurdish identity and 
individual and collective rights of the Kurdish people forming bulk of population in the 
region. As will be exemplified below, this perception has also shaped identities and interests 
of some of actors opposing the GAP in general and the construction of the Ilısu dam project 
in particular. Therefore, this mutual identity construction by the state elites and some of the 
actors in the opposition network of the Ilısu dam result in construction of incompatible views 
over the same physical reality. Moreover, these mutually perceived identities constructed in 
the context of the Kurdish issue and violent character of the PKK conflict in the region has 
constituted for the lack of middle ground views regarding the issue. Building upon the role of 
the Kurdish issue in the sanctioned discourses constructed around the GAP in general, this 
section scrutinises how the Kurdish issue has affected development of the Ilısu anti-dam 
network in particular.  
 
8.3.2.1. The Paradox of Kurdish issue both Catalysing and hindering anti-dam Efforts 
 
The role of Kurdish issue on the development of Ilısu anti-dam network is two-fold. It plays a 
catalyst role in the establishment of the Ilısu anti-dam network. However, paradoxically it 
serves as a hindrance in the development of the anti-dam opposition. There are two facets to 
the assertion of this apparent paradox. 
 
First, identity plays a vital role in the development of opposition against the Ilısu dam. While 
the sanctioned discourse constructed by the discursive elites of the state considers the project 
as an important tool for socio-economic development of the region and well being of the 
people, the NGOs located within the anti-dam network with a Kurdish identity recast the case 
and they perceive the hydraulic works as new tools for ‘assimilation of the Kurdish identity’. 
The Kurdish identity plays an important role in two leading NGOs of the anti-Ilısu dam 
campaign, the KHRP and the Hasankeyf Initiative. As previously discussed, the KHRP was 
founded to ‘defend and promote’ human rights issues in the regions where there is a 
significant portion of Kurdish population. Thus, it has considered the Ilısu dam from this 
aspect. Likewise, it is stated by İlhan, an activist from the Hasankeyf Initiative, that “…. the 
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Initiative was formed as a justice seeking platform taking into account primarily the Kurdish 
problem rather than environmental impacts of the proposed project.” (İlhan 2012).  
 
Likewise, Ayboğa, an activist from the Hasankeyf Initiative accuses the Turkish government 
for using hydraulic works as means for military operations and political repression in the 
region (Ayboğa 2012). Ayboğa also argues that one of the functions of large-scale dams is to 
establish ‘sovereign control’ over social groups, although this dimension is frequently 
neglected in terms of impacts of large dams. According to Ayboğa this mechanism works as 
follows. Since large-scale dams require displacement of large number of people, they are 
forced to settle in urban centres. However, they often live in poverty, since they can no longer 
conduct their economic activities in the urban centres. Therefore, they move from a self-
sufficient rural economic life to a market dependent urban life.  Another important outcome 
of this process, Ayboğa argues, is the assimilation of minority culture within the hegemonic 
culture (Ayboğa 2010:35,36). Ironically, one of the important aspects of the discourse is the 
project would curb migration to the urban centres and it would initiate a reverse population 
movement to the region, since number of job opportunities would be created through the 
implementation of the project. This remarkable contrast in perception of the same ‘physical 
context’ suggests that different discursive elites having different identities may construct 
incompatible ‘social facts’ from same physical reality.  Therefore, it could be argued that the 
Kurdish issue does, in fact, play an important role in the construction of these two discourses.  
 
Moreover, owing to highly politicised character of the Kurdish issue within and outside 
Turkey, the NGO networks which have already been established has provided an important 
platform for the Ilısu anti-dam network. For example, Atzl (2009:65) shows the role of 
Kurdish Student Association (YXK – Kurdish acronym) in mobilising Kurdish communities 
living across Europe against the construction of the Ilısu dam. Likewise, it is stated in the 
previous section that the Hasankeyf Initiative serves as a platform which includes local 
municipalities –majority of which is administered by the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy 
Party (BDP-Turkish Acronym) and wide-range of civil society organizations operating in the 
region.35  Moreover, the Hasankeyf Initiative also has ties with pro-Kurdish networks, which 
are active across Europe. These ties enable the Hasankeyf Initiative to establish transnational 
interactions with different actors at the international scale. Therefore, Kurdish issue plays an 
                                                        
35
 Since the BDP has also seats in the National Assembly, the link between the Initiative and the BDP also 
provides space for influence in a limited degree (Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm, 2012).   
305 
 
important role in the establishment of transnational anti-dam networks against the Ilısu dam 
project.  
 
The Kurdish issue also serves as a hindrance in development of the anti-dam network as well 
as its impact due to the following reasons.  
 
First, the persistence of violent conflict in the Southeastern Anatolia region strongly shapes 
people’s priorities. The activists from Hasankeyf Initiative argue this is the main reason why 
NGOs have not been able to fully mobilise local population in the region against the Ilısu 
dam (Interviewee 12   pers. comm. 2012, Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm. 2012).  
 
Second, the Hasankeyf Initiative or other NGOs having similar views towards the Kurdish 
issue and the BDP are frequently portrayed as actors in affiliating with the PKK. This 
perception limits the nation-wide support against the Ilısu dam as well as possible alliance 
opportunities with other NGOs (Interviewee 10 pers. comm. 2011, July 26, Interviewee 
Person 15 pers.comm. 2012). Owing to this, Atzl (2009:67) states that the ECA-Watch 
(Austria), the Hermsen Foundation (Germany) and the Nature Association (Turkey) initiated 
another campaign with more environmental focus to attract more nation-wide support from 
the Turkish audience. This also limits the possible involvement of other environmentally 
focused NGOs in Turkey. Thus, even the Nature Association, leading the environmentally 
focused campaign against the Ilısu, avoids aligning with the BDP on this matter (Interviewee 
10 pers. comm. 2011, July 26). However, it is worth noting that recently the emergence of 
local anti-dam activist networks against the small-scale HPPs across Turkey has enabled the 
Hasankeyf Initiative to seek new opportunities in making alliances with NGO networks. This 
newly emerged anti-dam activism against the HPPs has led to counter-sanctioned discourse 
as an alternative to hydraulic mission and marketization of water. Since this alternative 
discourse plays a determinant role in informing actors’ goals and their discursive power 
capabilities in the Ilısu dam dispute, the following part will further uncover this dimension in 
detail.  
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8.4. ANALYSIS C: Power Struggle in the Ilısu Dam Conflict  
 
 
After having identified how patterns of conflict between the pro-dam and anti-dam actors can 
be understood in the Ilısu dam conflict, this section aims to analyse the role of different 
dimensions of power in the hydropolitical relations between actors. This study argues that as 
in the case of inter-state politics of water outlined in the previous two chapters, the opponents 
and proponents of the Ilısu dam use both material and discursive power capabilities. In this 
chapter, after having identified the clear power asymmetry in terms of material, bargaining 
and ideational power capabilities, which favours the pro-dam actors, I will particularly focus 
on the strategies adopted by anti-dam actors and power tactics to realise these strategies.  
 
8.4.1. Assessing the Power Asymmetry Between the Opponents and Proponents 
of the Ilısu Dam Project  
 
There is a clear power asymmetry between the pro-dam and anti-dam networks in the Ilısu 
controversy for the following reasons. Firstly, the anti-dam network does not possess a 
particular territorial control, while the state, as the main proponent of the project, has absolute 
sovereign rights. Therefore, geography or riparian position as a dimension of power is simply 
unavailable for the anti-dam activist network. Moreover, due to unitary political structure of 
Turkey, the concept of sovereignty is only at the disposal of the central government. Second, 
the state also has monopoly to determine and modify (when it is needed) the legal order. In 
other words, state has a determinant power to form and modify the rules of the game in the 
domestic context. Third, pro-dam network also clearly has the advantage of financial 
resources.  
 
However, this clear power asymmetry does not necessarily mean that the anti-dam actors are 
entirely powerless. As the analytical framework shows, power is measured and exercised in a 
number of other ways that give considerable nuance and texture to the case of the Ilısu dam. 
The suite of other forms of power active in the Ilısu case becomes apparent when exploring 
the interests and goals of the actors involved. Here, while goals and interests can be 
considered as strategies, use of different dimensions of power can be considered as power 
tactics to realise those strategies. Referring to the framework of hydro-hegemony, Zeitoun 
and Warner (2006) identify resource capture, containment and integration as possible water 
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resource control strategies adopted by the strongest riparian states, hegemony of the basin, in 
transboundary water relations between /among riparian states. However, as Cascao (2009) 
argues relatively weaker riparian states are not entirely powerless they also adopt variety of 
resistance and counter-hegemonic mechanisms.  Similar to inter-state hydropolitical relations 
between riparian states, we may identify counter hegemonic and resistance mechanisms 
adopted by the opponents of the Ilısu dam conflict. These mechanisms can also be labelled as 
strategies adopted by the opponents of the Ilısu dam project to counter pro-dam actors. Being 
informed by the empirical literature regarding the Ilısu dam conflict, these strategies can be 
outlined as follows.  
 
Strategy 1 – counter-factuals (politicising the issue): The anti-dam actors seek to expose 
the counter-factual of hydraulic development. In doing so, it aims to increase awareness and 
support the audience (public, local people, ECAs, third party governments and so forth), 
thereby, ‘politicise’ the issue. To reach this aim, the actors mainly conduct ideational power 
tactics driven from the counter-sanctioned discourse.  
 
Strategy 2 – delay or possibly cancel: The network seeks to curb or at least slow down the 
project. Here, the actors conduct mainly bargaining power capabilities at different scales.  
 
Strategy 3 – offer an alternative (or alternative discourse): The anti-dam actors seek to 
realise the counter sanctioned discourse, as discussed in the previous section. The tactics of 
ideational power are mainly exerted to reach this aim.  
 
Zeitoun and Warner (2006) also argue that riparian states chose one of those water resources 
control strategies, resource capture, containment and integration, among others. However, as 
seen in the context of the Ilısu dam conflict, opponents adopt all these strategies. Thus, it 
appears that while politicising the issue and delaying or cancelling the project is short-term 
strategies of the opponents, but offering and imposing alternative sanctioned discourse can be 
considered as a long-term strategy adopted by the opponents. After having identified the 
strategies of the anti-dam network, the following section will focus on how opponents of the 
project use different power tactics to realise these strategies and influence in in the decision-
making processes. 
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8.4.2. Material Power  
 
Being informed by the theoretical framework (Chapter 3), the material power capabilities the 
Ilısu anti-dam actors possess are funding (economic power), ability to mobilise people by 
organizing non-violent actions and knowledge and expertise.  
 
In relation to economic power, although the power gap between the Ilısu anti-dam actors and 
the government is highly asymmetrical, NGOs are able to solve their financial issues by 
getting funding from international foundations and third party governments. Thus, rather than 
applying for joint funding to finance the campaign, each NGO separately accessed funding 
for its own role and shared the costs. For instance, the KHRP, the leading NGO in the first 
Ilısu dam campaign, was funded by a number of donors including international foundations 
and European governments (Interviewee 14 pers.comm. 2013). Likewise, by financing the 
ECA-Watch and the Nature Association, the German Manfred Hermsen Foundation has 
financially supported the second campaign centred in continental Europe and nation-wide 
environmentally focussed campaign in Turkey waged by the Nature Association (Atzl 
2009:79).  It is also worth noting that while developing large-scale scale projects like the Ilısu 
dam do require massive financial resources; the tasks conducted by the NGOs to hinder the 
project do not. In other words, even though there is clear power asymmetry in terms of 
financial resources between the government and NGOs, the latter are able to conduct their 
activities by using relatively smaller amounts of financial resources.   
 
Non-violent actions, conducted by the Ilısu ant-dam actors are another dimension of material 
power. Here, organising protests against the targeted actors is the main type non-violent 
method. However, actors also organise festivals, youth camps, or are part of other 
demonstrations, marches and so forth. The NGOs having activist dimension generally 
organise these non-violent actions, which is supported by the other Ilısu anti-dam actors. It 
could be argued that existence of strong transnational links allows the actors to organise 
protests within and outside Turkey. Infrastructure TNCs, banks, governmental institutions are 
chosen as targeted actors in such protests. Non-violent actions are not only organised to 
pressurise targeted actors, but also intended to raise awareness among mobilised groups. 
Therefore, the actors seek to include as many people as possible to increase their influential 
capacity. However, in spite of these attempts, the NGOs have difficulty in fully mobilising 
local population in the Ilısu dam site (Interviewee 12   pers. comm. 2012, Interviewee Person 
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15 pers.comm. 2012). Pictures 12 and 13 illustrated below are examples of such protests 
organised by Ilısu anti-dam network to targeted groups.  
 
Picture 12 Protest against the involvement of the Akbank in front of headquarters of Akbank in London 
 
 
The protest was held in London on 15th March 2010. The Turkish MP of the BDP at the time, Bengi Yıldız and 
the MEP of Green Party, Jean Lamptert, attended the protest.   
Source: KHRP 2010 
 
 
Picture 13 Activists from the Nature Association protest Garanti Bank, one of the creditors of the Ilisu 
dam project, for its involvement 
 
The protest was held in 2010 in front the of the headquarters of the Garanti bank in Istanbul due to its financial 
support  
Source: Nature Association 2010 
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Finally, the members of the Ilısu anti-dam network specialise in different fields such as 
environmental issues, those concerning human rights, displacement, cultural heritage and so 
forth. This diversity in knowledge and expertise provide the anti-dam network strong 
discursive power. Moreover, they are able to share and disseminate their knowledge, 
expertise, strategies and tactics through transnational network (Atzl 2009:76,77). This is also 
done by organising training programs, workshops and conferences; they are able to 
strengthen each other’s institutional capacity (İlhan 2011, Interviewee 14 pers.comm. 2013).  
 
To sum up, a clear power asymmetry can be identified between the opponents and proponents 
of the Ilısu dam in terms of material power capabilities, which favours the latter group of 
actors. Yet, opponents of the Ilısu dam also have material power capabilities. This study 
identifies ability to acquire funding from different organisations, organising non-violent 
actions that aim at raising awareness and publicity and ability to produce and share 
knowledge and expertise based on the fields that they specialise as material power 
capabilities of opponents.  
 
8.4.3. Political Opportunity Structures 
 
In the theoretical chapter, the study has shown a direct link between political opportunity 
structures and bargaining power capabilities of actors. Thus the concept of political 
opportunity structure has been analysed in the case of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations in the context of bargaining power in Chapter 6. Moreover, this study has shown 
that political opportunity structures are not fixed but subject to change over time. The study 
argues the more there are political opportunities for certain actors, the more bargaining power 
capabilities of actors increase.  
 
 
Since the Ilısu anti-dam actors do not have geography as a power capability, which is 
considered to be as one of the pillars of power dimension in theory of transboundary water 
politics, political opportunity structures have become even more important for the weaker 
actors – in this case, the anti-Ilısu dam actors in transnational hydropolitics. Here, political 
opportunity structures directly influence Ilısu anti-dam actors’ abilities to establish informal 
nation-wide or transnational networks, which enables them to open new spaces of influence.  
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The components of the opportunity structures that have enabled the anti-dam actors to 
establish a formidable opposition against the Ilısu dam project are: privatisation, salience of 
environmental law and other legal enforcement mechanisms, quantitative (their number) and 
qualitative (their impact) change in civil society actors, growing transnational opposition 
movements against the large-scale project across the world, changes in communication tools 
and movement of people.  
  
The first element of political opportunity is degree of privatisation in water resource 
development. Marketization and privatization in water resource development at the global 
scale has provided new opportunities to both proponents and opponents of large-scale 
projects.  A host of new actors show that forces of globalisation and movement of 
international capital has provided Turkish government new opportunities to finance its large-
scale projects. Moreover, movement of international capital has resulted in involvement of 
new actors such as infrastructure TNCs, nation-wide business, public and international 
creditors, ECAs and so on. This has resulted in relatively more complex decision-making 
processes. As we can see in the case of the Ilısu dam dispute, anti-dam networks have been 
able to influence pro-dam decision-making mechanisms. For example, engaging in 
environmental impact assessment plans stipulated by the ECAs to the DSI is the main space 
of influence used by opponents of the dam.  
 
The second element of opportunity is the salience of environmental law. In the case of 
Turkey, environmental law and regulation has gradually increased since 1980s. This process 
has particularly accelerated in the EU where Turkey has started to harmonise its 
environmental legal order with the EU legal order on environmental issues in general and 
water development in particular. In relation to dam development, perhaps one of the most 
important developments in the Turkish legal context is the adoption of by-law on 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in 1993. The by-law on the EIA has been revisited 
and the final amendment was done in 2008 to harmonise it with the EU EIA directive 
(Scheumann, Baumann et al. 2011:142,143). Here, the anti-dam activism, like in the case of 
the Ilısu dam, the phase of the EIA processes is one of the main accession points of anti-dam 
activist networks to engage in decision-making processes (Interviewee Person 17 2011). 
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The third element of political opportunity structure is both qualitative and quantitative change 
in involvement of civil society actors in Turkey.  There have been a growing number of civil 
society actors advocating around various related issues including human rights issues, gender 
issues, environmental issues and so on (Adem 2005, Aydın 2005, Keyman 2005). Keyman 
(2005:43,44) states that economic and political liberalisation processes since 1980s, 
emergence of identity issues (the rise of political Islam and the Kurdish nationalism), 
attempts to democratise the state-society relations are the main factors leading to quantitative 
increase of civil society actors. Keyman also argues that in spite of rapid increase in number 
of civil society actors in different issues, their qualitative impact has largely remained limited 
during 1980s and 1990s. With the EU integration process since 2000, however, civil society 
actors have also started to play an influential role (Keyman 2005:45,46). These significant 
changes in state-society relations have significantly influenced proliferation of non-state 
actors dealing with water development issues (Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm. 2012). 
 
 
The fourth element of political opportunity structure is the growing transnational advocacy 
networks across the world. Anti-dam activist networks against large-scale dams have 
dramatically increased across the world. In that sense, it would be misleading to consider the 
anti-dam campaign against the Ilısu dam as an isolated case. It is a part of longstanding 
struggle, which can be traced back to 1970s, against large-scale dams, waged by local, 
nation-wide and international opposition networks (Conca 2006). In number of similar cases 
such as anti-dam campaign against Narmada Valley project in India, Itoiz dam in Spain, Pak 
Mun dam in Thailand, Xaburi dam in Laos, Belo Monte Dam in Brazil and so on, we may 
observe similar local, nation-wide and international campaigns (Conca 2006, Khagram 2004). 
As a result, in some of these projects anti-dam campaigns resulted in postponing, cancelling 
or even decommissioning of dams (Khagram 2004). Another outcome of these anti-dam 
campaigns is construction and promotion of new set of norms and ideas on how social, 
environmental adverse impacts of large-scale projects can be addressed (Conca 2006:192). 
Moreover, these set of norms and ideas were not only promoted at global scales but also 
institutionalised as rules and criteria, which stipulates different players such as 
intergovernmental organisations, ECAs, TNCs and so on. For instance, the criteria on large 
dams outlined in the World Commission on Dams (WCD) Report (2000) have formed the 
main criteria for ECAs on environmental impact assessment to be met by the DSI 
(Scheumann 2008:68,69). As discussed in previous parts, the ToRs stipulated by the ECAs 
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provided an opportunity for the opponents of the Ilısu dam to influence. Therefore, recently 
promoted norms regarding the impacts of the large-scale hydraulic projects by the 
international bodies like WCD have increased Ilısu anti-dam actors’ influential capacities.  
 
 
A final element of political opportunity structure is changes in communication tools and 
revolutionary changes in communication, increased movement of people, expansion of 
English as globally spoken language has eased establishing transnational and nation-wide 
activist networks (Tarrow 2005:5). These developments enabled exchange of knowledge, 
expertise and experience among the actors more easily; it also helps transnational and nation-
wide advocacy networks. Moreover, as media has become more widespread and proliferated, 
the non-state actors effectively use it (Interviewee 10 pers. comm. 2011, July 26). In the case 
of Ilısu anti-dam activism, it could be argued these changes have also expanded actors’ 
influence in the decision-making processes. 
 
In my view changes in political opportunity structures in Turkey has resulted in establishment 
of opposition movements against hydraulic development projects as we have seen in the case 
of the Ilısu dam. The opposition against construction of the dam could be created within the 
context of this change in the Turkish domestic context, which occurred during 1990s and 
2000s. More importantly, considering the empirical case study outlined in the first section of 
this chapter (See 8.2), political opportunity structures have not remained fixed during the 
Ilısu dam dispute, which has impacted on bargaining power capabilities of opponents and 
proponents of the project. Therefore, by looking at such changes we can observe influential 
capacities of anti-dam actors in. Changes in political opportunity structures can be analysed 
within three different time periods as follows:  
 
a) The first period (1997-2001): Establishment of the 1st Ilısu dam consortium and 
opposition campaign.  
b) The second period (2004-2011): Establishment of the 2nd Ilısu dam consortium and 
opposition campaign.  
c) The third period (on-going since 2011): Amendment of the 2nd Ilısu dam consortium 
and opposition campaign.  
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Growing involvement of private sector and global financial capital during 1990s has provided 
opportunities to the Turkish government to mobilise new financial resources for its large-
scale hydraulic development projects. In other words, increasing role of private sector and 
global capital has increased Turkey’s bargaining power capabilities. While global financial 
capital provided opportunities to the Turkish government for new financial resources, the 
controversy over social and environmental impacts of the large dams at global scale provided 
opportunities for opponents for hydraulic development. Particularly, the establishment of the 
World Commission on Dams and the WCD principles and guidelines have become criteria 
for international creditors such as the World Bank and ECAs (Scheumann 2008:66,67). As 
shown in the case of Ilısu dam, international norms have provided considerable discursive 
power to the opponents.  
 
 
After the collapse of the 1st consortium, the Turkish government was able to gather another 
international consortium and the newly established consortium was able acquire credit 
assurance from the ECAs. Here, Turkey’s bargaining power over third party governments to 
which the ECAs belongs, can be considered as an important factor. To emphasise this point, 
Ercan Ayboğa, an activist from the Hasankeyf Initiative, states that: “We had direct 
discussions with representatives from the export credit agencies (ECAs) and European 
governments about the Ilısu project…they could not refute our arguments and basically 
agreed with our concerns. But then they say it is better for European companies to do the 
project rather than Chinese companies (Interview with Ercan Ayboğa 2008).”  
 
 
Furthermore, involvement of private sector and global capital in hydraulic development 
projects played an important role in the establishment of the 2nd consortium. Nonetheless, 
bargaining power capabilities of the opponents have increased due to political opportunity 
structures. The main changes in political opportunity structures are as follows. First, there has 
been growing influence of civil society actors in 2000s concerning environmental and various 
other issues. Thus, NGOs like the Nature Association and the Hasankeyf Initiative have 
emerged as active organisations in the Turkish domestic context against the project. Second, 
anti-dam activisms against the HPPs and emergence of number of informal anti-dam 
networks across Turkey have provided opportunities to the opponents of the Ilısu dam 
project. Finally, as the international consortium has shifted from the UK to continental 
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Europe, the NGOs such as ECA-Watch, Berne Deceleration, WEED, which already took part 
in the first campaign, have become more active in the second period. It is worth noting that 
among those NGOs, the Berne Declaration actively took part in the WCD processes (Conca 
2006:192). Thus, the second consortium ended with the withdrawal of credit guarantees 
provided by the ECAs.  
 
 
However, bargaining power capabilities of the opponents of the Ilısu dam has significantly 
decreased in the third period, since ECAs withdrew from the consortium as credit guarantors 
of the project. As indicated above, the ToRs (terms of references) stipulated by the ECAs to 
be fulfilled by the DSI was the main sphere of influence for anti-dam actors, which they have 
been able to construct claimed spaces. Cutting the money flow by claiming these spaces was 
the most effective bargaining power tactic successfully used by anti-dam actors twice. With 
the re-organisation of the second consortium, ECAs and subsequently the European banks 
and most of the foreign companies withdrew from the project; the ToRs were no longer the 
sphere of influence for Ilısu anti-dam actors. Re-organisation of the second consortium has 
also resulted in decrease in the impact of transnational NGOs such as ECA-Watch, Berne 
Declaration in this process.   
 
 
In my view, political opportunity structures, as a type of power, are the most important 
element of actors’ power capabilities (particularly for the opponents) in the Ilısu dam dispute. 
Therefore, this study suggests political opportunity structures as a separate type of power in 
transnational hydropolitics. The above-discussion shows major changes that have occurred in 
the Turkish domestic context during 1990s and 2000s enabling the opponents of the Ilısu dam 
project to establish an anti-dam movement. Furthermore, particular changes in opportunity 
structures during the Ilısu dam dispute has also directly affected actors’ capacity to influence. 
Actors’ capacity to influence is shaped by political opportunity and can be assessed by 
looking at the changes.   
 
8.4.4. Bargaining Power  
 
The bargaining power capabilities are of vital importance for the Ilısu anti-dam actors, since 
they do not have territorial control (geography or riparian position as a power dimension) and 
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there is a asymmetrical configuration on material power capabilities. It could be argued that 
they were able to engage and influence decision-making processes by using different types of 
bargaining power capabilities. The main driver to use bargaining power capabilities is to 
realise the following aims: curb (or at least slowing down) the project and politicise the issue. 
Being informed by the theoretical framework (Chapter 3) the main bargaining power tactics 
exerted by the Ilısu anti-dam actors are lobbying, using legal instruments, mobilising other 
related parties, building coalitions and drawing public attraction and support.  
 
Lobbying or pressurising the targeted groups is one of the main bargaining power tactics 
conducted by the opponents of the project. The main aim, in lobbying, is to cut the money 
flow by pressurising the targeted groups (Interviewee 14 pers.comm. 2013). Here, the third 
party governments backing the ECAs are the main targeted group for opponents of the 
projects. Apart from third party governments, the anti dam actors also approached to political 
parties in the third party states (particularly Green and Left-Wing Parties in Europe), 
institutions of the European Union (EU) such as the EU parliament, companies and banks 
enrolled in the Ilısu dam consortium.  
 
Using legal instruments is another bargaining power tactic used by the opponents of the Ilısu 
dam. Since Ilısu dam is exempted from the EIA processes, (the Turkish EIA by-law) limits 
the opponents of the project. 36 Yet, the anti-dam actors use the Turkish Law to hinder the 
project. In this respect, two cases were brought to the Council of State and Administrative 
Court of Ankara in 1999 and 2000 respectively. While the first case that claims cancellation 
of the Council of Ministers decision on the establishment of the consortium, the second case 
was forwarded to Administrative Court of Diyarbakir. The main standpoint of both cases is 
submergence of cultural and historical values of Hasankeyf town. Due to longstanding 
pending situation, the case in the Administrative of Diyarbakir was also appealed to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2006. 37 The main problem with these judicial 
                                                        
36
 According to EIA by-law, the projects whose master plans are approved prior to EIA by law, which came into 
force in 1993, are exempted from EIA processes. The Ilısu dam is one of the projects whose master plan is 
approved prior to enactment of the EIA by-law (Scheumann, Baumann et al 2011: 146).  
37Turkey is the signing party of the European Human Rights Convention. Therefore, the convention grants the 
Turkish citizens to make individual application to the ECHR in the issues related with the Convention. Although 
‘environmental rights’ or issues related with the cultural heritage are not specified in the Convention, the ECHR 
received cases on those issues and it made decisions. In this respect, the Bergama gold mining case in Turkey 
was brought to the ECHR. The ECHR adjudged the Turkish government to pay compensation to the local 
people (Ekşi 2008: 40, 41). Similar appeal has also made for the Ilısu dam project.  
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processes is their long standing pending situations for final decisions, while the project is 
underway (Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm. 2012).  
 
The Ilısu anti-dam actors also use judicial processes to hinder changes in legal context made 
by the executive bodies. For instance, the Initiative along with the Allainoi Initiative, which 
is another anti-dam activist network against the submergence of Allainoi ancient sites located 
in Western Anatolia owing to Yortanlı dam, appealed to the Council of State against the 
‘decision of principle’ made by the Supreme Board for the Conversation of Cultural and 
Natural Assets in 2006 (Interviewee 15 pers.comm. 2012). According to the decision of 
principle, the DSI would have full authority whether it is a necessity to build a dam project in 
culturally or naturally significant sites (Ministry of Culture and Tourism 2010). Since this 
authority was previously granted to the Supreme Board for the Conversation of Cultural and 
Natural Assets, the authority transfer to the DSI would mean closure of open space for 
engaging in decision-making process. However, the decision of the Council of State to 
suspend execution of the decision of principle is considered as an important achievement by 
the anti-dam NGO networks and disseminated to the other actors of the Ilısu anti-dam 
transnational networks as well as the Turkish public through media.  
 
Drawing public attention and support via using media sources is used as a bargaining 
power tactic by the opponents.  Here, one of the tactics conducted by the anti-dam actors is to 
seek support from prominent people including singers, composers, directors, actors and other 
celebrities. As a result of efforts made by NGOs, many prominent people within and outside 
of the Turkish society have supported the campaign by issuing statements, joining organised 
events and so forth. For example, Tarkan, Sezen Aksu, Ajda Pekkan (pop singers), Orhan 
Pamuk, Yasar Kemal (writers), Fatih Akin (movie director), Okan Bayulgen (showman and 
actor) and Mark Thomas (British Comedian) have supported the campaigns. Moreover, some 
of the supporters to the campaign have become representatives. For example, Mark Thomas, 
the British comedian, was one of the main public figures during the first campaign against the 
construction of the Ilısu dam (Interviewee 14 pers.comm. 2013). Likewise, the Turkish pop-
singer Tarkan has played a similar role in environmental campaigns led by the Nature 
Association. His involvement has attracted wide-range media attention and severe criticism 
from pro-dam actors, particularly the Turkish hydraucracy (Hurriyet Daily News 2010, 
October 21).  
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Coalition Building is another important bargaining power tactic for the Ilısu anti-dam actors. 
As already illustrated in this chapter, the opponents of the Ilısu dam wage campaign by 
establishing transnational and nation-wide informal networks. Therefore, the campaigns are 
forms of coalition building. This ability of establishing coalition enables the anti-dam actors 
to share costs, expertise and knowledge. Moreover, as in the case of the Hasankeyf Initiative, 
other NGOs having different interests located in the region are involved in the campaign by 
joining the initiative. In some cases, NGOs from the anti-dam network may establish strategic 
alliances. For instance, as stated above the Initiative and the Allainoi initiative jointly engage 
in particular judicial processes as seen in the previous example.  
 
Mobilising more powerful actors is important bargaining power tactics used by members of 
particular NGOs. The transboundary dimension of the Ilısu dam project provides certain 
opportunities for the NGOs to expand their influence. Here, the KHRP and the Cornerhouse, 
two leading NGOs of the first campaign, conducted task missions in Iraq and Syria to assess 
downstream impacts of the Ilısu dam as well as obtain support from both government and 
non-government actors against the project (KHRP 2002). However, the KHRP and the 
Cornerhouse was unable to get enough support, although state actors have shown interest in 
the works of the KHRP and Cornerhouse (Interviewee 14 pers.comm. 2013). Therefore, 
NGOs have not been able to mobilise a downstream bloc against the project The NGOs 
operating within Turkey also use this bargaining power tactic for expanding their influence. 
For example, the Nature Association sought to mobilise grass root movements by 
approaching municipal administrations most of which are run by the BDP (Interviewee 10 
pers. comm. 2011, July 26).  
 
Empowering relatively weaker actors can be seen as the final tool used by the Ilısu anti-dam 
networks. Here, the NGOs having knowledge and expertise seek to mobilise relatively 
weaker civil society organisations by conducting training. For example, the task missions 
conducted by the KHRP and the Cornerhouse do not only target to mobilise the Iraqi 
governmental bodies, but also civil society actors based in Iraq and Turkey.  
 
Likewise, NGOs from Iraq and the Marsh Arabs have been included in the campaign as a 
result of activities of the Initiative and its transnational dimensions across Europe. As a 
result, the actors such as the Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative (ICSSI), Civil 
Development Organisation (CDU) started to actively get involved in the Ilısu dam issue. 
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Considering the bargaining power tactics conducted by the opponents, lobbying pressurising 
targeted groups and using judicial procedures are the most effective bargaining power tactics 
to hinder the project. As shown above, lobbying and pressuring can particularly be effective 
if targeted towards the flow of money to finance the project. However, with the re-
organisation of the 2nd consortium, which resulted in withdrawal of most of the European 
actors, pressuring the targeted groups has become a less effective power tactic for Ilısu anti-
dam actors. The second effective bargaining power tactic used by the opponents is use of 
judicial processes. Considering the   judicial processes in general, the opponents were able to 
get favourable decision from the Turkish domestic courts. However, the main problem is that 
it often takes considerable amount of time, while the projects are underway as seen in the 
case of the Ilısu dam (Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm. 2012). Moreover, as stated above, 
the executive bodies have the power to set and change rules of the game by using legislative 
processes.  
 
8.4.5. Ideational Power  
 
To recall from Chapter 3, ideational power refers to the ability to promote and impose 
particular sanctioned discourse. As shown in the previous chapters, the discursive elites in 
Turkey have been able to impose a sanction discourse that would rationalise extensive 
hydraulic development projects on water resources. While this sanctioned discourse started as 
a typical hydraulic mission, it has evolved over time as the discourses such as environmental 
discourse, marketization, holistic approach to water resource development have been 
promoted in global scales and they have been diffused in the Turkish domestic context. In 
spite of changes in discursive field, extensive hydraulic development conducted by the 
Turkish government (recently by the private sector actors) had largely remained unchallenged 
until 2000s within the Turkish domestic context.  
 
However, as I have discussed above, the discourse promoted by the state elites was disputed 
by the counter sanctioned discourse drawing upon environmental and political resistance 
discourse. In this section, I will focus on ideational power tactics conducted by the opponents 
of the projects. Here, ideational power tactics are used primarily for putting the Ilısu dam 
project and the water policy of the Turkish government into public debate. In other words, 
opponents of the project primarily aim to politicise the issue as a short-term target. However, 
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it seems that they also aim to promote the ‘counter sanctioned discourse’ as a prevailing 
paradigm in water resource development in the long run. Thus, main ideational power tactics 
are identified and elaborated here are counter-securitisation, refuting the sanctioned discourse 
and framing.  
 
8.4.5.1. Securitisation and Counter-securitisation moves  
 
Given the fact that the Ilısu dam project is part of the GAP (Southeastern Anatolian Project), 
similar rational is at work in securitisation of the Ilısu dam as we have discussed through 
securitisation of hydraulic projects in general and the GAP in particular (See Chapter 6). 
Since the project is the largest-scale hydraulic dam with its reservoir capacity and 
hydropower generation, the Turkish politicians and the Turkish hydraucracy portray it as the 
lynchpin of the Tigris part of the GAP.  
 
However, the opponents also conduct several counter-securitisation speech acts in the 
following ways:  
 
The first way of counter-securitisation is securitising the environment. The NGOs, which 
oppose the project on environmental grounds, portray the Ilısu dam as an existential threat to 
the Tigris Valley and its flora and fauna. The second way of counter-securitisation is 
securitising cultural heritage. As we see in the case of the Hasankeyf, preservation of culture 
and history is being securitised and the Ilısu dam project is portrayed as an existential threat. 
The third way of counter-securitisation is securitising is recasting. Opponents of the Ilısu dam 
use different methods to recast the issue. First, since the project results in displacement of 
people in the project area, resettlement of people from the project area is portrayed as a 
‘human rights issue’ (Warner 2004:20). Here, owing to linkage between the project and the 
Kurdish issue, the securitising actors also portray the problem as a threat to the Kurdish 
identity. Second, the discursive elites stress on downstream impacts of the Ilısu dam and 
portray the projects as an existential threat to downstream riparian states of the Tigris River.  
 
Opponents of the Ilısu dam project conduct counter-securitisation moves as securitising 
actors. However, it is worth noting that each securitising move is conducted by particular 
securitising actors in the wide range of Ilısu anti-dam actors network. This mainly stems from 
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the fact that each actor specializes in particular issue area and some actors do not want to be 
in the same line with particular actors and issue areas. Finally, the audience of securitising 
moves are as follows: the public, NGO networks themselves and the decision makers. The 
public mainly includes, general public opinion in Turkey, opinion leaders, prominent 
members of the Turkish society, the local people and communities living outside Turkey and 
audience from downstream countries and the third party states from Europe (in relation to the 
involvement of the respective ECAs).  
 
8.4.5.2. Refuting the sanctioned discourse 
  
The opponents of the Ilısu dam seek to identify the weaknesses of existing sanctioned 
discourse promoted by the pro-dam actors and conduct refuting discourses. Opponents of the 
project use existing dams as ‘bad’ examples of how large-scale dams can have adverse social 
and environmental impacts. For example, it is claimed by the NGOs with environmental 
focus that large-scale dam projects on the Euphrates resulted in loss of ecosystem hosting 
various endangered species. This increased the significance of the Tigris Valley, as the only 
natural habitat for those species. In similar vein, the opponents of the Ilısu dam used the 
previous controversy around Zeugma and Halfeti historical sites, which were partly 
submerged due to the Birecik dam, built in the mainstream Euphrates River (Shoup 2006). 
The controversy over the Birecik dam is reflected in the discourse of the opponents of the 
Ilısu dam as ‘we have given Halfeti, Zeugma but we won’t give Hasankeyf” (Interviewee 
Person 15 pers.comm. 2012).  
 
8.4.5.3. Providing Alternatives or Politicisation  
 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, while securitisation implies ‘there is no 
alternative (TINA)’ approach, politicisation reveals possible alternatives. Therefore, 
providing alternative water policy, hydraulic development project (as an alternative to the 
Ilısu dam), alternative socio-economic development approach are used by the opponents of 
the Ilısu dam to show ‘counter-factuals’ of the existing project. Opponents of the project have 
conducted following methods as ideational power tactics.  
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First, as shown above, opponents of the Ilısu dam seek to provide an alternative water 
resource development paradigm as a counter sanctioned discourse. Here, they have published 
academic works, reports, forums, and conferences to promote the ‘counter sanctioned 
discourse discussed above. Second, the opponents of the dam also suggest alternative 
approaches of socio-economic development instead of hydraulic development based on 
construction of large-scale dams. For example, tourism is suggested by the opponents as an 
alternative development approach that could galvanize socio-economic development in the 
region. Moreover, they also suggest alternative energy resources to fill the vacuum left by 
hydropower development. For instance, the opponents of the Ilısu dam project suggest other 
renewable energy resources such as solar energy, wind energy (Interview with Güven Eken 
2009). These alternatives are promoted by the NGOs, though how they are implemented still 
remains ambiguous. Finally, alternative hydraulic development projects are promoted by 
some of the Ilısu anti-dam actors. For example, the Nature Association recommended the 
alternative Ilısu project to the private banks to be considered, which suggests five smaller 
scale dams on the Tigris basin instead of one big large dam. Even though the Nature 
Association is not particularly keen on constructions of five dams, it presented the plan to the 
Akbank and Garanti bank, the Turkish private banks as creditors of the project, for their 
consideration (Interviewee 11 pers. comm. 2013, February 19). 
 
8.4.5.4. Framing 
 
As I have shown in the first analytical chapter, discursive elites of state frequently use 
framings as ideational power tactics to communicate targeted audience more effectively. For 
instance state elites use both verbal and visual framings to link hydraulic development with 
the progress of the state.   
 
Framings are also a frequently used method by the opponents of the projects even at greater 
degree. One of the ways of framing is by making analogies. The different sides of the Ilısu 
anti-dam network conduct speech acts. For instance, as stated above, Maggie Ronayne, 
academic and activist in the campaign, describes the project as ‘a monument to barbarism’. 
Likewise, Kavuş, from the Hasankeyf Initiative, describes what is happening in Hasankeyf is 
a ‘cultural genocide’ because of the project. He states “as destructions of the Buddha Statues 
323 
 
created an outrage in Afghanistan in the world opinion, we expect similar sensitivity from the 
world regarding the submergence of Hasankeyf [author’s own translation] (Kavuş 2006).”   
 
 
Likewise, Eken, the head of the Nature Association, equates the importance of Hasankeyf for 
Turkey with the significance of the Great Wall for China or the Pyramids of Egypt. This 
argument also constitutes the campaign that calls for including Hasankeyf as one of 
UNESCO’s world cultural heritage sites (Interview with Güven Eken 2009).   
 
Framings can also be identified in audio-visual materials produced by the Ilısu anti dam 
actors. For example, the Tigris River is described as the ‘last wild free river’ in the whole 
Middle East Region in the short documentary, called Damocracy, produced by the Nature 
Association (Southgate 2013). While the pro-dam actors use the ‘necklace metaphor’ to 
describe the dams that glamourize the rivers, opponents of the HPPs depict dams as human 
intervention to detain freedom of rivers and pull apart communities united by rivers (Nurol 
Private Company 2006). Likewise, as illustrated in the Picture 14 below, the Garanti bank, 
one of the creditors of the project is targeted as the responsible actor to submerge Hasankeyf. 
Here, instead of directly targeting the bank itself, the Turkish national basketball team 
sponsored by the Garanti bank is used to convey the message more effectively to the 
audience.  
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Picture 14 Flyer prepared by the activists to get media and public attention and support 
 
 
The flyer illustrates the 12 Giant Men, the nickname of the Turkish national basketball team with the 
background of Hasankeyf under water. The flyer reads, “ Will the 12 Giant Men submerge Hasankeyf? “ 
Source: The picture is derived from a Facebook page that has been established to support Ilısu dam campaign. 
 
8.5. Conclusion  
 
The chapter analysed the transnational politics of water in the ET basin by looking at the dam 
dispute between the proponents and opponents of construction of the Ilısu. The findings of 
this chapter are summarised as follows.   
 
Considering the empirical case analysed above, the study illustrates that in comparison to 
inter-state politics of water, which is analysed in previous two chapters, involvement of 
actors and scalar dynamics are much more complex and diverse in transnational 
hydropolitics. It further shows that not only public sector actors are involved in political 
processes related to water, but a host of actors from private sector and civil society can also 
be identified, which are actively involved in (or attempt to be involved in) such processes. 
The chapter also shows that transnational politics of water necessarily includes multi-scalar 
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dynamics due to involvement of various actors. As seen in the case of the Ilısu dam dispute, 
the chapter identified transnational, regional, national and local scales.  
 
The study in this Chapter finds that conflict over the construction of the Ilısu dam can only be 
understood in the context of growing anti-dam movements (particularly against private-led 
small scale Hydropower Plants) across Turkey. The chapter shows that political economy of 
the Kurdish issue and issues related with the Kurdish identity establish the broader political 
context. Here, the Kurdish issue paradoxically catalyses and hinders the anti-dam efforts 
against the construction of the dam.  
 
The chapter argues that the Ilısu dam dispute must be understood in terms of conflict between 
two competing sanctioned discourses. Here, the existing sanctioned discourses are drawn 
upon paradigms of hydraulic mission, marketization of water and the holistic approach (the 
fifth paradigm). Pro-dam actors, composed of actors from public and private sector, are the 
discursive elites promoting the existing sanctioned discourse. The counter-sanctioned 
discourses are drawn upon the paradigm of ecological and political resistance to hydraulic 
development projects across the world. Anti-dam actors, largely composed of actors from 
civil society and to a limited extent from public sector, are the discursive elites promoting 
counter-sanctioned discourses. The existing discourses and the counter-sanctioned discourses 
also form ideational power capabilities of actors.  
 
Finally, the Chapter illustrates material and discursive power capabilities opponents and 
proponents have central importance in determining the outcome of the Ilısu dam conflict. 
Ilısu anti-dam networks adopt the following strategies: politicising the case, cancelling, if not, 
delaying the project and realising a paradigm shift on water resource development. They use 
material, bargaining and ideational power tactics to realise these strategies. Moreover, the 
Chapter introduces the concept of opportunity structure as determining factor increasing or 
decreasing anti-dam actors’ influential capacities (bargaining power). Furthermore, the 
above-discussion regarding power struggle between the opponents and proponents of the Ilısu 
dam project is not only guided by existing conceptual frameworks on water (the Framework 
of Hydro-hegemony, the framework of Counter- Hydro-hegemony), but also further 
diversifies the frameworks in terms of material, bargaining and ideational power tactics. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
FINAL ANLAYSIS: APPLYING THE ENHANCED ANLAYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
of POWER to INTER-STATE and TRANSNATIONAL HYDROPOLITICS  
 
9.1. Introduction  
 
The main aim of this chapter is to draw out the findings from analytical chapters (6, 7 and 8) 
and discuss them within the theoretical framework (Chapter 3) to deduce further theoretical 
and empirical contributions.  
 
As explained at the end of Chapter 5, this study adopted a particular analytical format in 
making the hydropolitical analysis in Chapters 6,7 and 8 (See Section 5.4). This chapter will 
follow a similar analysis design and it will refine findings of the study in terms of politics of 
scale and power, factors leading to patterns of conflict and cooperation and power relations 
and the role of power in hydropolitical relations. As explained in the beginning of the thesis, 
the conceptual focus of this study to look at two layers of hydropolitics; inter-state and 
transnational hydropolitics (See Section 1.4.1). Theoretical and empirical findings derived 
from analytical chapters will be summarised in terms of these two layers separately in the 
subsequent sections.  
 
9.2. Capturing the Layers of Hydropolitics  
 
One of the distinguishing character of this study is it not only examines inter-state relations 
between riparian states, but also analyses transnational anti-dam activist movements in the 
context of a certain hydraulic project (the Ilısu dam) between the proponents and opponents.  
 
Using such a conceptual focus revealed that hydropolitics as a study area is composed of 
different layers. In other words, it would be misleading to understand hydropolitics as merely 
inter-state relations between riparian states, although most of the academic work deals with 
this dimension. Being informed by the conceptualization made by Mollinga and the empirical 
cases of this study, the study identified five layers in hydropolitics, which are:  
 
I. Inter-state Hydropolitics  
II. Transnational Hydropolitics  
III. Sub-national Hydropolitics  
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IV. Global Hydropolitics  
V. Everyday Hydropolitics  
 
As shown in Section 1.3, this study does not intend to capture all the layers of hydropolitics 
but focuses on the first two layers, inter-state and transnational hydropolitics. The third layer, 
sub-national hydropolitics, was included in the analysis to relate it with transnational 
hydropolitics. The inter-state relations between riparian states was analysed in the context of 
the Turkish-Syrian inter-state hydropolitical relations in Chapters 6 and 7. Transnational 
hydropolitics was analysed in the context of the Ilısu dam conflict between opponents and 
proponents in Chapter 8. The findings conclude that understanding hydropolitics of the ET 
basin merely in terms of inter-state relations among riparian states, Turkey, Syria and Iraq is 
too narrow and argues that other layers must be taken into consideration. To partially 
overcome this shortcoming in literature, this study, first, outlined the critical body of 
literature, which seeks to understand patterns of conflict and cooperation between riparian 
states in different transboundary water contexts and analyse the role of power in 
transboundary water politics in Chapter 2. Second, the study established a theoretical 
framework based upon the critical body of literature and applied to analytical chapters, which 
deals with both layers of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics. The theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter 3 improved the critical body of literature in the following 
ways. First, the study showed that critical body of literature constituted the backbone of the 
theoretical frameworks applicable to empirical cases, the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relation over time and the Ilısu dam conflict between the opponents and proponents of the 
project. Therefore, by taking the case of the Ilısu dam, the study extends the utility of critical 
body of literature beyond inter-state hydropolitical relations between/among riparian states in 
transboundary water basins. Second, the study showed that scales and involvement of 
varieties of actors are much more diverse and complex. Complex character of scales and 
involvement of actors led this study to problematize the politics of scale and its relation with 
power in hydropolitics. Furthermore, problematizing enabled the study to inform critical 
body of literature. Therefore, the concept of scale, power and actor mapping formed the 
pillars of the hydropolitical analysis in this research.  
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9.3. Concept of Scale in Hydropolitics  
 
The study problematized the concept of scale to understand different sets of interactions 
among variety of actors such as different apparatuses of nation-state (ministries, 
municipalities, local governmental organisations and so on), regional governments, inter-
governmental organisations, TNCs and other nation-wide business, private banks, NGOs, 
informal activists networks and so on. Since the concept of scale is most debated in different 
disciplines such as geography, human geography, environmental governance, the study 
particularly focussed on two broad meanings of scale. First, the concept of scale is 
understood as spatial magnitudes such as region, basin, sub-basin and province. These are 
referred as spatial scales in existing literature. Second, scales are understood as interactions 
between levels of organisations such as international, global, provincial inter-state, 
transnational and so on. These are scales of governance where varieties of interactions occur 
among actors in decision-making processes on water related issues. The study concludes that 
both spatial scales and scales of governance are socially constructed and are politically 
contested.  
 
This study clearly shows that nation states play a determinant role, as the most powerful 
actor, in construction of spatial scales such as basin, sub-basin, region and province and so 
on. Moreover, the debate on whether ET basin should be considered a single basin or two 
separated basins, these constructions of spatial scales are reflected in inter-state relations in 
transboundary basins and they may be the core of political contestation between riparian 
states.  
 
The study draws the following conclusions on the scales of governance. First, 
intergovernmental networks between different state apparatuses of the Turkish and Syrian 
government form the main scale, which was referred as transboundary scale in this study. 
Limited involvement of third parties in decision-making processes is the main reason why 
this scale is constructed in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. Since both states have 
strong unitary structures, the interactions between local government institutions remained 
limited and subject to approval of central governments. Therefore, unitary state structures of 
both states can be considered as another factor why transboundary scale is the main scale of 
governance. The study showed in Chapter 7 that transboundary scale continued to be the 
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main scale of governance in spite of the attempts made by NGOs such as the SIWI, ETIC to 
influence in decision making processes of the ET basin.  
 
Second, the Ilısu dam conflict shows that as various actors from civil society and private 
sector were directly or indirectly involved in decision-making processes, national and 
international scales proliferated. Since actors located in international scales act 
transnationally in the case of the Ilısu dam, the study used the term transnational scale within 
international scale. This enables to differentiate transboundary and transnational scales within 
the category of international scale. Moreover, actors located in national scale can be 
delineated as sub-national and local scales according to their geographical origins within 
Turkey. These above-stated points are illustrated in Table 23 below. The table also locates 
actors involved in decision-making processes in the empirical cases of this study in terms of 
their position in state-society relations. Accordingly, actors are located in public sectors –
referring to governmental bodies-, private sector and civil society. 
 
Table 22 Mapping actors and scales in inter-state and transnational hydropolitics of the ET basin  
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 2014   
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As can be seen from Table 22, transnational, regional, national and local scales are main 
scales identified in the context of Ilısu dam dispute between opponents and proponents of the 
project. While regional and transnational states can be considered within international scales, 
national and local scales can be considered within domestic scales. Moreover, the table also 
includes transboundary scale, which was relevant in the context of the inter-state 
hydropolitics between Turkey and Syria.  Here, one of the key findings is mapping actors is 
the state (in our case Turkey) acts as a reference point between international and domestic 
scales in transnational hydropolitics. What makes transnational hydropolitics distinctive is 
actors from private, public sectors and civil society may interact with each other by passing 
the state. For example, local NGOs create alliances with other NGOs critical to export credit 
guarantee processes to large-scale projects provided by the ECAs (such as ECA Watch, 
Cornerhouse) and they pressure the ECAs, third party governments and TNCs. Furthermore, 
various interactions and alliances can be identified among the state (referring to different 
parts of the state apparatus such as judiciary, hydraucuracies) and actors from private sector 
and civil society.  
 
9.4. Scales and Politics Mix in Theory  
 
One of the contributions of this study is it not only maps out actors according scales 
considering different layers of hydropolitics, but the study also seeks to understand how these 
scales are constructed. The study argues that construction of scales is a power-laden process. 
To understand how scales are constructed as a result of power relations between actors, the 
study integrates the power cube approach developed by John Gaventa into hydropolitical 
analysis. Referring to the power cube approach, discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of place 
can be equated with scales of governance. Gaventa also introduces the concept of space, 
referring to platforms in which decision-making occurs and different actors influence or seek 
to influence. Gaventa identifies closed, invited and claimed spaces. The analytical chapters 
indicate invited, closed and claimed spaces at these scales of governance in the context of 
inter-state and transnational hydropolitics. The following conclusions can be drawn on inter-
state hydropolitics regarding the link between scales and power.  
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Firstly, both Turkish and Syrian governments keep closed spaces for excluding the riparian 
state or the third parties in their bilateral relations. Since the Syrian government has an upper 
hand in the Orontes basin in terms of geography, hydraulic infrastructure vis-à-vis the 
Turkish government, it has managed to keep inter-governmental negotiations as a closed 
space for the Turkish government for decades. Here, non-cooperation was exerted by the 
Syrian government as a main power tactic to exclude Turkish government. Whereas, since 
the Turkish government has an advantageous position in the ET basin and it enjoys power 
supremacy in terms of geography, material, bargaining and ideational power capabilities vis-
à-vis the Syrian government, it has managed to keep intergovernmental negotiations among 
riparian states as a closed space for third parties by imposing its discursive position in 
transboundary scale.  
 
 
Secondly, given the asymmetrical power configuration between the Turkish and Syrian 
government, the latter is seeking to claim new claimed spaces to increase its capacity to 
influence. For example, the Syrian government defended the view that international bodies 
such as the International Court of Justice can be used as a way to resolve water conflict 
between riparian states of the ET basin. This discursive position adopted during the bilateral 
and trilateral negotiations in 1980s and 1990s shows that the Syrian government claims new 
spaces for influence in decision-making processes.  
 
Thirdly, both Turkish and Syrian governments agreed to establish invited spaces as platforms 
for decision-making at transboundary scale. Here, the JTC (Joint Technical Committee) and 
ad hoc bilateral meeting between decision-makers have remained as invited spaces in which 
decision-making took place for decades. However, the impact of the JTC on the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations in particular and in Turkey, Syria and Iraq in general was 
minor, since very limited mandate was delegated to the JTC by the riparian states.  
 
Fourthly, changes in broader political context and political opportunity structures resulted in 
construction of new invited spaces or claimed spaces in decision-making. For example, a 
notable political rapprochement in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in 2000s made 
it possible establishment HLSCC (High Level Strategic Cooperation Council) as a new 
invited space for decision-making in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. Likewise, 
the pursuit of Turkish government to get financial assistance from international creditors 
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provided an opportunity for Syrian government to claim for a new space to influence in 
decision-making.  
 
The following conclusions can be drawn on transnational hydropolitics:  
 
Firstly, given the power asymmetry between pro-dam and anti-dam actors favouring the 
former, it is the relatively weaker party in terms of material, bargaining and ideational power 
capabilities seeking to open new claimed spaces to increase its bargaining power capabilities 
as in the case of inter-state hydropolitics. For example, one of the bargaining power tactics 
used by the opponents of the Ilısu dam project is to engage in the judicial processes. This can 
also be seen as an attempt to open new claimed spaces in decision-making processes. As 
Chapter 8 has shown Ilısu anti-dam actors have used both domestic and international courts 
to open new claimed spaces. Likewise, organising field visits to downstream riparian states 
and informing actors about the adverse effects of the Ilısu dam are attempts to open new 
claimed spaces and influence decision-making processes.  
 
Secondly, pro-dam actors tend to keep existing spaces for decision-making processes and 
hinder opening of new claimed spaces, which may influence existing spaces. For example, in 
the official memorandum issued by the Prime Ministry of Turkey in April 2012, one of the 
articles states complementary construction work would be exempted from the EIA 
(environmental impact assessment) Law as in the main body of the projects (see Section 
8.2.4). Since the EIA process stipulated by the Turkish environmental law enables the civil 
society groups to engage in judicial processes against the construction of dams, buildings, 
bridges and so on, the attempt to exempt complementary construction work made by the 
Prime Ministry can hinder possible opening of new claimed space by anti-dam actors. Thus 
as soon as the memorandum was issued by the Prime Ministry, this article stated in the 
memorandum was brought to the administrative court by anti-dam actors for cancellation. 
This empirical example shows how actors actively use different bargaining power tactics to 
claim or keep spaces in hydropolitics.   
 
Finally, political opportunity structures play a determining role in anti-dam actors’ ability to 
claim for new spaces. As shown in the case of Ilısu dam several factors such as qualitative 
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and quantitative change in the role civil society actors, involvement of private sector actors 
within and outside Turkey, growing salience of transnational advocacy networks against 
construction of large-dams across the world enabled the anti-dam actors to claim for new 
spaces in decision-making processes. This study finds that political opportunity structures are 
so important in transnational hydropolitics henceforth they must be considered as a separate 
factor in power relations between anti-dam and pro-dam actors.  
 
9.6. Understanding Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in Hydropolitics  
 
One of the overarching aims of this study is to understand factors leading to patterns of 
conflict and cooperation between actors in different layers of hydropolitics. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the critical body of literature formed the departure point for this study in 
understanding conflictual and cooperative processes between actors on water issues. 
However, even though this literature, to some extent, enables in understanding patterns of 
conflict and cooperation, it partially explains how we can conceptualise the factors leading to 
conflict and cooperation. This study argued that and cooperation could be explained by 
looking at combination of two overarching factors.  
 
Firstly, we may identify sets of norms, ideas regarding water resources development, which 
can be generalizable and applicable to all hydro-social context in hydropolitics. Actors in 
hydropolitics adopt those sets of norms that inform their interests in hydropolitics. The 
concept of competing prevailing paradigms developed by Tony Allan enables us to grasp 
those particular sets of norms, ideas, rules and practices in hydropolitics.  
 
Secondly, there are certain cultural considerations, actors’ perceived identities constructed as 
a result of repeated interactions over water and non-water issues, domestic security concerns, 
political considerations, which are directly or indirectly associated with water issues. Such 
values constructed within certain hydro-social context are not generalizable and may change 
over time. This study refers to this aspect as ‘broader political context’, which conditions 
hydropolitical relations thereby affecting conflictual and cooperative actions between actors.  
 
However, this study does not suggest that actors’ material and discursive power capabilities 
and power symmetries or asymmetries have no affect on patterns of conflict and cooperation 
in hydropolitics. On the contrary, as shown in the theoretical framework direct linkages can 
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be identified. Empirical evidence derived from analytical chapters show broader political 
context; prevailing water paradigms and power capabilities of actors shape one another. 
Furthermore, use of certain power tactics may exacerbate conflictual relations in cases where 
patterns of conflict are already more salient than patterns of cooperation. For example, the 
sanctuary provided by the Syrian government to the PKK to hinder Turkey’s hydraulic 
development in the ET basin heightened existing tense relations during 1980s and 1990s 
thereby it negatively affected hydropolitical relations. Finally, power capabilities of actors are 
not only reflected in conflictual relations, but also in patterns of cooperation. For example, as 
shown in Chapter 7, Turkey’s increasing material, bargaining and ideational power 
capabilities in the ET basin are largely reflected in the legal documents signed between 
Turkey and Syria. Therefore, power capabilities actors shape the nature of cooperation in 
hydropolitics.  
 
In the subsequent section I will discuss the role of broader political context in layers of inter-
state and transnational hydropolitics. 
 
9.6.1. The Role of Broader Socio-Political Context in Inter-state hydropolitics  
 
Research on inter-state hydropolitics has routinely queried the role of broader political 
context in shaping cooperation or conflict between riparian states (Gleick 1993, Lowi 1995, 
MacQuarrie 2004, Mirumachi 2010, among others). Analyses of cases studied here suggest 
the findings can be taken even further: the broader political context has a determining impact 
on both conflictual and cooperative relations among different actors at different scales in 
inter-state hydropolitics in the ET basin. As revealed in the case of Turkish-Syrian relations, 
initial interactions on water issues occurred in the context of on-going tense relations, where 
roots can even be traced back to the emergence of Turkey and Syria as nation states in the 
region. Second, direct issue linkages can be made by actors between water and non-water 
issues. A typical case exemplifying this is the inherent link between the Hatay territorial 
dispute and the long-standing lack of cooperation between the two governments on Orontes 
basin.  
 
On the basis on analytical chapters this study finds that the broader political context affects 
inter-state hydropolitics in the following ways.  
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The first influence of broader political context is that patterns of enmity or amity constructed 
within historical context in inter-state relations lead to either political will or lack of will for 
cooperation on water in inter-state hydropolitics. This finding confirms outcomes on the 
Jordan (e.g.: Lowi 1995), the Nile (e.g.: Cascao 2009), and the Ganges (e.g.: Mirumachi 
2013) river basins. As shown in Chapter 6, the political will for cooperation was simply 
lacking in Turkish-Syrian relations until 2000s in spite of occasional attempts for cooperative 
actions. However, this political will can be clearly identified during the period of political 
rapprochement.  
 
The second influence is the intensity of high level and lower level interactions according to 
broader political context. During 1923 to 2000s, the Turkish-Syrian diplomatic, economic 
relations remained very limited. As Altunışık and Tür (2006) incisively mark, Turkey and 
Syria have been ‘distant neighbours’ for decades, although they share the longest borderline 
and have religious and cultural similarities. The lack of interaction during this political era 
can be identified from the frequency of high-level meetings between state officials. For 
instance, Mustapha Miro, was the first Syrian PM to visit Turkey after 17 years in 2004. 
Likewise, Bashar Asad’s visit to Turkey in 2004 had a historical importance, because he was 
the first Syrian president to visit Turkey since 1947. Because both states have centralised 
structures, the lack of interactions at high political level also negatively impacted on 
hydropolitical interactions on technical issues. Since transboundary water issues require 
constant dialogue and collaboration between states, the lack of interaction between the 
governments has had negative affects on water issues. However, interactions between high-
ranking decision makers (presidential, ministerial levels) and lower ranking bureaucratic 
bodies have dramatically increased during the political rapprochement. As stated in Chapter 8 
one of the outcomes of intensified interactions is re-establishment of previously closed spaces 
(re-vitalization of the JTC) and creation of a new space (creation of High Level Strategic 
Cooperation Council) for decision-making processes.  
 
The third influence of the broader political context is it conditions securitization and de-
securitization processes. The empirical evidence from the cases shows while patterns of 
enmity lead to securitization, patterns of amity lead to de-securitization in inter-state 
hydropolitics (Oelsner 2005, Coşkun 2008). I will analyse this separately in the following 
sections due to its importance.  
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9.6.2 Understanding Conflict in Inter-state Hydropolitics as a Discursive Process: 
Securitization of Water Issues  
 
Chapter 6 shows Turkey’s extensive hydraulic development attempts in ET basin were 
considered by the Syrian decision-makers as an existential threat to their own socio-economic 
and political goals. However, this perception of threat cannot be understood without 
considering the general perception of Turkey by the Syrian decision makers. Muslih (2005) 
incisively explains how Turkey’s hydraulic development projects in the ET basin are 
interpreted as threatening by Syrian decision-makers. Muslih states: “… Syrian political 
elites view the dispute [meaning the Euphrates dispute] as symptom of larger problem. It is 
the problem of Turkey’s role and her conscious efforts to pressure Syria not simply to serve 
her own political ends, but the policy ends of foreign powers, in this case Israel and the 
United States” (Muslih 2005:113).  
 
As dams and irrigation schemes were realised by the Turkish government in the context of 
the GAP plan during 1980s and 1990s, diplomatic crisis erupted between two countries 
(Kibaroğlu and Ünver 2006:15). In this regard, the Syrian decision-makers found the support 
to PKK against Turkey as a useful material power tactic to hinder Turkey’s hydraulic 
development projects in the ET basin. However, Syria’s support to the PKK triggered another 
securitization process in inter-state relations.  
 
In the case of the PKK and Turkish foreign policy, Robins (2002: 318) concisely put it as “A 
simple equation has determined foreign relations: if you abhor the PKK you are our friend; if 
you (are perceived to) help or nurture the PKK you are our enemy”.  There were enough 
facilitating conditions for the Turkish securitizing actors such as residence of Abdullah 
Ocalan in Damascus plus PKK camps in the Bekaa Valley to cast Syria as the main supporter 
of the PKK. As Aras and Polat (2008:496) argue the Kurdish separatism, waged by the PKK, 
were externalised in Turkey’s relations with Syria by the Turkish securitizing actors. 
Therefore, while Turkey’s hydraulic development attempts in the pivotal waters of the ET 
basin was considered as an existential threat by the Syrian securitizing elites for their own 
hydraulic development projects, Syria’s support to the PKK to balance Turkey’s hydraulic 
development attempts were triggered another securitization process conducted by the Turkish 
discursive elites.  
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9.6.3. Understanding Cooperation in Hydropolitics of Water as a Discursive Process: 
De-Securitization of Water Issues  
 
In Chapter 6, I demonstrated water issues were securitized during 1960-1999. In Chapter 7, it 
was shown that this pattern has fundamentally changed in the context of political 
rapprochement in 2000s. Referring to the securitization theory, water issues have become 
‘politicised’ and discussed in number of formal and informal constructed spaces.   
 
I ague that the concept of ‘de-securitization’ developed in the context of the securitization 
theory has, to some extent, explanatory power in understanding how previously securitised 
water issues become politicised and significant change in hydropolitical relations between 
two states in 2000s provides a rich empirical account. 38  
 
In fact, de-securitization as a concept has been used, for example, to understand Turkish-
Syrian political rapprochement during 2000s in academic literature. For example, Daoudy 
(2007:28) describes cooperative actions in the early 2000s as “… the de-securitization of 
water issues induced by the recent Turkish-Syrian rapprochement” and she considers the 
current tendency as a promising path for further cooperation on water. In similar vein, Aras 
and Coşkun (2008: 496) provide a more detailed account to assess the applicability of the 
concept of de-securitization in Turkish-Syrian relations. They consider the entire Turkish-
Syrian political rapprochement as a de-securitization process of Turkey’s bilateral relations 
with Syria. Accordingly, they argue that securitised issues in the Turkish domestic politics, 
the Kurdish separatism and political Islam, were successfully externalised in Turkey’s 
relations with Syria and Iran respectively by the Turkish decision makers. This resulted in de-
securitization in the Turkish-Syrian relations. Drawing upon Benhke’s approach of de-
securitization, Aras and Coşkun also question how de-securitizations in bilateral relations 
took place. They consider ‘lack of previous securitised speech acts’ is the only indicator of 
this de-securitization (Behnke 2006:65, Aras and Karakaya-Polat 2008:499). These studies 
consider de-securitization in the general sense by incorporating de-securitization of Kurdish 
issue in Turkey with general political rapprochement.  
 
                                                        
38
 To recall, definition of ‘politicised’ introduced by Buzan et al is employed here, “… the issue is part of public 
policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation or, more rarely some other form of communal 
governance” (Buzan et al 1998:13)  
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The findings of this study confirm that previous scholars focus on the link between de-
securitization and political rapprochement between Turkey and Syria. Yet, they do not 
specifically look at how de-securitization of water could be realised in inter-state 
hydropolitical relations during 2000s. Even though I also consider that de-securitization 
cannot be understood without taking political rapprochement into account, the main issues 
being problematized here is to understand de-securitization of water issues in bilateral 
relations.  
 
To understand de-securitization some of the developing literature was reviewed; the 
following findings on how formerly securitised issued are de-securitised by actors were 
revealed:  
 
First, actors realise ‘de-securitization’ by deliberately avoiding conducting certain ‘speech 
acts’ (Wæver 2000:253, Åtland 2008:292). Husymans (1995:65) considers this strategy is 
‘the best strategy of de-securitization’. This is also similar to Benhke’s approach on ‘lack of 
speech’ (Behnke 2006:65). Perhaps, deliberate avoidance from using previously used 
belligerent speech acts can be added to this category.   
 
Second, securitising actors can transform the securitised issue in to the realm of politics. This 
is rather an active process in which securitising actors adopt different strategies. Husymans 
(1995) identifies three ‘de-securitization’ strategies: objectivist, constructivist and de-
constructivist. In objectivist strategy, actors seek to convince the audience that an issue being 
securitised is no longer a ‘security issue’. In constructivist strategy, actors consider security 
as a social construction henceforth they show how issues are being securitised. Once actors 
understand the process, they then seek to find alternative ways to re-approach the issues in 
the context of the existing knowledge. Finally, de-securitization is conducted by 
deconstructing identities of ‘others’ and ‘selves’ that is inherently constructed in the context 
of successful securitization (Husymans 1995:65,66, Roe 2004:286,287). Moreover, it appears 
that deconstructing identities of ‘selves’ and ‘others’ seem to be considered as a main 
strategy in the transformation of a securitised issue (Husymans 1995:67, Vuori 2011:191).  
 
Third, securitising actors may choose to ‘manage’ the issue rather than transform it. Roe 
argues that, it may be ‘logically impossible’ to adopt a de-constructivist strategy in some 
cases. For example, de-constructivist strategy simply cannot be conducted in the case of 
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minority issues, since identity struggle between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is the key contested area. In 
such cases, de-securitization as management is an appropriate method. Roe (2004: 285) 
describes management of securitised issues as follows “While the management of securitised 
issues may well bring with it some notion of ‘normalising’ the situation, the language of 
security will nevertheless also be present’’.  
 
On the basis of the analysis in Chapter 7, I argue that ‘de-securitization as management’ of 
the water issues constitutes the overall rationale behind cooperative actions. For example, 
considering the contents of two issue specific MoUs (MoU on Improving Water Quality and 
MoU on Effective Water Utilization), the main aim of both Turkish and Syrian discursive 
elites is to realise cooperation on water issues without necessarily addressing the contested 
fields and to deepen cooperation gradually. Likewise, considering rationale of cooperation 
between GAP Regional Authority (GAP-RDA) and its Syrian counterpart (GOLD), the main 
idea was to initiate cooperation in relatively less contested areas and extend cooperation to 
contested fields. Ad hoc joint actions such as training programs, projects, statements of 
decision-makers showing common views on water or temporary arrangements to tackle short- 
term problems can also be considered as speech acts showing de-securitization as 
management.  
 
 
Nevertheless, we can also identify de-securitising moves that may be read as careful 
avoidance of conducting particular speech acts and securitizing moves, which seeks to 
transform securitised character of water issues in inter-state hydropolitics. Both Turkish and 
Syrian discursive elites carefully avoided using previous political rhetoric during tense 
bilateral relations. For example, the Syrian decision-makers deliberately avoided conducting 
speech acts on the Hatay dispute in their interactions with the Turkish officials during 
political rapprochement, not to jeopardise on-going cooperation attempts in transboundary 
water management of the Orontes basin.  
 
There is also empirical evidence on discursive elites seeking to transform the securitised 
character of water issues. To recall de-constructivist strategy, actors seek to deconstruct 
identities that are inherent parts of any given securitization processes (Williams 2003:520, 
Coşkun 2008:94, Vuori 2011:191). In other words, de-securitization moves may be 
interpreted to refer to attempts to re-define the ‘other’ as ‘self’ (Roe 2004:287). For example, 
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the symbolism attached to joint Friendship dam on the Orontes River can be considered as 
de-securitization of water issues through transformation. Here, the symbolism attached to the 
construction of the Friendship Dam can be considered as a speech act. Re-definition of  
‘selves’ and ‘others’ in relation to Turkish-Syrian political relations in general and 
hydropolitical relations in particular is clearly reflected in the speech of Erdoğan, the Turkish 
PM, in the inaugural ceremony of the construction of the Friendship Dam. 39  Furthermore, 
the discourse ‘Turkey and Syria are friend and fellow states’ was promoted by the decision-
makers throughout repeated interactions between state officials at ministerial and presidential 
levels during rapprochement (Laçiner 2009).  
 
Finally, although decision-makers of the riparian states were the main ‘de-securitizing 
actors’, this study finds that epistemic communities such as the ETIC and private sector 
actors such as the SIWI also acted as ‘de-securitising actors’. For example, by adopting a 
similar approach indicated above, the ETIC has conducted activities to foster cooperation in 
the ET basin on relatively less contested areas between the riparian states. Such activities are 
in accordance with de-securitization as management.  
 
In my view, changes from conflictual relations to relatively more cooperative relations can be 
identified in most cases in inter-state hydropolitics. Therefore, the developing literature 
provides insights on conceptualizing change from conflict to cooperation in inter-state 
hydropolitics from a constructivist point of view. It follows that application of Security 
Studies literature is a promising path for future research projects.  
 
9.6.4. Recent Political Crisis and Turkish-Syrian Hydropolitical Relations  
 
The uprising in Syria in the context of the Arab Spring ended political rapprochement 
between the Turkish and Syrian governments and bilateral relations have gradually worsened 
since 2011. Reflections of worsening relations in the recent period were suspensions on all 
the cooperation attempts in various fields including water. In fact, it is rather early to draw 
conclusions on the impact on broader political context, considering the on-going crisis and 
de-stability in Syria. Yet, immediate suspension of hydropolitical relations between shows 
                                                        
39
 To recall the Turkish PM Erdoğan’s speech, he stated, “We are now realising an inaugural ceremony that 
would change the course of history. From now on, the Orontes will no longer be a river that divides us, that 
makes a boundary between us. But it will be a river that will bring us together, that will embrace us….” (See 
Section 7.4.3.1)  
341 
 
that importance of positive political environment for cooperative relations between riparian 
states. Therefore, this rapid change in hydropolitical relations between Turkey and Syria in 
recent context of worsening bilateral relations endorses the argument that the role of broader 
political context is particularly vital in trajectory of Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations in 
terms of patterns of conflict and cooperation.  
 
The reasons why the broader political context has such importance in shaping patterns of 
conflict and cooperation can be summarised as follows, considering the empirical evidence. 
First, as analysed in previous section in this chapter, broader political context plays a major 
role in patterns of amity and enmity in inter-state relations thereby it affects on establishment 
of political will or lack of political will for cooperative actions in transboundary water issues. 
Second, as analysed in previous sections broader political context conditions securitisation 
and de-securitization speech acts. Third, the broader political context also affects the intensity 
of interactions between riparian states and constructions of spaces between different divisions 
of state apparatuses regarding water or non-water issues. Fourth, there are direct issues 
linkages between water and non-water issues in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations as 
shown in analytical chapters. Finally, since both riparian states have centralised state 
structures, cooperative or conflictual relations between high-ranking decision makers also 
influence in cooperation or lack of cooperation between different parts of hydraucracies in 
the field of transboundary water issues.   
 
9.6.5. Broader Socio-political Context in Transnational hydropolitics  
 
The analysis in Chapter 8 suggests that the broader political context also influences 
interactions between proponents and opponents. The Kurdish issue constitutes the main 
aspect of the relevant political context in which the Ilısu dam dispute takes place. This study 
shows that the Kurdish issue influences the Ilısu dam dispute between the pro-dam and anti-
dam actors in the following ways.  
 
First, I argue the Kurdish issue enables both opponents and proponents of the Ilısu dam to 
conduct speech acts serving securitization of the Ilısu dam project. There are discursive elites 
of the Turkish government who securitise the Ilısu dam project, as it is the ‘lynchpin’ of the 
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GAP.40  Furthermore, as discussed in Section 8.3.2.1, opponents securitizing the Ilısu dam 
and other hydraulic projects in the ET basin securitise these projects as posing threats to the 
Kurdish identity, since it destructs cultural heritage of the region and assimilation of the 
Kurds (See section 8.3.2.1).  
 
Second, the Kurdish issue provides the opponents of the Ilısu dam project certain 
practicalities in terms of construction of various claimed spaces. Empirical evidence in 
Chapter 8 shows civil society movements affiliated with the Kurdish issue across Europe 
have played an important role in the construction of the transnational scales. Thus, certain 
opponents also admit that linking the project with the Kurdish issue does increase the impact 
of anti-dam campaign (Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm. 2012). 
 
However, politicization of Ilısu dam by linking it with Kurdish issue also provides certain 
drawbacks to the anti-dam activism networks. The first obstacle is the violent character of the 
Kurdish issue. It is claimed by the anti-dam network that on-going violent conflict in the 
Southeastern Anatolian region also determines priorities of the local people. Therefore, 
opponents of the project argue that environmental concerns and protection of cultural 
heritage, which stem from large-dams, are not on top of the agenda at local scales. According 
to opponents this feature is the main reason why the anti-dam activist network has not been 
able to mobilise local population against the construction of the Ilısu dam (Interviewee 12   
pers. comm. 2012, Interviewee Person 15 pers.comm. 2012).  
 
The second aspect of Kurdish issue that constrains anti-dam activists is (or claimed to be) 
their association with the PKK. Actors located in the issue are of human rights and the 
Kurdish issue is often labelled as affiliated organisations of the PKK. This feature impacts on 
the anti-dam network in two ways. First, actors coming from environmental protection have 
been hesitant to make alliances with those coming from human rights and the Kurdish issue. 
This dynamic can be found both at transnational and national scales (Interviewee 10 pers. 
comm. 2011, July 26, Interviewee 14 pers.comm. 2013). Furthermore, it also limits public 
support to opposition in the Turkish domestic context. This helps to explain why the 
                                                        
40
 In Chapter 6, it was shown that the GAP is securitised by the Turkish discursive elites in terms of territorial 
and socio-economic integrity of state. Moreover, the GAP is the largest project conducted by the Turkish 
government and it was considered to be the very symbol of state progress. (See Chapter 6) 
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environmental campaign launched by the Nature Association in 2006 has become more 
salient within Turkey.  
 
9.6.5. Prevailing paradigms and Water Conflict and Cooperation in Hydropolitics  
 
Empirical evidence on inter-state and transnational hydropolitics has shown competing 
prevailing water paradigms in hydropolitics, which was developed by Tony Allan, shaping 
conflictual and cooperative relations between actors. Elements of different prevailing 
paradigms promoted by actors were identified throughput the thesis. Moreover, the study 
argues that prevailing water paradigms, which are composed of certain discourses, narratives, 
ideas, serve as the basis for ideational power capabilities of actors including securitised 
discourses, framings, and sanctioned discourses and so on. Therefore, there is an inherent link 
between prevailing paradigms and ideational power (see Section 3.3.2). The following 
sections will briefly recapture which prevailing paradigms actors have been promoted by 
actors and how it has shaped conflictual and cooperative patterns in different periods in inter-
state and transnational hydropolitics.  
 
9.6.5.1. Prevailing paradigms and Inter-state hydropolitics 
 
Considering the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations during the first era (1923-1998) in 
which patterns of conflict were dominant in inter-state relations, the study clearly shows that 
hydraulic mission as a prevailing paradigm in water resources development have sanctioned 
certain discourses, ideas, rules and practices both in Syria and Turkey. These sets of norms, 
ideas, narratives and practices have driven both the Turkish and Syrian governments to 
conduct extensive hydraulic development projects unilaterally. This pattern was coined by 
this study as ‘two hydraulic missions over the same transboundary water basins.” It played a 
vital role in construction of conflictual patterns in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations.  
 
During the second era (1998-2011) when cooperative interactions were dominant, the 
empirical evidence derived from Chapter 7 identifies elements of the holistic approach as a 
prevailing water paradigm, which promotes the idea that water related problems should be 
tackled by adopting a basin-wide approach and which support involvement and collaboration 
of different stakeholders in transboundary water management. The general content and 
rationale behind the agreed MoUs, joint actions conducted by the hydraucracies, statements 
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by both discursive elites show such paradigmatic change in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations. In Chapter 7 it was illustrated that IWRM, which contains standpoints of the 
holistic approach, has become more salient in national water frameworks of both riparian 
states. Yet further studies are needed to understand to what extent norms, ideas, rules and 
practices were diffused through the domestic contexts of Turkey and Syria and how they are 
reflected in inter-state relations.  
 
9.6.5.2. Conflicting Prevailing Paradigms in Transnational Hydropolitics  
 
In the case of transnational hydropolitics, the study showed prevailing paradigms of 
ecological and political resistance, which has sanctioned particular norms, ideas, rules and 
practices, promoted primarily by civil society groups within and outside of Turkey against 
private-led and state-led hydraulic development projects. While private and public sector 
actors defend extensive hydraulic development schemes and privatization and marketization 
of water, civil society groups challenge such ideas due to environmental (protection of 
environmental and cultural values) and political (resistance to privatization, human rights 
issues due to displacement) concerns. In other words, the competing characters of such 
discourses constitute the main issue in transnational hydropolitics. Here since pro-dam and 
anti-dam actors are driven by competing prevailing paradigms, actors construct incompatible 
and conflicting discourses and narratives regarding the same social realities.  
 
Furthermore, the study draws the following empirical conclusions on how competing 
paradigms in hydropolitics shape conflictual relations between actors in the context of the 
Ilısu dam.  
 
First, the discourse on hydraulic mission and its evolution in the course of time (gradual 
salience of discourse of marketization and the discourse of the holistic approach in 
hydropolitics) in Turkey has remained unchallenged and it has been a hegemonic concept for 
decades due to lack of any societal forces. In order to emphasise this fact, one of the 
interviewees from an environmentally driven NGO states: “Even saying that dams are bad 
was a taboo. Therefore, we had great difficulty convincing people regarding the adverse 
affects of dam at the beginning of our campaigns” (Interviewee 10 pers. comm. 2011, July 
26). However, as discussed in the context of the Ilısu dam and other local opposition 
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movements against state-led and private-led hydropower projects, the opponents promoted a 
counter sanctioned discourse to challenge this existing discourse.  
 
Second, the study finds the Ilısu dam dispute cannot be understood without considering 
broader anti-dam opposition movements across Turkey on the basis of ecological and 
political (anti-privatization movements against marketization of water resources 
development). Thus, the dispute is a pioneer and the most prominent case carrying all 
elements of counter paradigm being promoted by the civil society groups (See Section 
8.3.1.2).  
 
9.7. The Role of Power in Inter-State and Transnational Hydropolitics  
 
Assessing material, bargaining and ideational power capabilities of actors and analysing how 
the outcomes (who gets what) are established are the main contributions of the critical body 
of literature in understanding hydropolitical relations between riparian states in 
transboundary water basins across the world. The study confirms the utility of conceptual 
frameworks, hydro-hegemony, counter hydro-hegemony frameworks and related literature, 
developed within the critical body of literature in explaining the outcome in hydropolitical 
relations.  
 
However, even though this literature provides a detailed account on the role of power in 
hydropolitics, it does not fully grasp the concept of power and its role in layers of inter-state 
and transnational hydropolitics. One of the key contributions of this study is to extend critical 
body of literature on power towards transnational hydropolitics. Furthermore, application of 
this literature to the empirical case studies has revealed the link between the previously 
outlined points (scales, broader political context and prevailing paradigms) and power 
thereby expanding existing understanding of power in hydropolitics. The following section 
will refine the findings made by this study and emphasise contributions of the thesis to 
existing conceptual frameworks on power.  
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9.7.1. Power and inter-state hydropolitics   
 
Power is one of the most researched concepts in inter-state hydropolitics. Power was initially 
analysed in terms of material power capabilities. Here, military capabilities along with 
economic capacity were considered as main elements of material power. Moreover, 
geography, referring to riparian position, is considered as a separate factor in power analysis, 
given its importance in inter-state relations between riparian states at transboundary water 
contexts.  
 
Although power was initially considered as material power capabilities, the developing 
literature also points out the importance of discursive power and material power capabilities 
of riparian states. Discursive power capabilities are further sub-divided as bargaining and 
ideational power capabilities. The critical body of literature was applied in this study to 
examine Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations.  
 
The study shows both discursive and material power capabilities of actors affect 
hydropolitical relations between riparian states in several ways. Although those aspects are 
used in making hydropolitical analysis in the critical body of literature, they are not outlined 
in a systemic manner. The following points can be made in terms of different roles of power 
in inter-state hydropolitics.  
 
Power as a goal: Power serves as a goal in inter-state hydropolitics. Here, Zeitoun and 
Warner (2006) make the following equation, as co-founders of the framework of hydro-
hegemony. While upstreamers use water to get more power, downstreamers use power to get 
more water. In other words, while power is a tool for downstream riparian states, it is a goal 
for upstream riparian states. However, empirical evidence derived from cases shows that both 
the upstream and downstream riparian states consider hydraulic development projects as tools 
for increasing their material and discursive power capabilities. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
increasing states’ discursive (e.g.: legitimacy and authority of central government) and 
material (e.g.: contribution to hydraulic development projects to economy) power capabilities 
are inherent part of hydraulic mission. In other words, regardless of their riparian position at 
transboundary water contexts, states may securitise their hydraulic development works at 
domestic contexts since they are seen as effective tools to increase discursive and material 
347 
 
power capabilities. Therefore, empirical evidence derived from the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations show the equation made by Zeitoun and Warner based on riparian 
position oversimplifies factors driving states for hydraulic development.  
 
Power as a tool: Power is also considered a tool by riparian states in inter-state hydropolitics 
according to critical body of literature. The empirical cases discussed in this study confirm 
riparian states use material, bargaining, and ideational power tactics to achieve certain 
objectives in inter-state hydropolitics. In other words, material and discursive power 
capabilities exerted by the riparian states in any given transboundary watershed strongly 
shapes the outcome in inter-state hydropolitics.  
 
Potential power and actual power: Power is considered in terms of potential power (power 
as/puissance) and actualised power (power over/poivoir) (Zeitoun and Warner 2006:442). 
This study showed that riparian states turn their potential power capabilities into actual power 
as power tactics. For example, in transboundary context, where there are highly conflictual 
relations between the two riparian states, State A may use its military might as a coercion-
pressure mechanism against State B by deploying troops to their common borderline or 
conducting military drills. Likewise, economic capabilities can be turned into bargaining 
power tactics by providing economic incentives to other riparian states or by introducing 
further hydraulic development projects. Furthermore, another aspect of power that is not 
identified by the critical body of literature is both potential and actual power capabilities of 
states are subject to other states’ perception towards them. In other words, drawing upon 
constructivism in IR theory, the study argues that power must be understood as a relational 
concept in inter-state hydropolitics.  A typical case was of comparative studies between the 
state behaviours of Egypt and Syria as downstream riparian states of the Nile and ET basins 
respectively. 41  
 
Power determining patterns of conflict and cooperation: As discussed in the theoretical 
framework (Chapter 3), the critical body of literature also questions relationship between 
patterns of conflict and cooperation and power relations between riparian states. Accordingly, 
it is further argued by this literature that while conflictual outcomes are more likely to occur 
in asymmetrical power configurations, while cooperative outcomes are more likely in 
                                                        
41
 Here Syria is labeled as downstream state in relation with Turkey in the ET basin.  
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symmetrical power configurations (Zeitoun, Mirumachi et al. 2010). This study, showed 
critical body of literature partially explains why there are patterns of high conflict and low 
cooperation in certain transboundary water contexts, while low conflict and high cooperation 
in others. Two overarching factors were identified which are prevailing paradigms and 
broader political context. However, this study does not suggest that power has not affected 
construction of patterns of conflict and cooperation. On the contrary, direct linkages can be 
identified between these factors and material and discursive facets of power. For example, 
seeking to increase power capabilities form one of the main aspects of hydraulic mission for 
nation-states. Furthermore, certain power tactics used by riparian states to balance other 
riparian state or dominate the status quo may exacerbate patterns of conflict. For example, the 
support provided by the Syrian government to the PKK to hinder upstream hydraulic 
development projects developed by the Turkish government exacerbate conflictual relations 
between the governments thereby jeopardising hydropolitical relations.   
 
Reflection of power relations in cooperative frameworks: Although different types of power 
can be easily spotted in conflictual relations, power is also at work in cooperative relations in 
inter-state hydropolitics. As seen in the case of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
over time, the degree to which riparian states are able to reflect their discursive positions in 
treaties and protocols shows changes in actors’ material and discursive power capabilities. 
For instance, considering the agreed documents (MoUs) signed between the Turkish and 
Syrian governments during political rapprochement, while Turkey’s discursive position has 
remained intact, we can identify deviations from previous discursive positions of the Syrian 
government in terms of its transboundary water policy. This fact supports the argument that 
there has been change of power in the four-hydropolitical eras in favour of Turkey on 
absolute and relative power capabilities.  
 
Importance of riparian position: The critical literature on power in inter-state hydropolitics 
considers riparian position as a separate pillar, although the literature also emphasise other 
aspects of power capabilities. A comparative analysis based on existing status quo in the ET 
and the Orontes basins provides further insights on the role of geography in inter-state 
hydropolitics, since Turkey and Syria are located in reverse riparian positions in the ET and 
Orontes basins. Based on the findings discussed in detail in Section 6.5.2.1, the study revisits 
the assumption made by the framework of Hydro-Hegemony that those riparian states 
enjoying material, bargaining and ideational power supremacies over others necessarily 
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impose their agenda in inter-state hydropolitics regardless of their riparian position. Here the 
main inquiry is that if Turkey is the hegemon of the ET basin then why can it not impose its 
agenda on the Orontes basin against Syria. The study identifies two factors explaining this 
fact. First, the study concludes that riparian position is not a power dimension on its own. It 
widens or constrains other power capabilities of states. For example, cooperation without 
most powerful riparian state (e.g.: conducting joint hydraulic infrastructure) can be an 
effective bargaining power tactic for relatively weaker actors in transboundary water contexts 
where most powerful riparian state is located as the downstream riparian state. However, in 
transboundary water contexts where the most powerful riparian state is located as the 
upstream riparian state, cooperation without the most powerful actor may not have a similar 
impact as a bargaining powerful tactic. Second, although the hydraulic mission as a 
prevailing paradigm may be a hegemonic concept in a particular domestic context driving the 
state to extensive hydraulic development, it may not necessarily be manifested at the same 
degree in their water resources.  
 
Importance of material power: This study finds that there is direct correlation between 
riparian states’ changing economic conditions and their hydraulic development attempts. 
Increasing economic capabilities or availability of funding does allow states to allocate more 
financial resources towards hydraulic development projects. For example, the empirical 
evidence derived from the cases show that Turkey’s economic performance over the years 
directly affected financial resources allocated to its hydraulic projects. Furthermore, it 
appears that preventing a state from reaching certain funds is one of the main tactics of those 
opposing and hindering a particular project. The lobbying attempts made by the Syrian 
government to hinder the release of international funds to finance GAP can be considered as 
a good example of how riparian states seek ‘to cut the money flow’ as an effective bargaining 
power tactic. As will be pointed in the following section, the same pattern can be seen in the 
context of the anti-dam activisms between the opponents and proponents of the Ilsu dam 
project.  
 
Power and scales: As shown in the first section of this chapter, there is an inherent link 
between power and scales. Accordingly, while actors exert power tactics to open new 
claimed spaces or to keep the existing scalar dynamics, newly constructed spaces for 
decision-making increases actors’ bargaining power capabilities. The analytical chapters 
provide a rich account on the link between scales and power in hydropolitics.  
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Imposing sanctioned discourses at different scales: The study finds that riparian states 
establish discursive positions on transboundary water policy in general and certain 
transboundary water contexts in particular. They also seek to impose discursive position as 
sanctioned discourse to establish a status quo and maximize benefits. In order to impose their 
discursive position in certain transboundary water context, they exert different power tactics 
(material, bargaining, ideational) at their disposal in inter-state hydropolitics. Although 
securitization seems to be one of the most frequently ideational power tactic used by riparian 
states, we can identify other types of speech acts such as politicisation (providing alternative 
counter-factuals), de-politicisation (portraying the issue as purely a technical matter and 
advocating its position as scientifically sound), de-securitisation (attempts to normalise 
situation, portraying the water issue as possible to resolved through bargaining processes) in 
inter-state hydropolitics. Furthermore, apart from speech acts, this study identifies that 
discursive elites of riparian states to convey their message more effectively to the audience 
frequently use framings (verbal and non-verbal). The study finds that both Turkish and 
Syrian discursive elites were successfully able to impose their sanctioned discourses in water 
resources management during 1923 and 1998 and established certain discursive positions in 
negotiations with the other riparian states on transboundary basins that they are part of. 
However, neither Turkey nor Syria was able to sanction their respective discursive position in 
their hydropolitical relations. Nevertheless, they did attempt to impose their discursive 
position in bilateral relations to maximise their benefits and used material, bargaining and 
ideational power tactics to reach this aim.  
 
9.7.2. Power and Transnational hydropolitics  
 
The weakest spot of the critical body of literature that assesses power relations in 
hydropolitics is its state-centric view, although we can identify recent academic works that 
apply the literature to other layers of hydropolitics (e.g.: Sojamo, Keulertz et al. 2012). One 
of the main contributions of this study is to apply this literature to transnational hydropolitics. 
The following theoretical and empirical conclusions can be drawn on such trans-national 
hydropolitics.  
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Both opponents and proponents of particular hydraulic development projects exert material, 
bargaining and ideational power tactics in in transnational hydropolitics as in the case of 
inter-state hydropolitics. The Ilısu dam conflict provides rich literature on how actors use 
different dimensions of power.  
 
Considering the relations between opponents and proponents of the Ilısu dam, a clear power 
asymmetry can be identified between anti-dam and pro-dam actors. The following reasons 
can be identified in understanding the asymmetrical power relations between the two groups. 
First, there is a huge gap in economic capabilities between the anti-dam and pro-dam 
networks. Second, actors located in anti-dam actors often do not possess any rights to control 
a territory in which a particular watershed is located, while states, as the main proponent of 
the hydraulic development projects, have exclusive ownership rights in their territories. 
Therefore, riparian position as power dimension is not available for anti-dam actors. Third, 
anti-dam actors located within the domestic context of a particular state are obliged to 
perform their activities in legal context determined by the state. In other words, anti-dam 
actors must act in an environment where rules of the game are decided by the state as main 
actor in pro-dam network.  
 
In spite of such asymmetrical power configurations between the anti-dam actors and pro-dam 
actors, opponents of the dam are not entirely powerless in transnational hydropolitics. The 
anti-dam activists attempt to engage in decision-making processes by using different tactics. 
In terms of material power, the opponents of the projects in transnational hydropolitics use 
non-violent actions as material power tactics. In some cases, such non-violent actions may 
turn violent and include harming earthmovers and other equipment in the dam sites.  
 
In terms of bargaining power, the study introduces drawing public attention and support and 
empowering relatively weaker actors as power tactics used by the opponents in transnational 
hydropolitics. In terms of ideational power the study identifies counter-securitizing moves 
conducted by opponents of the project by portraying environment and cultural heritage as a 
referent object in terms of adverse affects of large-scale dams. Opponents of the Ilısu dam 
project also effectively use framings to convey their arguments to the audience.   
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Moreover, political opportunity structures have an important role either allowing or hindering 
opponents of the project in decision-making processes. Therefore, while this dimension is 
within bargaining power capabilities in the case of inter-state hydropolitics, it is considered a 
separate category by this study in the case of transnational hydropolitics. Furthermore, the 
study finds that opponents seek to open new claimed spaces by using power tactics or by 
benefiting from certain opportunity structures. For instance, changing political opportunity 
structures (privatization and growing salience of private sector in water resources 
development across the world as well as in Turkey, qualitative and quantitative change in 
civil society movements in Turkey, growing transnational advocacy networks against the 
large-scale dams across the world) have played a determinant role in creation of anti-dam 
movement against the Ilısu dam project. Furthermore, the study concludes considering the 
trajectory of the Ilısu dam dispute, certain changes in political opportunity structures seem to 
be the most important factor in determining the outcome. For example, withdrawal of the 
European ECAs and creditors from the second international consortium decreased the 
bargaining power capabilities of the anti-dam actors, since opponents are no longer able to 
pressure actors to cut flow of money to finance the project (See section 8.4.3).  
 
Finally, engaging in decision-making processes by using judicial processes and pressuring 
targeted groups to cut money flow seems to be the most effective tool used as bargaining 
power tactic by the opponents of the Ilısu dam.  
 
 
9.8. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed the theoretical and empirical findings of this study derived from 
theoretical framework (Chapter 3), literature review (Chapter 2) and analytical chapters 
(Chapters 6,7 and 8). These findings can be outlined as follows:  
 
• The study shows that understanding hydropolitics of the ET basin in terms of inter-
state relations between riparian states is too narrow. Thus, the study identifies 
different layers of hydropolitics other than inter-state hydropolitical relations. By 
taking Ilısu dam conflict and Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations as empirical 
cases, it analyses layers of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics.  
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• The study shows that we may observe different scales in different layers of 
hydropolitics and shows the importance of scalar analysis in hydropolitics. Informed 
by analytical chapters, the study shows different aspects of scales and how they are 
socially constructed.  
 
• Empirical evidence show broader political context strongly influences construction of 
patterns of high conflict and low cooperation and vice versa in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. The study finds that broader political context influences 
patterns of conflict and cooperation in the following ways. First, mutually perceived 
identities are constructed within the context of the broader political context in 
between Turkish and Syrian discursive elites with one another, which results in 
existence or lack of political will for cooperation on water and non-water issues, 
securitization or de-securitization of water and non-water issues in inter-state 
relations. Second, there are certain linkages between water and non-water issues. 
Therefore, changes in particular non-water issues directly impacts water related 
issues. The direct linkage between territorial conflict over Hatay province, Orontes 
basin and the PKK as well as ET basin in 1980s and 1990s are empirical examples on 
linkages between water and non-water issues.  
 
• The study finds that Kurdish issue constitutes broader political context in the case of 
the Ilısu dam conflict between opponents and proponents of the project. The study 
concludes the Kurdish issue enables both opponents and proponents securitise the 
Ilısu dam project from different aspects. Furthermore, the empirical evidence in 
Chapter 8 suggests violent character of the Kurdish issue creates certain 
disadvantages to the opponents of the project in establishing anti-dam campaign 
against the project within Turkey.  
 
• The study finds that hydraulic mission was promoted as the prevailing paradigm at 
national scale by the Turkish and Syrian discursive elites. The study concludes these 
hydraulic missions, carrying similar discourses, result in extensive hydraulic 
development in Turkey and Syria thereby unilateral development over shared 
transboundary water resources resulted in patterns of high conflict and low 
cooperation.  
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• Empirical evidence in Chapter 7 illustrated the elements of the fifth paradigm and its 
reflections on transboundary water management. We may observe reflections of the 
fifth paradigm both in speech acts made by the Turkish and Syrian discursive elites 
and legal documents agreed between two governments.  
 
• The study finds hydraulic mission and its evolution in time (gradual salience of 
discourse of marketization and the discourse of the holistic approach in 
hydropolitics), formed a sanctioned discourse at national scale in Turkey until 2000s, 
were confronted by discourses of ecological and political resistance against state-run 
or privatised hydraulic development projects. The study shows that societal forces 
such as NGOs outside or within Turkey, informal activist networks, lawyers, 
academics act as societal forces in promotion of the counter-sanctioned discourse. 
These two conflicting sanctioned discourses inform actors’ interests thereby shaping 
patterns of high conflict.  
 
• The study supports the core argument made in the critical body of literature that 
material and discursive power capabilities of actors, power symmetries/asymmetries 
in transboundary water contexts shape the outcome (who gets what) among variety of 
actors at different scales. During the first era (1923-1998), although a clear power 
asymmetry existed between Turkey and Syria, favouring the former, the Syrian 
government is not entirely powerless. It particularly exerted discursive power tactics 
to balance Turkey’s supreme position in the ET basin.  
 
• Empirical evidence derived from Chapter 7 show that Turkey’s increasing material 
and discursive power capabilities were reflected in the limited cooperative framework 
realised by the Turkish-Syrian government. Therefore, the study concludes that 
patterns of cooperation during the second era cannot be fully grasped without looking 
at changes in power relations.  
 
• The study concludes that although a clear power asymmetry can be found between the 
opponents and proponents of the Ilısu dam favouring the latter, those opposing the 
project are not entirely powerless. As in the case of the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
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relations, they particularly exert variety of discursive power tactics to hinder or 
possibly cancel the Ilısu dam project.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
CONCLUSION  
10.1. Introduction  
 
 
Turkish decision-makers have always considered hydraulic development a key issue since the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey. They have regarded hydraulic development as a 
vital tool for modernisation and the socio-economic development of Turkey. Certain security 
concerns, which are considered to be products of socio-economic backwardness, have also 
been directly associated with the hydraulic development projects and seen as tools to resolve 
issues.  
 
Furthermore, hydraulic development projects have been portrayed as symbols of state 
progress and power. To achieve these goals, hydraulic mission has been used as a prevailing 
paradigm in water resource development by the Turkish discursive elites and they have 
conducted speech acts to securitise and thereby legitimise large sums of financial resources 
being allocated to realise hydraulic projects. As a result, Turkey is one of the states 
conducting extensive hydraulic development projects to realise its water potential for decades 
in the world. Most of the hydraulic works have been developed on water resources that are 
transboundary in nature, since Turkey is part of several transboundary water contexts as 
either upstream or downstream riparian state and transboundary water resources constitute 
40% of Turkey’s entire water potential. Due to this fact, Turkey’s hydraulic works on 
transboundary water resources establish various sets of relations between Turkish 
government and other riparian states as well as non-state actors.  
 
Considering the variety and complexity of transboundary water resources that Turkey is part 
of, this study sets to examine how Turkey’s hydropolitical relations at different scales can be 
analysed in terms of inter-state hydropolitics and transnational hydropolitics. The study 
examined the following main points to address this issue. First it analysed overarching factors 
leading to conflictual and cooperative relations on water issues in the case of Turkey’s 
hydropolitical relations at different scales. Second, it looked at the role of power in inter-state 
and transnational hydropolitics and thus enriched the current understanding of power in 
hydropolitics. Finally, it sought to understand how actors have exerted different power tactics 
in terms of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics in the case of Turkey.  
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The departure point of this study was extending and improving existing critical conceptual 
frameworks, which are largely state-centric (considering relationships between riparian states 
in transboundary water contexts) to other dimensions of hydropolitical analysis. In this regard 
inter-state hydropolitics and transnational hydropolitics (introduced by the study) were 
identified as two main conceptual foci of the study. By looking at the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations and the Ilısu dam conflict between opponents and proponents of the 
project as two empirical cases, the study proposed a theoretical framework informing both 
cases.  
 
The study demonstrated the necessity of actors-scale mapping, particularly for understanding 
transnational hydropolitics. The analysis regarding actors and scales also showed that scales 
and scalar dynamics are not given but are socially constructed. Therefore, they are subject to 
change and power determines constructions of scales. The study also demonstrated prevailing 
water paradigms in water resources management and broader socio-political context are two 
determinant factors in terms of conflictual and cooperative relations. Finally, the study 
demonstrated the different roles of power in hydropolitics. The study did not only improve 
existing critical conceptual frameworks in terms of inter-state hydropolitics, but also applied 
critical conceptual frameworks on power to transnational hydropolitics.  
 
The structure of this final chapter will be as follows. In the first part, the research questions 
and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 1 will be reviewed based on the findings of the empirical 
case studies. In the second part, the analytical gaps and limitations will be identified and the 
reasons why the study was unable to cover gaps will be explained.  Furthermore, given the 
analytical gaps in the research area, potential future research directions will be highlighted. 
Finally, the main contributions of the study to existing literature will be briefly reiterated.  
 
10.2. Reviewing the Research Questions and Hypotheses   
 
This section explicitly addresses the main research question - how can Turkey’s inter-state 
and transnational hydropolitical relations be interpreted drawing upon an enhanced 
constructivist analytical framework of power? In the light of analytical and theoretical 
chapters, the following points enabled a response.   
.   
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 This study emphasised the importance of multi-scalar approach in hydropolitics, 
particularly in Chapters 8. The ET Basin constitutes the primary spatial context of this 
study. The growing involvement of non-state actors in the context of the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations and the Ilısu dam dispute during 2000s in ET Basin has 
shown that it would be misleading to consider transboundary water politics solely as 
relations between riparian states. There are clearly number of non-state actors that are 
actively involved in the decision-making process. There are subsequently several 
other sets of relations that should be considered alongside inter-state relations. In 
order to analyse multi-scalar character of hydropolitics in transboundary water 
contexts, this study first has delineated hydropolitics as a study area composed of 
different layers. Thereafter, depending on the conceptual focus, it identifies actors and 
scales that are constructed by those actors.  
 
 This study sought to understand factors leading to conflictual cooperative patterns 
between various state and non-state actors. The study has argued in Chapters 6,7 and 
8 that to understand conflictual and cooperative patterns between actors, we need to 
look at norms, values, and ideas, narratives that are constructed in any given hydro-
social context. This study analysed conflictual and cooperative relations between the 
actors in the empirical cases by looking at constructed values, norms, ideas and 
narratives.  
 
 This study has also considered the concept of power as a key concept in 
understanding inter-state and transnational hydropolitics. In chapters 6, 7 and 8, 
it looked at the concept of power in terms of understanding actors’ abilities to achieve 
their goals and shaping conflictual and cooperative relations between actors. Here, the 
critical body of literature regarding power, which draws upon Lukes’s multi-
dimensional power approach, is applied to the empirical cases. The analysis revealed 
that understanding power relations between actors provides a strong explanatory 
framework on the role of power. Yet, a more comprehensive approach is necessary to 
understand power in the context of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics.  
 
The points outlined above enabled me to answer each sub-question of key research question. 
In the following part, I will re-emphasise the sub-questions defined in Chapter 1 and discuss 
them. 
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Sub-question 1: How should power be re-interpreted to better explain relations between 
actors in the context of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics? 
 
Hypothesis 1: Power has central importance in understanding hydropolitical relations 
between actors. It strongly influences the outcome in hydropolitical relations between actors. 
It also shapes conflictual and cooperative relations between actors. However, the following 
key elements must be taken into account to provide a comprehensive account of the role of 
power in inter-state and transnational hydropolitics: a) the relationship between scalar 
dynamics and power; b) non-material factors leading to conflictual and cooperative relations 
between actors and their linkage with power; and c) material and discursive aspects of power 
and their role in inter-state and transnational hydropolitics.   
 
This study argues that power is a key concept in understanding relations between actors in 
inter-state and transnational hydropolitics. Power strongly influences the outcomes in 
hydropolitical relations and shapes conflictual and cooperative patterns between actors. The 
evidence derived from the empirical chapters has shown that although critical conceptual 
frameworks regarding the role of power has, to some extent, explanatory power in 
understanding hydropolitical relations, they do no fully grasp different aspects of power. In 
order to cover this shortcoming in the literature, this study established a distinctive theoretical 
framework referred as “An Enhanced Analytical Framework of Power in Hydropolitics”. The 
empirical evidence derived from Chapters 6, 7 and 8 has shown that while material and 
discursive power capabilities and their role in hydropolitics are at hand, the concept power 
can be further enhanced: a) by linking scales and power, b) by linking non-material factors 
(norms, values, ideas) leading to conflictual and cooperative relations and power. Evidence 
derived from the empirical chapters corroborates links among the above stated points 
regarding power. The following sub-questions further uncover the points being made above.  
   
Sub-question 2: To what extent the interplay between power and scales serve to explain 
hydropolitical relations?   
 
Hypothesis 2: Scales refer to both spatial realms where actors are located and levels where 
they interact with one another in hydropolitics. Scales are not just given but they are socially 
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constructed. Construction of scales is subject to material and discursive power capabilities of 
actors and power configurations between each other.  
 
Given the empirical evidence derived from Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this study has shown that 
scales, which refer to both spatial realms and levels of interactions, are not given but they are 
social constructions and power strongly influences in constructions of scales. In order to 
understand the link between scales and power in hydropolitics, the study integrated the 
concept of the Power Cube, developed by John Gaventa to the existing critical conceptual 
frameworks and applied to the empirical cases. The evidence derived from the empirical 
chapters has shown that actors seek to open new spaces or to keep the closure of existing 
spaces by using material and discursive power capabilities. The empirical evidence has also 
shown that changes in power configurations may result in constructions of new spaces. 
Finally, the empirical chapters support the argument that opening or closure of spaces 
directly affects actors’ capacity to influence hydropolitics. Therefore, based on the empirical 
evidence hypothesis 2 may be corroborated.  
 
The Hypothesis 2 may be further corroborated by looking at the following sub-question 2A.   
 
Sub-question 2A: How can scales be analysed in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
and in the Ilısu dam dispute between the opponents and proponents of the project?  
 
Hypothesis 2A: Actors exert both material and discursive power tactics to construct new 
scales or keep existing scalar dynamics in the case of Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations 
and the Ilısu dam dispute. Changes in power configurations directly influence constructions 
or de-constructions of scales in both cases.  
 
The analytical chapters regarding Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations (Chapter 6 and 7) 
and the Ilısu dam dispute (Chapter 8) show that there is a direct link between scales and 
power. Moreover, they highlight socially constructed feature of scales in hydropolitics.  
 
In terms of Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, both the Turkish and Syrian governments 
use different barraging and ideational power tactics to open new claimed spaces or keep the 
existing closed spaces. In the case of the Orontes basin, the Syrian government kept inter-
governmental negotiations in the basin as a closed space for Turkey by refusing the Turkish 
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government in the decision-making processes for decades. In the case of the ET basin, while 
the Syrian government sought to claim new spaces for decision-making processes by 
including third parties, the Turkish government will keep closed spaces to exclude third 
parties other than the riparian states. Furthermore, opening or closure of spaces has decreased 
or increased bargaining power capabilities of Turkey and Syria. Finally, the basin vs. basin(s) 
debate between the riparian states of the ET basin (in this regard between Turkey and Syria) 
has provided evidence that riparian states do not necessarily agree on what transboundary 
water basin represent as a spatial scale and this disagreement may be the core of water 
conflict.  
 
In terms of the Ilısu dam dispute, while opponents seek to open new claimed spaces to 
increase their capacity to influence, proponents seek to hinder opening new claimed spaces. 
Evidence derived from Chapter 8 has also shown that changes in political opportunity 
structures directly affect opening or closure of spaces thereby influencing the outcome in 
relations between the opponents and proponents of the project.   
 
To sum up, the evidence derived from empirical chapters (Chapter 6, 7 and 8) corroborate the 
hypotheses 2A. Moreover, the findings derived from the analytical chapters also support 
theoretical assertions on the link between power and scales.  
 
Sub-question 3: How can patterns of conflict and cooperation be understood in relationships 
between actors in the context of inter-state and transnational hydropolitics?  
 
Hypothesis 3: Two factors are relevant to understand conflictual and cooperative patterns 
between actors in inter-state hydropolitics and transnational politics. One is prevailing water 
paradigms that legitimise certain set of norms, idea, rules and practices shaping conflictual 
and cooperative relations between actors. Secondly the broader socio-political context 
constructed in any given hydro-social context also shape conflictual and cooperative relations 
between actors on water issues. The latter is composed of cultural-religious values, mutually 
constructed perceived identities between actors, and domestic, regional, global political and 
security concerns.  
 
This study identifies two main factors leading to conflictual and cooperative relations 
between actors.  
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First, drawing upon the concept of prevailing water paradigms developed by Tony Allan, this 
study has shown that the prevailing water paradigms in water resources development play a 
major role in construction of conflictual and cooperative relations between actors, since 
prevailing water paradigms sanction certain norms, ideas, narratives, rules and practices in 
hydropolitics. These norms, ideas and narratives are promoted by actors and can be found in 
any given hydro-social context; they also lead to construction of competing discourses and 
inform actors’ interests.  
 
Second, other values constructed by actors in hydro-social contexts can also be identified. 
These values may include religious or cultural considerations linked with a particular water 
resource, perceived identities between actors mutually constructed within a historical context, 
direct issues linkages between water and non-water issues and security concerns linked with 
water issues. Unlike the previous point, values may differ according to different hydro-social 
contexts and their impacts on hydropolitical relations between actors vary. Moreover, 
evidence derived from empirical cases show that values can change over time. This study 
labels this factor as broader political context. The study has argued that elements of broader 
socio-political context are interpreted and re-interpreted by actors and shape conflictual and 
cooperative patterns. Empirical evidence derived from Chapters 6,7 and 8 corroborates the 
argument that conflictual and cooperative relations between actors can be analysed by 
looking at values and norms constructed in a particular context. Hypothesis 3 may be further 
corroborated by looking at the following sub-questions 3A and 3B.  
 
Sub-question 3A: How can patterns of conflict and cooperation be understood between the 
Turkish and Syrian governments in relation to transboundary water issues in different eras?  
 
Hypothesis 3A: Conflictual and cooperative patterns in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations at different time periods can be understood by looking at prevailing water paradigms 
that sanction certain norms, ideas, narratives and practices (sanctioned discourses), and 
changes in broader socio-political contexts in bilateral relations.  
 
Sub-question 3B: How can predominantly conflictual relations be understood between the 
opponents and proponents of the Ilısu dam project?  
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Hypothesis 3B: As in the case of Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations, conflictual 
relations between proponents and opponents of the Ilısu dam project can be understood by 
looking at sanctioned discourses that compete with each other and the broader political 
context.  
 
Regarding the sub-question 3A, this study has shown that conflictual and cooperative 
relations between Turkey and Syria can be understood by looking at two overarching factors: 
a) the prevailing water paradigms which sanction certain set of norms, ideas, practices in 
hydropolitics, and b) the broader political context.  
 
This study analyses the long-standing Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations by dividing 
them into two main eras. Each era was further sub-divided into different phases in empirical 
chapters 6 and 7. Accordingly the first era covers the period between 1923 and 1998. During 
this long period in bilateral relations, hydropolitical relations between the two riparian states 
of the ET and Orontes basin gradually worsened particularly from 1960s specifically when 
both Turkish and Syrian governments commenced hydraulic development projects on these 
two major transboundary watersheds. High conflict and low cooperation was the main pattern 
between Turkey and Syria during this period. Factors leading to conflictual relations are as 
follows.  
 
First, both Turkish and Syrian state elites considered realising hydraulic development 
projects in their water resources as important elements of their state making processes. Thus, 
hydraulic mission as a prevailing paradigm was adopted by discursive elites of two 
governments, which sanctioned extensive hydraulic development projects. As shown in 
Chapter 6, we can identify similar framings, securitization speech acts, and sanctioned 
discourses in the discursive positions of both states. A corollary outcome of promoting 
hydraulic mission as a prevailing paradigm in domestic contexts is conducting extensive 
hydraulic development projects unilaterally which has reflected in transboundary water 
relations as securitised hydropolitical relations on which patterns of high conflict and low 
cooperation can be identified.  
 
Second, the broader socio-political context in which the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations occurred resulted in conflictual hydropolitical relations. Thus, the study showed in 
Chapter 6 negative mutual identities, which have been constructed, in historical context, 
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regional and global political dynamics; direct issue linkages between water and non-water 
issues (links between the PKK issue and the ET Basin, and the Alexandretta/Hatay issue and 
the Orontes Basin) acted as main obstacles in cooperative actions. Evidence from empirical 
chapters showed that Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations provide a rich account on how 
broader socio-political context has a strong influence in creation of conflictual patterns in 
inter-state hydropolitics.  
 
While high conflict and low cooperation is the main pattern during the first era this pattern 
fundamentally changed during the period between 1998 and 2011 in the second era. During 
this period, we may observe de-securitization of water relations in bilateral relations. As 
discussed in Chapter 9, the discursive elites of both governments adopted different strategies 
to de-securitise water issues in inter-state relations. While de-securitisation as management is 
the main strategy to de-securitise water issues, this study also identifies deliberate avoidance 
of former speech acts and de-constructivist strategy –referring to re-define selves and others- 
as strategies of de-securitization.   
 
This study identifies three fundamental changes during 2000s in the Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations. First, the broader socio-political context that acted as the main 
obstacle for cooperative actions between Turkey and Syria in the previous era has been re-
interpreted by discursive elites to such an extent that provided a suitable environment for 
cooperative actions. Thus, reconstruction of mutual identities by emphasising cultural, 
religious, historical affinities between the two states and nations, strategic change in foreign 
policies of both governments and their reflection on bilateral relations, converging interests 
on regional issues resulted in re-interpretation of the broader social context.  The direct link 
between cooperative actions and the broader socio-political context on water between Turkey 
and Syria shows the importance of broader political context in construction of cooperative 
actions on water. Thus, the recent political crisis between Turkey and Syria since 2011 was 
directly reflected in the end of the cooperative relations between the two states.  
 
Second, as the holistic approach to water resource development has become a sanctioned 
discourse at the global scale, it has been also reflected in cooperative frameworks between 
the Turkish-Syrian relations in 2000s. By examining the MoUs, as the outcome of 
cooperative framework, the study has shown how holistic approach as the prevailing 
paradigm was diffused through inter-state hydropolitical relations. The study also argues the 
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holistic approach has diffused through domestic contexts of both states must be analysed to 
understand this change in the transboundary scale. Furthermore, non-state actors from the 
private sector and civil society also emerged during 2000s to foster on-going cooperative 
actions between Turkey and Syria. These actors acted as de-securitizing actors to foster 
cooperation on water although their impact remained limited.  
 
Finally, the study has also shown that power asymmetries between Turkey and Syria, which 
favour the former, are also reflected in the Turkish-Syrian cooperative relations during 2000s. 
In the light of the MoUs as outcomes of cooperative actions, while Turkey has been able to 
reflect its discursive position regarding its transboundary water politics, changes can be 
identified in the discursive position of Syrian government. This pattern can be interpreted in 
terms of Turkey’s increasing material, bargaining and discursive power capabilities in inter-
state hydropolitics at transboundary water contexts.  
 
 
Regarding the sub question 3B, the study has shown that prevailing water paradigms and 
broader political context can be considered as two main factors leading to conflictual 
relations between the pro-dam and anti-dam actors in the context of the Ilısu dam dispute.  
 
This study argued that Ilısu dam conflict must be considered within the context of on-going 
anti-dam movements in Turkey that emerged in 2000s as discussed in Chapter 8. 
Accordingly, the prevailing paradigm that sanctions extensive hydraulic development and 
privatization of water promoted by state actors and private sector has been challenged by the 
discourse of environmental and political resistance against the hydraulic development 
projects both from and within Turkey. This newly promoted counter sanctioned discourse 
promoted by the wide range of societal forces serve as construction of counter-securitising 
speech acts, framings, conduct of speech act to politicise the issue and inform actors’ 
interests, who promote the counter sanctioned discourse.  
 
Furthermore, the broader socio-political context shapes conflictual patterns in the Ilısu dam 
dispute in the following ways. First, the discursive elites due to its socio-economic and 
political importance securitise the GAP. Here, the Ilısu dam project, as the largest-scale 
hydraulic development project on the Tigris part of the GAP, is framed by the discursive 
elites as the ‘lynchpin’ of the GAP. Therefore, there is a strong political motivation to realise 
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the project, as it is an integral part of the GAP. It appears that those opposing the project seek 
to re-frame the Ilısu dam project as a threat to Kurdish identity and culture. Moreover, the 
issue of displacement also enables the anti-dam actors to recast the issue as a human rights 
problem and displacement also draws in the Kurdish issue. Therefore, the Kurdish issue 
enables the anti-dam actors to frame the issue as part of the Kurdish issue and conduct 
counter-securitization moves. Moreover, the Kurdish issue provides certain logistical 
advantages in creating a wide range of anti-dam networks and campaigns against the Ilısu 
dam. However, the broader political context also provides disadvantages to the opponents of 
the Ilısu dam due to following reasons. Here, these disadvantages and obstacles mainly stem 
from presence of the PKK and the violent conflict in the region. The broader political context 
acts as an obstacle for opponents of the project through following ways.  
 
First the violent and unresolved character of the Kurdish issue largely dominates the relations 
between state and non-state actors. Therefore, the Ilısu dam project relatively remains a low 
profile issue. Second, NGOs and political parties who oppose the project from human rights 
or other political and cultural aspects are often portrayed as being affiliated with the PKK. 
Within this context, other NGOs who oppose the project for environmental reasons or 
cultural heritage refrain from being part of this broader conflict. Therefore, they tend to avoid 
forming alliances with those actors.  
 
To sum up, the evidence derived from analytical chapters corroborates the hypotheses 3A and 
3B. Moreover, the findings also support theoretical assertions regarding factors leading to 
conflictual and cooperative relations in hydropolitics.  
 
Sub-question 4: How does power influence relations between actors in the context of inter-
state and transnational hydropolitics?  
 
Hypothesis 4: Power plays a major role in determining the outcome in hydropolitical 
relations between actors. Power also shapes conflictual and cooperative relations in inter-
state and transnational hydropolitics. In order to understand the role of power in terms of 
determining the outcome and shaping conflictual and cooperative patterns between actors, a 
more comprehensive approach is necessary which would look at different understandings and 
roles of power in inter-state and transnational hydropolitics.  
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The study improves existing understanding of power developed by critical literature in the 
following ways.  
 
Firstly, the study takes into account different aspects of power developed within the critical 
body of literature and outline aspects in a systematic manner. Accordingly, the study looks at 
following aspects of power developed within literature.  
 
a. Power capabilities of actors should be understood in terms of both potential (power 
as) and actual power (power over) capabilities. Actors adopt certain power tactics to 
transform their potential power capabilities to actual power (actualization of potential 
power as power tactics).  
 
b. Power should not only be considered in terms of absolute power capabilities of each 
actor, but relative power capabilities (power asymmetries, symmetries) shape the 
outcome in hydropolitics.  
 
c. The potential power of actors is a relational concept in hydropolitics. The power 
holder alone does not decide its power capabilities, but they become meaningful in 
relation to other actor’s mutual perception of each other’s power capabilities.  
 
d. Discursive power capabilities are as important as material power capabilities in inter-
state hydropolitics and transnational hydropolitics. In the case inter-state 
hydropolitics, while discursive power capabilities can be divided into bargaining and 
ideational power, material power capabilities can be geography (riparian position) and 
material power. In the case of transnational hydropolitics, bargaining and ideational 
powers are intact as in the case of inter-state hydropolitics; riparian position is not 
applicable to transnational hydropolitics. However, political opportunity structures in 
which actors perform have a crucial role in determining the outcome in transnational 
politics water. Therefore, it can be considered as a separate power capability.  
 
Secondly, there is a direct link between power and scales in hydropolitics. In the light of the 
power cube approach developed by John Gaventa, this study argued that actors in 
hydropolitics seek to open new claimed spaces to engage in decision-making or keep closed 
spaces not to allow certain actors in decision-making processes. In some cases new spaces are 
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constructed as a result of change in power configurations. Therefore, constructions of new 
scalar dynamics in hydropolitics are a power-laden process.  
 
Thirdly, the study questions the argument that symmetrical/asymmetrical power 
configurations between riparian states determine patterns of conflict and cooperation. The 
study argues that it would be narrow to understand patterns of conflict and cooperation in 
inter-state hydropolitics by merely looking at power configurations. As explained in 
Hypothesis 3, we need to look at how norms, ideas, values, perceived identities are 
constructed in particular hydro-social context between actors. Thus, the study identifies two 
overarching factors, prevailing water paradigms and broader political context.  
 
 
However, this study does not disregard the role of power in patterns of conflict and 
cooperation in hydropolitics. On the contrary, it was shown by this study that there are 
linkages between these two factors and power. For example, seeking to increase material and 
discursive power capabilities of nation state is one of the important aspects of hydraulic 
mission. Likewise, broader political context may shape actors’ material and bargaining power 
capabilities. Furthermore, empirical evidence from the study shows use of particular power 
tactics may exacerbate patterns of conflict in hydropolitics. Therefore regarding how power 
affects on patterns of conflict and cooperation, the study showed it would be narrow to 
understand patterns of conflict and cooperation between actors in hydropolitics. In other 
words, the argument that power symmetries and asymmetries determine patterns of conflict 
and cooperation can be partially justified based on empirical evidence provided in this study.  
 
 
Finally, the study confirms that power strongly shapes the outcome (who gets what) in 
hydropolitics and power symmetries and asymmetries are not only at work in patterns of 
conflict but also reflected in patterns of cooperation. The study also extends the utility of 
conceptual frameworks developed within critical body of literature to transnational 
hydropolitics.  
 
Regarding how power strongly shapes the outcome in inter-state and transnational 
hydropolitics, Hypothesis 4 can be further delineated by looking at sub-questions 4A and 4B.  
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Sub-question 4A: To what extent different aspects of power serve to explain Turkish-Syrian 
hydropolitical relations?  
 
Hypothesis 4A: Both Turkish and Syrian governments have bargaining and ideational 
material capabilities and exert them at different scales to achieve their goals. The study 
argues material and bargaining power capabilities of actors have changed over time. These 
changes in power capabilities of actors have played a vital role in determining the outcome in 
hydropolitical relations as well as conflictual and cooperative relations between actors.  
 
Sub-question 4B: To what extent different aspects of power serve to explain hydropolitical 
relations between the opponents and proponents of the llısu dam project?   
 
Hypothesis 4B: Multi-dimensional power analysis (understanding material, bargaining and 
ideational power capabilities of actors in hydropolitics) made for understanding the Turkish-
Syrian hydropolitical relations in transboundary water issues is also applicable to relations 
between opponents and proponents of the project. Both proponents and opponents adopt 
different power capabilities including material, bargaining and ideational power tactics. 
Although opponents lack material power capabilities in comparison with proponents of the 
project they are able to use discursive (bargaining and ideational) power to achieve their 
goals.  
 
Regarding the Sub-question 4A, this study applies Lukes’s multi-dimensional approach of 
power by drawing upon the critical body of the literature in transboundary water contexts. 
The power analysis regarding the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations provides important 
theoretical insights, as they are located as riparian states in two major water resources in the 
MENA region, the ET and Orontes basins.  
 
If we apply different dimensions of power (riparian position, material power, bargaining 
power and ideational power) to the Orontes issue, it appears that the Syrian government as 
mid-stream riparian states of the Orontes basin has been able to impose its status quo in the 
Orontes basin. Thus, the Syrian government was also able to codify its supremacy in the 
Orontes basin by signing a bilateral agreement with Lebanon. This agreement signed in 1994, 
allocated the lion’s share of the Orontes water to the Syrian government. Moreover, extensive 
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hydraulic development projects developed by the Syrian government also enabled Syria to 
have control over the basin.  
 
Here, it is worth noting that Syria was able to achieve this status quo by defying Turkey, 
although we can identify Turkey’s supremacy in terms of material power capabilities. It was 
shown in Chapter 6 that the Syrian government has not even considered Turkey as a riparian 
state of the Orontes basin for decades due to the territorial dispute over Hatay (Alexandretta) 
province. In other words, official inter-state negotiations over the Orontes basin have 
remained a closed space for Turkey due to persistent refusal of the Syrian government to 
negotiate the issue with Turkish government.  
 
If we apply different dimensions of power to the ET basin, the picture is completely diverse. 
Turkey is located on the pivotal waters of the ET basin and has supreme riparian position in 
the basin. Moreover, massive scale hydraulic development projects conducted in the basin 
afford the Turkish government physical control and bargaining power in hydropolitics. 
Moreover, Turkey is also a powerful riparian state in terms of material power capabilities 
including economic capacity, technical expertise and military power. The study has shown 
economic performance of riparian states over time has directly affected hydraulic 
development projects conducted in the ET basin, since both Turkey and Syrian have 
conducted large-scale hydraulic development projects requiring huge sums of financial 
resources. Military might has never been used by either of the riparian state nor has either 
state threatened each other with use of force, although there have been tense relations 
between the two states particularly during 1980s and 1990s. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that military strength does not have any influence in bilateral hydropolitical 
relations.  
 
Here, the fact is that Turkey has enough military capacity to deter Syria from using its 
military to achieve its goals or coercing the former with possible use of military might. This 
constructed perception resulted in absence of any bellicose discourses such as military threats 
by Syria in spite of highly tense bilateral conflictual relations on water. Thus power is a 
relational concept as pointed out in previous sub-question in the third point. Therefore, a 
clear power asymmetry between Turkey and Syria can be identified in terms of material 
power capabilities and riparian position, which favours Turkey. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that Syria, as the downstream riparian states in the ET basin, is entirely 
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powerless. It was shown in Chapter 6 that the Syrian government used different material and 
bargaining power tactics to counter Turkey’s extensive hydraulic development projects in the 
ET basin. These power tactics include establishing a common downstream position, using 
PKK as leverage, targeting international creditors to cut money flow, portraying Turkey’s 
hydraulic development projects as an act of regional domination (perceiving hydraulic 
infrastructure as a weapon) and so on. Moreover, empirical evidence has shown while Syrian 
government sought to open new claimed spaces in decision-making in inter-state 
hydropolitical relations, the Turkish government kept closed spaces as they are in the context 
of the ET basin.  
 
In terms of ideational power capabilities, empirical evidence has shown both Turkish and 
Syrian governments were able to establish their sanctioned discourses at their 
domestic/national scales due to lack of societal forces claiming otherwise. These sanctioned 
discourses promoted domestically served construction of ideational power tactics including 
securitization acts, framings and their discursive positions in transboundary water policies. 
Here, it has been shown in Chapter 6 that although both Turkish and Syrian governments 
sought to impose their discursive positions in inter-state hydropolitical relations, but they 
have not been able to achieve this goal.  
 
Finally, the study has shown that power configurations have changed over time. Turkey’s 
material, bargaining and ideational power capabilities have significantly increased in relation 
to Syria. Here, the study also showed that change in broader political contexts could be 
considered as a factor in Turkey’s bargaining power capabilities vis-à-vis Syria (See Section 
7.5.3). This shift in power configurations is also reflected in cooperative framework between 
Turkey and Syria, which was realised during political rapprochement.  
 
Regarding sub-question 4B, this study showed that there is clear power asymmetry between 
the proponents and opponents of the Ilısu dam project in terms of material, bargaining and 
ideational power capabilities. However, this does not necessarily mean that opponents of the 
project are entirely powerless. The study showed there are three strategies adopted by 
opponents and material, bargaining and ideational power tactics to achieve those strategies 
(See Section 8.4.1). The strategies of the opponents are: 
 
i. Strategy 1 – offering counter-factuals (politicizing the issue): 
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ii. Strategy 2 – delaying or possibly cancelling the project  
iii. Strategy 3 – promoting an alternative (or alternative discourse): 
 
The study showed that while material and bargaining power tactics are mainly used to 
achieve the first two strategies, anti-dam actors to achieve the third strategy use ideational 
power tactics. In terms of material power capabilities of anti-dam actors mobilizing funding, 
organising non-violent actions such as demonstrations, press statements, protests and so on 
can be considered sources of material power capabilities. Although material power 
capabilities of anti-dam actors are far more limited than pro-dam actors, organising such 
events does not require large amount of money to finance these activities. Opponents of the 
Ilısu dam have also used a wide range of bargaining power tactics, particularly to achieve the 
first two strategies. The bargaining power tactics include lobbying or pressurising targeted 
groups, using legal instruments, drawing public attention and support via using media 
sources, coalition building, mobilizing more powerful actors, empowering relatively weaker 
actors (See 8.4.4). In terms of ideational power tactics, opponents of the Ilısu dam have used 
counter-securitization speech acts, framings, providing alternatives views, narratives and 
refuting the sanctioned discourse promoted by pro-dam actors. The ideational power tactics 
mainly seek to achieve the third strategy to offer an alternative discourse. As pointed out in 
sub-question 2B, ecological and political resistance to hydraulic projects as a prevailing 
paradigm has served to sanctioned ideational power tactics. Furthermore, opponents of the 
Ilısu dam projects were excluded spaces for decision-making processes. Yet, they sought to 
open new claimed spaces by using different power tactics to increase their capacity to 
influence.  
 
Finally, although the opponents of the Ilısu dam project lack riparian position as power 
capability, they have used opportunity structures both in domestic and international scales to 
increase their capacity to influence in hydropolitics. This study has argued that political 
opportunity structures enabled the opponents to create opposition movements. Moreover, the 
study also showed particular changes in political opportunities in the course of conflict 
directly affected anti-dam actors’ power capabilities. Due to the importance of political 
opportunity structure, this study considered it a separate power capability in the context of the 
transnational hydropolitics.   
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To sum up, the evidence derived from analytical chapters of the study corroborates the 
hypotheses 4A and 4B. Moreover, the findings derived from the empirical chapters also 
support theoretical assertions on understanding power and its role in hydropolitics.  
 
10.3. Analytical Gaps and Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
Directions 
 
10.3.1. Actors Focus Analysis  
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the study adopted ‘actors focus’ in analysing Turkey’s hydropolitical 
relations.  
 
In terms of inter-state hydropolitics, this study focussed on the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical 
relations in the long time span. Among other reasons, the multi-layered focus is the primary 
reasons why the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations were selected as an empirical case. 
Moreover, given the variety of transboundary water resources that Turkey is part of, there are 
other riparian states including Iraq, Iran, Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia and Armenia located in 
those transboundary water resources.42 It would be beyond the scope and time of this study to 
analyse Turkey’s hydropolitical relations with these riparian states. Nevertheless, since the 
ET basin constitutes the main spatial realm of this study, similar hydropolitical analysis can 
be carried out to look at water relations between Turkey and Iraq and Iraq and Syria thereby 
extend the analysis done in this study on inter-state hydropolitics. Furthermore, since several 
tributaries of the Tigris originate from Iran and the Iranian government has been developing 
several hydraulic projects on these tributaries, the involvement of Iran as a riparian state in 
inter-state hydropolitics of the ET basin and its relations with the other riparian states appear 
to be a promising research direction.  
 
In terms of transnational hydropolitics, the study focussed on the Ilısu dam conflict. One can 
safely argue that the Ilısu dam conflict between the anti-dam and pro-dam actors is the most 
important empirical case in the context of Turkey. The conflict on the construction of Ilısu 
dam provides a rich empirical case study in analysing complexity of actor mapping and 
scales; understanding factors of conflictual relations between different actors and analysing 
                                                        
42 The reasons why the empirical case of Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations was selected by study has been 
outlined in detail in Section 1.4.2.  
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how power operates in transnational hydropolitics. Moreover, the conflict on construction of 
the Ilısu dam has become one of the most well known examples regarding the anti-dam 
activism across the world waged by transnational anti-dam movements against large-scale 
hydraulic projects.  
 
This study has mainly focussed on sub-national (domestic) and transnational scales. Yet, as 
pointed out in Chapter 8, one of the tactics used by opponents of Ilısu dam is to raise 
awareness on possible adverse transboundary impacts of the project in Iraq and Syria as the 
downstream riparian states. The study also highlighted the growing involvement of civil 
society groups located within Iraq and interactions with their counterparts in Turkey. 
Therefore, further research is necessary to uncover these newly developed dynamics. 
Uncovering the perceptions of actors, including the central government of Iraq, Iraqi 
Kurdistan Regional government, civil society groups that are active within Iraq and their 
relations with actors involved in the Ilısu dam dispute would also help bridge inter-state and 
transnational hydropolitics in the context of the ET basin.  
 
10.3.2. Scalar Focus in Hydropolitical Analysis  
One of the distinctive features of this study is that it does not only look at inter-state 
hydropolitics, but also introduces the dimension of the transnational hydropolitics and 
analyses conflictual patterns and power dynamics in the context of the Ilısu dam. Having 
such a research approach necessarily requires looking at the Turkish domestic context in 
which state and non-state actors interact with one another.  
However, in spite of the multidimensional focus that the research adopted, we can identify 
further avenues for future research. Several empirical case studies can be identified in the 
context of sub-national hydropolitics within Turkey. As pointed out in Chapter 8, the case of 
Ilısu dam must be understood as the pioneer and prominent case study of on-going anti-dam 
activist movements particularly against private-led small-scale HPPs. Therefore, 
understanding local and national dynamics in terms of conflict-cooperation patterns and 
power can be considered as a promising area of research. For instance, anti-dam activism 
against the cascades of small scale HPPs in Munzur Valley, located in one of the tributaries 
of the Euphrates River in Turkey, provides a rich empirical case study in understanding sub-
national hydropolitics. Other empirical cases can also be identified where nation-wide activist 
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groups ally with local population and establish opposition movements against construction of 
certain hydraulic projects.  
10.3.3. Dynamic Feature of the Empirical Cases  
 
 
Both Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations and the Ilısu dam dispute are dynamic case 
studies where significant changes can be identified at different time periods.  
 
When I started my PhD project in 2010, cooperation on water issues was the main pattern in 
Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations and understanding change from highly conflictual 
water relations before 2000s to on-going cooperative relations during 2000s was one of the 
main research inquiries. However, this has changed as political crisis erupted between two 
governments due to uprising in Syria in 2011. The relations in various fields gradually 
worsened which were also reflected in the case of water. This study has briefly analysed the 
preliminary reflections of on-going political crisis in hydropolitical relations between Turkey 
and Syria. As these crises have already confirmed the determinant impact of broader political 
context in the Turkish-Syrian relations, it appears that future trajectory of relations depends 
on the outcome of on-going uprising in Syria and possible government changes in Turkey 
after the general election which is proposed to be held in 2015. Therefore, further research is 
essential to follow the trajectory of hydropolitical relations between Turkey and Syria in the 
context of changing broader political context.  
 
Furthermore, since large-scale dams on the Tigris part of the GAP such as the Ilısu dam, 
Silvan Dam, Cizre Dam are either under construction or in the planning phase, water is more 
likely to be key issue in political agenda in the Turkish-Iraqi relations. It is worth noting that 
while there are two inter-related bilateral deals between Turkey and Syria and Syria and Iraq 
regarding temporary water entitlement for each riparian state from the Euphrates River, such 
status quo does not exist in the case of the Tigris. Therefore, future research projects should 
not only apply critical conceptual frameworks to the Turkish-Iraqi relations in the course of 
time, they also must assess recent developments in hydropolitical relations.  
 
The dynamism of empirical case studies discussed in this study is even more visible in the 
context of the Ilısu dam conflict. As analysed in Chapter 8, decisions made by actors such as 
ECAs, TNCs, the Turkish government and judicial authorities resulted in significant changes 
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in the trajectory of the dispute. Although the project is currently under construction and 55% 
construction work has already been completed, opponents of the project still seek ways to 
hinder the project. For instance one of the interviewees of this research from environmentally 
driven NGO made it clear that oppositions against the dams in Turkey will continue even if 
Ilısu dam is completed. It appears that dams will continue to occupy political agenda in the 
domestic politics of Turkey. They have even become one of the components of general 
opposition against the AK Party. For example, in the recent Taksim Gezi Park protest, which 
is considered to be as one of the most significant political events in the recent political history 
of Turkey, one of the demands made by the opposition movements was to cancel all HPPs 
that are under construction or plan phase across Turkey. The Gezi Park protests, which 
started as environmental protest and turned into general revolt against the AK Party 
government, show that environmental issues, in this respect the dam politics, will continue to 
occupy the political agenda in Turkey.  
 
10.4. Main Contributions of the Study  
 
By way of conclusion, the main contributions of this study can be summarised as follows.  
 
The main contributions of this study are related with empirical context. As stated above this 
study seeks to understand Turkey’s hydropolitical relations with states and non-state actors 
and primarily looks at hydropolitics of the ET basin, which is the second largest 
transboundary watershed in the MENA region. In spite of the importance of the ET basin, the 
applications of conceptual frameworks that critically assess patterns of conflict and 
cooperation and power relations between riparian states in transboundary water basins have 
largely remained limited. This study covers this gap by applying critical body of literature to 
two empirical cases studies; The Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations and the Ilısu dam 
conflict between the opponents and proponents of the project. In doing so, the study makes 
the following empirical contributions.   
 
First, the study showed how certain norms and ideas are constructed and promoted in national 
and transnational scales. These norms and ideas play an important role in patterns of conflict 
and cooperation as they inform actors’ interests. Second, this study not only contends that 
hydropolitical relations should be analysed by considering broader political context, but it 
also uncovers this within the context of the empirical case studies. In doing so, the study 
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shows how broader political context affects on patterns of conflict and cooperation in 
different time period in different layers of hydropolitics of the ET basin. Third, the study 
analyses power relations between actors and how actors’ material and discursive power 
capabilities shape the outcome in hydropolitics. It argues that even though we may observe 
asymmetrical power relations in both empirical case studies, so called weaker parties are not 
entirely powerless and exert variety of material and discursive power tactics to pursue their 
goals. Fourth, there is a notable change in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations from 
patterns of high conflict-low cooperation to low conflict-high cooperation in two different 
eras. The study explains this notable change in bilateral relations with respect to water issues. 
It was argued that changes in broader political context and prevailing paradigms resulted in 
notable change in the Turkish-Syrian hydropolitical relations. However, the study also argued 
that changes in power configurations were also reflected in cooperative framework and 
shaped hydropolitical cooperation. Finally, the recent conflict over the construction of Ilısu 
dam has become one of the prominent case studies where domestic and international actors 
establish transnational activist networks to hinder large-scale dams. Yet, relatively fewer 
studies addressed this dimension in the ET basin from a hydropolitical point of view. This 
study sought to cover this empirical gap in literature by taking the recent conflict between the 
opponents and proponents of the Ilısu dam as a case study.  In doing so, the study provided 
recent developments regarding the hydropolitics of the ET basin in terms of growing 
transnational anti-dam activism as well as inter-state relations between riparian states.  
 
Apart from the empirical contribution made by the study, it establishes a theoretical 
framework and further extends the conceptual frameworks that critically look at relations 
between riparian states in transboundary water contexts in terms of power, conflict and 
cooperation dynamics to transnational hydropolitics. The theoretical framework enhances the 
critical body of literature in the following ways. First, the study problematizes the issue of 
scale in hydropolitics in detail and shows the link between scales and power; thereby it 
enriches current understanding of power. Second, the study questions one of the core 
arguments of existing literature; that power symmetries and asymmetries not only explain the 
outcome of relations (who gets what) between different actors, but also determine patterns of 
conflict and cooperation. While the study does concur the role of power in understanding 
patterns of conflict and cooperation, it asserts that norms, values, ideas, identities must be 
taken into consideration as they inform actors’ interests. The study introduces the prevailing 
water paradigms and broader political context as two overarching factors to uncover this 
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dimension and elaborates this in analytical chapters.  Finally, the study concurs the utility of 
critical body of literature, which assesses material and discursive power capabilities of 
riparian states in understanding the outcome in hydropolitics. However, the study extends the 
utility of critical body of literature on power to the layer of transnational hydropolitics 
thereby enriching existing understanding of power in hydropolitics and its application to 
different dimensions of power.  
 
 
Finally, these empirical and theoretical contributions of the study provide insights to policy 
communities. The study showed importance of scalar analysis in understanding different 
layers of hydropolitics. In understanding inter-state hydropolitical relations in transboundary 
water context, the study showed that socio-economic and political considerations, prevalence 
of certain sets of norms, ideas and discourses and relationships between those factors and 
water must be understood as national scales. The study showed that understanding those 
dynamics in national scales is vital for understanding inter-state hydropolitical relations 
regarding transboundary water issues between riparian states. Therefore, in-depth analysis is 
necessary, which not only should include transboundary scale but also national scale, to 
address patterns of conflict and foster cooperation in inter-state hydropolitical relations 
regarding transboundary water context. Furthermore, scalar analysis to understand different 
layers of hydropolitics also shows that there are patterns of conflict in other layers of 
hydropolitics as well as in the layer of inter-state hydropolitics. Therefore, policy 
recommendations should also target to address those water related issues occurring at 
different scales as well as fostering cooperation and collaboration between riparian states in 
the ET basin. Furthermore, as it was analysed in detail in the context of empirical case studies 
of this thesis, understanding broader political context is also important to understand patterns 
of conflict and cooperation in hydropolitics of the ET basin. Therefore, policies to foster 
cooperation in different layers of hydropolitics should take into consideration the dynamics 
that are product of broader political context. Finally, the study showed that constructions of 
patterns of conflict, patterns of cooperation and scales are power-laden processes. Therefore, 
power symmetries and asymmetries between different actors must be taken into consideration 
to address water related issues to foster cooperation among actors in the context of different 
layers of hydropolitics.  
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ANNEX 1: TREATIES AND PROTOCOLS  
 
LAUSANNE TREATY Article 109 regarding Water states:  
 
In default of any provisions to the contrary, when as the result of the fixing of a new frontier the 
hydraulic system (canalisation, inundation, irrigation, drainage or similar matters) in a State is 
dependent on works executed within the territory of another State, or when use is made on the 
territory of a State, in virtue of pre-war usage, of water or hydraulic power, the source of which is on 
the territory of another State, an agreement shall be made between the States concerned to safeguard 
the interests and rights acquired by each of them. Failing an agreement, the matter shall be regulated 
by arbitration. 
 
ANKARA TREATY 1921 Article 12 (Turkey and France)  
 
“The Kuveyk stream will be distributed between the city of Aleppo and the region remained under 
Turkish control in such a way to distribute equitable satisfaction to the both parties. It would also be 
possible to get water from the Euphrates in order to meet the water needs of the city of Aleppo, as the 
costs are paid” 
 
1987 PROTOCOL ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC –Articles 
6,7,8,9 and 10 Regarding Water  
Water 
6. During the filling up period of the Ataturk Dam reservoir and until the final allocation of the waters 
of Euphrates among the three riparian countries, the Turkish Side under- takes to release a yearly 
average of more than 500 MVSec. at the Turkish-Syrian border and in cases where the monthly flow 
falls below the level of 500 M ' / S e c , the Turkish Side agrees to make up the difference during the 
following month. 
7. The two Sides shall work together with the Iraqi Side to allocate the waters of the rivers Euphrates 
and Tigris in the shortest possible time. 
8. The two Sides agreed to expedite the work of the Joint Technical Committee on Regional Waters. 
9. The two Parties agreed in principle to construct and operate jointly projects in the lands of both 
countries on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for irrigation and power generation provided that the 
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technical and economic feasibility studies of these projects are carried out in cooperation by the 
experts of the two countries. 
10. The Turkish Side explained the details of the "Peace Pipe Line" planned to carry a portion of the 
waters of the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers in Turkey, through Syria by two pipe-lines, one going to 
countries of the Gulf and the other to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia to supply water for household purposes and limited irrigation for the region. 
The Syrian Side agreed in principle to the project and showed interest provided that the Turkish Side 
carries out its technical and economic feasibility study by an international consultancy firm. 
The Syrian Side undertakes to facilitate the feasibility studies pertaining to the Syrian portion of the 
project. 
In case of its positive conclusion, the Syrian Side will enter into negotiations for the final realization 
of the project. 
 
ANNEX 2:  HATAY (ALEXENDRETTA) TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 
BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA   
 
 
The territorial dispute over Hatay province can be considered as a product of the post 1st World War 
status quo. The Turkish liberation movement led by Ataturk upon the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 
the 1st World War was overwhelmingly successful to restore territories established in the National 
pact . 43  However, some of the territories that were envisioned within the new Turkish state had either 
not been able to be restored or remained unsolved at the end of the Turkish liberation war in 1923. 
The future of the Alexandretta province is one of those unsolved issues. According to bilateral 
agreement between Turkey and France, the Sanjak (province) of Alexendretta is left to French 
Mandatory Authorities on the condition that Turks living in the province will have right to develop 
their culture and language and Turkish will be recognised as an official language in the province 
(Ankara Treaty in ÖZTÜRK 1993:125). France and the Syrian national bloc signed an agreement to 
hand over the administration from the mandatory authorities to Syrians in 1936 leaving the status of 
                                                        
43The national Pact (Misak-Milli in Turkish) is decision made by the last Ottoman Parliament in 28th of January 
1920. It sets out the aims of the ongoing Turkish liberation movement in Anatolia. The pact also envisages the 
territories in which the prospected state will be established. The pact considers the Mondros Truce (30 OCT 
1918) signed between the allied forces and the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 1st Word War as a reference. 
Accordingly, the pact states, “When the Mondros Truce was signed in 30th of October 1920, the occupied 
territories where Arab population is majority, the border is determined by free plebiscites. In the same date, 
those territories which are not under occupation of the allied forces and where the Turkish and Muslim is 
majority are integral part of future Turkish State”.  (Doğanay 2001: 284)  
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the province unsolved. The Turkish government intensified its diplomatic efforts over France as well 
as supporting the Turks in the Sanjak of Alexendretta. Turkey claimed that like in Syria, an 
independent state must also be established in the Alexandretta province.  
 
Meanwhile backed by Ankara, Turkish nationalists living in the region intensified their activities in 
the province, organising committees against the French Mandatory Authorities in order to resolve the 
issue in Turkey’s favour. They imported new revolutionary symbols of Turkey such a the Turkish 
national anthem, the new brimmed hat replaced by Ottoman Fez, which is considered to be a symbol 
of Turkey’s new secular/Western identity and the new Turkish alphabet based on Latin Character. 
The Halkevi (people’s house), which were installed all around Anatolia during 1920s under the new 
regime, was also established in Antioch as a gathering point of Turkish nationalists. They even 
converted name of the province as Hatay that refers to Homeland of the Hitit civilisation. 44  
According to this argument, as Hatay is the homeland of Hitites, the Alewites are portrayed as 
Alewite Turks (Watenpaugh 1996:3172) Creating conscience among the Turkish speaking population 
in the region is important, since the idea of belonging to one single ethnic identity is simply a new 
phenomenon in the region. Therefore, they published a daily newspaper called Yenigün (new day in 
Turkish) to raise the conscience among the Turkish speaking community and gain hearts and minds of 
the other communities. In her book regarding the Alexandretta Dispute, Fezzes in the River, Shields 
shows how the Turkish campaign was well organized and effective in comparison with the activities 
of the Arab nationalists in the province (Shields 2011).  
 
Nevertheless, the Arab nationalists who sought the resolve the issue in favour of Syria confronted 
those campaigns waged by the Turkish nationalists. In this regard, Zeki al Arsuzi, a Syrian Alewite 
schoolteacher who studied philosophy in the Sorbonne University, was the leading figure of the 
counter-campaign led by the Arab nationalists in the province. As a high school teacher and highly 
influenced by the idea of nationalism during his education in Sorbonne University, Al-Arsuzi tried to 
mobilise the idea of Arab nationalism in the province. He describes his notion of Arab nationalism as 
follows “We are Arabs in the first instance, not Christians or Moslems. Let us from now on declare 
nothing but our Arab nationality.” (Arsuzi-Elamir 2003:318).  
 
 
He presided the Antioch branch of the League of National Action (Usbat al-Amal al-Qawmi), which 
is an organisation to promote Arab Unity across Syria. While the centre of the organisation was in 
Damascus, the struggle took place in Alexandretta (Arsuzi-Elamir 2003:317,323). As a response to 
activities of the Turkish nationalists they encourage people to register as Arabs to prove the existence 
                                                        
44
 According to this view, Hitits were considered as the early Turkey settled in Anatolia.  
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of Arab identity in the province; they wore Sedera, the Arab national covering as a reaction to 
brimmed hat promoted by the Turkish nationalists in the Alexandretta region. Arsuzi and his 
supporters also promoted the idea of single identity based on Arab nationalism. Therefore, to raise the 
conscience of Arab nationalism among the people in the region, they published a newspaper called al-
Uruba (Arabism in Arabic) (Arsuzi-Elamir 2003, Shields 2011).  
 
 
The conflict between the Turkish nationalists and Arab nationalists even resulted in violent 
confrontations between these two groups at times during late 1930s (Shields 2011) . The dispute over 
the Sanjak of Alexendretta ended up with the independence of the province in 1938 and thereafter its 
annexation by Turkey in 1939. However, the resolution of the dispute outraged the public opinion 
across Syria. During the Alexandretta crisis numerous demonstrations were organised to support the 
Arab nationalists in the province. As it became clear that the province would not be part of Syria, 
public anger increased against three targets. First, the French government was accused of betraying its 
promises regarding the province to be part of Syria. Second, the Turkish government was accused of 
‘’ behaving like Europeans trying to colonize the others”. Finally, protestors condemned their own 
government for being powerless and relying too much on France (Shields 2011:79).  
 
After the annexation of the province Arsuzi fled to Damascus and continued his political activities in 
Damascus with his disciples.  He became one of the founding figures of the Ba’th Movement along 
with Michel Aflaq and Salah ad-Din Bitar. He particularly played an important role in attracting 
Alawi youth to join the movement (Hinnebusch 2001:30). As he was one the supporters of the 
Arsuzi’s disciples of the Ba’th movement and al-Arsuzi, Hafiz al Asad, described al-Arsuzi as ‘’one 
of the greatest Syrians of his day and the first to conceive of the Baath as a political movement’’ 
(Seale 1995:27) .  
 
The Syrian decision-makers that have come to power since have never recognized the resolution of 
the conflict. In the official sources the province is depicted as ‘’stolen territory’’ and it is illustrated 
within Syrian territory. The date 29th of November is commemorated as ‘Occupied Alexandretta’ in 
demonstrations in Syria. On the contrary, the historical episode with regard to Hatay province is 
presented as ‘’re-joining of Hatay to the Motherland’’ in the Turkish historical narrative. The Hatay 
dispute jeopardized the Turkish-Syrian political relations, due to continues statements made by Syrian 
official and responses of their Turkish counterparts in the initial phases of political interactions 
between the parties (Sanjian 1956:386, Soysal 1998:102). The maps illustrated below show the 
existing national boundaries and location of the Hatay province (the first map) and how the province 
is illustrated within Syria in the Syrian sources (the second map).  
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Map 11 The official map of Turkey and location of the Hatay province 
 
Source: http://www.forumdas.net/konu/hatay-hangi-bolgede.62232/ 
 
 
 
Map 12 The map of Syria including Hatay province 
 
Source: Ministry of Tourism online at:  
http://syrian-friendship-association.org/Map_of_Syria/Map_of_Syria.html  
 
 
In sum, territorial dispute over Alexandretta has a profound impact mutually constructed identities in 
Turkish-Syrian relations. During 1940s and 1950s, it formed the main obstacle for cooperative 
relations between the parties. More importantly, it has a direct effect on transboundary water relations 
with respect to the Orontes basin, given the fact that the mainstream Orontes River enters Turkey in 
Hatay province and empties its water to Mediterranean Sea. The case also supports the view that what 
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constitutes as a transboundary/international watershed is subject to mutual understanding of the 
parties. Therefore, in some cases these very conflicting views may be the main obstacle on 
cooperation in hydropolitics.  
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ANNEX 3 INFORMATION ABOUT INTERVIEWS  
 
INTERVIEWEE 
CODE 
 
 
 
AFFILIATION PLACE YEAR TYPE OF 
COMMUNUCATION 
Interviewee 1  
 
High ranking official from the DSI  Stockholm  2011 Personal  
Interviewee 1  
 
High ranking official from the DSI Ankara  2011 Personal  
Interviewee 1  
 
High ranking official from the DSI Ankara  2011 Personal  
Interviewee 1  
 
High ranking official from the DSI  ----------- 2012 Online  
Interviewee 1  
 
High ranking official from the DSI Ankara  2013 Personal  
Interviewee 2  High ranking official from the DSI (Retired) 
 
 
Ankara  2011 Personal  
Interviewee 2 High ranking official from the DSI (Retired) 
 
  
Ankara  2013 Personal  
Interviewee 3  
 
High ranking official from the DSI  Ankara  2011  Personal  
Interviewee 4 Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
in Transboundary Waters Division  
 
Ankara  2011 Personal  
416 
 
Interviewee 5 Official from Southeastern Anatolian Project 
Regional Development Administration 
Şanlıurfa Directorate  
 
   
 
Şanlıurfa  2011 Personal  
 
 
Interviewee 6 
 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Diplomat specialised in Transboundary Water 
Issues 
 
 
Ankara  
 
 
2011 
 
 
Personal  
Intervıewee 7 High ranking Official from Ministry of EU 
Affairs the Directorate of Sectoral Policies  
 
 
Ankara  2011 Personal  
Interviewee 8 Former Head of Southeastern Anatolian Project 
Regional Development Administration 
Şanlıurfa Directorate and Academic in Water 
Engineering  
 
 
Şanlıurfa 2011 Personal  
Interviewee 9  Former High ranking official from the DSI and 
researcher in hydropolitics  
 
Ankara  2011 Personal 
Interviewee 10  Activist from Nature Association responsible 
for the Hasankeyf Campaign  
 
 
Ankara  2011 Personal  
Interviewee 10  Activist from Nature Association responsible 
for the Hasankeyf Campaign  
 
 
Ankara  2013 Personal  
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Interviewee 11 
 
 
 
 
 
Activist from the Munzur Conservation 
Association  
 
 
 
 
 
Istanbul  
 
 
 
2011 
 
 
 
Personal  
Interviewee 11 Activist from the Munzur Conservation 
Association  
 
 
 
Istanbul  2013 Personal  
Interviewee 12  Activist from the Save Hasankeyf Alive 
Initiative and Academic in Political ecology  
 
 
---------- 2013  Online  
Interviewee 13  Conservation officer from the WWF Turkey  
 
 
Ankara  2011 Personal  
Interviewee 14  Legal Adviser in the Kurdish Human Rights  
Project  
 
 
London  2012  Personal  
Interviewee 15  Activist from the Save Hasankeyf Alive 
Initiative  
 
 
Istanbul  2012  Personal  
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Interviewee 15  
 
Activist from the Save Hasankeyf Alive 
Initiative  
 
----------- 
 
2011 
 
Online   
     
 
 
Interviewee 16  
 
 
 
Former head of İkizdere Association  
 
 
 
 
Istanbul  
 
2011 
 
Personal  
Interviewee 17  Lawyer and Activist against small-scale HPPs in 
Turkey  
Istanbul  2011 Personal  
 
Interviewee 18  
 
Academic specialised in hydropolitics and 
transboundary water issues  
 
 
 
Istanbul  
 
2011 
 
Personal  
Interviewee 18  Academic specialised in hydropolitics and 
transboundary water issues  
 
 
 
------------- 
2011 Online  
     
Interviewee 19  Academic from Syria specialised in civil 
engineering and dam building  
 
 
Stockholm  2011 Personal  
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Interviewee 19  
 
Academic from Syria specialised in civil 
engineering and dam building  
 
 
 
Istanbul  
 
2011 
 
Personal  
Interviewee 20  Academic from Turkey specialised in 
hydropolitics and transboundary water issues 
 
 
Ankara  2011 Personal  
Interviewee 20  Academic from Turkey specialised in 
hydropolitics and transboundary water issues 
 
 
 
------------- 
2012 Online  
Interviewee 21  Academic from Turkey specialised in 
hydropolitics and transboundary water issues 
 
 
Istanbul  2012  Personal  
 
 
Interviewee 22  
 
Journalist from Turkey with the Syrian origin 
specialised in Middle East politics, particularly 
Syrian politics 
 
 
Istanbul  
 
 
2011 
 
 
Personal  
Interviewee 23  Academic from Turkey specialised in Turkish 
Water Law and the EU Law 
 
 
Ankara  2011 Personal  
